7.  f 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


GIFT  OF 


TREATISE 


BY   I.   RAY,   M.  D. 


THIRD    EDITION,    WITH   ADDITIONS. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,   BROWN  AND   COMPANY. 

1853. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1853,  by 

LITTLE,  BROWN  AND  COMPANY, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


T 


CAMBRIDGE: 

ALLEN   AND   FARNHAM,  PRINTERS. 


PREFACE 


TO    THE    FIRST    EDITION, 


FEW,  probably,  whose  attention  has  not  been  particularly 
directed  to  the  subject,  are  aware  how  far  the  condition  of 
the  law  relative  to  insanity  is  behind  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge  concerning  that  disease.  While  so  much  has 
been  done,  within  a  comparatively  short  period,  to  promote 
the  comfort  of  the  insane,  and  so  much  improvement  has 
been  effected  in  the  methods  of  treating  their  disorder,  as  to 
have  deprived  it  of  half  its  terrors,  it  is  both  a  curious  and  a 
melancholy  fact,  that  so  little  has  been  accomplished  towards 
regulating  their  personal  and  social  rights,  by  more  correct 
and  enlightened  principles  of  jurisprudence.  While  nations 
are  vying  with  one  another  in  the  excellence  of  their 
public  establishments  for  the  accommodation  of  this  unfor- 
tunate class  of  our  fellow  men,  and  physicians  are  every 
year  publishing  some  instance  of  an  unexampled  proportion 
of  cures,  we  remain  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  wisdom  of 
our  predecessors  in  every  thing  relative  to  their  legal  relations. 
This,  no  doubt,  is  mainly  the  fault  of  medical  men  them- 
selves, who  have  neglected  to  obtain  for  the  results  of  their 
researches,  that  influence  on  the  law  of  insanity,  which  they 
have  exerted  on  its  pathology  and  therapeutics.  In  general 
treatises  on  legal  medicine,  this  branch  of  it  has  always 
received  a  share  of  attention ;  but  the  space  allotted  to  it  is 
altogether  too  limited  to  admit  of  those  details  which  can 

755989 


IV  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION. 

alone  be  of  any  really  useful  service  ;  and  it  is  one  of  those 
branches  on  which  the  author  is  usually  the  least  qualified 
by  his  own  experience,  to  throw  any  additional  light.  Insan- 
ity itself  is  an  affection  so  obscure  and  perplexing,  and  the 
occasions  have  now  become  so  frequent  and  important  when 
its  legal  relations  should  be  properly  understood,  that  an 
ampler  field  of  illustration  and  discussion  is  required  for  this 
purpose,  than  is  afforded  by  a  solitary  chapter  in  works  of 
this  description. 

Notwithstanding  the  great  prevalence  of  insanity  in  Great 
Britain,  and  the  vast  amount  of  property  affected  by  legal 
regulations  and  decisions  respecting  it,  yet  the  English  lan- 
guage does  not  furnish  a  single  work  in  which  the  various 
forms  and  degrees  of  mental  derangement  are  treated  in 
reference  to  their  effect  on  the  rights  and  duties  of  man.  Dr. 
Haslam's  tract  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to 
Insanity,  (1807,)  which  was-  republished  in  this  country  in 
1819  by  Dr.  Cooper,  in  a  volume  of  tracts  by  various  Eng- 
lish writers  on  different  subjects  of  medical  jurisprudence, 
though  abounding  in  valuable  reflections,  is  altogether  too 
brief  and  general,  to  be  of  much  practical  service  as  a  book 
of  reference.  Among  a  few  other  works  more  or  less  direct- 
ly concerned  with  this  subject,  or  in  which  some  points  of  it 
are  particularly  touched  upon,  the  Inquiry  Concerning  the 
Indications  of  Insanity,  (1830,)  by  Dr.  Conolly,  late  Professor 
in  the  London  University,  is  worthy  of  especial  notice  in 
this  connection,  for  the  remarkable  ability  and  sound  judg- 
ment with  which  all  its  views  are  conceived  and  supported. 
Though  not  entirely  nor  chiefly  devoted  to  the  legal  relations 
of  the  insane,  yet  the  medico-legal  student  will  find  his 
views  of  insanity  enlarged  and  improved  by  a  careful  perusal 
of  it ;  and  every  physician  will  do  well  to  ponder  the  sug- 
gestions contained  in  the  chapter  on  the  "  Duties  of  medical 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION.  V 

men  when  consulted  concerning  the  state  of  a  patient's  mind." 
In  the  JUDGMENTS  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  (contained  in  Hag- 
gard, Phillimore  and  Addams's  Reports)  in  the  Ecclesiastical 
Courts,  which  in  their  jurisdiction  of  WILLS  have  frequent 
occasion  to  inquire  into  the  effect  of  mental  diseases  on  the 
powers  of  the  mind,  are  also  to  be  found,  not  only  some 
masterly  analyses  of  heterogeneous  and  conflicting  evidence, 
but  an  acquaintance  with  the  phenomena  of  insanity  in  its 
various  forms,  that  would  be  creditable  to  the  practical 
physician,  and  an  application  of  it  to  the  case  under  con- 
sideration, that  satisfies  the  most  cautious  with  the  correct- 
ness of  the  decision. 

In  Germany  this  branch  of  legal  medicine  has  received  a 
little  more  attention,  and  in  a  work,  entitled,  Die  Psycologie 
in  ihren  Hauptamvendungen  auf  die  Rechtspflege,  (Psychology 
in  its  chief  Applications  to  the  Administration  of  Justice,)  by 
J.  C.  Hoff bauer,  a  Doctor  of  Laws  and  Professor  in  the 
University  of  Halle,  and  published  in  1809,  we  had,  till 
quite  recently,  the  only  complete  and  methodical  treatise  on 
insanity  in  connection  with  its  legal  relations.  It  bears  the 
impress  of  a  philosophical  mind  accustomed  to  observe  the 
mental  operations  when  under  the  influence  of  disease ;  it  con- 
tains a  happy  analysis  of  some  states  of  mental  impairment ; 
its  doctrines  are  generally  correct,  and  in  many  instances  in 
advance  of  his  own,  and  even  of  our  time.  Hoffbauer,  how- 
ever, not  being  a  practical  physician,  was  less  disposed  to  con- 
sider insanity  in  its  pathological  than  in  its  psychological  rela- 
tions, and  consequently  has  attached  too  little  importance  to 
its  connection  with  physical  causes,  and  to  the  classification 
and  description  of  its  different  forms  by  means  of  which  they 
may  be  recognized,  and  distinguished  from  one  another.  It 
is  also  too  deeply  imbued  with  the  peculiar  metaphysical 
subtleties  in  which  his  countrymen  are  so  fond  of  indulging, 


VI  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION. 

to  suit  the  taste  or-  convenience  of  the  English  reader.  It 
has  been  translated  into  French  by  Dr.  Chambeyron,  with 
many  valuable  notes  by  Esquirol  and  Itard. 

In  France,  M.  Georget  has  cultivated  this  field  of  inquiry 
with  a  success  proportioned  to  his  indefatigable  zeal  and 
diligence  ;  and  his  various  writings  will  ever  be  resorted  to 
by  future  inquirers,  as  they  have  been  by  the  author  of  the 
present  work,  as  to  a  fund  of  original  and  interesting  infor- 
mation. Having  long  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  insanity, 
and  especially  to  the  observation  of  the  manners  and  charac- 
ter of  the  insane,  he  was  peculiarly  well  qualified  to  treat 
this  subject  in  a  spirit  corresponding  to  the  present  condition 
of  the  science.  His  work  entitled,  Des  Maladies  mentales 
conside're'es  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation  civile  et 
criminelle,  (1827,)  is  an  admirable  manual,  and  though  but  a 
humble  brochure,  it  yet  abounds  with  valuable  information, 
and  is  pervaded  by  sound  and  philosophical  views.  In  his 
Examen  medical  des  proces  criminels  des  nommes  Feldtman, 
L£ger,  Lecouffe,  (1825,)  and  his  Discussion  medico-leg-ale,  sur 
la  Folie,  (1826,)  as  well  as  a  sequel  to  the  last,  entitled, 
Nouvelle  discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  (1828,)  he  has 
collected  accounts  of  numerous  criminal  trials  in  which 
insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence  of  the  accused,  and  has 
taken  the  occasion  to  discuss  the  many  important  questions 
to  which  they  give  rise.  In  the  course  of  these  discussions 
there  is  scarcely  a  dark  or  disputed  point  in  the  whole  range 
of  the  subject,  which  he  has  not  examined  with  great  ability  ; 
and  if  he  has  not  always  settled  them  satisfactorily  to  the 
unprejudiced  inquirer,  he  has  at  least  afforded  him  the  means 
of  forming  more  clear  and  definite  views. 

On  becoming  aware  of  the  deficiency  in  our  medical  litera- 
ture, of  works  on  insanity  considered  exclusively  in  its  legal 
relations,  it  was  the  author's  first  thought  to  make  a  transla- 


PREFACE   TO    THE   FIRST   EDITION.  Vli 

tion,  either  of  Hoffbauer's  or  Georget's  work,  but  consider- 
ing that  the  numerous  notes  which  would  be  required  in 
order  to  bring  it  up  to  the  present  state  of  the  science,  and 
adapt  it  to  our  own  laws,  would  prove  inconvenient  and  em- 
barrassing to  the  reader,  besides  not  fully  accomplishing  the 
object,  he  was  induced  to  abandon  this  project,  and,  as  the  only 
means  of  fairly  developing  the  subject,  to  prepare  an  original 
work,  — •original  strictly  in  plan  and  in  many  of  its  general 
views  only,  —  for  the  materials  have  been  necessarily  drawn, 
in  a  great  degree,  from  other  sources  than  the  author's  own 
experience.  The  main  object  which  he  proposed  to  himself 
was,  to  establish  the  legal  relations  of  the  insane  in  conform- 
ity to  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  respecting  their 
disease.  In  furtherance  of  this  object,  he  has  given  a  suc- 
cinct description  of  the  different  species  of  insanity,  and  the 
characters  by  which  they  are  distinguished  from  one  another, 
so  that  the  professional  student  may  have  some  means  of 
recognizing  them  in  practice  ;  and  thence  deducing,  in  regard 
to  each,  such  legal  consequences  as  seem  warranted  by  an 
humane  and  enlightened  consideration  of  all  the  facts.  He 
is  well  aware  that  he  has  presented  some  views  that  will  not, 
at  first  sight,  meet  with  the  cordial  assent  of  all  his  readers. 
He  can  only  say  in  justification,  that  they  have  appeared  to 
him  to  be  founded  on  well -observed,  well-authenticated  facts, 
and  that  as  such,  it  was  an  imperative  duty  required  by  the 
claims  of  humanity  and  truth,  to  present  them  in  the  strong- 
est possible  aspect.  Before  being  condemned  for  substitut- 
ing visionary  and  speculative  fancies,  in  the  place  of  those 
maxims  and  practices  which  have  come  down  to  us  on  the 
authority  of  our  ancestors,  and  been  sanctioned  by  the  ap- 
proval of  all  succeeding  times,  he  hopes  that  the  grounds  on 
which  those  alleged  fancies  have  been  built,  will  be  carefully, 
candidly,  and  dispassionately  examined.  Of  the  manifold 


Vlll  PKEFACE   TO   THE   FIRST  EDITION. 

imperfections  of  his  work,  no  one  can  be  more  sensible  than 
the  author  himself ;  but  if  it  succeed  in  directing  attention  to 
the  subject  and  putting  others  on  the  track  of  inquiry,  it  will, 
at  the  very  least,  have  been  followed  by  one  beneficial  result. 

March  20, 1838. 


PREFACE 


TO    THE    SECOND    EDITION 


SINCE  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work, 
quite  a  number  of  contributions  possessing  various  degrees 
of  merit,  have  been  made  to  the  subject.  Among  those 
most  deserving  the  attention  of  the  professional  inquirer,  I 
would  mention  the  following :  The  Medical  Jurisprudence  of 
Insanity,  by  J.  M.  Pagan,  M.  D.,  Lecturer  on  Medical  Juris- 
prudence, Member  of  the  Faculty  of  Physicians  and  Sur- 
geons of  Glasgow,  etc.  London,  1840;  On  the  effect  of 
drunkenness  upon  criminal  responsibility,  etc.,  by  Professor 
C.  J.  A.  Mittermaier,  translated  from  the  German  into  the 
American  Jurist,  XXIII.  290;  On  the  different  forms  of 
insanity  in  relation  to  jurisprudence,  by  J.  C.  Prichard, 
M.  D.,  F.  R.  S.  London,  1842 ;  Report  of  the  trial  of  D. 
McNaughtonfor  the  murder  of  Mr.  Drummond,  by  Bousfield 
and  Merrett.  London,  1843 ;  De  la  Folie  dans  ses  rapports 
avec  les  questions  medico-judiciares,  par  M.  Marc  ;  (On  insan- 
ity considered  in  its  medico-judicial  relations,  by  M.  Marc). 
Paris,  1839.  Among  these,  the  work  of  Marc  is  preemi- 
nently valuable,  for  he  was  rarely  qualified  for  the  undertak- 
ing. During  a  long  and  brilliant  professional  career,  insanity 
in  its  manifold  relations  occupied  a  large  portion  of  his 
attention.  He  was  in  habits  of  intimacy  with  many  of 
those  physicians  who  were  devoted  to  its  study  and  treat- 
ment ;  for  twenty -five  years  he  examined  officially  the  mental 


X  PREFACE   TO   THE   SECOND   EDITION. 

condition  of  applicants  for  admission  into  the  private  estab- 
lishments of  the  insane  ;  and  in  his  quality  of  expert,  he  was 
often  commissioned  by  the  courts  to  examine,  for  judicial 
purposes,  the  mental  condition  of  individuals.  Although  not 
a  work  of  the  highest  philosophical  order,  yet  the  accuracy 
of  its  statements,  the  general  correctness  of  its  views,  and  its 
eminently  practical  character,  render  it  exceedingly  valuable 
to  the  medical  jurist.  From  these  sources  as  well  as  my 
own  personal  observations,  I  might  have  enlarged  this  edition 
with  many  striking  cases,  buf  as  I  have  quoted  cases  solely 
with  the  view  of  illustrating  general  principles,  I  have 
sought  to  multiply  them  no  farther  than  seemed  to  be  neces- 
sary for  this  purpose.  Some  additions  have  been  made 
which,  it  is  hoped,  will  increase  the  usefulness  of  the  work, 
and  some  of  the  sections  have  been  rearranged ;  but  except- 
ing these,  no  other  except  merely  verbal  changes  have  been 
introduced. 

May  1,  1844. 


PREFACE 


TO    THE    THIRD    EDITION, 


FOR  the  last  twenty  years,  no  part  of  Medical  Jurispru- 
dence has  received  so  much  attention,  in  one  way  and 
another,  as  that  which  relates  to  Insanity.  During  that 
period,  the  cases  in  which  it  has  been  discussed  in  Eng- 
lish and  American  courts,  greatly  outnumber  the  whole 
amount  of  those  which  had  been  previously  recorded.  In 
preparing  the  present  edition  of  this  work,  therefore,  it  has 
formed  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  notice  all,  or  any  consider- 
able number  of  such  cases,  but  I  have  rather  sought,  by  means 
of  some  additions  prudently  made,  to  indicate -the  progress 
of  the  science,  to  supply  important  omissions,  and  to  place 
some  views  in  a  stronger  light.  I  take  the  opportunity  to 
state,  that  an  increased  practical  acquaintance  with  the  sub- 
ject, while  it  has  occasionally  led  me  to  more  precision  and 
accuracy  of  statement,  has  not  weakened  my  belief  in  those 
doctrines  which  have  been  regarded  as  peculiar  to  this  work. 
On  the  contrary,  every  year's  experience  has  only  strength- 
ened the  conviction,  that  much  of  the  common  law  relative 
to  insanity,  whatever  other  support  it  may  have,  has  no 
foundation  in  the  facts  of  science. 

Providence,  March  1,  1853. 


CONTENTS. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS 

CHAPTER  I. 
MENTAL  DISEASE  IN  GENERAL        .        . 

CHAPTER  II. 
IDIOCY 73 

CHAPTER  HI. 
IMBECILITY 78 

CHAPTER  IV. 
LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  MENTAL  DEFICIENCY    .        .  f     .        .    101 

CHAPTER  V. 
PATHOLOGY  AND  SYMPTOMS  OF  MANIA 129 

CHAPTER  VI. 

INTELLECTUAL  MANIA 15"! 

Sec.  I.     General  Intellectual  Mania 151 

Sec.  H.  Partial  Intellectual  Mania 158 

CHAPTER  VH. 
MORAL  MANIA 166 

Sec.  I.     General  Moral  Mania 168 

Sec.  H.  Partial  Moral  Mania 189 

B 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VHI. 

LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OP  MANIA 234 

Sec.  I.    Legal  Consequences  of  Intellectual  Mania        .        .        .  235 
Sec.  II.  Legal  Consequences  of  Moral  Mania      ....     259 

CHAPTER  IX. 
DEMENTIA 291 

CHAPTER  X. 
LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DEMENTIA 299 

CHAPTER  XI. 
FEBRILE  DELIRIUM 315 

CHAPTER  XH. 
LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DELIRIUM 320 

CHAPTER  XHI. 

DURATION  AND  CURABILITY  OF  MADNESS 326 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
LUCID  INTERVALS 333 

CHAPTER  XV. 

SIMULATED  INSANITY 349 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
CONCEALED  INSANITY 380 

CHAPTER  XVH. 

EPILEPSY  AND  ITS  LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES 389 

CHAPTER  XVIH. 
SUICIDE  395 


CONTEXTS.  XV 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  SUICIDE 404 

CHAPTER  XX. 

SOMNAMBULISM 408 

CHAPTER  XXL 

LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  SOMNAMBULISM 415 

CHAPTER  XXH. 
SIMULATED  SOMNAMBULISM 418 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
EFFECT  OF  INSANITY  ON  EVIDENCE 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
DRUNKENNESS 435 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DRUNKENNESS 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 
INTERDICTION  AND  ISOLATION 


CHAPTER  XXVH. 
DUTIES  OF  MEDICAL  WITNESSES     '.  503 


MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE 


INSANITY. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS. 

STATUTES  were  framed  and  principles  of  law  laid  down, 
regulating  the  legal  relations  of  the  Insane,  long  before 
physicians  had  obtained  any  accurate  notions  respecting 
their  malady ;  and,  as  might  naturally  be  supposed,  error  and 
injustice  have  been  committed  to  an  incalculable  extent  under 
the  sacred  name  of  law.  The  actual  state  of  our  knowledge 
of  insanity,  as  well  as  of  other  diseases,  so  far  from  being 
what  it  has  always  heretofore  been,  is  the  accumulated  result 
of  the  observations  which,  with  more  or  less  accuracy  and 
fidelity,  have  been  prosecuted  through  many  centuries,  under 
the  guidance  of  a  more  or  less  inductive  philosophy.  In 
addition  to  the  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  knowledge  respect- 
ing other  diseases,  there  has  been  this  also  in  regard  to 
insanity,  that,  being  considered  as  resulting  from  a  direct 
exercise  of  Divine  power  and  not  from  the  operation  of  the 
ordinary  laws  of  nature,  arid  thus  associated  with  mysterious 
and  supernatural  phenomena  confessedly  above  our  compre- 
hension, inquiry  has  been  discouraged  at  the  very  threshold, 
by  the  fear  of  presumption,  or,  at  least,  of  fruitless  labor. 
To  this  superstition  we  may  look  as  the  parent  of  many  of 
the  false  and  absurd  notions  that  have  prevailed  relative  to 

I 


2  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

this  disease,  and  especially  of  the  reckless  and  inhuman  treat- 
ment once  universally  bestowed  on  its  unfortunate  subjects. 
Instead  of  the  kindness  and  care  so  usually  manifested  to- 
wards the  sick,  as  if  it  were  a  natural  right  for  them  to  receive 
it ;  instead  of  the  untiring  vigilance,  the  soothing  attention, 
the  lively  solicitude  of  relatives  and  friends;  the  patient, 
afflicted  with  the  severest  of  diseases,  and  most  of  all  depen- 
dent for  the  issue  of  his  fate  on  others,  received  nothing  but 
looks  of  loathing,  was  banished  from  all  that  was  ever  dear  to 
him,  and  suffered  to  remain  in  his  seclusion  uncared  for  and 
forgotten.  In  those  receptacles  where  living  beings,  bearing 
the  image  and  superscription  of  men,  were  cut  off  from  all 
the  sympathies  of  fellow  men,  and  were  rapidly  completing 
the  ruin  of  their  spiritual  nature,  there  were  scenes  of  bar- 
barity and  moral  desolation,  which  no  force  of  language  can 
adequately  describe.  The  world  owes  an  immense  debt  of 
gratitude  to  the  celebrated  Pinel  who,  with  an  ardor  of  phi- 
lanthropy that  no  discouragement  could  quench,  and  a 
courage  that  no  apprehension  of  danger  could  daunt,  suc- 
ceeded, at  last,  in  removing  the  chains  of  the  maniac,  and 
establishing  his  claims  to  all  the  liberty  and  comfort  which 
his  malady  had  left  him  capable  of  enjoying.  With  the  new 
aspect  thus  presented,  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  condition 
of  this  portion  of  our  race,  the  medical  jurisprudence  of  in- 
sanity became  invested  with  an  interest,  that  has  led  to  its 
most  important  improvements. 

§  2.  In  all  civilized  communities,  ancient  or  modern,  in- 
sanity has  been  regarded  as  exempting  from  the  punishment 
of  crime,  and  under  some  circumstances  at  least,  as  vitiating 
the  civil  acts  of  those  who  are  affected  with  it.  The  only 
difficulty,  or  diversity  of  opinion,  consists  in  determining 
who  are  really  insane,  in  the  meaning  of  the  law,  which  has 
been  content  with  merely  laying  down  some  general  princi- 
ples, and  leaving  their  application  to  the  discretion  of  the 
judicial  authorities.  Inasmuch  as  the  greatest  possible  vari- 
ety is  presented  by  the  mental  phenomena  in  a  state  of 
health,  it  is  obvious,  that  profound  study  and  extensive  ob- 
servation of  the  moral  and  intellectual  nature  of  man  can 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS. 
/ 

alone  prevent  us  from  sometimes  confounding  them  with 
the  effects  of  disease.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  an  almost 
self-evident  proposition,  that  a  certain  knowledge  of  the 
mind  in  its  healthy  state,  is  an  essential  preliminary  to  the 
attainment  of  correct  ideas  concerning  its  diseased  manifes- 
tations. If,  in  addition  to  this,  it  is  considered,  that  opinions 
on  the  nature  of  insanity,  viewed  solely  in  the  light  of  a  dis- 
ease, —  of  a  derangement  of  the  physical  structure,  —  have 
been  constantly  changing  for  the  better,  it  follows  of  course, 
that  its  legal  relations,  which  should  be  determined  in  some 
measure  by  our  views  of  its  nature,  ought  to  be  modified 
by  the  progress  of  our  knowledge.  That  much  of  the  juris- 
prudence of  insanity  in  times  past,  should  bear  marks  of 
the  crude  and  imperfect  notions  that  have  been  entertained 
of  its  pathological  character,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at ;  but, 
it  is  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  it  should  be  adhered  to,  as  if 
consecrated  by  age,  long  after  it  has  ceased  to  be  supported 
by  the  results  of  more  extensive  and  better  conducted  inqui- 
ries. It  is  to  be  feared,  that  the  principles  laid  down  on 
this  subject  by  legal  authorities,  have  been  viewed  with  too 
much  of  that  reverence  which  is  naturally  felt  for  the  opin- 
ions and  practices  of  our  ancestors ;  and  that  innovations 
have  been  too  much  regarded,  rather  as  the  offspring  of 
new-fangled  theories,  than  of  the  steady  advancement  of 
medical  science.  In  their  zeal  to  uphold  the  wisdom  of  the 
past,  from  the  fancied  desecrations  of  reformers  and  theo- 
rists, the  ministers  of  the  law  seem  to  have  forgotten  that, 
in  respect  to  this  subject,  the  real  dignity  and  respectability 
of  their  profession  is  better  upheld,  by  yielding  to  the  im- 
provements of  the  times  and  thankfully  receiving  the  truth 
from  whatever  quarter  it  may  come,  than  by  turning  away 
with  blind  obstinacy  from  every  thing  that  conflicts  with  long- 
established  maxims  and  decisions.  In  the  course  of  the 
review  proposed  to  be  taken  of  the  principles  that  have  regu- 
lated the  civil  and  criminal  responsibilities  of  the  insane,  the 
reader  will  have  constant  opportunity  to  witness  the  influ- 
ence of  the  spirit  above  condemned ;  and  be  inclined,  per- 
haps, to  consider  it  as  the  source  of  that  striking  difference, 


4  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

presented  by  the  sciences  of  law  and  medicine,  in  the  amount 
of  knowledge  they  respectively  evince  on  the  subject  of 
insanity. 

§  3.  Legislators  and  jurists  have  done  little  more,  than 
merely  to  indicate  some  of  the  most  obvious  divisions  of  in- 
sanity, without  undertaking  anything  like  a  systematic  clas- 
sification of  its  various  forms.  In  the  Roman  law,  the  in- 
sane, or  dementes,  are  divided  into  two  classes ;  those  whose 
understanding  is  weak  or  null,  mente  capti,  and  those  who 
are  restless  and  furious,  furiosi.  The  French  and  Prussian 
codes  make  use  of  the  terms  demence,fureur,  and  imbecillite, 
without  pretending  to  define  them.  The  English  common 
law  originally  recognized  but  two  kinds  of  insanity,  idiocy 
and  lunacy,  the  subjects  of  which  were  designated  by  the 
term,  non  compotes  mentis,  which  was  used  in  a  generic 
sense,  and  meant  to  embrace  all  who,  from  defect  of  under- 
standing, require  the  protection  of  the  law.  An  occasional 
attempt  has  been  made  by  jurists,  to  attach  some  definite 
ideas  to  these  terms,  and  to  point  out  the  various  descrip- 
tions of  persons,  to  whom  they  may  be  applied.  Lord  Coke 
says,  there  are  four  kinds  of  men,  who  may  be  said  to  be 
non  compotes  mentis:  —  1.  An  idiot,  who,  from  his  nativity, 
by  a  perpetual  infirmity  is  non  compos ;  2.  He  that  by  sick- 
ness, grief,  or  other  accident,  wholly  loseth  his  memory  and 
understanding ;  3.  A  lunatic  that  hath  sometimes  his  under- 
standing, and  sometimes  not,  aliquando  gaudet  lucidis  inter- 
vallis ;  and  therefore  he  is  called  non  compos  mentis,  so  long 
as  he  hath  not  understanding ;  4.  He  that  by  his  own  vicious 
act  for  a  time  depriveth  himself  of  his  memory  and  under- 
standing, as  he  that  is  drunken.1 

§  4.  Nothing  can  show  more  plainly  how  imperfect  were 
the  notions  of  the  early  law-writers  concerning  insanity, 
than  this  classification  of  insane  persons,  and  their  attempts 
to  define  the  several  classes.  An  idiot  is  defined  to  be  a  per- 
son who  cannot  count  or  number  twenty  pence,  or  tell  who 
was  his  father  or  mother,  or  how  old  he  is,  so  as  it 

1  Coke's  Littleton,  247  a. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  O 

appear  that  he  hath  no  understanding  of  reason,  what  shall 
be  for  his  profit  or  what  shall  be  for  his  loss ;  but  if  he  have 
sufficient  understanding  to  know  and  understand  his  letters, 
and  to  read  by  teaching  or  information,  he  is  not  an  idiot.1 
Now  the  truth  is,  that  many  of  those  whose  idiocy  is  unques- 
tionable, are  capable  of  attaining  the  kind  of  knowledge 
herein  specified,  by  means  of  the  ordinary  intercourse  with 
men,  or  of  special  teaching.  The  entire  loss  of  memory  and 
understanding,  attributed  to  the  second  class,  is  observed 
only  as  a  sequel  to  madness  or  some  other  disease,  or  as  the 
result  of  some  powerful  moral  causes  ;  so  that  if  this  is  to  be 
considered  an  essential  character  of  madness,  by  much  the 
larger  proportion  of  madmen  will  be  altogether  excluded 
from  this  classification ;  for,  instead  of  wholly  losing  their 
understanding,  they  are  for  the  most  part  perfectly  rational 
on  some  topics,  and  in  some  relations  of  life ;  and  a  little 
effort  is  frequently  necessary,  in  order  to  detect  the  fact  of 
the  understanding  being  at  all  impaired.  Judging  from  the 
almost  exclusive  use  of  the  term  lunacy,  and  the  frequent 
reference  to  lucid  intervals,  the  intermittent  character  of  mad- 
ness was  either  more  common,  some  hundreds  of  years  since, 
or,  which  is  more  probable,  in  consequence  of  the  general 
belief  in  its  connection  with  lunar  influences,  this  intermission 
was  imagined  to  occur  far  oftener  than  it  really  did.  This 
certainly  is  a  more  reasonable  explanation,  than  the  idea  that 
the  course  of  nature  has  changed,  so  that  lucid  intervals, 
which  were  once  of  the  most  common  occurrence  in  insanity, 
are  now  among  its  rarest  phenomena. 

§  5.  Common  sense  and  a  tolerable  share  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  time,  if  fairly  exercised,  would  probably  prevent, 
in  practice,  any  grossly  improper  application  of  these  theo- 
retical principles ;  but,  in  civil  cases,  the  law,  though  not  dis- 
posed to  guage  the  exact  measure  of  men's  intellects,  has 
sometimes  insisted  on  technical  distinctions,  that  have  little 
foundation  in  nature  or  reason.  Originally,  commissions  of 
lunacy  were  granted  for  the  purpose  of  inquiring  whether 

1  1  Fitzherbert,  Natura  Brevium,  583,  ed.  1652. 
1* 


6  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  individual  were  either  an  idiot  ex  nativitate,  or  a  lunatic, 
in  Coke's  meaning  of  the  term,  and,  in  consequence  thereof, 
incapable  of  governing  himself  and  managing  his  worldly 
affairs.  The  injustice  of  leaving  beyond  the  protection  of  the 
law,  that  larger  class  of  insane,  who,  though  neither  idiots  nor 
lunatics,  labor  under  more  or  less  mental  derangement,  led  to 
a  change  in  the  form  of  the  writ,  by  which  the  phrase 
unsound  mind  was  used  for  the  purpose  of  embracing  all 
others,  who  were  considered  proper  objects  of  a  commission. 
What  is  the  precise  meaning  of  this  term,  it  is  not  easy  to 
gather  from  the  observations  of  various  high  legal  authorities 
who  have  attempted  to  fix  its  meaning.  It  seems  to  be 
agreed,  that  it  is  not  idiocy,  nor  lunacy,  nor  imbecility,  but 
beyond  this  all  unanimity  is  at  an  end.  Lord  Hardwicke 
held,  that  unsoundness  of  mind  did  not  mean  mere  weakness 
of  mind,  but  a  depravity  of  reason  or  a  want  of  it.1  Lord 
Eldon  once  referred  to  the  case  of  a  person  advanced  in 
years,  "  whose  mind  was  the  mind  of  a  child,"  and  observed, 
that,  "  it  was,  therefore,  in  that  sense,  imbecility  and  inability 
to  manage  his  affairs,  which  constituted  unsoundness  of 
mind."2  The  same  high  authority  had  observed,  on  a  pre- 
vious occasion,  that  "  the  court  had  thought  itself  authorized 
to  issue  the  commission  de  lunatico  inquirendo,  provided  it  is 
made  out,  that  the  party  is  unable  to  act  with  any  proper 
and  provident  management ;  liable  to  be  robbed  by  any  one ; 
under  that  imbecility  of  mind,  not  strictly  insanity,  but  as  to 
the  mischief,  calling  for  as  much  protection  as  actual 
insanity."8  Mr.  Amos,  late  professor  of  Medical  Jurispru- 
dence in  the  London  University,  has  said,  that  "  the  term 
unsoundness  of  mind,  in  the  legal  sense,  seems  to  involve 
the  idea  of  a  morbid  condition  of  intellect,  or  loss  of  reason, 
coupled  with  an  incompetency  of  the  person  to  manage  his 
own  affairs." 4  Whatever  it  may  signify,  it  has  always  been 
insisted  on,  that  the  return  of  the  commission  must  state  the 


1  Ex  Parte  Barnsley,  3  Atkyns's  Reports,  168. 

2  Haslam :  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  336. 

8  8  Vesey's  Eeports,  66.  4  London  Medical  Gazette,  Vol.  8,  p.  19. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  7 

incapacity  or  inability  of  the  party  to  manage  his  affairs,  to 
be  evidence  of  its  existence,  in  order  that  the  party  may  have 
the  protection  of  the  law.  If  the  jury  are  unwilling,  from 
what  they  see,  to  infer  the  presence  of  a  mental  condition,  to 
which  the  highest  dignitaries  of  the  law  have  declined  fixing 
a  precise,  intelligible  meaning,  then  the  inquisition  is 
quashed.  The  feelings  of  dread  and  disgust,  with  which 
madness  has  been  generally  contemplated,  have  often  deter- 
red juries,  acting  under  a  commission,  from  returning  a  ver- 
dict of  unsound  mind,  which  has  become  equivalent  to 
insanity;  either  from  a  disinclination  to  embarrass  the 
family  with  an  odious  distinction,  or  because  the  individual 
was  not  really  unsound  in  the  popular  acceptation  of  the 
term,  though  his  mental  faculties  might  have  been  so  far 
enfeebled  by  old  age,  or  sickness,  or  congenital  causes,  as  to 
render  him  absolutely  incapable  of  conducting  himself  or  his 
affairs,  —  a  fact  which  they  have  sometimes  returned.  These 
attempts  to  change  the  ordinary  course  have  never  succeeded, 
the  court  having  in  every  case  required  the  verdict  to  be  in 
the  words  of  the  inquisition,  or  in  equipollent  words.  "  It  is 
settled,"  says  Lord  Eldon,  "  that  if  the  jury  find  merely  the 
incapacity  of  the  party  to  manage  his  affairs,  and  will  not 
infer  from  that  and  other  circumstances  unsoundness  of  mind, 
though  the  party  may  live  where  he  is  exposed  to  ruin  every 
instant,  yet  upon  that  finding  the  commission  cannot  go 
on."1  The  consequence  is,  that  the  afflicted  party  must 
either  forego  the  protection  of  the  law,  or  fix  upon  his  family 
a  sort  of  stigma  of  the  most  disagreeable  and  onerous  des- 
cription. When  it  is  considered  how  many  are  the  cases, 
where  individuals  are  incapacitated  from  managing  their 
affairs,  simply  from  that  impairment  of  the  mind  so  common 
in  old  age,  or  mere  defect  of  memory,  the  other  powers 
remaining  sound,  it  is  a  little  surprising,  that  no  effectual 
measures  have  been  taken,  to  render  the  operation  of  the 
law  less  imperfect  and  unequal.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  the 
ground  of  the  extreme  repugnance  displayed  by  the  English 

1  19  Vesey's  Reports,  286. 


8  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

courts,  towards  any  return  that  does  not  assert  the  mental 
unsoundness  of  the  affected  party,  unless  it  may  be  some  ob- 
stacle thereby  thrown  in  the  course  of  the  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings. The  object  of  the  commission  is,  to  ascertain 
whether  or  not  the  party  in  question  is  incapable,  by  reason 
of  mental  infirmities,  of  governing  himself  and  managing  his 
affairs ;  and  if  they  so  find  him,  it  certainly  is  irrelevant  to 
any  useful  purpose,  to  connect  this  inability  as  an  effect  with 
any  particular  kind  of  insanity,  whether  expressed  in  com- 
mon or  technical  language.  Indeed,  to  require  a  jury  to 
infer  explicitly  unsoundness  of  mind  from  inability  to  man- 
age affairs,  which  is  of  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  all  the 
mental  unsoundness  that  is  required  for  practical  purposes, 
and  reject  their  return  if  they  do  not,  would  seem  exceed- 
ingly puerile,  were  it  not  strictly  professional.  In  ex  parte 
Cranmer,1  where  the  jury  pronounced  the  party  in  their  ver- 
dict, "  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind  as  to  be  incapable  of  the 
general  management  of  his  affairs,"  Lord  Chancellor  Erskine 
gives  some  reasons  for  finding  fault  with  the  terms  of  the 
verdict,  and  directing  the  inquisition  to  be  quashed.  "  The 
verdict,"  he  says,  "  does  not  state  distinctly,  that  he  is  inca- 
pable ;  but  that  he  is  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind,  that  he 
is  not  equal  to  the  general  management  of  his  affairs."  The 
very  word  incapable,  it  is  true,  is  not  used,  but  the  words 
"not  equal"  are  surely  of  equivalent  meaning;  and  it  is  not 
easy  to  conceive,  how  a  clearer  or  stronger  idea  of  a  person's 
incapacity  can  be  conveyed,  than  to  pronounce  him  "not 
equal  to  the  management  of  his  affairs."  "  How  can  I  tell," 
he  asks,  "  what  is  '  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind  that  he  is  not 
equal  to  the  general  management  of  his  affairs  ?";  He  cer- 
tainly could  not  tell  the  precise  quantity  of  mind  left,  but 
even  if  the  party  had  been  returned  non  compos  and  therefore 
unequal  to  the  management  of  his  affairs,  it  is  not  quite 
obvious,  how  any  more  definite  notion  on  this  point  would 
have  been  conveyed.2 

1  12  Vesey's  Reports,  406. 

2  In  a  recent  case,  the  inquisition  was  quashed  by  Lord  Lyndhurst,  be- 
cause the  verdict  of  the  jury  said  too  much,  instead  of  too  litt  e,  viz. :  "  that 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  9 

§  6.  The  business  of  the  jury  in  these  cases  is,  to  ascer- 
tain whether  the  individual  is  mentally  capable  of  managing 
his  affairs;  and  this  is  a  duty,  which,  generally  speaking, 
they  are  able  to  perform  with  tolerable  correctness.  But 
what  can  be  more  irrelevant  to  the  object  in  view,  or  more 
remote  from  the  ordinary  circle  of  their  reflections,  than  the 
additional  duty  of  deciding  whether  his  mental  impairment 
has  gone  far  enough,  to  bear  being  designated  by  the  techni- 
cal phraseology,  unsoundness  of  mind  ?  When  it  is  recol- 
lected, too,  that  the  members  of  these  juries  are  mostly  unedu- 
cated men,  and  but  few  of  them  at  all  acquainted  with  the 
force  of  legal  or  medical  distinctions,  it  cannot  be  supposed, 
that  such  a  return  is  always  the  recorded  opinion  of  unbias- 
ed, understanding  minds.  Indeed,  the  inconvenience  and  in- 
justice of  this  proceeding  have  been  so  strongly  felt,  as  to 
have  led  to  the  repeated  expression  of  a  wish,  that  its  defects 
were ,  remedied  by  the  action  of  the  legislature.  That  it 
should  still  continue  in  a  country,  where  it  is  linked  in  with 
a  system,  whose  foundations  are  in  the  very  constitution  of 
the  government,  is  perhaps  not  strange ;  but,  that  it  should 
be  used  in  some  of  our  own  States  which  are  untrammelled 
by  such  considerations,  is  certainly  an.  anomaly  in  legislation. 

§  7.  This  is  not  the  only  instance  where  the  principles 
of  common  sense  and  common  justice,  which  ought  to  regu- 
late the  legal  relations  of  the  insane,  have,  with  astonishing 
inconsistency,  been  strangely  disregarded  in  the  maxims  of 
the  common  law.  "While  theoretically  it  requires  that  con- 
tracts, to  be  valid,  should  spring  from  a  free  and  deliberate 
consent,  it  refuses  to  suffer  the  party  himself  to  avoid  them 
on  the  plea  of  lunacy,  in  accordance  with  an  ancient  maxim, 
that  no  man  of  full  age  shall  be  allowed  to  disable  or  stultify 
himself;  though  at  the  same  time,  it  does  allow  his  heirs,  or 
other  persons  interested,  to  avail  themselves  of  this  privilege.1 

the  party  was  not  a  lunatic,  but  partly  from  paralysis  and  partly  from  old  age, 
his  memory  was  so  much  impaired,  as  to  render  him  incompetent  to  the  man- 
agement of  his  affairs,  and  consequently  that  he  was  of  unsound  mind,  and 
had  been  so  for  two  years."  In  Re  Holmes,  4  Russel's  Chancery  Reports,  182. 
1  2  Blackstone,  295. 


10  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

Thus,  a  person  who  recovers  from  a  temporary  insanity 
before  the  return  of  an  inquisition,  has  no  remedy  at  law  or 
in  equity  for  the  most  ruinous  contracts  that  he  may  have 
entered  into  while  in  that  condition,  except  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  though,  after  his  death,  his  heirs  may  have  them  set 
aside  by  establishing  the  fact  of  lunacy  alone.  Well  may  a 
distinguished  jurist  exclaim,  that  "it  is  matter  of  wonder 
and  humiliation,  how  so  absurd  and  mischievous  a  maxim 
could  have  found  its  way  into  any  system  of  jurisprudence, 
professing  to  act  on  civilized  beings." l  It  arose,  no  doubt,  in 
part,  from  erroneous  notions  of  the  nature  of  insanity,  and 
partly  from  apprehensions,  not  well  founded,  of  the  conse- 
quences, that  might  follow  the  admission  of  the  plea  of  lunacy 
in  avoidance  of  contracts.  Within  a  few  years,  however,  the 
English  courts  have  almost  entirely  disregarded  the  ancient 
maxim,2  and  in  this  country,  it  has  long  since  lost  its  author- 
ity altogether.8  Indeed,  there  now  seems  to  be  a  strong  dis- 
position to  run  to  the  opposite  extreme.  We  cannot  but 
think  that  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  better  obtained,  if  no 
general  rule  at  all  were  adopted,  and  every  case  decided  on 
its  own  merits.  Where  the  insanity  of  one  of  the  parties  is 
perfectly  well  known  to  the  other,  or  might  have  been  so  by 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  sagacity,  a  contract  between  them, 
except  for  the  necessaries  of  life  or  comforts  and  luxuries 
suitable  to  his  wealth  or  station,  should  obviously  be  held  in- 
valid, because  the  insane  party  is  deprived  by  the  act  of  provi- 
dence of  his  natural  share  of  discernment  and  foresight.  It 
often  happens,  however,  that  a  person's  insanity  is  not  general- 
ly known  and  is  not  very  apparent,  and,  in  such  cases,  if  it  can 
be  proved,  that  the  contract  is  a  fair  and  reasonable  one  on  the 
face  of  it,  and  was  entered  into  in  perfect  honesty  and  good 
faith,  he  certainly  should  not  be  permitted  to  stultify  himself, 


1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  225. 

2  Bagster  v.  Earl  Portsmouth,  Chitty  on  Contracts,  256 ;  Gates  v.  Boen, 
2  Strick.  1104. 

s  3  Day,  90,  Webster  v.  Woodward;    15  Jolms.  503,  Rice  v.  Peet;  5  Pick. 
431,  Mitchell  v.  Kingman. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  11 

in  order  to  escape  its  performance.  Neither  does  his  death 
or  interdiction  so  change  the  case,  as  to  render  it  proper  for 
his  heirs  or  guardians  to  do  that  which  he  could  not  do  for 
himself.  Much  as  the  law  is  bound  to  protect  the  interests 
of  the  insane,  it  is  no  less  required  to  protect  those  who  deal 
with  them,  unacquainted  with  their  mental  condition.  It  as 
often  happens,  that  the  same  party  suffers  from  the  avoid- 1 
ance  of  the  contract,  as  that  the  insane  or  his  heirs  do  from 
its  validity ;  and  nothing  can  be  more  clearly  unjust,  than 
the  application  of  a  maxim  or  general  rule  that  favors  only 
the  interests  of  the  unsound  party. 

§  8.  Though  little  of  this  pertinacious  adherence  to 
merely  technical  distinctions  is  observed,  in  the  application 
of  the  law  to  criminal  cases,  yet  there  is  much  of  the  same 
respect  for  antiquated  maxims,  that  have  little  else  to  recom- 
mend them  but  their  antiquity,  and  are  so  much  the  more 
pernicious  in  their  application,  as  the  interests  of  property 
are  of  less  importance  than  reputation  and  life.  It  by  no 
means  follows,  that  a  person  declared  to  be  non  compos  by 
due  process  of  law,  is  to  be  considered,  on  that  account 
merely,  to  be  irresponsible  for  his  criminal  acts.  This  is  a 
question  entirely  distinct,  and  is  determined  upon  very  differ- 
ent views  of  the  nature-  of  insanity,  and  of  its  effects  on  the 
operations  of  the  mind ;  and,  here  it  is,  that  the  lawyer  en- 
croaches most  on  the  domain  of  the  physician.  The  first 
attempt  to  point  out  precisely  those  conditions  of  insanity, 
in  which  the  civil  and  criminal  responsibilities  are  unequally 
affected,  was  made  by  Lord  Hale.  "  There  is  a  partial 
insanity,"  says  he,  "  and  a  total  insanity.  The  former  is 
either  in  respect  to  things,  quoad  hoc  vel  illud  insanlre. 
Some  persons  that  have  a  competent  use  of  reason,  in  re- 
spect of  some  subjects,  are  yet  under  a  particular  dementia, 
in  respect  of  some  particular  discourses,  subjects,  or  applica- 
tions, or  else  it  is  partial  in  respect  of  degrees ;  and  this  is 
the  condition  of  very  many,  especially  melancholy  persons, 
who  for  the  most  part  discover  their  defect  in  excessive  fears 
and  griefs,  and  yet  are  not  wholly  destitute  of  the  use  of 
reason ;  and  this  partial  insanity  seems  not  to  excuse  them, 


12  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

in  the  committing  of  any  offence  for  its  matter  capital ;  for, 
doubtless,  most  persons  that  are  felons  of  themselves  and 
others,  are  under  a  degree  of  partial  insanity,  when  they 
commit  these  offences.  It  is  very  difficult  to  define  the 
invisible  line  that  divides  perfect  and  partial  insanity;  but 
it  must  rest  upon  circumstances  duly  to  be  weighed  and 
considered  both  by  judge  and  jury,  lest  on  the  one  side  there 
be  a  kind  of  inhumanity  towards  the  defects  of  human 
nature ;  —  or,  on  the  other  side,  too  great  an  indulgence 
given  to  great  crimes."1  So  strongly  was  this  celebrated 
jurist  possessed  with  the  idea,  that  it  is  the  strength  and  capa- 
city of  the  mind  only  that  are  affected  by  insanity,  that  he  has 
actually  founded  upon  it  a  test  of  criminal  responsibility. 
"  Such  a  person,"  says  he,  "  as  laboring  under  melancholy 
distempers,  hath  yet  ordinarily  as  great  understanding  as 
ordinarily  a  child  of  fourteen  years  hath,  is  such  a  person  as 
may  be  guilty  of  treason  or  felony."  As  if  the  only  difference 
between  sanity  and  insanity  were  precisely  that  which  is 
made  by  difference  of  age,  and  as  if  there  could  be  two  things 
more  unlike  than  the  mind  of  a  person  "laboring  under 
melancholy  distempers,"  and  that  of  a  child  fourteen  years  old. 
§  9.  The  doctrines  thus  dogmatically  laid  down  by  Lord 
Hale,  have  exerted  no  inconsiderable  influence  on  the  judicial 
opinions  of  his  successors ;  and  his  high  authority  has  often 
been  invoked  against  the  plea  of  insanity,  whenever  it  has 
been  urged  by  the  voice  of  philanthropy  and  true  science. 
If,  too,  in  consequence  of  the  common  tendency  of  indul- 
gence in  forced  and  unwarrantable  constructions,  whenever 
a  point  is  to  be  gained,  his  principles  have  been  made  to 
mean  far  more  than  he  ever  designed,  the  fact  impressively 
teaches  the  importance  of  clear  and  well-defined  terms,  in 
the  expression  of  scientific  truths,  as  well  as  of  enlarged, 
practical  information,  relative  to  the  subjects  to  which  they 
belong.  In  the  time  of  this  eminent  jurist,  insanity  was  a 
much  less  frequent  disease  than  it  now  is,  and  the  popular 
notions  concerning  it  were  derived  from  the  observation  of 

1  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  30. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  13 

those  wretched  inmates  of  the  mad-house,  whom  chains  and 
stripes,  cold  and  filth,  had  reduced  to  the  stupidity  of  the 
idiot,  or  exasperated  to  the  fury  of  a  demon.  Those  nice 
shades  of  the  disease  in  which  the  mind,  without  being 
wholly  driven  from  its  propriety,  pertinaciously  clings  to 
some  absurd  delusion,  were  either  regarded  as  something 
very  different  from  real  madness,  or  were  too  few,  too  far 
removed  from  the  common  gaze,  and  too  soon  converted  by 
bad  management  into  the  more  active  forms  of  the  disease, 
to  enter  much  into  the  general  idea  entertained  of  madness. 
Could  Lord  Hale  have  contemplated  the  scenes  presented  by 
the  lunatic  asylums  of  our  own  times,  we  should  undoubt- 
edly have  received  frpm  him  a  very  different  doctrine,  for  the 
regulation  of  the  decisions  of  after  generations. 

§  10.  Judging  from  the  few  cases  that  have  been  reported, 
the  course  of  practice  in  the  English  criminal  courts  has  been 
in  strict  conformity  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  Hale.  For 
instance,  in  the  trial  of  Arnold  in  1723  for  shooting  at  Lord 
Onslow,  Mr.  Justice  Tracy  observed,  "  that  it  is  not  every 
kind  of  frantic  humor,  or  something  unaccountable  in  a 
man's  actions,  that  points  him  out  to  be  such  a  madman,  as 
is  exempted  from  punishment:  it  must  be  a  man  that  is 
totally  deprived  of  his  understanding  and  memory,  and  doth 
not  know  what  he  is  doing,  no  more  than  an  infant,  than  a 
brute,  or  a  wild  beast,  such  a  one  is  never  the  object  of  pun- 
ishment." *  This  is  but  the  echo  of  Lord  Hale's  doctrine, 
and  the  circumstances  of  the  case  show  how  faithfully  the 
principles  were  applied.  Arnold  seems  to  have  been  of 
weak  understanding  from  his  birth,  and  to  have  led  an  idle, 
irregular,  and  disordered  life,  sometimes  unequivocally  mad, 
and  at  all  times  considered  exceedingly  strange  and  different 
from  other  people  ;  one  witness  describing  him  as  a  strange, 
sullen  boy  at  school,  such  as  he  had  never  seen  before.  It 
was  testified  by  his  family  and  his  neighbors,  that  for  several 
years  previous,  they  had  considered  and  treated  him  as  mad, 
occasionally  if  not  always,  although  so  little  disposed  to  mis- 

1  8  Hargrave's  State  Trials,  322. 
2 


14  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

chief,  that  he  was  suffered  to  be  at  large.  Contrary  to  the 
wishes  of  his  friends,  he  persisted  in  living  alone  in  a  house 
destitute  of  the  ordinary  conveniences ;  was  in  the  habit  of 
lying  about  in  barns  and  under  hay -ricks ;  would  curse  and 
swear  to  himself  for  hours  together ;  laugh  and  throw  things 
about  the  house  without  any  cause  whatever,  and  was  much 
disturbed  in  his  sleep  by  fancied  noises.  Among  other 
unfounded  notions,  he  believed  that  Lord  Onslow,  who  lived 
in  his  neighborhood,  was  the  cause  of  all  the  tumults,  disturb- 
ances, and  wicked  devices  that  happened  in  the  country, 
and  his  thoughts  were  greatly  occupied  with  this  person. 
He  was  in  the  habit  of  declaring,  that  Lord  Onslow  sent  his 
devils  and  imps  into  his  room  at  night  to  disturb  his  rest,  and 
that  he  constantly  plagued  and  bewitched  him,  by  getting 
into  his  belly  or  bosom,  so  that  he  could  neither  eat,  drink, 
nor  sleep,  for  him.  He  talked  much  of  being  plagued  by  the 
Bollies  and  Bolleroys ;  he  declared  in  prison  it  was  better  to 
die  than  live  so  miserably,  and  manifested  no  compunction 
for  what  he  had  done.  Under  the  influence  of  these  delu- 
sions, he  shot  at  and  wounded  Lord  Onslow.  The  proof  of 
insanity  was  strong  enough,  but  not  that  degree  of  it,  which 
the  jury  considered  sufficient  to  save  him  from  the  gallows, 
and  he  was  accordingly  sentenced  to  be  hung.  Lord  Onslow 
himself,  however,  thought  differently ;  and,  by  means  of  his 
intercession,  the  sentence  was  not  executed,  and  Arnold  was 
continued  in  prison  for  life.  It  is  clear,  that  the  court  recog- 
nized that  class  of  madmen  only,  as  exempted  from  the  penal 
consequences  of  crime,  whose  reason  is  completely  dethroned 
from  her  empire,  and  who  are  reduced  to  the  condition  of  an 
infant,  a  brute,  or  a  wild  beast.  If  it  be  true,  as  the  court 
said,  that  such  are  never  the  objects  of  punishment,  though  it 
neglected  to  state  that  they  are  never  the  objects  of  prosecu- 
tion, the  converse  must  be  equally  true,  that  those  not  exactly 
in  this  condition  can  never  avoid  punishment  on  the  plea  of 
insanity.  It  appears,  then,  that  the  law  at  that  time  did  not 
consider  an  insane  person  irresponsible  for  crime,  in  whom 
there  remained  the  slightest  vestige  of  rationality ;  though  it 
did  then,  and  has  ever  since  deprived  him  of  the  management 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  15 

of  himself  and  his  affairs,  and  vitiates  Ms  civil  acts,  even  when 
they  have  no  relation  to  the  delusions  that  spring  from  his 
madness.  That  the  progress  of  science  and  general  enlight- 
enment has  produced  no  improvement  of  the  law  on  this  sub- 
ject, is  abundantly  shown  in  the  strong  declarations  of  Sir 
Vicary  Gibbs,  when  attorney-general  of  England,  on  the 
trial  of  Bellingham,  in  1812.  "  A  man,"  says  he,  "  may  be 
deranged  in  his  mind,  —  his  intellects  may  be  insufficient  for 
enabling  him  to  conduct  the  common  affairs  of  life,  such  as 
disposing  of  his  property,  or  judging  of  the  claims  which  his 
respective  relations  have  upon  him  ;  and  if  he  be  so,  the 
administration  of  the  country  will  take  his  affairs  into  their 
management,  and  appoint  to  him  trustees ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  such  a  man  is  not  discharged  from  his  responsibility  for 
criminal  acts."  x  Lord  Erskine  had  previously  given  the  same 
doctrine  the  sanction  of  his  authority,  in  his  celebrated  speech 
in  defence  of  Hadfield.  "  I  am  bound,"  he  says,  "  to  admit 
that  there  is  a  wide  distinction  between  civil  and  criminal 
cases.  If,  in  the  former,  a  man  appears,  upon  the  evidence, 
to  be  non  compos  mentis,  the  law  avoids  his  act,  though  it 
cannot  be  traced  or  connected  with  the  morbid  imagination 
which  constitutes  his  disease,  and  which  may  be  extremely 
partial  in  its  influence  upon  conduct ;  but,  to  deliver  a  man 
from  responsibility  for  crimes,  above  all,  for  crimes  of  great 
atrocity  and  wickedness,  I  am  by  no  means  prepared  to  apply 
this  rule,  however  well  established  when  property  only  is 
concerned." 

§  11.  That  a  person,  whom  the  law  prevents  from  manag- 
ing his  own  property,  by  reason  of  his  mental  impairment, 
should,  in  respect  to  criminal  acts,  be  considered  as  possess- 
ing all  the  elements  of  responsibility,  and  placed  on  the  same 
footing  with  men  of  the  soundest  and  strongest  minds,  is  a 
proposition  so  strange  and  startling,  that  few,  uninfluenced 
by  professional  biases,  can  yield  to  it  unhesitating  assent,  or 
loo^  upon  it  in  any  other  light,  than  as  belonging  to  that 
class  of  doctrines  which,  while  they  may  be  the  perfection  of 

1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 


16  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

reason  to  the  initiated,  appear  to  be  the  height  of  absurdity 
to  every  one  else.  Georget,  an  able  French  writer  on  the 
legal  relations  of  the  insane,  in  commenting  on  the  speech  of 
M.  de  Peyronnet  who,  in  the  trial  of  Papavoine,  had  adduced 
the  passage  above  extracted  from  Lord  Hale,  in  support  of 
his  own  views,  expresses  his  astonishment  and  indignation, 
that  such  a  sentiment  should  ever  have  been  uttered,  least  of 
all,  quoted  with  approbation,  in  a  French  court  of  .justice,  by 
the  chief  law-officer  of  the  government.  "  Can  we  help  won- 
dering," he  exclaims,  "  at  these  sentiments  of  Lord  Hale,  who 
seems  to  make  more  account  of  property  than  life.  No 
excuse  for  the  unfortunate  man  who,  in  a  paroxysm  of  mad- 
ness, commits  a  criminal  offence,  while  civil  acts  are  to  be 
annulled,  even  when  they  have  no  relation  to  the  insane 
impressions  that  might  have  influenced  his  conduct."  l  The 
language  of  the  law,  virtually  addressed  to  the  insane  man, 
is,  your  reason  is  too  much  impaired  to  manage  your  pro- 
perty ;  you  are  unable  to  distinguish  between  those  measures, 
which  would  conduce  to  your  profit  and  such  as  would  end 
in  your  ruin,  and  therefore  it  is  wisely  taken  altogether  from 
your  control;  but  if  under  the  influence  of  one  of  those 
insane  delusions  that  have  rendered  this  step  necessary,  you 
should  kill  your  neighbor,  you  will  be  supposed  to  have  acted 
under  the  guidance  of  a  sound  reason ;  you  will  be  tried,  con- 
victed, and  executed  like  any  common  criminal  whose  under- 
standing has  never  been  touched  by  madness.  As  for  any 
physiological  or  psychological  ground  for  this  distinction 
between  the  legal  consequences  of  the  civil  and  criminal  acts 
of  an  insane  person,  it  is  in  vain  to  look  for  it.  That  the 
mind,  when  meditating  a  great  crime,  is  less  under  the  influ- 
ence of  disease,  and  enjoys  a  more  sound  and  vigorous  exer- 
cise of  its  powers,  than  when  making  a  contract,  or  a  will, 
few,  probably,  will  be  hardy  enough  to  affirm ;  and  yet  the 
practice  of  the  law  virtually  admits  it.  The  difference,  if 
there  be  any,  would  seem  to  be  all  the  other  way.  In  the 
disposal  of  property,  the  mind  is  engaged  in  what  has  per- 

1  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  8. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  17 

haps  often  exercised  its  thoughts ;  the  conditions  and  conse- 
quences of  the  transaction  require  no  great  mental  exertion 
to  be  comprehended ;  and  there  may  be  nothing  in  it,  to 
deprive  the  mind  of  all  the  calmness  and  rationality  of  which 
it  is  capable.  Now  criminal  acts,  though  abstractly  wrong, 
may  under  certain  circumstances  become  right  and  meritori- 
ous ;  and  if  the  strongest  and  acutest  minds  have  sometimes 
been  perplexed  on  this  point,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  crazy 
and  distorted  perceptions  of  him,  whose  reason  shares  a  divi- 
ded empire  with  the  propensities  and  passions  ?  Most  mani- 
acs have  a  firm  conviction  that  all  they  feel  and  think  is  true, 
just,  and  reasonable  ;  and  nothing  can  shake  their  convictions. 
The  contracts  of  the  insane  are,  in  many  cases,  declared  to 
be  invalid,  and  are  set  aside,  in  courts  of  equity,  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  ;  in  accordance  with  an  established  principle, 
that  the  parties  to  a  contract  must  be  capable  of  giving  their 
deliberate  and  rational  consent,  the  power  of  doing  which  is 
destroyed  by  mental  derangement.1  In  point  of  mental  sound- 
ness they  must  be  equal,  and  common  justice  requires, 
that  the  insane  man,  in  his  dealings  with  his  fellow  men, 
should  be  protected  from  the  effect  of  his  disorder.  Even  in 
the  simplest  transaction,  it  is  supposed  that  the  insane  party 
may  not  be  able  to  discern  all  the  circumstances  that  may 
conduce  to  his  advantage,  and  may  not  act  as  if  his  mind 
were  perfectly  sound.  But  it  remains  to  be  proved  that,  in 
the  commission  of  a  criminal  offence,  he  has  more  clearly 
apprehended  its  abstract  nature,  its  relations  to  the  injured 
party,  and  its  consequences  to  himself,  than  he  would  all  the 
circumstances  attending  a  contract ;  if,  therefore,  he  have  not 
acted  rationally,  but  under  the  influence  of  a  disorderd  mind, 
he  ought  to  be  no  more  responsible  for  the  former  than  for 
the  latter. 

§  12.  A  distinction  is  also  made  between  civil  and  criminal 
cases,  in  regard  to  evidence  respecting  the  state  of  the  party's 
mind.  In  the  former,  proof  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  act 
in  question  is  sometimes  paramount  to  all  others,  and,  in  the 

1  Story's  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  227. 

2* 


18  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

absence  of  others,  admitted  to  be  alone  conclusive ;  while,  in 
the  latter,  to  seek  to  prove  the  existence  of  insanity  from  the 
character  of  the  act,  would  be  viewed  as  nothing  less  than  a 
begging  of  the  question.  "  If  a  lunatic  person,"  says  Swin- 
burne,1 "  or  one  that  is  beside  himself  at  sometimes  but  not 
continually,  make  his  testament,  and  it  is  not  known  whether 
the  same  were  made  while  he  was  of  sound  mind  and  memory 
or  no,  then  in  case  the  testament  be  so  conceived,  as  thereby 
no  argument  of  phrensy  or  folly  can  be  gathered,  it  is  to  be 
presumed  that  the  same  was  made  during  the  time  of  his 
calm  and  clear  intermissions,  and  so  the  testament  shall  be 
adjudged  good,  yea,  although  it  cannot  be  proved  that  the 
testator  useth  to  have  any  clear  and  quiet  intermissions  at  all, 
yet,  nevertheless,  I  suppose  that  if  the  testament  be  wisely 
and  orderly  framed,  the  same  ought  to  be  accepted  for  a  law- 
ful testament."  Sir  John  Nicholl  has  observed,  that  where 
there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  the  time  or,  consequently,  of 
the  deceased's  state  of  mind  at  the  time,  of  the  act  done, 
recourse  must  be  had  to  the  usual  mode  of  ascertaining  it 
in  such  cases  —  which  is  by  looking  at  the  act  itself.  "  The 
agent  is  to  be  inferred  rational,  or  the  contrary,  in  such  cases 
from  the  character  broadly  taken  of  his  act." 2  So,  on  the 
other  hand,  "  in  the  case  of  a  person  who  is  sometimes  sane 
and  sometimes  insane,  if  there  be  in  it  a  mixture  of  wisdom 
and  folly,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  same  was  made  dur- 
ing the  testator's  phrensy,  even  if  there  be  but  one  word 
sounding  to  folly." 8  If,  then,  testamentary  dispositions  that 
conflict  with  the  natural  distribution  of  property  and  the 
known  and  expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  yea,  if  they 
contain  but  one  word  "  sounding  to  folly,"  are  to  be  held  as 
sufficient  evidence  of  unsound  mind,  in  doubtful  cases,  why, 
when  an  atrocious  crime  is  shown  to  be  motiveless,  unnatural, 


1  Of  Testaments  and  Last  Wills,  Part  II,  Section  3. 

2  1  Addam's  Ecclesiastical  Keports,  74,  Scruby  and  Finch  v,  Fordham  and 
others.     See  also  1  Phillimore's  Reports,  90;  1  Dow's  Reports,  178,  for  a 
recognition  of  the  same  principle. 

8  Swinburne,  Part  H,  §  3,  pi.  16. 


PEELIMINARY  VIEWS.  19 

in  opposition  to  the  habits,  feelings,  and  principles  of  the 
whole  past  life,  and  unfollowed  by  any  consciousness  of  guilt, 
should  not  this  act  be  considered  as  equally  strong  proof  of 
unsoundness  of  mind  ?  Why  is  it,  that  instead  of  being  thus 
considered,  it  actually  avails  the  accused  nothing ;  the  charac- 
ter of  the  act,  in  the  last  resort,  being  too  often  explained,  on 
the  supposition  of  an  inherent  ferocity  and  thirst  for  blood, 
which  no  considerations  can  restrain;  even  in  the  face  of 
totally  different  dispositions,  indicated  by  the  whole  tenor  of 
his  life. 

§  13.  Notwithstanding  that  Lord  Hale's  doctrine  was 
cited  with  approbation  by  M.  de  Peyronnet,  (§  11),  yet,  by 
the  French  penal  code,  madness,  without  limit  or  condition, 
exempts  from  the  punishment  of  criminal  acts.  The  language 
of  the  law  is,  that  "  there  is  no  crime  nor  offence  when  the 
accused  was  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  of  the  action."  l 
The  existence  of  insanity  once  established,  the  accused  is,  by 
the  spirit  of  the  law,  acquitted.  This  intention  has  some- 
times been  near  being  defeated,  in  consequence  of  the  great 
liberty  allowed  to  French  juries,  in  the  construction  of  the 
phraseology  of  their  verdict,  in  which  they  may  declare,  if 
they  choose,  not  whether  the  accused  was  guilty  or  not  guilty, 
sane  or  insane,  but  whether  or  not  the  act  was  committed 
voluntarily.2  A  verdict  of  this  kind,  in  an  instance  men- 
tioned by  Georget,  led  to  a  curious  result,  in  the  hands  of 
men  who  were  not  indoctrinated  in  the  subtleties  of  meta- 
physics. The  fact  of  insanity  having  been  given  to  the  jury 
for  decision,  they  returned  that  the  accused  acted  voluntarily 
and  with  premeditation ;  and,  secondly,  that  he  was  insane  at 
the  time  of  committing  the  act.3  This  verdict,  so  consistent 
in  reality,  but  so  utterly  contradictory  in  a  legal  sense,  was 
received  by  the  court  and  understood  to  mean,  that  the 
accused  possessed  the  will  of  a  madman,  a  merely  animal 


1  II  n'y  a  ni  crime  ni  delit  lorsque  le  prevent!  etait  en  e"tat  de  demence  au 
temps  de  1'action.     Art.  64. 

2  Special  verdicts  in  criminal  cases  are  quite  common  in  France. 

3  Des  maladies  mentales,  100. 


20  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

will  which  excludes  legal  culpability.  Had  not  the  last 
question  been  raised,  the  accused,  though  mad,  would  have 
been  condemned  to  death.1  It  seems  evident,  that  the  legis- 
lator, in  framing  that  law,  was  impressed  with  the  difficulty 
of  drawing  the  line  between  general  and  partial  insanity,  and 
of  estimating  the  quantity  of  reason  left  after  the  invasion  of 
this  disease,  and  therefore  determined  to  avoid  it  altogether 
by  recognizing  but  one  kind  of  insanity.  Though  not  pre- 
pared to  acquiesce  entirely  in  the  dispositions  of  this  enactment, 
yet  it  is  infinitely  preferable,  with  all  its  faults,  to  the  English 
practice  of  requiring  a  number  of  men,  who  may  have  had 
very  little  education  of  any  kind,  and  least  of  all,  any  very 
accurate  notions  of  the  influence  of  insanity  on  the  operations 
of  the  mind,  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  measure  of  a  man's 
understanding,  and  decide  whether  or  not  he  had  enough  of 
reason  left  to  discern  the  nature  of  the  act  he  committed. 
True,  mental  unsoundness  is  not  necessarily  incompatible 


i  It  is  one  of  those  metaphysical  subtleties,  so  prevalent  on  the  subject  of v 
insanity,  that  the  acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary.  It  certainly  can  be 
of  little  practical  consequence,  what  epithet  is  applied  to  the  acts  of  a  mind 
admitted  to  be  insane ;  though  it  seems  to  be  an  abuse  of  language,  to  call  any 
act  involuntary,  which  proceeds  from  a  person's  own  free  will.  True,  the 
exercise  of  the  will  may  be  greatly  influenced  by  the  condition  of  the  mind, 
even  to  such  an  extent  as  to  deprive  a  person  of  all  criminal  responsibility. 
But  this  does  not  necessarily  prove  the  act  to  be  involuntary,  unless,  for 
instance,  every  man,  who  commits  a  criminal  act  under  the  influence  of  strong 
passions,  is  considered  as  acting  involuntarily.  The  objection  to  this  distinc- 
tion is,  that  it  is  used  as  a  test  in  the  decision  of  doubtful  cases,  every  one 
being  left  to  decide,  as  he  pleases,  what  acts  are  voluntary,  and  what  invol- 
untary. A  curious  application  of  the  distinction  is  made  by  Mr.  Shelford,  in 
his  work  on  Lunatics,  (Introduction,  p.  xlix.)  when  speaking  of  suicide.  "  The 
art  with  which  the  means  are  often  prepared,  and  the  time  occupied  in  plan- 
ning them,  seem  to  mark  it  [suicide]  as  an  act  of  deliberate  volition ;  but  the 
acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary,  and  not  voluntary ;  therefore,  the 
question  must  always  revert  to  what  was  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  when 
suicide  was  committed."  If  the  preparation  for  the  suicidal  act  be  so  indica- 
tive of  that  volition  which  is  exercised  by  sound  minds  only,  it  is  not  very 
clear  by  what  process  of  logic,  from  these  two  propositions  would  be  drawn 
the  conclusion,  that  the  "  question  must  always  revert  to  what  was  the  real 
condition  of  the  mind  when  suicide  was  committed." 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  21 

with  crime,  for  we  can  conceive  of  cases,  where  the  criminal 
act  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  influence  of  the  reigning 
delusion,  and  therefore,  as  far  as  that  is  concerned,  the  off- 
spring of  a  sound  mind ;  yet  we  must  acknowledge  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  establishing  this  fact,  and  the  caution  with  which 
we  should  proceed  to  a  decision. 

§  14.  On  the  trial  of  Hadfield,  for  shooting  at  the  king  in 
Drury  Lane  theatre,  in  1800,  there  occurred  for  the  first  time, 
in  an  English  criminal  court,  anything  like  a  thorough  and 
enlightened  discussion  of  insanity  as  connected  with  crime ; 
and  the  result  was,  that  a  fatal  blow  was  given  to  the  doc- 
trines of  Lord  Hale  by  Mr.  Erskine  who  brought  all  the 
energies  of  his  great  mind  to  bear  upon  the  elucidation  of 
this  subject.1  In  accordance  with  these  doctrines,  the  attor- 
ney-general had  told  the  jury,  that  to  protect  a  person  from 
criminal  responsibility,  there  must  be  a  total  deprivation  of 
memory  and  understanding.  To  this  Mr.  Erskine  very  justly 
replied,  that  if  these  expressions  were  meant  to  be  taken  in 
the  literal  sense  of  the  words  —  which  however  he  did  not 
deny  —  "  then  no  such  madness  ever  existed  in  the  world." 
This  condition  of  mind  is  observed  only  in  idiocy  and  fatuity, 
and  its  unhappy  subjects  are  never  made  accountable  to  the 
laws.  In  proper  madness,  on  the  contrary,  so  far  was  there 
from  being  a  total  deprivation  of  memory  and  understanding, 
that  "  in  all  the  cases  that  have  filled  Westminster  Hall,"  said 
he,  "  with  the  most  complicated  considerations,  the  lunatics 

1  One  reason,  why  the  criminal  law  of  insanity  has  undergone  so  little 
improvement  in  England  is,  probably,  that  the  accused,  not  having  been 
allowed  counsel  to  speak  in  their  defence,  except  in  trials  for  high  treason, 
the  officers  of  government  have  always  been  at  liberty  to  put  their  own  con- 
struction on  the  law,  and  urge  it  on  the  jury  as  the  only  correct  one,  without 
fear  of  being  contradicted  or  gainsayed.  Thus  the  old  maxims  have  been 
repeated,  year  after  year,  and  not  being  questioned,  their  correctness  has 
remained  undoubted,  both  in  and  out  of  the  legal  profession.  Can  any  one 
doubt,  that  had  those  insane  criminals  who  have  been  condemned  within  the 
last  half  century,  been  defended  by  an  Erskine,  many  of  them  would  have  been 
acquitted,  and  a  great  advance  made  in  the  law  of  insanity,  that  would  have 
prevented  some  of  those  exhibitions  of  presumptuous  ignorance,  which  will 
one  day  be  universally  regarded  with  feelings  of  disgust  and  pity  ? 


22  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

and  other  insane  persons  who  have  been  the  subjects  of  them, 
have  not  only  had  memory  in  my  sense  of  the  expression  — 
they  have  not  only  had  the  most  perfect  knowledge  and 
recollection  of  all  the  relations  they  stood  in  towards  others, 
and  of  the  acts  and  circumstances  of  their  lives,  but  have,  in 
general,  been  remarkable  for  subtlety  and  acuteness.  Defects 
in  their  reasonings  have  seldom  been  traceable — the  disease 
consisting  in  the  delusive  sources  of  thought:  —  all  their 
deductions,  within  the  scope  of  their  malady,  being  founded 
on  the  immovable  assumption  of  matters  as  realities,  either 
without  any  foundation  whatever,  or  so  distorted  and  dis- 
figured by  fancy,  as  to  be  nearly  the  same  thing  as  their 
creation."  Instead  therefore  of  making  that  kind  of  insanity 
which  would  exempt  from  punishment  to  consist  in  the 
absence  of  any  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  he  lays  down 
delusion  as  its  true  character,  of  which  the  criminal  act  in 
question  must  be  its  immediate  unqualified  offspring.1  Here 
was  a  great  step  made  in  this  branch  of  medical  jurisprudence, 
and  it  might  have  been  expected,  that  the  victory  thus  gained 
over  professional  prejudices  and  time-honored  errors,  would 
be  felt  in  all  subsequent  decisions.  But,  though  the  day  has 
gone  by,  when  such  insanity  only  as  is  attended  by  total 
deprivation  of  memory  and  understanding,  can  be  admitted 
in  excuse  for  crime,  the  test  offered  by  Erskine  was  altogether 
too  simple  and  too  philosophical,  to  be  readily  adopted  by 
minds  that  delighted  in  subtleties  and  technicalities. 

1  It  is  surprising  and  perfectly  unaccountable  that  Mr.  Erskine,  in  advert- 
ing to  the  case  of  Arnold,  (§  10),  should  have  declared,  "  that  his  counsel 
could  not  show,  that  any  morbid  delusion  had  overshadowed  his  understand- 
ing ! "  If  it  were  no  delusion  in  Arnold  to  believe  that  Lord  Onslow  was  the 
cause  of  all  the  turmoils  and  troubles  in  the  country  —  that  he  bewitched  him 
in  particular  by  getting  into  his  belly  and  bosom,  and  sending  his  devils  and 
imps  into  his  room  to  prevent  his  rest ;  it  surely  was  none  for  Hadfield  to 
imagine  that  he  had  constant  intercourse  with  God  —  that  the  world  was 
about  to  come  to  an  end  —  and  that  he  was  to  sacrifice  himself  for  its  salva- 
tion, by  taking  away  the  life  of  another.  Either  the  able  advocate,  in  his  zeal 
for  his  client,  must  have  egregiously  deceived  himself  respecting  the  facts  of 
Arnold's  case,  or  have  attached  some  ideas  to  delusion,  which  have  never 
entered  into  the  ordinary  conceptions  of  that  kind  of  belief. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  23 

§  15.  In  the  case  of  Bellingham,  for  instance,1  tried  for 
the  murder  of  the  Hon.  Spencer  Percival  in  1812,  it  appeared 
from  the  history  of  the  accused,  from  his  own  account  of  the 
transactions  that  led  to  the  fatal  act,  and  from  the  testimony 
of  several  witnesses,'  that  he  labored  under  many  of  those 
strange  delusions  that  find  a  place  only  in  the  brain  of  a 
madman.  His  fixed  belief  that  his  own  private  grievances 
were  national  wrongs ;  that  his  country's  diplomatic  agents 
in  a  foreign  land  neglected  to  hear  his  complaints  and  assist 
him  in  his  troubles,  though  they  had  in  reality  done  .more 
than  could  have  reasonably  been  expected  of  them ;  his  con- 
viction, in  which  he  was  firm  almost  to  the  last,  that  his 
losses  would  be  made  good  by  the  government,  even  after  he 
had  been  repeatedly  told,  in  consequence  of  repeated  applica- 
tions in  various  quarters,  that  the  government  would  not 
interfere  in  his  affairs ;  and  his  determination,  on  the  failure 
of  all  other  means  to  bring  his  affairs  before  the  country, 
to  effect  this  purpose  by  assassinating  the  head  of  the  gov- 
ernment, by  which  he  would  have  an  opportunity  of  mak- 
ing a  public  statement  of  his  grievances  and  obtaining  a  tri- 
umph, which  he  never  doubted,  over  the  attorney-general ; 
these  were  all  delusions,  as  wild  and  strange  as  those  of 
seven-eighths  of  the  inmates  of  any  lunatic  asylum  in  the  land. 
And  so  obvious  were  they,  that  though  he  had  not  the  aid 
of  an  Erskine  to  press  them  upon  the  attention  of  the  jury, 
and  though  he  himself  denied  the  imputation  of  insanity,  the 
government,  as  if  virtually  acknowledging  their  existence, 
contended  for  his  responsibility  on  very  different  grounds. 
As  the  various  tests  of  this  condition,  commonly  urged  on 
such  occasions,  were  dwelt  upon  with  unusual  earnestness 
and  force,  and  with  strong  expressions  of  confidence  in  their 
value,  it  may  be  well  to  examine  them  critically,  in  order  to 
ascertain  to  how  much  weight  they  are  really  entitled,  in  set- 
tling the  question  of  criminal  responsibility. 

§  16.  In  the  trial  of  Arnold,  already  noticed  (§  10),  the 
jury  were  directed  to  settle  it  in  their  own  minds,  whether 

1  1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  650. 


24  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  accused  was  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong, 
good  from  evil,  and  if  they  concluded  that  he  was,  that  they 
must  return  a  verdict  of  guilty.  In  Bellingham's  case,  the 
attorney-general  declared,  "  upon  the  authority  of  the  first 
sages  in  the  country,  and  upon  the  authority  of  the  estab- 
lished law  in  all  times,  which  law  has  never  been  questioned, 
that  although  a  man  may  be  incapable  of  conducting  his  own 
affairs,  he  may  still  be  answerable  for  his  criminal  acts,  if  he 
possess  a  mind  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong." l 
Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield  who  tried  the  case,  echoed  the 

*  ' 

same  doctrine  in  his  charge  to  the  jury.  In  speaking  of  a 
species  of  insanity,  in  which  the  patient  fancies  the  existence 
of  injury,  and  seeks  an  opportunity  of  gratifying  revenge  by 
some  hostile  act,  he  says,  "  if  such  a  person  were  capable,  in 
other  respects,  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  there  was 
no  excuse  for  any  act  of  atrocity,  which  he  might  commit 
under  this  description  of  derangement." 2  Mr.  Russell,  in  his 
work  on  criminal  law,  includes  inability  to  distinguish  right 
from  wrong  among  the  characters  of  that  grade  of  insanity 
which  exempts  from  the  punishment  of  crime.8 

§  17.  That  the  insane  mind  is  not  entirely  deprived  of 
this  power  of  moral  discernment,  but  on  many  subjects  is 
perfectly  rational  and  displays  the  exercise  of  a  sound  and 
well-balanced  mind,  is  one  of  those  facts  now  so  well  estab- 
lished, that  to  question  it  would  only  betray  the  height  of 
ignorance  and  presumption.  The  first  result,  therefore,  to 
which  the  doctrine  leads,  is,  that  no  man  can  ever  success- 
fully plead  insanity  in  defence  of  crime,  because  it  can  be 
said  of  no  one  who  would  have  occasion  for  such  a  defence, 
that  he  was  unable  in  any  case  to  distinguish  right  from 
wrong.  To  show  the  full  merits  of  the  question,  however, 
it  is  necessary  to  examine  more  particularly,  how  far  this 


1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 

2  This  opinion  was  delivered  scarcely  a  dozen  years  after  the  absurdity  of 
its  principles  had  been  so  happily  exposed  in  a  few  words,  by  Mr.  Erskine,  on 
the  trial  of  Hadfield.    What  a  comment  on  the  progress  of  improvement  in 
the  medical  jurisprudence  of  insanity !  * 

8  Russell  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  12. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  25 

moral  sentiment  is  affected  by,  and  what  relation  it  bears  to 
insanity.  By  that  partial  possession  of  the  reasoning  powers, 
which  has  been  spoken  of  as  being  enjoyed  by  maniacs  gene- 
rally, is  meant  to  be  implied  the  undiminished  power  of  the 
mind,  to  contemplate  some  objects  or  ideas  in  their  cus- 
tomary relations,  among  which  are  those  pertaining  to  their 
right  or  wrong,  their  good  or  evil  tendency;  and  it  must 
comprise  the  whole  of  these  relations,  else  the  individual  is 
not  sane  on  these  points.  A  person  may  regard  his  child 
with  the  feelings  natural  to  the  paternal  bosom,  at  the  very 
moment  he  believes  himself  commanded  by  a  voice  from 
heaven  to  sacrifice  this  child,  in  order  to  secure  its  eternal 
happiness,  than  which,  of  course,  he  could  not  accomplish  a 
greater  good.  Our  belief  in  a  maniac's  soundness,  on  certain 
subjects,  is  founded  in  part  on  the  moral  aspect  in  which  he 
views  those  subjects ;  for  it  would  be  folly  to  consider  a  per- 
son rational  in  reference  to  his  parents  and  children,  while  he 
entertains  the  idea  that  it  would  be  doing  God  service  to 
kill  them ;  though  he  may  talk  rationally  of  their  characters, 
dispositions,  and  habits  of  life,  their  chances  of  success  in 
their  occupations,  their  past  circumstances,  and  the  feel- ' 
ings  of  affection  which  he  has  always  cherished  towards 
them.  Before,  therefore,  an  individual  can  be  accounted 
sane  on  a  particular  subject,  it  must  appear  that  he  regards 
it  correctly,  in  all  its  relations  to  right  and  wrong.  The 
slightest  acquaintance  with  the  insane  will  convince  any  one 
of  the  truth  of  this  position.  In  no  school  of  logic,  in  no 
assembly  of  the  just,  can  we  listen  to  closer  and  shrewder 
argumentation,  to  warmer  exhortations  to  duty,  to  more  glow- 
ing descriptions  of  the  beauty  of  virtue,  or  more  indignant 
denunciations  of  evil-doing,  than  in  the  hospitals  and  asy- 
lums for  the  insane.  And  yet  many  of  these  very  people 
may  make  no  secret  of  entertaining  notions  utterly  subversive 
of  all  moral  propriety;  and,  perhaps,  are  only  waiting  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  execute  some  project  of  wild  and 
cruel  violence.  The  purest  minds  cannot  express  greater 
horror  and  loathing  of  various  crimes  than  madmen  often  do, 
and  from  precisely  the  same  causes.  Their  abstract  concep- 

3 


26  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tions  of  crime,  not  being  perverted  by  the  influence  of  dis- 
ease, present  its  hideous  outlines  as  strongly  defined,  as  they 
ever  were  in  the  healthiest  condition ;  and  the  disapprobation 
they  express  at  the  sight  arises  from  sincere  and  honest  con- 
victions. The  particular  criminal  act,  however,  becomes 
divorced  in  their  minds  from  its  relations  to  crime  in  the 
abstract;  and,  being  regarded  only  in  connection  with  some 
favorite  object  which  it  may  help  to  obtain,  and  which  they 
see  no  reason  to  refrain  from  pursuing,  is  viewed,  in  fact,  as 
of  a  highly  laudable  and  meritorious  nature.  Herein,  then, 
consists  their  insanity,  not  in  preferring  vice  to  virtue,  in 
applauding  crime  and  deriding  justice,  but  in  being  unable 
to  discern  the  essential  identity  of  nature  between  a  particu- 
lar crime  and  all  other  crimes,  whereby  they  are  led  to 
approve  what,  in  general  terms,  they  have  already  con- 
demned. It  is  a  fact,  not  calculated  to  increase  our  faith  in 
the  march  of  intellect,  that  the  very  trait  peculiarly  character- 
istic of  insanity,  has  been  seized  upon  as  a  conclusive  proof 
of  sanity  in  doubtful  cases ;  and  thus  the  infirmity  that  enti- 
tles one  to  protection,  is  tortured  into  a  good  and  sufficient 
reason  for  completing  his  ruin. 

§  18.  If  this  power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong  do 
really  indicate  soundness  of  mind,  it  may  be  justly  com- 
plained, that  the  question  of  its  existence  is  never  agitated  in 
any  but  criminal  cases,  while  it  certainly  should  be  whenever 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  insane  are  to  be  invaded.  If  it 
is  proper  to  make  those  who  possess  this  power  responsible 
for  their  criminal  acts,  how  unjust  and  absurd  is  it  to  deprive 
them  of  their  liberty,  and  seclude  them  from  their  customary 
scenes  and  enjoyments,  before  they  have  violated  a  single 
human  law.  Undoubtedly,  this  measure  would  be  conducive 
to  their  good,  by  taking  from  them  effectually  the  oppor- 
tunity of  injuring  the  persons  or  property  of  themselves  or 
others ;  and  so  it  would  be  for  every  other  unprincipled  and 
reckless  individual  who  bids  fair  to  be  a  pest  to  society.  But 
if  it  is  alleged,  that  the  latter  are  morally  free,  and,  therefore, 
are  personally  free,  until  the  commission  of  some  overt  act,  it 
may  be  replied,  that  the  former,  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  law, 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  27 

which  makes  moral  freedom  consist  in  the  power  of  distin- 
guishing right  from  wrong,  have  the  same  claim  to  immunity 
from  personal  constraint.  This  preposterous  distinction 
between  civil  and  criminal  cases,  gives  rise  in  practice  to 
one  of  the  most  curious  and  startling  inconsistencies  that 
human  legislation  ever  presented.  While  the  mental  impair- 
ment is  yet  slight,  comparatively,  and  the  patient  is  quiet  and 
peaceable,  the  law  considers  him  incapable  of  managing  him- 
self or  his  worldly  affairs,  and  provides  him  with  a  guardian 
and  a  place  in  the  wards  of  a  hospital ;  but  when  the  disorder 
has  proceeded  to  such  a  height  as  to  deprive  the  maniac  of 
all  moral  restraint,  and  precipitate  him  on  some  deed  of  vio- 
lence, he  is  to  be  considered  as  most  capable  of  perceiving 
moral  distinctions,  and,  consequently,  most  responsible  for 
his  actions! 

§  19.  The  qualifications  with  which  some  of  the  latest 
writers  have  promulgated  this  test  of  responsibility,  encour- 
age the  hope,  that  it  will  ere  long  be  viewed  in  a  very  differ- 
ent aspect.  A  disposition  to  disregard  the  old  landmarks  on 
this  point  was  manifested,  not  long  since,  by  Lord  Lynd- 
hurst,  in  the  case  of  the  King  v.  Orford,  when  he  directed 
the  jury  to  acquit  the  prisoner,  if  satisfied,  "  that  he  did  not 
know,  when  he  committed  the  act,  what  the  effect  of  it,  if 
fatal,  would  be  with  reference  to  the  crime  of  murder ; "  *  in 
other  words,  they  were  to  satisfy  themselves,  before  acquit- 
ting him,  that  he  did  not  know  that  the  act  would  be 
essentially  murder,  —  that  crime  which  in  the  abstract  is 
equally  abhorred  by  the  sane  and  the  insane.  Still,  how- 


i  5  Carrington  and  Payne,  168.  The  defendant,  in  this  case,  was  tried  for 
murder.  It  appeared  that  he  entertained  the  notion,  that  the  person  whom 
he  shot  and  many  others  were  desirous  of  depriving  him  of  his  liberty,  and 
had  accordingly  conspired  together  to  accomplish  their  purpose,  and,  under 
the  influence  of  this  delusion,  he  would  abuse  people  whom  he  met  in  the 
streets,  though  wholly  unacquainted  with  them.  In  his  pocket  was  found  a 
paper  purporting  to  be  "  a  List  of  Hadleigh  Conspirators  against  my  Life,"  in 
which  he  had  enrolled  the  names  of  the  deceased  and  his  family.  Several 
medical  witnesses  who  heard  the  evidence,  deposed  that  the  prisoner  was 
affected  with  monomania. 


28  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ever,  this  is  not  sufficient,  for  he  might,  like  Hadfield  and 
many  others,  have  recognized  the  wrong  and  illegality  of 
the  act,  and  been  perfectly  conscious  of  its  consequences  to 
himself,  while  he  felt  impelled  to  its  execution  by  a  voice 
from  heaven,  or  by  a  strong  conviction  of  certain  great  ends 
which  it  was  to  promote,  and  thus  have  acted  the  part,  if 
the  expression  may  be  allowed,  of  an  insane  Abraham  or 
Brutus.  This  principle,  therefore,  is  far  from  being  univer- 
sally applicable,  though  if  it  had  been  admitted  in  the  case 
of  Bellingham,  it  would  have  produced  the  acquittal  of  that 
unfortunate  man.  The  criminal  act  which  he  committed 
was  not  viewed  by  him  at  all  as  one  of  murder,  any  more 
than  the  killing  of  a  brute  for  the  same  purpose,  but  merely 
as  a  disagreeable  though  justifiable  method  of  bringing  his 
affairs  before  the  country,  and  obtaining  redress  for  his  man- 
ifold wrongs  and  sufferings.  And  yet  Lord  Lyndhurst,  in 
this  very  case,  expressed  his  approbation  of  the  doctrines 
laid  down  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield  on  the  trial  of 
Bellingham,  —  doctrines  which  he  had  found  it  necessary 
here  to  modify,  in  order  that  they  might  afford  to  an  inno- 
cent man  the  protection  to  which  he  was  entitled!  Mr. 
Chitty  seems  inclined  to  proceed  a  step  farther  on  this  point. 
"  The  substantial  question  presented  to  the  jury,"  he  ob- 
serves, "is,  whether,  at  the  time  the  alleged  criminal  act 
was  committed,  the  prisoner  was  incapable  of  judging 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  did  not  then  know  he  was 
committing  an  offence  against  the  law  of  God  and  of  na- 
ture." l  By  some  late  Scotch  writers  on  criminal  law,  this 
test  of  responsibility  has  been  disapproved  of,  in  still  more 
explicit  terms.  Baron  Hume  disposes  of  it  in  the  following 
language :  "  Would  he  have  answered  on  the  question,  that 
it  is  wrong  to  kill  a  fellow  creature  ?  this  is  hardly  to  be 
considered  a  just  criterion  of  such  a  state  of  mind  as  ought 
to  make  him  answer  to  the  law  for  his  acts.  Because  a  per- 
son may  happen  to  answer  in  this  way,  who  is  yet  so  abso- 
lutely insane  as  to  have  lost  all  power  of  observation  of  facts, 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  354. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  29 

all  discernment  of  the  good  or  bad  intentions  of  those  who 
are  about  him,  or  even  the  knowledge  of  their  persons. 
Besides,  the  question  is  put  in  another  and  a  more  special 
sense,  as  relative  to  the  act  done  by  the  panel,  and  his  know- 
ledge of  the  place  in  which  he  did  it.  Did  he  at  that  moment 
understand  the  evil  of  what  he  did  ?  Was  he  impressed  with 
the  consciousness  of  guilt  and  fear  of  punishment?  —  it  is 
then  a  pertinent  and  a  material  question,  but  one  which 
cannot  be  rightly  answered,  without  taking  into  considera- 
tion the  whole  circumstances  of  the  situation.  Every  judg- 
ment in  the  matter  of  right  and  wrong  supposes  a  case,  or 
state  of  facts  to  which  it  applies.  And  though  the  person 
may  have  that  vestige  of  reason  which  may  enable  him  to 
answer  in  the  general,  that  murder  is  a  crime,  yet  if  he  can- 
not distinguish  a  friend  from  an  enemy,  or  a  benefit  from  an 
injury,  but  conceives  every  thing  about  him  to  be  the  reverse 
of  what  it  really  is,  and  mistakes  the  ideas  of  his  fancy  in 
that  respect  for  realities,  those  remains  of  intellect  are  of  no 
sort  of  service  to  him  in  the  government  of  his  actions,  in 
enabling  him  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  what  is  right  or  wrong 
on  any  particular  occasion."  l  From  all  this,  Hume  draws 
the  broad  conclusion,  that  the  judgment  of  right  and  wrong 
ha£  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of  responsibility.  This 
view  of  the  subject  is  certainly  liberal  enough,  and  increases 
our  regret,  that  it  should  be  contrasted  in  a  subsequent  stage 
of  his  remarks,  by  one  of  those  vague  and  senseless  notions, 
that  seem  to  have  obtained  a  prescriptive  place  in  the  books 
on  criminal  law.  "  It  is  not  to  be  understood,"  he  continues, 
"  that  there  is  any  privilege  of  mere  weakness  of  intellect,  or 
of  a  strange  and  moody  humor,  or  of  a  crazy  and  capricious, 
or  irregular  temper  and  habit.  None  of  these  things  either 
are,  or  ought  to  be  law."  When  all  these  traits  are  observed 
in  an  individual,  or  any  one  of  them  in  a  remarkable  degree, 
there  is  great  reason  to  suspect  the  existence  of  insanity,  and 
the  most  faithful  means  should  be  resorted  to,  in  order  to 
determine  this  fact.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  the  sus- 

1  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland  respecting  Crimes,  I,  36. 
3* 


30  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

picion  will  prove  to  be  well  founded,  and  the  judgment  of 
right  and  wrong  on  "  particular  occasions  "  to  be  completely 
perverted.  These  traits  of  character  must  not  be  considered 
as  they  too  generally  are,  in  and  by  themselves  exclusively, 
and  unconnected  with  the  previous  moral  and  intellectual 
habits  of  the  individual,  but  as  symptoms  of  a  deviation  from 
the  normal  condition  —  of  pathological  changes  in  the  action 
of  the  cerebral  organism.  When  viewed  in  this  light,  they 
will  be  examined  with  the  patience  and  intelligence  neces- 
sary to  establish,  beyond  doubt,  the  existence  of  that  insanity 
of  which  they  are  the  almost  certain  signs,  instead  of  being 
hastily  dismissed,  as  only  the  marks  of  an  ill-governed, 
malicious  temper. 

§  20.  Mr.  Alison  lays  down  the  principle,  that  "  to  amount 
to  a  complete  bar  to  punishment,  the  insanity,  either  at  the 
time  of  committing  the  crime,  or  of  the  trial,  must  have  been 
of  such  a  kind  as  entirely  deprived  the  accused  of  the  use  of 
reason,  as  applied  to  the  act  in  question,  and  the  knowledge 
that  he  was  doing  wrong  in  committing  it."  *  This  is  all 
very  clear  and  rational,  but  a  subsequent  remark  shows,  that 
in  his  struggle  with  the  errors  of  the  law,  he  had  not  com- 
pletely emancipated  his  mind  from  their  binding  influence. 
"  Anything,"  he  observes,  "  short  of  this  complete  alienation 
of  reason,  will  be  no  defence ;  and  mere  oddity  of  manner, 
or  half-craziness  of  disposition,  if  unaccompanied  by  such  an 
obscuring  of  the  conscience,  will  not  avail  the  prisoner." 
The  idea  that  "anything  short  of  complete  alienation  of 
reason  will  be  no  defence,"  is  not  only  at  variance  with  his 
previous  qualification,  that  this  loss  of  reason  must  be  in 
reference  "to  the  act  in  question,"  but  is  identically  the 
doctrine  of  the  last  century,  the  fallacy  of  which  was  clearly 
exposed  by  Erskine  in  Hadfield's  case.  "What  is  precisely 
meant  by  such  vague  phraseology  as  "  half-craziness  of  dispo- 
sition," it  would  be  hardly  worth  while  to  inquire ;  it  is 
enough  to  say,  that,  taking  the  language  in  its  most  natural 
and  obvious  signification,  the  mental  condition  expressed  by 

1  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland,  etc.,  645. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  31 

it  is  one  utterly  unknown  in  metaphysics  or  medicine.  Mr. 
Alison  very  justly  disapproves  of  the  law  as  laid  down  by 
Chief  Justice  Mansfield,  in  Bellingham's  case,  viz. ;  that  the 
prisoner  was  'accountable,  because  he  could  distinguish  good 
from  evil,  and  knew  that  murder  was  a  crime ;  but  his  remark 
respecting  it  betrays  an  ignorance  of  insanity,  that  would  be 
surprising  were  it  not  so  common  in  discussions  upon  this 
subject.  "  On  this  case,"  says  he,  "  it  may  be  observed,  that 
unquestionably  the  mere  fancying  a  series  of  injuries  to  have 
been  received  will  not  serve  as  an  excuse  for  murder,  for  this 
plain  reason,  that,  supposing  it  true,  that  such  injuries  had 
been  received,  they  would  have  furnished  no  excuse  for  the 
shedding  of  blood ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  such  an  illusion 
as  deprives  the  panel  of  the  sense  that  what  he  did  was 
wrong,  amounts  to  legal  insanity,  though  he  was  perfectly 
aware  that  murder  in  general  was  a  crime ;  and,  therefore, 
the  law  appears  to  have  been  more  correctly  laid  down,  in 
the  cases  of  Hadfield  and  Bowler,  than  in  this  instance." 
Whether  the  insane  belief  have  reference  to  a  matter  of  fact, 
or  to  views  of  right  and  wrong,  it  ought  equally  to  be  regarded 
as  annulling  legal  responsibility.  If  a  single  step  in  the 
reasoning  which  leads  to  the  commission  of  a  criminal  act 
be  the  offspring  of  insanity,  the  conclusion  must  necessarily 
be  vitiated  thereby.  If  this  be  the  law  by  which  maniacs  are 
to  be  tried,  few  will  escape  punishment  for  criminal  acts  ;  for, 
in  by  far  the  greater  proportion,  such  acts  have  been  com- 
mitted in  consequence  of  a  fancying  of  injuries  received. 
One  man  kills  his  neighbor  whom  he  insanely  fancies  to 
have  joined  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  him  of  his  property  or 
his  liberty ;  or  for  having  insulted  and  exposed  him  to  scorn 
and  derision ;  or  for  standing  in  the  way  of  his  attaining 
certain  honors  or  estates ;  yet  the  insanity  is  not  to  excuse 
him,  unless  it  deprived  him  of  the  consciousness  that  he  was 
doing  a  wrong  act.  The  existence  of  the  delusion  is  obvious 
and  cannot  be  mistaken ;  but  what  may  be  the  views  of  the 
maniac  respecting  the  moral  character  of  the  criminal  acts 
which  he  commits  under  its  influence,  can  never  be  exactly 
known ;  and,  therefore,  they  ought  not  to  be  made  the  crite- 


32  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

rion  of  responsibility.  Even  if  the  party  himself  acknowl- 
edge that  he  knew  he  was  doing  wrong,  the  very  fact  of  his 
insanity  destroys  the  value  of  his  confession  which  is  no 
more  entitled  to  notice  than  his  most  incoherent  ravings. 
But  it  is  known,  that  one  of  the  most  striking  and  character- 
istic effects  of  insanity  on  the  mental  operations  is,  to  destroy 
the  relations  between  end  and  means,  —  between  the  object 
in  view  and  the  course  necessary  to  pursue  in  order  to  obtain 
it,  —  between,  as  in  the  cases  just  instanced,  the  fancied 
injury  and  the  measure  of  punishment  it  deserves.  It  was  in 
accordance  with  these  views,  that  Lord  Erskine  pronounced 
delusion  to  be  the  true  test  of  such  insanity  as  exempts  from 
punishment,  and  that  the  correctness  of  the  principle  was 
recognized  by  the  Court.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to 
divine  why  Mr.  Alison  should  say,  that  the  law  was  more 
correctly  laid  down  in  Hadfield's  case,  when  it  is  in  direct 
conflict  with  his  own  opinions.  Thus,  as  if  frightened  by 
their  own  temerity  in  overthrowing  one  ancient  landmark  on 
the  domain  of  error,  it  would  seem  as  if  these  writers  were 
anxious  to  compound  with  their  fears,  by  adhering  with 
unusual  pertinacity  to  all  the  rest.  The  radical  fault  of  this 
test  of  responsibility  lies  in  the  metaphysical  error  of  always 
looking  on  right  and  wrong  in  the  abstract,  —  as  things 
having  a  positive  and  independent  existence,  and  not  as  they 
really  are,  mere  terms  expressing  the  relations  that  exist 
between  actions  and  certain  faculties  of  our  moral  nature. 
That  they  express  the  same  relations  in  nearly  all  men,  is 
because  nearly  all  men  possess  the  same  faculties ;  but  when 
these  faculties  are  absent,  as  in  idiots,  or  when  their  action 
is  perverted  by  disease,  as  in  the  insane,  the  relations  of  right 
and  wrong  are  widely  different. 

§  21.  Another  trait,  which  has  been  greatly  relied  on 
as  a  criterion  in  doubtful  cases,  is  the  design  or  contrivance 
that  has  been  manifested  in  the  commission  of  the  criminal 
act.  That  it  should  ever  have  been  viewed  in  this  light,  is 
an  additional  proof,  if  more  were  wanting,  of  the  deplorable 
ignorance  that  characterizes  the  jurisprudence  of  insanity; 
for  the  slightest  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  33 

would  have  prevented  this  pernicious  mistake.  The  source 
of  this  error  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  "that, 
among  the  vulgar,  some  are  for  reckoning  madmen,  those 
only  who  are  frantic  or  violent  to  some  degree ; " l  the  vio- 
lence being  supposed  to  preclude  every  attempt  at  design, 
or  plan  of.  operations.  In  the  trial  of  Bellingham,  the  attor- 
ney-general declared  that,  "  if  even  insanity  in  all  his  other 
acts  had  been  manifest,  yet  the  systematic  correctness,  with 
which  the  prisoner  contrived  the  murder,  showed  that  he 
possessed  a  mind,  at  the  time,  capable  of  distinguishing  right 
from  wrong." 2  In  Arnold's  case  (§  10),  great  stress  was 
laid  on  the  circumstances  of  his  having  purchased  shot  of  a 
much  larger  size,  than  he  usually  did  when  he  went  out  to 
shoot,  with  the  design  then  formed  of  committing  the  mur- 
der he  afterwards  attempted.  Mr.  Russell 8  recognizes  the 
correctness  of  the  principle,  and  lays  it  down  as  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land.  If,  however,  the  power  of  design  is  really 
not  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  insanity,  this  pre- 
tended test  must  be  as  fallacious  as  that  already  adverted  to. 
What  must  be  thought  of  the  attainments  of  those  learned 
authorities,  in  the  study  of  madness,  who  see  in  the  power  of 
systematic  design  a  disproof  of  the  existence  of  insanity  when, 
from  the  humblest  menial  in  the  service  of  a  lunatic  asylum, 
they  might  have  heard  of  the  ingenuity  of  contrivance  and 
adroitness  of  execution,  that  preeminently  characterize  the 
plans  of  the  insane?  If  the  mind  continues  rational  on 
some  subjects,  it  is  no  more  than  what  might  be  expected, 
that  this  rationality  should  embrace  the  power  of  design, 
since  a  person  could  not  properly  be  called  rational  on  any 
point,  in  regard  to  which  he  had  lost  his  customary  ability  to 
form  his  plans  and  designs  for  the  future.  These  view.s  are 
abundantly  confirmed  by  ev.ery  day's  observation.  The  sen- 
timent of  cunning,  too,  which  is  necessary  to  the  successful 
execution  of  one's  projects,  holds  but  a  low  place  in  the  scale 


1  Sir  John  Xicholl,  in  Dew  v.  Clark,  3  Addams's  Reports,  441. 

2  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 

3  Russell,  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  13. 


34  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  the  mental  faculties  —  being  a  merely  animal  instinct  — 
and  is  oftentimes  observed  to  be  rendered  more  active  by 
insanity,  so  as  to  require  the  utmost  vigilance  to  detect  and 
defeat'  its  wiles.  One  who  is  not  practically  acquainted 
with  the  habits  of  the  insane,  can  scarcely  conceive  of  the 
cunning  which  they  will  practise,  when  bent  on  accomplish- 
ing a  favorite  object.  Those,  for  instance,  whose  madness 
takes  a  suicidal  direction,  are  known  to  employ  wonderful 
address  in  procuring  and  concealing  the  means  of  self-de- 
struction ;  pretending  to  have  seen  the  folly  of  their  designs, 
and  to  have  renounced  them  entirely,  sending  away  their  at- 
tendants after  thus  lulling  them  into  security,  and,  when  least 
expected,  renewing  their  suicidal  attempts.  When  desirous 
of  leaving  their  confinement,  also,  the  consummate  tact  with 
which  they  will  set  suspicion  at  rest,  the  forecast  with  which 
they  make  their  preparations  for  escape,  and  the  sagacity 
with  which  they  choose  the  time  ahd  place  of  action,  would 
do  infinite  credit  to  the  conceptions  of  the  most  sound  and 
intelligent  minds.  Mr.  Haslam  has  related  a  case  so  strik- 
ingly illustrative  of  this  trait,  that  it  is  well  worth  extracting 
in  this  connection.  An  Essex  farmer,  after  having  so  well 
counterfeited  recovery  as  to  produce  his  liberation,  and  having 
been  sent  back,  immediately  became  tranquil,  and  remon- 
strated on  the  injustice  of  his  confinement.  "  Having  once 
deceived  me,  he  wished  much  that  my  opinion  should  be 
taken  respecting  the  state  of  his  intellects,  and  assured  his 
friends  that  he  would  submit  to  my  determination.  I  had 
taken  care  to  be  well  prepared  for  this  interview,  by  obtain- 
ing an  accurate  account  of  the  manner  in  which  he  had  con- 
ducted himself.  At  this  examination,  he  managed  himself 
with  admirable  address.  He  spoke  of  the  treatment  he  had 
received  from  the  persons  under  -whose  care  he  was  then 
placed,  as  most  kind  and  fatherly :  he  also  expressed  himself 
as  particularly  fortunate  in  being  under  my  care,  and  bestow- 
ed many  handsome  compliments  on  my  skill  in  treating  this 
disorder,  and  expatiated  on  my  sagacity  in  perceiving  the 
slightest  tinges  of  insanity.  When  I  wished  him  to  explain 
v  certain  parts  of  his  conduct,  and  particularly  some  extrava- 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  35 

gant  opinions,  respecting  certain  persons  and  circumstances, 
he  disclaimed  all  knowledge  of  such  circumstances,  and  felt 
himself  hurt  that  my  mind  should  have  been  poisoned  so 
much  to  his  prejudice.  He  displayed  equal  subtlety  on  three 
other  occasions  when  I  visited  him  ;  although,  by  protracting 
the  conversation,  he  let  fall  sufficient  to  satisfy  my  mind  that 
he  was  a  madman.  In  a  short  time  he  was  removed  to  the 
hospital,  where  he  expressed  great  satisfaction  in  being  under 
my  inspection.  The  private  madhouse,  which  he  had  for- 
merly so  much  commended,  now  became  the  subject  of 
severe  animadversion ;  he  said  that  he  had  there  been  treated 
with  extreme  cruelty,  that  he  hacl  been  nearly  starved,  and 
eaten  up  by  vermin  of  various  descriptions.  On  inquiring 
of  some  convalescent  patients,  I  found  (as  I  had  suspected) 
that  I  was  as  much  the  subject  of  abuse  when  absent,  as  any 
of  his  supposed  enemies,  although  to  my  face  he  was  cour- 
teous and  respectful.  More  than  a  month  had  elapsed  since 
his  admission  into  the  hospital,  before  he  pressed  me  for  my 
opinion ;  probably  confiding  in  his  address,  and  hoping  to 
deceive  me.  At  length  he  appealed  to  my  decision,  and 
urged  the  correctness  of  his  conduct  during  confinement  as 
an  argument  for  his  liberation.  But  when  I  informed  him 
of  circumstances  he  supposed  me  unacquainted  with,  and 
assured  him  that  he  was  a  proper  subject  for  the  asylum 
which  he  then  inhabited,  he  suddenly  poured  forth  a  torrent 
of  abuse ;  talked  in  the  most  incoherent  manner ;  insisted  on 
the  truth  of  what  he  formerly  denied;  breathed  vengeance 
against  his  family  and  friends ;  and  became  so  outrageous 
that  it  was  necessary  to  order  him  to  be  strictly  confined. 
He  continued  in  a  state  of  unceasing  fury  for  more  than 
fifteen  months."1  Even  the  purely  intellectual  power  of 
combining  a  series  of  acts  that  shall  accomplish  or  eventuate 
in  certain  results,  when  properly  carried  into  execution,  seems 
to  be  not  only  less  frequently  involved  in  the  mental  derange- 
ment, but  often  to  have  received  a  preternatural  degree  of 
strength  and  activity.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac  who  endea- 

1  Observations  on  Madness,  53. 


36  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

vored  to  discover  the  perpetual  motion,  and,  in  the  course  of 
his  attempts,  constructed  some  very  curious  machines.  Es- 
quirol  has  given  the  case  of  a  mad  general,  who,  though 
laboring  under  great  mental  excitement  and  disorder,  con- 
ceived of  an  improvement  in  the  construction  of  a  military 
weapon,  and  made  a  drawing  of  the  same.  Having  expres- 
sed a  desire  to  have  a  model  of  it  cast,  and  given  his  word  of 
honor  that  he  would  go  only  to  the  founder's  and  return 
peaceably,  he  was  permitted  to  go.  He  went  on  foot  to  the 
founder's,  gave  him  the  drawing,  requested  him  to  cast  a 
model  of  it,  and  passed  an  hour  in  the  shop,  without  the 
founder's  once  suspecting  that  he  was  dealing  with  a  maniac. 
On  leaving,  he  remarked  that  he  would  return  in  eight  days, 
as  he  did,  although  a  period  of  great  excitement  intervened 
during  that  time.  On  the  second  visit,  he  found  the  model 
executed,  and  gave  an  order  for  fifty  thousand  to  be  cast, 
which  was  the  only  circumstance  that  led  the  founder  to  sus- 
pect the  general's  disease.  It  is  observed  that  the  weapon 
thus  improved  was  subsequently  adopted  in  the  army.1  The 
plans  which  the  brain  of  a  maniac,  who  imagines  himself  a 
monarch,  is  perpetually  hatching  for  the  management  of  his 
kingdom,  will  bear  to  be  compared  with  the  political  schemes 
of  some  rulers  who  are  supposed  to  have  the  advantage  of 
sanity  on  their  side. 

§  22.  If,  then,  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  the  power  of  design,  are  to  be  considered  as 
fallacious  tests  of  responsibility,  notwithstanding  they  have 
proved  the  death  warrant  of  many  a  wretched  maniac,  let  us 
come  back  to  that  proposed  by  Erskine  —  delusion  —  and 
see  if  that  will  bear  a  more  rigid  scrutiny,  when  viewed  by  the 
light  of  modern  discovery.2  Now,  if  it  ,were  a  fact,  that  the 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  JI.  190. 

2  The  use  of  this  test  of  irresponsible  insanity  has  been  sanctioned  by  the 
high  authority  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  the  case  of  Dew  v.  Clark,  3  Addams, 
79.     "  The  true  criterion,"  says  he,  "  the  true  test,  of  the  absence  or  pre- 
sence of  insanity,  I  take  to  be  the  absence  or  presence  of  what,  used  in  a 
certain  sense  of  it,  is  comprisable  in  a  single  term,  namely,  delusion."     "  In 
short,  I  look  upon  delusion  in  this  sense  of  it,  and  insanity  to  be,  almost,  if  not 


PRELIMINARY  "VIEWS.  37 

reason,  or,  to  speak  more  definitely,  the  intellectual  powers 
are  exclusively  liable  to  derangement,  this  test  would  be 
unobjectionable,  and  would  furnish  an  easy  and  satisfactory 
clew  to  the  elucidation  of  doubtful  cases.1  But  it  must  not 
be  forgotten,  that  the  author  of  our  being  has  also  endowed 
us  with  certain  moral  faculties,  comprising  the  various  senti- 
ments, propensities,  and  affections  which,  like  the  intellect, 
being  connected  with  the  brain,  are  necessarily  affected  by 
pathological  actions  in  that  organism.  The  abnormal  condi- 
tion thus  produced  may  exert  an  astonishing  influence  on  the 
conduct,  changing  the  peaceable  and  retiring  individual  into 
a  demon  of  fury,  or,  at  the  least,  turning  him  from  the  calm 
and  quiet  of  his  lawful  and  innocent  occupations,  into  a 
career  of  shameless  dissipation  and  debauchery,  while  the 
intellectual  perceptions  seem  to  have  lost  none  of  their  ordi- 
nary soundness  and  vigor.  The  existence  of  this  form  of 
insanity  is  now  too  well  established,  to  be  questioned  by 

altogether,  convertible  terms."  "On  the  contrary,  in  the  absence  of  any 
such  delusion,  with  whatever  extravagances  a  supposed  lunatic  may  be  justly 
chargeable,  and  how  like  soever  to  a  real  madman  he  may  either  think  or 
act  on  some  one,  or  on  all  subjects ;  still,  in  the  absence,  I  repeat,  of  anything 
in  the  nature  of  delusion,  so  understood  as  above,  the  supposed  lunatic  is,  in 
my  judgment,  not  properly,  or  essentially  insane." 

1  Even  Mr.  Erskine  himself  has  furnished  an  exception  to  his  own  rule,  in 
a  case  he  has  related  of  a  young  woman  indicted  for  murder,  who  was  acquit- 
ted on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  it  was  not  pretended  that  she  labored 
under  a»y  delusion  whatever.  "  It  must  be  a  consolation,"  he  says,  "  to  those 
who  prosecuted  her.  that  she  was  acquitted,  as  she  is  at  this  time  in  a  most 
undoubted  and  deplorable  state  of  insanity ;  but  I  confess,  if  I  had  been  upon 
the  jury  who  tried  her,  I  should  have  entertained  great  doubts  and  difficul- 
ties ;  for,  although  this  unhappy  woman  had  before  exhibited  strong  marks 
of  insanity  arising  from  grief  and  disappointment ;  yet  she  acted  upon  facts 
and  circumstances  which  had  an  existence,  and  which  were  calculated,  upon 
the  ordinary  principles  of  human  action,  to  produce  the  most  violent  resent- 
ment. l\Ir.  Errington  having  just  cast  her  off,  and  married  another  woman, 
or  taken  her  under  his  protection,  her  jealousy  was  excited  to  such  a  pitch, 
as  occasionally  to  overpower  her  understanding ;  but  when  she  went  to  Mr. 
Errington's  house  where  she  shot  him,  she  went  with  the  express  and  deliberate 
purpose  of  shooting  him."  "  She  did  not  act  under  a  delusion,  that  he  had 
deserted  her  when  he  had  not,  but  took  revenge  upon  him  for  an  actual  de- 
sertion." Erskine's  Speeches. 

4 


38  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

those  who  have  any  scientific  reputation  to  lose ;  and  though 
the  proofs  of  this  will  be  furnished  in  their  proper  place,  it 
will,  for  the  present,  be  supposed  that  the  assent  of  the 
reader  has  been  obtained  without  them.  In  this  the  most 
deplorable  condition  to  which  a  human  being  can  be  reduced, 
where  the  wretched  patient  finds  himself  urged,  perhaps,  to 
the  commission  of  every  outrage,  and  though  perfectly  con- 
scious of  what  he  is  doing,  unable  to  offer  the  slightest  resis- 
tance to  the  overwhelming  power  that  impels  him,  the  respon- 
sibility is  to  be  considered  as  not  affected,  because  no  delusion 
is  present  to  disturb  and  distort  the  mental  vision !  In  short, 
the  very  character  that  renders  this  mental  disorder  more  ter- 
rible than  all  others,  is  also  that  which  is  made  to  steel  the 
heart  against  the  claims  of  humanity  in  behalf  of  its  misera- 
ble victim. 

§  23.  The  doctrine  of  moral  insanity  has  been  as  yet  un- 
favorably received  by  judicial  authorities,  not  certainly  for 
want  of  sufficient  facts  to  support  it,  but  probably  from  that 
common  tendency  of  the  mind,  to  resist  innovations  upon 
old  and  generally  received  views.  If,  a  quarter  of  a  century 
ago,  one  of  the  highest  law-officers  of  Great  Britain  pro- 
nounced the  manifestation  of  "  systematic  correctness"  of  an 
action,  to  be  a  proof  of  sanity  sufficient  to  render  all  others  un- 
necessary, it  is  not  surprising,  that  the  idea  of  moral  insanity 
has  been  considered  by  the  legal  profession,  as  having  sprung 
from  the  teeming  brains  of  medical  theorists.  In  the  fulness 
of  this  spirit,  Mr.  Chitty  declares,  that,  "  unless  a  jury  should 
be  satisfied  that  the  mental  faculties  have  been  perverted,  or, 
at  least,  the  faculties  of  reason  and  judgment,  it  is  believed, 
that  the  party  subject  to  such  a  moral  insanity,  as  it  is  term- 
ed, would  not  be  protected  from  criminal  punishment ; "  l  and 
in  the  trial  of  Howison  for  the  murder  of  the  widow  Geddes, 
at  King's  Crammond,  Scotland,  two  or  three  years  since, 
moral  insanity  which  was  pleaded  in  his  defence,  was  declar- 
ed by  the  court  to  be  a  "  groundless  theory," 2  Such  opin- 

1  1  Chitty,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  352. 

2  Simpson  on  Homicidal  Insanity,  in  a  Treatise  on  Popular  Education. 
Boston,  1834. 


PRELIMINAKY  VIEWS.  39 

ions,  from  quarters  where  a  modest  teachableness  would 
have  been  more  becoming  than  an  arrogant  contempt  for  the 
results  of  other  men's  inquiries,  involuntarily  suggest  to  the 
mind  a  comparison  of  their  authors  with  the  saintly  persecu- 
tors of  Galileo,  who  resolved  by  solemn  statutes,  that  nature 
always  had  operated  and  always  should  operate  in  accord- 
ance with  their  views  of  propriety  and  truth. 

§  24.  It  appears,  then,  that  as  a  test  of  responsibility, 
delusion  is  no  better  than  those  before  mentioned.  The 
truth  is,  there  is  no  single  character  which  is  not  equally  lia- 
ble to  objection.  Jurists  who  have  been  so  anxious  to 
obtain  some  definition  of  insanity,  which  shall  furnish  a  rule 
for  the  determination  of  responsibility,  should  understand, 
that  such  a  wish  is  chimerical  from  the  very  nature  of  things. 
Insanity  is  a  disease,  and,  as  is  the  case  with  all  other  dis- 
eases, the  fact  of  its  existence  is  never  established  by  a  single 
diagnostic  symptom,  but  by  the  whole  body  of  symptoms,  no 
particular  one  of  which  is  present  in  every  case.  To  distin- 
guish the  manifestations  of  health  from  those  of  disease, 
requires  the  exercise  of  special  learning  and  judgment;  and, 
if  no  one  doubts  this  proposition,  when  stated  in  reference  to 
the  bowels,  the  lungs,  the  heart,  the  liver,  the  kidneys,  etc., 
what  sufficient  or  even  plausible  reason  is  there,  why  it 
should  be  doubted  when  predicated  of  the  brain  ?  The  func- 
tions of  those  organs  proceed  with  the  regularity  and  same- 
ness of  clock-work,  compared  with  the  ever-varying  and  une- 
qual phenomena  of  this;  and  yet  there  are  persons  who 
assume  a  magisterial  tone  in  writing  or  talking  of  the  latter, 
who  would  defer  to  a  tyro's  judgment,  in  whatever  concerns 
the  others.  If,  when  anxious  to  know  all  we  can,  respecting 
a  disease  of  the  lungs  or  stomach,  we  repair  to  those  who 
have  a  high  and  well-founded  reputation,  in  the  pathology  of 
these  parts,  why  adopt  the  converse  of  this  rule  in  regard  to 
diseases  of  the  brain  ?  No  reasonable  person  would  desire  to 
set  up  an  insuperable  barrier  between  the  domain  of  profes- 
sional knowledge  and  that  of  common  sense  and  common 
information ;  but  it  is  not  too  much  to  insist,  that  facts  estab- 
lished by  men  of  undoubted  competence  and  good  faith, 


40  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

should   be  rejected   for  better  reasons  than  the   charge   of 
"  groundless  theory." 

§  25.  In  the  passage  taken  from  Lord  Hale  (§  8),  it  will 
be  observed,  that  he  considers  all  crime  to  be  the  offspring  of 
partial  insanity,  and  the  inference  he  meant  should  be  drawn 
from  it  is,  that  partial  insanity  furnishes  no  excuse  for  crime. 
It  is  a  curious  fact,  that  many  benevolent  people,  in  their 
desire  to  palliate  the  sins  of  criminals,  have  inculcated  the 
same  principle,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  from  it  a  very 
different  inference.  Says  the  former:  crime  must  be  pun- 
ished ;  but  all  crime  proceeds  from  madness,  therefore  mad- 
ness furnishes  no  exemption  from  punishment.  Say  the  lat- 
ter :  madmen  are  not  responsible  for  their  criminal  acts ;  but 
madness  is  the  source  of  all  crime,  therefore  madmen  and 
criminals  are  equally  irresponsible  and  exempt  from  punish- 
ment. Which  of  these  two  precious  specimens  of  human 
subtlety  can  claim  the  triumph  of  absurdity,  it  would  not  be 
easy  to  determine.  Crime  is  not  necessarily  the  result  of 
madness,  not  even  when  perpetrated  under  the  excitement  of 
fierce  and  violent  passions ;  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  it 
is  never  so,  but  is  always  actuated  by  motives ;  insufficient 
it  may  be,  but  still  rational  motives,  having  reference  to 
definite  and  real  objects.  The  misfortune  which  the  crimi- 
nal is  going  to  avert,  the  interest  which  he  is  going  to  sub- 
serve, the  revenge  he  is  about  to  gratify,  the  insult  or  injury 
he  is  about  to  repay,  are  real  injuries  and  insults  and  inter- 
ests, however  much  they  may  be  exaggerated,  or  however  dis- 
proportionately small  they  may  be  to  the  crime  they  provoke ; 
and,  the  ends  to  be  obtained  by  the  criminal  act,  are  real  and 
have  an  appreciable  value.  In  the  most  violent  trans- 
ports of  passion,  he  never  wholly  loses  his  knowledge  of 
the  true  relations  of  things.  The  person  whom  he  considers 
his  enemy,  or  the  author  of  the  insult,  is  really  such,  or  at 
least,  he  has  some  ground  for  believing  him  such ;  and  with 
the  absence  of  the  object  of  his  passion,  disappears  the  inten- 
tion to  offend.  Violent  passions  may  weaken  the  judgment, 
and  diminish  its  power  of  control,  but  they  do  not  vitiate  the 
perceptions,  nor  deprive  the  mind  of  its  powers  of  compari- 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  41 

son.  All  this  is  very  different  in  mental  derangement.  The 
causes  which  urge  the  insane  to  deeds  of  violence  are  gene- 
rally illusory  —  the  hallucinations  of  a  diseased  brain  —  or 
they  may  act  from  no  motive  at  all,  solely  in  obedience  to  a 
blind  impulse,  with  no  end  to  obtain,  nor  wish  to  gratify. 
Madness,  too,  is  more  or  less  independent  of  the  exciting 
causes  that  have  given  rise  to  it,  and  exists  long  after  those 
causes  have  been  removed,  and  after  the  paramount  wish  or 
object  has  been  obtained.  In  short,  madness  is  the  result  of 
a  certain  pathological  condition  of  the  brain,  while  the  crimi- 
nal effects  of  violent  passions  merely  indicate  unusual 
strength  of  those  passions,  or  a  deficient  education  of  those 
higher  faculties  that  furnish  the  necessary  restraint  upon 
their  power.  It  is  admitted,  that  strong  passions  do  deprive 
the  individual  of  the  power  of  calmly  deliberating,  and  per- 
ceiving the  terrible  consequences  of  his  fury ;  and  legislators 
have  wisely  distinguished  homicide  committed  under  their 
influence,  from  deliberate,  premeditated  homicide,  by  visiting 
it  with  a  minor  degree  of  punishment.  In  drunkenness  the 
same  effect  is  sometimes  produced  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
amount  to  temporary  insanity;  but  neither  does  this  any 
more  than  strong  passions  exempt  from  all  punishment;  for 
the  plain  reason,  that,  in  both  cases,  the  impairment  of  moral 
liberty  is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  individual  himself,  and  must 
be  imputed  to  him  as  a  fault.  If  the  remarks  on  this  point 
may  seem  to  be  unnecessarily  prolix,  it  can  only  be  observed, 
by  way  of  excuse,  that  where  opinions  are  handed  down,  as 
they  are  in  law,  from  one  generation  to  another,  they  attain 
much  the  same  kind  of  value  that  is  possessed  by  established 
facts  in  natural  science,  and  exert  an  influence  that  demands 
for  them  a  degree  of  consideration  which  their  intrinsic  merits 
do  not  deserve. 

§  26.  Enough  has  been  said,  it  is  believed,  to  convince 
every  unprejudiced  reader  that,  in  Great  Britain,  the  law 
of  insanity,  especially  that  relative  to  criminal  cases,  is  still 
loose,  vacillating,  and  greatly  behind  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge  of  that  disease.  If  we  carefully  examine  the 
cases  tried  within  the  last  hundred  years,  as  they  are  brought 

4* 


42  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

together  in  the  various  treatises  on  lunacy  and  on  criminal 
law,  the  utmost  respect  for  authority  will  not  prevent  us 
from  observing  the  want  of  any  definite  principle  as  the 
ground  of  the  difference  of  their  results.  Amid  the  mass  of 
theoretical  and  discordant  speculations  on  the  psychological 
effects  of  insanity,  and  of  crude  and  fanciful  tests  for  detect- 
ing its  presence,  which  these  trials  have  elicited,  the  student 
who  turns  to  them  for  the  purpose  of  informing  his  mind  on 
this  branch  of  his  profession,  finds  himself  completely  dis- 
heartened and  bewildered.  Instead  of  inquiring  into  the 
effect  produced  by  the  peculiar  delusions  of  the  accused  on 
his  ordinary  conduct  and  conversation,  and  especially  of 
their  connection  with  the  criminal  act  in  question,  the  courts, 
in  these  cases,  have  been  contented  with  laying  down  meta- 
physical dogmas  on  the  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  of 
good  and  evil,  and  the  measure  of  understanding  still  pos- 
sessed by  the  accused.  One  principle  after  another  has  been 
successively  abandoned  and  resumed,  either  with  the  strangest 
disregard  of  consistency,  or  the  most  extraordinary  ignorance 
of  previous  decisions.  Thus,  the  old  maxim  that  insanity 
does  not  annul  criminal  responsibility  in  one  who  retains  the 
power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  was  abandoned  in 
the  case  of  Hadfield,  reaffirmed  in  that  of  Bellingham,  (§  15), 
again  abandoned  in  the  trial  of  Martin,1  subsequently  modi- 
fied by  Lord  Lyndhurst  (§  19),  and  again,  in  the  year  1837,  a 
jury,  holding  in  their  hands  the  life  of  a  fellow  man,  are  told 
by  Mr.  Justice  Park,  that,  as  regards  the  effect  of  insanity  on 
responsibility  for  crime,  "it  is  merely  necessary  that  the 
party  should  have  sufficient  knowledge  and  reason  to  dis- 
criminate between  right  and  wrong" 2  Three  years  after- 
wards, on  the  trial  of  Oxford  for  shooting  at  the  Queen,  Lord 
Chief  Justice  Denman  told  the  jury,  "  that  the  question  for 
them  to  decide  was,  whether  the  prisoner  was  laboring  under 
that  species  of  insanity  which  satisfied  them  that  he  was 

1  Report  of  the  trial  of  Jonathan  Martin  for  setting  fire  to  the  York 
Minster. 

2  Trial  of  Greensmith,  noticed  in  Medico- Chirurg.  Review,  v.  28.  86, 

N.a 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  43 

quite  unaware  of  the  nature,  character,  and  consequences  of 
the  act  he  was  committing,  or,  in  other  words,  whether  he 
was  under  the  influence  of  a  diseased  mind,  and  was  really 
unconscious  at  the  time  he  was  committing  the  act,  that  it 
was  a  crime." l 

§  27.  In  the  spring  of  1843,  a  Scotchman  named  Mc- 
Naughton,  met  in  one  of  the  streets  of  London,  Mr.  Drum- 
mond,  the  private  secretary  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,  and  shot  him 
dead  with  a  pistol.  For  some  time  previous,  he  had  enter- 
tained the  delusion  that  he  was  pursued  by  enemies  who 
followed  him  every  where,  blasting  his  fame,  disturbing  his 
peace,  and  filling  him  with  intolerable  inquietude ;  and  fan- 
cying his  victim  to  be  one  of  the  crew,  he  determined  to 
sacrifice  him.  His  insanity  was  not  obvious  at  sight,  he  had 
recently  transacted  business,  he  viewed  some  of  his  relations 
in  their  true  light,  and  behaved  with  much  propriety  in  the 
ordinary  intercourse  with  men.  He  was  defended  by  able 
and  zealous  counsel  who  brought  before  the  jury  the  more 
sound  and  humane  views  of  insanity  which  have  resulted 
from  modern  inquiry,  and  the  court  readily  favored  his 
acquittal.  The  community,  however,  were  far  from  being 
satisfied  with  this  result,  for  it  beheld  only  two  facts  in  the 
case,  —  a  worthy  man  had  been  shot  down  in  broad  day, 
and  without  provocation,  by  one  who  could  transact  business, 
discourse  correctly,  and  who  showed  no  very  obvious  symp- 
toms of  insanity.  Participating  in  the  popular  feeling,  the 
house  of  Lords  propounded  to  the  law-judges  certain  queries 
relative  to  the  law  of  England  on  the  subject  of  insanity  as 
a  defence  in  criminal  actions.  The  queries  implied  a  doubt 
of  the  correctness  of  the  doctrine,  that  delusion,  in  and  of 
itself  alone,  is  necessarily  an  exculpatory  plea,  and  seemed 
to  suggest  the  idea  that,  to  have  this  effect,  it  must  be 
accompanied  by  some  other  mental  disability.  They  were 
intended,  no  doubt,  to  obtain  an  authoritative  exposition  of 
the  law  that  should  settle  its  principles  and  regulate  the 
future  practice  of  courts.  They  wished,  indeed,  to  obtain 

1  9  Carrington  &  Paine,  525. 


44  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

from  the  judges  collectively  what  had  eluded  their  grasp 
individually,  —  a  general  expression  of  the  law  capable  of 
embracing  every  possible  case,  and  working  injustice  to  none. 
We  shall  see  whether  the  attempt  of  the  judges  fulfils  this 
high  object. 

§  28.  The  first  query  is,  "  what  is  the  law  respecting 
alleged  crimes  committed  by  persons  afflicted  with  insane 
delusions  in  respect  of  one  or  more  particular  subjects  or  per- 
sons ;  as,  for  instance,  where,  at  the  time  of  the  commission 
of  the  alleged  crime,  the  accused  knew  he  was  acting  con- 
trary to  law,  but  did  the  act  complained  of  with  a  view,  under 
the  influence  of  insane  delusion,  of  redressing  or  avenging 
some  supposed  grievance  or  injury,  or  of  producing  some 
supposed  public  benefit  ? "  To  this  the  judges  reply  that, 
assuming  the  inquiry  "  to  be  confined  to  those  persons  who 
labor  under  such  partial  delusions  only,  and  are  not  in  other 
respects  insane,  they  are  of  the  opinion,  that  notwithstanding 
the  party  accused  did  the  act  complained  of,  with  a  view, 
under  the  influence  of  insane  delusion,  of  redressing  or  aveng- 
ing some  supposed  grievance  or  injury,  or  of  producing  some 
public  benefit,  he  is  nevertheless  punishable,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  crime  committed,  if  he  knew,  at  the  time  of 
committing  such  crime,  that  he  was  acting  contrary  to  law, 
by  which  expression  they  understand  their  Lordships  to  mean, 
the  law  of  the  land." 

§  29.  Had  the  principle  here  laid  down,  been  always 
strictly  followed,  it  is  very  certain  that  many  a  one  who  has 
been  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  would  have  met 
the  fate  of  ordinary  criminals.  Hadfield  knew  —  so  far  as  a 
man  in  his  condition  may  be  said  to  know  anything  —  that  in 
shooting  at  the  king,  he  was  doing  an  illegal  act,  because, 
when  apprehended,  he  declared  that  his  life  was  forfeited,  and 
that  he  did  the  deed  for  this  very  purpose,  in  order  that  by  his 
own  death,  he  might  fulfil  some  great  end  to  which  he 
fancied  himself  to  have  been  called.  The  mental  disability 
of  the  insane  may  be  evinced,  not  in  failing  to  recognize  the 
illegality  of  their  acts,  but  in  considering  themselves  as  ab- 
solved from  the  obligations  of  the  law.  An  act  which  they 


PRELIMINAKY   VIEWS.  45 

know  to  be  forbidden,  they  may  feel  constrained  to  commit 
by  reasons  that  transcend  all  law.  They  move  in  a  sphere 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  ordinary  motives  of  human  conduct, 
and  are  a  law  unto  themselves.  It  is  certainly  very  unrea- 
sonable for  any  one  to  believe,  that,  to  revenge  a  private 
grievance,  or  secure  a  public  benefit,  he  may  set  aside  all  law 
and  take  any  and  every  extreme  measure  that  may  seem  to 
him  necessary  for  the  purpose.  But  shall  we  be  guilty  of  the 
absurdity  of  expecting  an  insane  person  to  act  reasonably  in 
reference  to  his  delusions  ? 

§  30.  The  second  and  third  queries  are,  "  what  are  the 
proper  questions  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  when  a  person, 
alleged  to  be  afflicted  with  insane  delusion  respecting  one  or 
more  particular  subjects  or  persons,  is  charged  with  the  com- 
mission of  a  crime,  (murder,  for  example,)  and  insanity  is  set 
up  as  a  defence  ?  In  what  terms  ought  the  question  to  be 
left  to  the  jury,  as  to  the  prisoner's  state  of  mind  at  the  time 
when  the  act  was  committed  ?  " 

§  31.  The  judges  state  that  these  two  questions  can  be 
more  conveniently  answered  together,  and  their  reply  is,  that, 
"  to  establish  a  defence  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  it  must  be 
clearly  proved,  that  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  the 
party  accused  was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason 
from  disease  of  the  mind,  as  not  to  know  the  nature  and 
quality  of  the  act  he  was  doing,  or,  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he 
did  not  know  he  was  doing  what  was  wrong."  They  add,  that 
the  question  of  right  and  wrong  should  be  put  in  reference  to 
the  particular  act  with  which  he  is  charged. 

§  32.  The  principle  of  responsibility  here  laid  down,  man- 
ifestly conflicts  with  that  promulgated  in  the  answer  to  the 
first  query.  An  insane  person  may  do  an  act  he  knows  to 
be  contrary  to  law,  because  he  thinks  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  the  case  render  it  right  for  him  to  disregard  the 
law.  We  have  just  seen  that  Hadfield  admitted  that  he  had 
violated  the  law,  but  believed  he  was  right  in  so  doing,  for 
the  sake  of  the  end  which  it  would  enable  him  to  accomplish. 
Tried  by  the  former  test,  he  would  have  been  convicted, 
while  by  the  latter  he  would  have  been  acquitted.  Without 


46  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mentioning  all  the  objections  to  which  this  test  of  responsi- 
bility is  liable,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  it  furnishes  no  protec- 
tion to  that  large  class  of  the  insane  who  intertain  no  specific 
delusion,  but  act  from  momentary  irresistible  impulses,  or 
diseased  moral  perceptions. 

§  33.  The  fourth  query  is,  "  If  a  person,  under  an  insane 
delusion  as  to  existing  facts,  commits  an  offence  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  is  he  thereby  excused  ?  "  To  this  the  judges 
reply,  that,  on  the  assumption  "  that  he  labors  under  partial 
delusion  only,  and  is  not  in  other  respects  insane,  he  must  be 
considered  in  the  same  situation  as  to  responsibility,  as  if  the 
facts,  with  respect  to  which  the  delusion  exists,  were  real. 
For  example,  if  under  the  influence  of  delusion,  he  supposes 
another  man  to  be  in  the  act  of  attempting  to  take  away  his 
life,  and  he  kills  that  man,  as  he  supposes,  in  self-defence,  he 
would  be  exempt  from  punishment.  If  his  delusion  was,  that 
the  deceased  had  inflicted  a  serious  injury  to  his  character 
and  fortune,  and  he  killed  him  in  revenge  for  such  supposed 
injury,  he  would  be  liable  to  punishment." 

§  34.  Such  a  remarkable  doctrine  as  this  can  have  sprung 
from  only  the  most  deplorable  ignorance  of  the  mental  opera- 
tions of  the  insane.  If  the  insane  person  really  believe  that 
his  neighbor  is  engaged  in  a  conspiracy  to  take  his  life,  he 
may  anticipate  the  blow  by  killing  him ;  but  if  he  merely 
believes  that  the  said  neighbor  has  inflicted  a  serious  injury 
on  his  character  or  fortune,  the  law  will  not  hold  him  guilt- 
less if  he  hurt  a  hair  of  his  head !  This  is  certainly  very 
plain,  and  it  must  be  the  fault  of  the  lunatic,  if  he  do  not 
understand  it.  It  is  very  reasonable,  too,  if  insane  men  would 
but  listen  to  reason.  This  doctrine  of  the  English  judges 
seems  to  be  essentially  that  of  Hoffbauer,  who  says  that  the 
acts  of  the  accused  should  be  judged,  precisely  as  if  he  were 
really  in  the  circumstances  he  imagined.  That  is,  if  he  fan- 
cies there  is  a  design  to  take  his  life,  he  may  take  life ;  if  he 
fancies  that  he  is  only  insulted  or  railed  at,  he  may  insult  or 
rail  in  turn ;  if  he  fancies  his  neighbor  is  defrauding  him,  he 
may  say  hard  things  about  him,  (taking  care  to  utter  no 
matter  libellous,)  or  bring  against  him  a  suit  at  law.  This  is 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  47 

virtually  saying  to  a  man,  "  you  are  allowed  to  be  insane ;  the 
disease  is  a  visitation  of  Providence,  and  you  cannot  help  it ; 
but  have  a  care  how  you  manifest  your  insanity;  there 
must  be  method  in  your  madness.  Having  once  adopted 
your  delusion,  all  the  subsequent  steps  connected  with  it, 
must  be  conformed  to  the  strictest  requirements  of  reason  and 
propriety.  If  you  are  caught  tripping  in  your  logic ;  if  in  the 
disturbance  of  your  moral  and  intellectual  perceptions  you 
take  a  step  for  which  a  sane  man  would  be  punished,  insanity 
will  be  no  bar  to  your  punishment.  In  short,  having  become 
fairly  enveloped  in  the  clouds  of  mental  disorder,  the  law  ex- 
pects you  will  move  as  discreetly  and  circumspectly  as  if  the 
undimmed  light  of  reason  were  shining  upon  your  path." 

§  35.  The  principle  in  question  is  not  supported  by  our 
knowledge  of  the  psychological  effects  of  insanity,  and  can- 
not be  followed  out  without  working  great  injustice.  Mc- 
Naughton  did  not  suppose  that  Mr.  Drummond  nor  any  one 
else  was  seeking  his  life,  but  that  his  fancied  enemies  fol- 
lowed him  about,  traducing  his  reputation  and  disturbing  his 
peace.  There  was  no  proof  that  he  apprehended  any  deadly 
injury,  and  yet  he  was  acquitted  with  the  approbation  of  the 
judge,  by  whom  this  principle  was  not  once  mentioned,  —  the 
very  Chief  Justice  Tindall  who  read  the  answers  of  the 
judges  to  the  Lords,  and  probably  had  the  principal  share  in 
framing  them.  Oxford,  too,  who  shot  at  the  queen,  did  not 
imagine  that  he  had  sustained  any  personal  wrong  from  her 
or  any  one  else,  but  that  killing  the  queen  was  necessary  in 
order  to  accomplish  some  great  public  benefit.  Yet  he  was 
acquitted  with  the  approbation  of  the  court,  Lord  Denman, 
who  said  nothing  of  this  principle  in  his  charge  to  the  jury, 
though  he  joined  in  the  reply  to  the  queries  of  the  Lords. 

§  36.  It  is  beyond  our  power  to  conceive  how  this  prin- 
ciple can  be  reconciled  with  that  conveyed  in  the  reply  to  the 
second  and  third  queries.  Most  if  not  all  those  lunatics  who, 
like  McNaughton,  take  life  in  order  to  revenge  some  suppos- 
ed injury  to  their  character  or  fortune,  have  a  strong  belief 
that  they  are  doing  right.  Nothing  is  more  common  than 
for  the  insane  to  be  guilty  of  the  utmost  violence  towards 


48  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

persons  from  whom  they  fancy  they  have  received  only  some 
trivial  offence,  while  their  views  of  law  and  right  on  this 
point,  are  so  confused  and  perverted,  that  they  might  as  well, 
for  any  good  influence  they  exert,  be  obliterated  altogether. 
And  it  is  because  their  mental  perceptions  are  so  dull  and 
distorted,  that  they  do  not  proportion  their  measures  of  retal- 
liation  by  the  same  rules  that  govern  sane  men.  But  now, 
it  seems,  the  state  of  the  person's  mind,  the  extent  of  the  mor- 
bid influence  of  the  disease  over  his  perceptions  of  truth,  and 
right,  and  propriety,  and  the  degree  to  which  it  has  consigned 
him  to  the  dominion  of  delusion  and  passion,  are  no  longer 
to  be  considered  in  settling  the  extent  of  his  legal  responsi- 
bility, —  we  are  to  look  only  to  his  acts,  and  these  are  to  be 
judged  of  as  if  committed  by  perfectly  sane  men. 

§  37.  In  the  debate  which  sprung  up  in  the  house  of 
Lords,1  on  the  occasion  of  McNaughton's  trial,  the  distin- 
guished law-Lords  Lyndhurst,  Brougham.  Cottenham,  and 
Campbell,  expressed  their  views  on  the  general  question, 
furnishing  a  signal  illustration  of  the  inconsistency  and  con- 
tradiction which  we  have  charged  upon  the  opinions  of 
courts.  Lyndhurst,  in  referring  to  the  Hadfield  case,  quotes 
the  following,  as  the  exposition  of  the  law  made  by  Erskine 
and  adopted  by  the  Court.  "  When  a  man  is  laboring  under 
a  delusion,  if  you  are  satisfied  that  a  delusion  existed  at  the 
time  of  the  committal  of  the  offence  —  that  the  act  was  done 
under  its  influence  —  then  he  cannot  be  considered  as  guilty 
of  any  crime."  Subsequently,  he  restates  the  principle  in 
the  following  words  of  his  own.  "  If  the  man  who  committed 
.a  crime  was  insane  at  the  time  he  committed  it,  that  is  to 
say,  was  laboring  under  such  disease  of  the  mind  as  not  to 
know  whether  he  were  doing  right  or  wrong,  in  that  case,  he 
was  not  a  subject  for  a  criminal  trial."  The  fact  is,  that 
Erskine  neither  adopted  nor  approved  the  criterion  furnished 
by  knowing  right  from  wrong.  It  is  not  once  mentioned  in 
the  whole  course  of  his  speech  on  that  occasion,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  it  was  his  design  to  establish  a  very 

1  Hansard,  67.  714. 


PRELIMINAKY  VIEWS.  49 

different  criterion,  or  test,  —  a  point  of  which  the  speaker 
seems  to  have  had  not  the  slightest  conception.  Lord 
Brougham  said,  "  he  could  conceive  the  case  of  a  human  be- 
ing, of  a  weakly  constituted  mind,  who  might,  by  long  brood- 
ing over  real  or  fancied  wrongs,  work  up  so  perverted  a  feeling 
of  hatred  against  an  individual,  that  danger  migjit  occur.  He 
might  not  be  deluded  as  to  the  actual  existence  of  injuries  he 
had  received,  but  he  might  grievously  and  grossly  exaggerate 
them,  and  they  might  so  operate  on  a  weakly  framed  mind 
and  intellect  as  to  produce  crime.  He  could  conceive  that 
the  Maker  of  that  man,  in  his  infinite  mercy,  having  regard 
to  the  object  of  his  creation,  might  deem  him  not  an  object 
for  punishment.  But  that  man  was  accountable  to  human 
tribunals  in  a  totally  different  sense.  Man  punished  crime 
for  the  purpose  of  practically  deterring  others  from  offend- 
ing by  committing  a  repetition  of  the  like  act.  It  was  in 
that  sense  only  that  he  had  any  thing  to  do  with  the  doctrine 
of  accountable  and  not  accountable.  He  could  conceive  a 
person  whom  Deity  might  not  deem  accountable,  but  who 
might  be  perfectly  accountable  to  human  laws."  He  thought 
that  the  later  tests  of  responsibility,  such  as  knowing  good 
from  evil,  or  what  was  proper  or  wicked,  were  not  preferable 
to  the  old  one,  of  knowing  right  from  wrong ;  and  yet  he 
immediately  remarks,  that  sane  people  differ  in  their  views  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  though  he  knew  what  the  learned 
judges  meant  by  right  and  wrong,  he  was  not  sure  that  the 
public  at  large  did,  especially  juries.  He  blamed  the  court  - 
for  refusing  to  postpone  Bellingham's  trial,  in  order  that  his 
friends  might  procure  evidence  respecting  his  mental  con- 
dition. He  says,  "  affidavits  had  been  made  of  the  prisoner's 
family  having  been  tainted  with  insanity.  Affidavits  had 
been  produced  from  those  who  had  known  him  from  infancy 
of  his  having  been  insane.  Affidavits  were  offered,  showing 
a  prima  facie  case  of  mental  alienation."  But  he  adds  with 
wonderful  coolness,  "  no  man  doubted  that  the  result  of  the 
trial  would  have  been  precisely  the  same,  had  the  evidence 
been  adduced."  His  Lordship  cautions  courts  against  urging 
the  conviction  of  persons  who  entertain  delusions,  and  yet 

5 


50  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

he  approves  of  the  conviction  of  Bellingham,  of  whose  de- 
lusions he  furnishes  additional  evidence  not  before  published. 
He  says,  on  the  authority  of  Mr.  Stephens  and  Mr.  Wilber- 
force  who  saw  him  after  the  trial,  that  "  Bellingham  had  no 
conception  that  he  had  done  any  thing  wrong ;  he  lamented 
the  death  of  4Mr.  Percival ;  spoke  of  him  with  the  greatest 
respect,  and  even  esteem  for  his  character ;  said  that  no  man 
could  more  lament  that  such  a  thing  should  have  befallen 
that  gentleman,  than  he  did ;  that  nothing  could  be  more 
hard,  both  to  his  family  and  the  public  and  society  at  large ; 
and  that  it  was  greatly  to  be  lamented.  '  Then,'  he  was 
asked,  '  why  did  you  do  the  deed  ? '  '  O,  do  it,'  he  answered, 
'  that  was  perfectly  inevitable ;  there  was  no  wrong  at  all  in 
doing  it ;  he  could  not  help  that.' "  Lords  Lyndhurst  and 
Brougham  were  of  the  opinion,  that  from  the  time  of  Had- 
field's  case  to  the  present  day,  the  law  had  been  laid  down  by 
successive  courts,  with  great  uniformity.  Lord  Campbell 
said  of  the  same  cases,  that  "  there  was  a  wide  difference  both 
in  meaning  and  in'  words,  in  their  description  of  the  law." 
He  therefore  thought  that  an  authoritative  statement  of  the 
law  was  desirable,  though  he  had  just  before  declared  that 
"the  law  of  England  on  this  subject  admitted  of  no  altera- 
tion." To  say  that  a  thing  is  so  correct  as  to  admit  of 
no  alteration,  and,  in  the  next  breath  to  add,  that  there  is 
needed  an  authoritative  statement  of  what  that  thing  is,  indi- 
cates a  confusion  of  ideas  not  uncommon  in  discussions  on 
•this  subject. 

§  38.  Nothing  can  more  clearly  show  how  completely  the 
authoritative  statement  of  the  English  judges  has  failed  to 
accomplish  its  purpose,  than  the  fact  that  in  subsequent  trials, 
the  result  seems  to  have  been,  as  much  as  ever,  a  matter  of 
accident  or  caprice,  rather  than  of  principles  well-settled  and 
clearly  understood.  Several  have  been  convicted  and  execu- 
ted, in  spite  of  the  plea  of  insanity,  in  whom  the  manifesta- 
tions of  disease  were  far  more  abundant  than  in  some  who 
were  acquitted  under  the  same  plea.  As  they  involve  no 
new  principle,  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  our  present  pur- 
pose, to  bestow  upon  them  a  particular  notice.  A  recent 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  51 

writer  who  has  given  them  some  attention,  thinks  they  indi- 
cate both  uncertainty  and  injustice  in  the  operation  of  the 
criminal  law.  "  Either  some  individuals,"  he  says,  "  are  most 
improperly  acquitted  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  or  others  are 
most  unjustly  executed." *  A  more  correct  expression  of  the 
actual  fact,  could  not  be  made.  We  have  no  means  of 
knowing,  however,  how  far  the  verdict  of  the  jury  reflects  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  and  therefore  must  remain  in  doubt 
whether  this  remarkable  want  of  uniformity  is  to  be  attributed 
to  the  growing  independence  of  the  former,  or  a  more  lenient 
construction  of  the  principles  which  have  hitherto  governed 
the  latter.  Some  of  it  is,  probably^  owing  to  an  increasing  dis- 
position to  heed  the  opinions  of  experts,  and  a  commendable 
reluctance  to  convict  a  man  declared  by  competent  authority 
to  be  insane,  merely  on  the  strength  of  some  metaphysical 
tests  of  responsibility  laid  down  by  the  courts. 

§  39.  Notwithstanding  the  occasional  instances  of  ameli- 
oration in  the  English  law,  the  old  principle  that  some  insane 
men  are  proper  objects  of  punishment,  is  as  binding  at  this 
moment,  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Lord  Hale.  It  seems  to  be 
almost  impossible  for  those  who  have  not  a  professional 
knowledge  of  insanity,  to  view  the  subject  in  the  true  light. 
The  popular  feeling,  mixed  unquestionably  with  some  truth, 
was  strongly  expressed  by  Lord  Brougham,  in  the  debate  to 
which  we  have  already  referred.  "If,"  says  he,  "the  perpe- 
trator knew  what  he  was  doing,  if  he  had  taken  his  precau- 
tions to  accomplish  his  purpose,  if  he  knew,  at  the  time  of 
doing  the  desperate  act,  that  it  was  forbidden  by  the  law, 
that  was  his  test  of  sanity ;  he  cared  not  what  judge  gave 
another  test ;  he  should  go  to  his  grave  in  the  belief  that  it 
was  the  real,  sound,  and  consistent  test."  That  some  insane 
persons  know  very  well,  that,  in  committing  their  offences, 
they  are  guilty  of  a  moral  and  legal  wrong,  and  that  they 
may  be  more  or  less  deterred  by  the  fear  of  punishment,  are 
propositions  that  cannot  be  denied.  The  fallacy  of  which 
the  courts  are  guilty,  consists  in  supposing  that  these  abstract 

^  Taylor,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  3d  Am.  Ed.  p.  642. 


52  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

propositions  may  be  safely  applied  to  particular  cases  by 
means  of  certain  criteria.  It  has  been  shown  that  these 
criteria  are  insufficient  for  the  purpose,  because  .they  do  not 
cover  the  whole  ground,  and  are,  at  the  best,  but  a  begging  of 
the  question.  For  admitting  that  the  person  knew  that  he 
was  doing  wrong  and  contrary  to  law,  it  remains  to  be  proved 
that  this  knowledge  embraces  all  the  elements  of  responsibility. 
The  real  question  at  issue  is,  why,  with  this  knowledge,  he 
should  commit  acts  incompatible  with  his  natural  character 
and  disposition,  and  the  only  rational  answer  is  to  say,  that 
the  action  of  the  mental  powers  is  disturbed  by  the  presence 
of  disease.  "Whatever  degree  of  intelligence  or  self-control 
may  be  left,  there  still  remains  this  disturbing  element,  the 
precise  influence  of  which  never  can  be  safely  estimated.  It 
is  a  monstrous  doctrine  to  put  forth  in  a  civilized  age,  that  a 
man  hitherto  of  irreproachable  conduct  and  conversation,  shall 
be  punished  for  any  criminal  act  he  may  commit,  while  ad- 
mitted to  be  laboring  under  a  morbid  condition,  the  tendency 
of  which  is  to  distort  the  moral  perceptions  and  destroy  the 
healthy  balance  of  the  mental  faculties.  Whether  Belling- 
ham  or  McNaughton  knew  they. were  doing  an  act  for- 
bidden by  the  law,  when  they  shot  down  unoffending  men, 
in  open  day,  is  a  question  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  purpose. 
What  we  want  to  know  is,  whether  they  would  have  com- 
mitted the  outrage,  if  »they  had  not  been  prompted  by  delu- 
sions which  were  the  effect  of  disease.  To  inflict  upon  such 
men  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime,  is  virtually  to  punish 
them  for  being  diseased,  and  the  utmost  ingenuity  of  logic  or 
metaphysics  can  make  nothing  else  of  it.  Lord  Brougham 
intimates  that  he  had  been  much  annoyed,  if  not  frightened, 
by  a  class  of  persons  with  deranged  intellects,  who  hover 
around  the  courts  in  search  of  redress  for  their  real  or  fancied 
wrongs,  and  he  believes  that  the  fear  of  punishment  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  deter  them  from  actual  mischief.  Now,  in 
whatever  aspect  we  consider  the  case,  we  can  find  no  support 
for  such  a  doctrine.  The  punishment  of  one  insane  person 
would  not  deter  another  insane  person  from  committing  a 
criminal  act,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  latter,  no't  regard- 


PKELIMIXARY   VIEWS.  53 

i  ng  himself  as  insane,  sees  in  it  no  application  to  him  who,  as 
he  believes,  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  health,  pursuing  a  right 
and  lawful  object.  He  either  thinks  that  his  case  is  an  ex- 
ception to  the  general  rule,  and  that  he  is  about  to  do  some- 
thing that  will  receive  universal  approbation,  or  that  he  is 
bound  by  solemn  obligation  to  do  the  act,  whatever  may  be 
the  consequences.  The  proper  remedy  for  the  evil  is  to  be 
sought  for  in  suitable  measures  of  prevention,  and  spciety  is 
guilty  of  a  great  wrong  when  it  punishes  the  individual  for 
the  consequences  of  its  own  neglect.  The  management  of 
the  insane  in  hospitals  where  they  are  excited  to  behave  with 
propriety  by  the  promise  of  reward,  and  deterred  from  wrong 
doing  by  the  fear  of  being  deprived  of  some  privilege  or 
indulgence,  is  confidently  appealed  to  in  support  of  this  idea. 
It  is  unquestionably  the  practice  in  such  institutions  to  pre- 
sent to  the  insane  motives  for  maintaining  their  self-control, 
but  it  is  not  the  fact  that  when  such  motives  fail  to  produce 
the  end  in  view,  they  are  punished.  They  are  deprived  of  a 
privilege  or  indulgence,  not  as  a  punishment,  but  because 
they  have  shown  themselves  incapable  of  enjoying  it.  The 
anecdote  is  often  related  for  the  same  purpose,  respecting  the 
conversation  that  occurred  among  the  inmates  of  a  lunatic 
asylum  on  the  case  of  Martin  who  was  then  waiting  his  trial 
for  setting  fire  to  the  York  Minster.  "  He  wili  not  be 
hanged,"  said  one  of  them,  "  They  cannot  hang  him,  because 
he  is  mad  —  he  is  one  of  ourselves."  It  is  not  very  obvious 
how  this  anecdote  which,  by  the  way,  has  the  appearance  of 
a  little  embellishment,  affords  any  support  to  the  doctrine  that 
some  insane  men  should  be  punished,  while  others  may  be 
properly  acquitted.  If  it  indicates  any  thing  on  this  point,  it 
is  that  every  insane  man  who  commits  a  criminal  act,  even 
though  he  may  escape  from  an  asylum  for  the  purpose,  is  a 
proper  object  of  punishment. 

§  40.  Criminal  trials,  in  which  insanity  was  pleaded  in  de- 
fence, have  been  generally  so  little  known  beyond  the  place 
of  their  occurrence,  that  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  on  what 
particular  principles  of  the  common  law  the  decisions  of 
American  courts  have  been  founded,  though  from  all  that 


54  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

can  be  gathered,  it  appears  that  their  practice,  like  that  of  the 
British,  has  been  diverse  and  fluctuating.  In  the  trial  of 
Lawrence,  at  Washington,  in  1835,  for  shooting  at  president 
Jackson,  the  jury  were  advised  by  the  court  to  regulate  their 
verdict  by  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Hadfield, 
which  had  been  stated  to  them  by  the  district-attorney.1  In 

I  the  case  of  Theodore  Wilson,  tried  in  York  county,  Maine, 
in  1836,  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  in  a  paroxysm  of  insanity, 

"(  the  court  charged  the  jury  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the  pris- 

/oner  was  not  of  sound  memory  and  discretion  at  the  time  of 
committing  the  act,  they  were  bound  to  return  a  verdict  of 
acquittal.  This  is  all  that  could  be  wished ;  and  considering 
that  two  highly  respectable  physicians  had  given  their  opin- 
ion in  evidence  that  the  prisoner  had  some  consciousness  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  that  the  attorney-general,  though  he 
admitted  the  existence  of  insanity  in  some  degree,  denied 
that  it  was  of  sufficient  extent  to  exempt  him  from  punish- 
ment, supporting  his  assertion  on  the  authority  of  the  lead- 
ing English  cases  relating  to  insanity,  this  decision  indicates 
an  advance  in  the  criminal  jurisprudence  of  insanity  that  does 
credit  to  the  humanity  and  intelligence  of  that  court.  In  the 
trial  of  Cory,  for  murdering  Mrs.  Nash,  in  New  Hampshire, 
1829,  the  court,  Chief  Justice  Richardson,  stated  in  his  charge 
to  the  jury  that  the  only  question  for  them  to  settle  was, 
whether  he  was  of  sane  mind  when  the  deed  was  done  ?  The 
same  language  was  used  by  the  same  court  on  the  trial  of 
Prescott,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Cochran,  in  1834.  On  the 
trial  of  Rogers,  in  July,  1843,  for  the  murder  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
in  the  State  Prison  of  Massachusetts,  the  court,  Chief  Justice 
Shaw,  charged  the  jury,  that  insanity  or  delusion  is  an  excuse 
for  crime,  in  two  ways ;  first,  where  it  amounts  to  a  firm 
belief  that  one  is  liable  to  lose  his  own  life,  or  suffer  some 
great  bodily  harm ;  secondly,  "where  some  violent  outbreak 
occurs  which,  taken  in  connection  with  former  acts,  indicates 

1  Niles's  Eegister,  vol.  48,  p.  119.  The  principle  adopted  in  Hadfield's 
case  was,  that  a  person  is  not  responsible  for  whatever  criminal  act  is  com- 
mitted under  the  influence  of  delusion. 


•  PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  55 

that  the  will  was  overborne.  The  questions  for  them  to 
decide  were,  whether  such  a  delusion  existed  in  the  mind  of 
the  accused ;  whether  he  did  the  act  under  an  insane  but 
firm  belief  that  the  deceased  was  going  to  shut  him  up  with 
some  dangerous  design,  or  not  for  a  slight  punishment; 
whether  the  facts  indicate  that  the  deed  was  done  at  a  mo- 
ment when  the  delusion  was  uncontrollable.1  On  the  trial  of 
Abbot  for  killing  his  wife,  in  1841,  by  the  superior  court  of 
Connecticut,  the  jury  was  instructed  to  acquit  the  prisoner 
"  if  they  found  that,  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  he 
was  insane  —  had  not  sufficient  understanding  to  distinguish 
right  from  wrong,  and  did  not  know  that  the  murder  of  his 
wife  was  an  offence  against  the  laws  of  God  and  nature." 2 
Similar  language  was  used  by  the  court  on  the  trial  of  Mer- 
cer for  the  murder  of  Heberton,  in  New  Jersey,  April,  1843.8 
§  41.  The  frequency  with  which  insanity  is  pleaded  in 
defence  of  crime,  the  magnitude  of  its  consequences  to  the 
parties  concerned,  and  the  perplexity  in  which  the  discussions 
it  occasions  involve  the  minds  of  judges  and  jurors,  are  am- 
ple reasons  why  the  law  relative  to  insanity  should  be  simple 
and  easily  understood  —  a  result  that  can  only  be  obtained 
by  direct  legislative  enactments.  It  is  time  for  the  legislature 
to  determine  what,  amid  the  mass  of  conflicting  opinions  on 
this  subject,  shall  be  the  law  of  the  land  ;  and  thus  no  longer 
permit  the  lives  and  liberties  of  people  to  be  suspended  on 
the  dicta  of  men,  whose  knowledge  of  insanity  was  exceed- 
ingly imperfect,  and  which  have  not  even  the  merit  of  uni- 
formity and  consistency.  It  may  be  well,  therefore,  to  see  what 
has  been  the  legislation  of  various  enlightened  nations,  in 
reference  to  this  subject,  inasmuch  as  it  may  furnish  valua- 
ble hints  for  our  own.  In  some,  the  legislator  has  been  con- 
tented with  indicating,  by  some  popular,  general  phrase,  that 
condition  of  mind  which  the  judge  may  consider  as  freeing 

1  MS.  notes  of  prisoner's  counsel,  George  Bemis,  Esq. 

2  MS.  notes  of  Hon.  H.  M.  Waite,  one  of  the  court,  kindly  furnished  the 
author. 

3  Dollar  Newspaper,  April  5,  1843. 


56  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

from  responsibility.  The  Bavarian  code  (1813)  follows  this 
course,  as  well  as  the  code  of  Basle,  promulgated  in  1835. 
In  the  latter,  we  find  the  following  words :  —  "  Minors,  and 
those  laboring  under  general  mania,  or  haUucination,  cannot 
be  punished  as  criminals,  nor,  generally  speaking,  can  any 
others  be  punished,  who  have  committed  a  crime  while  de- 
prived of  the  use  of  their  minds."  Art.  2.  Very  nearly 
the  same  language  is  used  in  describing  such  as  are  exempted 
from  punishment  by  reason  of  mental  disorders,  in  the  code 
of  Turin,  (1835)  Art.  63,  and  in  the  proposed  Hanoverian 
code,  Art.  83.  In  other  codes,  general  terms  alone  are  used, 
in  describing  the  mental  condition  of  such  as  are  irresponsi- 
ble. Thus,  in  the  Saxon  code,  we  find  these  words :  — 
|  \ 

"  Responsibility  is  annulled  in  persons  who  are  deprived  of 
the  use  of  reason  by  mental  disease."  Art.  65.  It  is  a  suf- 
ficient objection  to  such  enactments  that,  in  any  particular 
trial,  no  two  persons  could  be  found  to  agree  respecting  the 
practical  application  of  such  terms  as,  deprived  of  the  use  of 
reason,  bereft  of  understanding,  etc. ;  and  how  many  judges 
and  juries  would  see,  in  the  unfortunate  monomaniac  before 
them,  —  who,  though  stained  with  the  blood  of  a  fellow  man 
whom  some  wild  delusion  had  prompted  him  to  kill,  is  still 
correct  and  coherent  in  his  discourse,  staid  and  dignified  in 
his  demeanor,  ready  and  shrewd  in  his  replies,  —  a  being 
deprived  of  the  use  of  his  reason,  or  bereft  of  his  understand- 
ing ?  We  have  seen  too  often  the  deplorable  failure  of  such 
general  terms  to  protect  the  miserable  subjects  of  disease, 
under  the  operation  of  the  English  common  law,  to  recom- 
mend their  use  to  the  legislator.  In  some  codes  an  attempt 
is  made  to  avoid  this  objection  to  general  terms,  by  mention- 
ing various  mental  diseases  as  illustrations  of  the  meaning 
they  are  to  convey.1  Thus,  the  proposed  Wurtemberg  code 
contains  the  following  provision  :  —  "  An  illegal  act  is  exempt 
from  punishment,  if  committed  in  a  state  of  mind  in  which 
the  use  of  reason  is  taken  away ;  to  this  state  belong,  chiefly, 
general  mania,  general  and  partial  hallucination,  entire  imbe- 

1  J.  C.  Mittennaier :  De  principle  imputationis  alienationum  mentis,  p.  24. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  57 

cility,  and  complete  confusion  of  the  senses,  or  understand- 
ing." Art.  91.  In  the  code  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Hesse,  propo- 
sed in  1836,  we  find  the  following  provision :  —  "  By  reason  of 
their  impaired  responsibility,  punishment  cannot  be  inflicted 
on  those  who  commit  penal  acts  in  a  state  of  sleep,  of  som- 
nambulism, of  general  mania,  of  hallucination,  of  imbecility, 
or  of  any  other  mental  disorder,  which  either  takes  away  all 
consciousness  respecting  the  act  generally  and  its  relation  to 
penal  law,  or  in  conjunction  with  some  peculiar  bodily  condi- 
tion, irresistibly  impels  him,  while  completely  unconscious,  to 
violent  acts."  Art.  29.  In  the  code  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Ba- 
den, it  is  enacted  as  follows  :  —  "  Responsibility  is  annulled 
in  that  condition,  in  which,  either  a  consciousness  of  the  crim- 
inality of  the  offence,  or  the  free  will  of  the  offender  is  taken 
away."  Art.  65.  "  To  the  condition  which  annuls  responsi- 
bility on  the  strength  of  the  65th  Art.  belong  chiefly,  imbe- 
cility, hallucination,  general  mania,  distraction,  and  complete 
confusion  of  the  senses,  or  understanding."  Art.  69.  Some- 
what similar  is  the  phraseology  used  by  the  code  of  Lucerne, 
in  Switzerland.  This  method  is  liable  to  precisely  the  same 
objection  as  the  former,  for  the  difficulty  will  be  as  great  in 
the  one  as  in  the  other,  of  settling  the  exact  meaning  of  the 
particular  terms.  Many  a  case  will  occur,  that  will  not  be 
unanimously  referred  to  some  one  of  the  above-mentioned 
affections.  To  avoid  the  difficulties  incumbent  on  the  use  of 
such  terms,  and  to  bring  the  wretched  subjects  of  mental 
disease  under  the  protection  of  the  law,  without  discrimina- 
tion, the  legislator  has,  in  some  instances,  made  the  single 
fact  of  the  presence  of  disease,  sufficient  to  annul  criminal 
responsibility.  In  Livingston's  code,  it  is  provided  that  —  "  No 
act  done  by  a  person  in  a  state  of  insanity  can  be  punished 
as  an  offence."  The  revised  statutes  of  the  State  of  New 
York  contain  the  same  words.1  The  revised  statutes  of  Ar- 
kansas provide  that  a  lunatic,  or  insane  person,  without  lucid 
intervals,  shall  not  be  found  guilty  of  any  crime  or  misde- 
meanor with  which  he  may  be  charged.2  The  French  penal 

1  Vol.  H.  p.  697.  2  Revised  Statutes  of  Arkansas,  236.  ^ 


58  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

code  is  equally  simple.  "  There  can  be  no  crime  nor  offence, 
if  the  accused  were  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  of  the 
act."1  If  we  insert  after  the  word  insanity,  the  following 
words,  or  any  other  condition  of  mind  in  which  the  person  is 
involuntarily  deprived  of  the  consciousness  of  the  true,  nature 
of  his  acts,  in  order  to  protect  him  from  the  consequences  of 
acts  committed  in  a  state  of  sleep  or  somnambulism,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  any  other  provision  would  better  pro- 
mote the  purposes  of  justice,  than  that  of  Livingston's  code. 
Under  this  law,  when  strictly  applied,  if  the  existence  of  in- 
sanity is  once  established,  the  responsibility  of  the  party  is 
taken  away ;  and  all  nice  discussions  concerning  the  effect 
of  this  or  that  kind  or  degree  of  mental  derangement,  and  the 
exact  measure  of  reason  that  has  been  left  or  taken  away,  are 
thus  effectually  precluded.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  an  in- 
sane person  may  be  actually  guilty  of  a  criminal  act,  his  in- 
sanity being*  very  partial,  and  the  act  not  within  the  range  of 
its  operation,  while  by  the  letter  of  the  law,  he  must  be  acquit- 
ted. The  only  way  of  avoiding  this  evil,  would  be  to  add 
something  like  the  following ;  — provided,  it  can  be  proved 
that  the  act  was  not  the  offspring  of  the  insanity.  True,  the 
fact  of  insanity  would  be  left,  as  it  now  is,  with  the  jury  to 
decide ;  but  as  they  would  no  longer  be  puzzled  with  meta- 
physical distinctions  between  total  and  partial  insanity,  and 
engaged  in  nice  estimates  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil, 
of  right  and  wrong,  and  of  the  power  of  design  possessed  by 
the  accused,  their  inquiries  would  be  narrowed  down  to  the 
single  fact  of  mental  impairment  on  a  certain  point  —  a  duty 
much  less  remote  from  the  train  of  their  ordinary  habits  and 
pursuits.  Thus  a  great  object  would  be  gained,  for  the  more 
that  is  provided  by  statute  and  the  less  that  is  left  to  judi- 
cial discretion,  the  greater  is  the  benefit  afforded  by  law. 

§  42.  As  the  conclusions  of  the  jury,  relative  to  the 
existence  of  insanity,  must  necessarily  be  founded  on  the 
testimony  offered  by  the  parties,  it  is  a  subject  of  the  utmost 
importance,  by  whom  and  in  what  manner,  this  testimony 

8  Art.  64. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  59 

shall  be  given.  If  the  decision  of  this  point  were  purely  a 
matter  of  facts,  the  only  duty  of  the  jury  would  be  to  see 
that  they  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  and  proceeded  from 
authentic  sources ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  matter  of 
inference  to  be  drawn  from  certain  data,  and  this  is  a  duty 
for  which  our  juries,  as  at  present  constituted,  are  manifestly 
unfit.  That  a  body  of  men,  taken  promiscuously  from  the 
common  walks  of  life,  should  be  required  to  decide,  whether 
or  not  certain  opinions  and  facts  in  evidence  prove  derange- 
ment of  mind,  or,  in  other  words,  to  decide  a  professional 
question  of  a  most  delicate  nature  and  involving  some  of  the 
highest  interests  of  man,  is  an  idea  so  preposterous  that  one 
finds  it  difficult,  at  first  sight,  to  believe  that  it  ever  was  seri- 
ously entertamed.  Such,  however,  is  made  their  business, 
and,  in  the  performance  of  it,  there  is  but  one  alternative 
for  them  to  follow ;  —  either  to  receive  with  the  utmost  defer- 
ence the  opinions  of  those  who  have  a  professional  acquaint- 
ance with  the  subject,  or  to  slight  them  altogether,  and  rely 
solely  on  their  own  judgment  of  the  facts.  The  latter  course 
has  sometimes  been  adopted,  though  no  one,  probably,  per- 
sonally concerned  in  the  issue  of  the  case,  would  congratu- 
late himself  on  their  choice,  unless  specially  anxious  to  be- 
come a  victim  of  ignorance  and  obstinacy.  But,  in  the  larger 
proportion  of  cases,  the  medical  testimony,  which  is  given  in 
the  shape  of  opinions,  though  rather  an  anomaly  in  evidence 
that  courts  have  been  sorely  puzzled  at  times  whether  to  ad- 
mit or  reject,  is  mostly  relied  on,  and  determines  the  verdict 
of  the  jury.  It  is,  perhaps,  of  little  consequence,  who  testifies 
to  a  simple  fact,  that  it  requires  only  eyes  to  see,  or  ears  to 
hear ;  but  it  is  all  very  different  with  the  delivery  of  opinions 
that  are  to  shape  the  final  decision.  As  this  requires  an  ex- 
ercise of  judgment  as  well  as  observation,  there  ought  to  be 
some  kind  of  qualification  on  the  part  of  those  who  render 
such  opinions,  not  required  of  one  who  testifies  to  mere  facts. 
The  understanding  certainly  is,  that  their  habits,  pursuits, 
and  talents,  have  rendered  them  peculiarly  competent  for 
this  high  duty,  for,  in  spite  of  the  power  of  cross-examina- 
tion, these  constitute  the  only  pledge  that  can  be  had  of  its 


60  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

correct  and  faithful  performance.  But  as  the  law  makes  no 
exclusion,  and  the  witnesses'  stand  is  open  to  any  one  whom 
the  parties  may  choose  to  call,  it  frequently  happens,  that  the 
witness  has  nothing  but  his  professional  character  to  rely  on, 
to  give  his  opinions  the  authority  they  ought  to  possess. 
And  even  when  he  may  have  been  preceded  by  the  shadow 
of  a  great  reputation,  the  jury  may  not  know,  nor  be  able  to 
discover,  how  much  of  that  reputation  is  a  factitious  one ; 
and,  in  consequence,  may  be  induced  to  confide  in  opinions 
which,  from  a  different  quarter,  they  would  have  listened  to 
with  feelings  of  doubt  and  distrust.  It  is  true,  the  law  re- 
quires that  such  opinions  should  be  founded  on  facts,  but 
who  is  to  decide  whether  the  fact  is  a  sufficient  foundation 
for  the  opinion,  or,  indeed,  has  any  relation  to  it  at  all  ? 

§  43.  It  is  not  enough,  that  the  standing  of  the  medical 
witness  is  deservedly  high  in  his  profession,  unless  it  is  found- 
ed on  extraordinary  knowledge  and  skill  relative  to  the  par- 
ticular disease,  insanity.  Lunatic  asylums  and  retreats  for  the 
insane  have  so  multiplied  in  our  country,  that  patients  of  this 
class  are  almost  entirely  taken  away  from  the  management  of 
the  private  physician,  and  consigned  to  the  more  skilful  con- 
ductors of  these  institutions ;  so  that  many  a  medical  man 
may  spend  a  life  of  full  practice,  without  having  been  in- 
trusted with  the  care  of  a  dozen  insane  persons.  To  such, 
therefore,  a  practical  knowledge  of  the  disease  is  out  of  the 
question,  and  thus  the  principal  inducement  is  wanting,  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  labors  of  those,  who  have  in- 
joyed  better  opportunities.  If  a  particular  class  of  men  only 
are  thought  capable  of  managing  the  treatment  of  the  insane, 
it  would  seem  to  follow,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  such  only 
are  capable  of  giving  opinions  in  judicial  proceedings  relative 
to  insanity.  True,  in  important  cases,  the  testimony  of  one 
or  more  of  this  class  is  generally  given ;  but  it  may  be  con- 
tradicted by  that  of  others  utterly  destitute  of  any  knowledge 
of  the  subject  on  which  they  tender  their  opinions  with  arro- 
gant confidence,  and  the  jury  is  seldom  a  proper  tribunal  for 
distinguishing  the  true  from  the  false,  and  fixing  on  each  its 
rightful  value.  An  enlightened  and  conscientious  jury,  when 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  61 

required  to  decide  in  a  case  of  doubtful  insanity,  which  is  to 
determine  the  weal  or  woe  of  a  fellow  being,  fully  alive  to 
the  delicacy  and  responsibility  of  their  situation,  and  of  their 
own  incompetence  unaided  by  the  counsels  of  others,  will  be 
satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  opinions  of  those  who 
have  possessed  unusual  opportunities  for  studying  the  char- 
acter and  conduct  of  the  insane,  and  have  the  qualities  of 
mind  necessary  to  enable  them  to  profit  by  their  observa- 
tions. If  they  are  obliged  to  decide  on  professional  subjects, 
it  would  seem  but  just,  and  the  dictate  of  common  sense,  that 
they  should  have  the  benefit  of  the  best  professional  advice. 
This,  however,  they  do  not  always  have ;  and,  consequently, 
the  ends  of  justice  are  too  often  defeated  by  the  high-sound- 
ing assumptions  of  ignorance  and  vanity. 

§  44.  It  may,  at  first  sight,  be  thought  impossible  to  rem- 
edy this  defect,  without  what  would  seem  to  be  an  engraft- 
ment  upon  our  judicial  system  of  practices  not  in  perfect 
harmony  with  it;  but  the  difficulty,  after  all,  may  not  be 
found  utterly  intractable,  if  names  are  not  allowed  to  usurp 
in  our  minds  the  place  of  things.  Instead  of  the  unqualified 
and  irresponsible  witnesses  now  too  often  brought  forward 
to  enlighten  the  minds  of  jurymen  on  medical  subjects,  it 
would  be  far  better,  if  we  had  a  class  of  men  more  or  less 
like  that  of  the  experts l  of  the  French,  peculiarly  fitted  for 


1  The  term  experts  is  used  in  the  French  law  to  designate  certain  persons, 
appointed  in  the  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  either  by  the  court  or  by  the 
agreement  of  the  parties,  to  make  inquiry  under  oath,  in  reference  to  certain 
facts,  and  to  report  thereon  to  the  court  They  are  not  examined  as  wit- 
nesses ;  nor  have  they  the  power  of  deciding  the  cause,  like  arbitrators ;  their 
functions  are  more  analogous  to  those  of  a  master  in  chancery,  according  to 
our  laws.  The  following  extract  from  Pothier's  Treatise  on  Civil  Procedure 
(Part  L  chap.  ILL  art  ILL  §  I.)  will  give  an  idea  of  the  functions  of  these 
officers. 

"  The  decision  of  a  cause,  frequently  depends  on  some  fact  contested 
between  the  parties,  which  can  only  be  established  by  a  visit  to  the  thing 
which  makes  the  object  of  the  contestation ;  for  example,  the  buyer  of  a  horse 
brings  a  redhibitory  action  against  the  seller,  to  compel  the  latter  to  take  back 
the  horse,  on  account  of  some  pretended  defect,  which  the  former  alleges 
entitles  him  to  a  return ;  if  the  seller  denies  the  existence  of  the  defect,  this 

6 


62  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  duty  by  a  course  of  studies  expressly  directed  to  this  end. 
They  might  be  appointed  by  the  government,  in  numbers 
adapted  to  the  wants  and  circumstances  of  the  population," 
and  should  be  always  ready,  at  the  call  of  courts,  to  examine 
the  health  of  criminals,  draw  up  reports  touching  the  same, 
and  deliver  opinions.  When  the  courts  see  the  minds  of 
jurors  perplexed  and  confounded  by  the  contradictory  opin- 
ions of  medical  witnesses,  and  with  no  means  of  satisfying 
themselves  as  to  what  is  really  true,  it  should  be  their  duty 
to  submit  the  accused  to  the  examination  of  experts,  who 
should  report  at  a  subsequent  period.  Something  like  this 
is  often  done  in  France  and  Germany,  and  ought  to  be 
provided  for  in  the  criminal  procedure  of  every  country.1 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  in  Paris,  for  murder- 
ing a  neighbor's  child,  November  4,  1825,  the  court,  at  the 
request  of  the  prisoner's  counsel,  made  shortly  before  the 
trial,  which  was  ordered  to  take  place  February  27,  1826, 
appointed  a  committee  of  three  distinguished  physicians  to 
report,  after  due  examination,  whether  or  not  she  was  a  fit 


fact,  upon  which  the  decision  of  the  cause  depends,  can  only  be  ascertained 
by  an  examination  of  the  horse  by  experts ;  and  the  judge,  therefore,  before 
rendering  a  definitive  judgment,  must  order  the  animal  to  be  examined  by 
experts,  who  shall  report  whether  he  labors  under  the  said  defect  or  not.  In 
like  manner,  if  I  make  a  bargain  with  a  workman  to  do  certain  work  upon  a 
house,  and  when  the  latter  demands  the  agreed  price  of  me,  I  object  that  the 
work  is  badly  done,  and  therefore  not  receivable,  there  must  be  an  order  for 
an  examination  by  experts." 

1  Fodere  (De  medicine  legale,  Tome  I.,  Introd.  p.  xlii.)  relates  with  the 
most  naive  astonishment,  that,  in  a  question  of  survivorship,  arising  out  of  the 
accouchement  of  Mrs.  Fischer  in  England,  the  opinion  of  the  celebrated 
Denman  was  rejected  by  a  jury,  that  yielded  implicit  belief  in  the  testimony 
of  one  Dallas,  who  was  not  a  physician,  and  of  two  ignorant  women,  who 
spoke  only  from  memory,  after  the  expiration  of  fourteen  years.  Many 
readers  may  recollect,  that,  in  the  case  of  Donellan,  tried  in  1781,  (see  2 
Beck's  Medical  Jurisprudence,  fifth  edition,  563,)  for  the  murder  of  Sir 
Theodosius  Boughton,  by  poisoning,  the  opinions  of  three  or  four  physicians, 
as  unknown  to  fame  as  the  science  they  professed  to  understand  seems  to 
have  been  unknown  to  them,  far  outweighed  with  the  court  that  of  John 
Hunter,  though  illustrated  by  his  various  learning,  and  supported  by  his  repu- 
tation for  unrivalled  talents  and  original  research. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  63 

subject  for  trial.  Their  reports  not  being  satisfactory  to  the 
avocat-g^ne'ral  (attorney-general),  the  trial,  at  his  request, 
•was  postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  prisoner  was  again 
subjected  to  the  examination  of  the  committee,  who  reported 
three  months  afterwards.1  What  a  contrast  does  this  calm 
and  deliberate  inquiry  present,  to  the  indecent  haste  with 
which  the  legal  proceedings  were  precipitated  against  Bel- 
lingham  who  committed  his  offence,  was  indicted,  tried, 
hanged,  and  dissected,  all  within  the  space  of  eight  days.  In 
this  case,  there  was  a  strong  disinclination  manifested  by  the 
court  to  listen  to  the  plea  of  insanity  ;  as  if  it  were  a  fiction 
set  up  by  counsel,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  ground  of 
defence;  and  the  earnest  request  of  his  counsel  for  a  little 
delay,  that  he  might  obtain  witnesses  from  the  part  of  the 
country  where  the  accused  had  lived  and  was  well  known, 
who  would  substantiate  the  fact  of  his  insanity,  of  which 
there  was  already  more  than  suspicion,  was  disregarded. 
Few,  it  is  believed,  at  this  period,  unbiased  by  the  political 
prejudices  of  the  times,  and  examining  the  event  as  a  point 
of  history,  will  read  the  report  of  Bellingham's  trial  without 
being  forced  to  the  conclusion,  that  he  was  really  mad,  or,  at 
the  very  least,  that  the  little  evidence  which  did  appear  rela- 
tive to  his  state  of  mind,  was  strong  enough  to  have  entitled 
him  to  a  deliberate  and  thorough  investigation  of  his  case. 
Mr.  Simpson,2  after  mentioning  the  case  of  Howison,  who 
was  tried  and  executed  for  the  murder  of  the  widow  Geddes, 
in  which  the  evidence  of  his  insanity  was  so  strong,  that  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  conceive  what  additional  evidence  could 
make  it  stronger,  states,  that  "  application  was  made  without 
success  to  the  secretary  of  state,  by  Howison's  law-agent,  for 
time  to  obtain  further  evidence  of  his  insanity.  To  this  that 
gentleman  was  emboldened,  by  receiving  the  concurring 
opinions  of  some  of  the  first  medical  men  in  Edinburgh,  who 
had  not  been  cited,  that  even  the  evidence  adduced  on  the 
trial  was  sufficient ;  but  that,  when  several  post-judicial  facts 
v 

1  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  71. 

2  Homicidal  Insanity,  222. 


64  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

were  added,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  unhappy  man 
was  not  a  fit  subject  for  punishment."  Cases  like  these 
ought  to  convince  us,  that  the  feelings  of  horror  and  ven- 
geance excited  by  the  bloody  deeds  of  the  insane,  completely 
unfit  the  popular  mind  for  a  careful  and  impartial  investiga- 
tion of  the  plea  of  insanity,  and  that  the  mental  condition  of 
the  accused  should  be  examined  by  men  who  have  become 
fitted  for  such  duties  by  a  peculiar  course  of  study  and  expe- 
rience. Is  it  necessary  to  go  into  a  labored  argument  to 
prove  that  this  method  of  determining  the  grave  and  delicate 
question  of  insanity  must  be  infinitely  more  satisfactory,  than 
that  of  summoning  medical  witnesses  to  the  trial  —  most  of 
whom  have  but  very  imperfect  notions  of  the  disease,  and 
probably  have  not  had  the  least  communication  with  the 
accused,  —  and  forcing  out  their  evidence,  amid  the  embar- 
rassment produced  by  the  queries  of  ingenious  counsel,  bent 
on  puzzling  and  distracting  their  minds  ?  If  a  physician, 
after  listening  to  divers  vague  and  rambling  details  concern- 
ing a  person's  ill-health,  and  looking  at  him  across  the  apart- 
ment, without  being  permitted  to  address  to  him  a  single 
word,  or  lay  a  finger  on  his  person,  should  then  be  required 
to  say  on  his  oath,  whether  or  not  the  individual  in  question 
were  laboring  under  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  bowels,  or 
kidneys,  he  would  scarcely  restrain  a  smile  at  the  stupidity 
which  should  expect  a  satisfactory  answer.  And  yet,  absurd 
and  foolish  as  such  a  course  would  be  considered  in  the  ab- 
stract, it  is  the  only  one  recognized  by  our  laws,  when  the 
disease,  whose  existence  is  to  be  established,  happens  to  be 
insanity.  Besides,  where  mental  derangement  is  suspected, 
there  are  many  physical  symptoms  and  numerous  other  cir- 
cumstances that  cannot  be  investigated  in  an  hour  or  a  day, 
but  require  a  course  of  diligent  observation  that  may  occupy 
weeks  or  months,  before  the  suspicion  can  be  confirmed  or 
disproved.  From  these  considerations,  the  general  conclu- 
sion is,  that  in  criminal  cases  where  insanity  is  pleaded  in 
defence,  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  best  promoted  by  the 
appointment  of  a  special  commission,  consisting  of  men  who 
possess  a  well-earned  reputation  in  the  knowledge  and  man- 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  65 

agement  of  mental  derangement,  who  should  proceed  to  the 
examination  of  the  accused  with  the  coolness  and  impar- 
tiality proper  to  scientific  inquiries.1 

§  45.  To  facilitate  the  inquiries  of  such  a  commission, 
there  is  needed  some  suitable  provision  for  the  examination 
of  the  accused.  Indeed,  with  every  disposition  to  arrive  at 
the  truth,  it  is  generally  impossible  under  the  present  arrange- 
ments. In  jails,  where  prisoners  accused  of  crime  are  con- 
fined, proper  opportunities  are  not  afforded  for  investigating 
their  mental  condition.  In  the  few  formal  interviews  to  which 
the  observation  of  the  prisoner  is  confined,  it  may  often  hap- 
pen that  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  will  not  be  discovered. 
If  really  insane,  he  will  be  likely  to  control  his  movements, 
and  to  discourse  and  appear  very  differently  from  what  he 
would  when  left  to  himself  and  unconscious  of  being  ob- 

1  It  may  be  proper,  perhaps,  to  inform  the  reader  that  the  exclusive  com- 
petence of  medical  men  to  give  opinions,  as  experts,  in  cases  of  doubtful  con- 
dition of  mind,  has,  at  different  times,  been  warmly  disputed.  The  celebra- 
ted Kant,  by  whom  the  dispute  was  begun,  contended  that  such  cases  ought 
more  properly  to  be  submitted  to  the  Philosophical  Faculty.  (Anthropologie 
§  41.)  His  arguments  were  satisfactorily  answered  by  Metzger,  (Gerichtl. 
medic.  Abhand.  s.  74),  Hcffbauer,  (Die  Psycologie  in  ihren  Anwendungen 
aufdie  Rechtspjlege,  §  1,  not.  3,)  and  others,  and  the  controversy  was  set  at 
rest  until  the  trial  of  Henriette  Cornier,  at  Paris,  which  led  to  its  revival  with 
renewed  vigor.  Coste,  a  French  physician,  (Journ.  univer.  des  Scien.  med.  t. 
43,  p.  53,)  and  Regnault,  a  Parisian  advocate,  who  wrote  a  book  on  the  sub- 
ject, (Du  degree  de  competence  des  medicins  dans  les  questions  relatives  aux 
alienation  mentale,  1828,)  have  hotly  contended  that  any  tolerably  sensible, 
well-informed  man  is  as  competent  as  a  Pinel  or  an  Esquirol,  to  form  opin- 
ions for  judicial  purposes,  relative  to  cases  of  doubtful  condition  of  mind. 
The  arguments  —  or,  more  properly  speaking,  the  assumptions  and  declama- 
tion —  of  these  writers,  have  been  severely  handled  by  their  opponents, 
(Georget,  NouveUe  Discussion  medico  legate  sur  lafolie,  p.  20;  North  Ameri- 
can Medical  and  Surgical  Journal,  April,  1828,  p.  457;  Friedreich,  Hand- 
buch  der  gericht.  Psychologic  ;  Leuret,  Annals  d' Hygiene,  i.  281 ;  Royer-  Col- 
lard  Journ.  hebd  ii.  181,)  and  the  controversy  may  be  considered  as  once 
more  at  rest,  precisely  where  it  was  found.  We  have  not  thought  it  worth 
while  to  discuss  this  question,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  objections  against 
receiving  the  opinions  of  physicians,  as  experts,  are  altogether  founded  in 
gross  ignorance,  misconception,  and  prejudice,  without  even  a  plausible  show 
of  support. 

6* 


66  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

served.  Many  insane,  as  we  have  already  shown,  manifest 
their  aberration  only  under  certain  circumstances  and  on  par- 
ticular occasions,  and  appear  quite  correct  at  all  other  times. 
Many,  too,  whose  insanity  is  recognized  by  every  body  who 
knows  them,  never  evince  it  in  their  discourse,  but  solely  in 
their  ways  and  habits.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  prisoner  is 
feigning  insanity,  he  will  summon  all  his  powers  to  produce 
the  requisite  impression  at  these  interviews  which,  being 
short  and  few,  the  difficulty  of  his  task  is  much  lessened.  To 
ascertain  satisfactorily  the  mental  condition  of  a  prisoner 
suspected  of  being  insane,  he  should  be  placed  where  the 
expert  may  be  able  to  see  him  often,  and  at  times  when  he  is 
not  aware  of  being  observed.  His  words,  and  acts,  and 
movements,  his  manners  and  habits  should  be  systematically 
watched,  and  a  single  day  of  such  observation  would  often 
throw  more  light  on  the  case  than  many  formal  interviews. 
We  see  no  difficulty  in  so  changing  our  modes  of  criminal 
procedure,  that  when  the  court  shall  be  satisfied  that  there 
are  reasonable  doubts  of  the  prisoner's  sanity,  it  may  be 
authorized  to  postpone  the  trial,  and  place  him,  in  the  mean 
time,  in  the  charge  of  an  expert  —  for  which  our  hospitals 
for  the  insane  furnish  a  convenient  and  suitable  opportunity 
—  whose  report  shall  be  received  in  evidence  at  the  trial. 
This  is  substantially  the  course  adopted  in  France,  and 
nothing  short  of  its  adoption  with  us,  will  render  the  plea  of 
insanity  powerless  for  evil,  and  remove  the  suspicions  of  the 
community  on  this  point. 

§  46.  If  the  above  hasty  review  of  the  judicial  opinions 
and  practices  that  have  hitherto  prevailed  relative  to  insanity, 
have  left  the  impression,  that  this  disease  is  as  yet  but  imper- 
fectly understood,  as  well  in  the  medical  profession  as  out  of 
it,  an  explanation  of  this  fact  may  perhaps  be  demanded ; 
but  as  it  would  be  hardly  relevant  to  the  present  purpose  to 
enter  largely  into  a  discussion  of  this  point,  nothing  more 
will  be  attempted  than  merely  to  indicate  what  seems  to 
have  had  the  principal  share  in  producing  it.  To  explain 
the  little  progress,  comparatively  speaking,  that  has  been 
made  b^  medical  men  in  the  knowledge  of  insanity,  it  is  too 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  67 

much  the  fashion  to  allege,  that  they  have  neglected  the 
study  of  mental  philosophy,  or  that  of  mind  in  the  healthy 
state,  which  is  indispensable  to  correct  notions  on  the  disor- 
dered condition  of  mind.  So  far,  however,  is  the  fact  here 
indicated  from  being  true,  generally,  that  one  cannot  hesitate 
to  say,  that  the  result  in  question  has  been  owing  to  the  un- 
due account  that  physicians  have  made  of  the  popular  phi- 
losophy of  mind,  in  explaining  the  phenomena  of  insanity,  and 
that  they  have  failed  in  consequence  of  studying  metaphysics 
too  much  instead  of  too  little.  While  it  is  admitted  that  the 
knowledge  of  healthy  structure  and  functions  is  necessary  to 
a  thorough  understanding  of  diseased  structure  and  functions, 
there  isxevery  reason  to  believe,  that  the  converse  of  the  pro- 
position is  equally  true ;  neither  can  be  successfully  studied 
independently  of  the  other.  In  the  prosecution  of  psycholog- 
ical science,  this  latter  truth  has  been  almost  entirely  disre- 
garded, and  therefore  it  is,  that  we  see  the  metaphysician 
looking  for  his  facts  and  his  theories  in  the  healthy  manifes- 
tations of  the  mind,  and  directed  in  his  course  solely  by  his  own 
self-consciousness,  while  the  student  of  insanity,  after  collect- 
ing his  facts  with  commendable  diligence  and  discrimination, 
amid  the  disorder  and  irregularity  of  disease,  resorts  to  the 
theories  of  the  former,  for  the  purpose  of  generalizing  his  re- 
sults, instead  of  building  upon  them  a  philosophy  of  his  own. 
Metaphysics,  in  its  present  condition,  is  utterly  incompetent  to 
furnish  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  in- 
sanity, and  a  more  deplorable  waste  of  ingenuity  can  hardly 
be  imagined,  than  is  witnessed  in  the  modern  attempts  to 
reconcile  the  facts  of  the  one  with  the  speculations  of  the 
other.  In  proof  of  the  truth  of  these  assertions,  it  is  enough 
barely  to  mention,  that  the  existence  of  monomania,  as  a 
distinct  form  of  mental  derangement,  was  denied,  and  de- 
clared to  be  a  fiction  of  medical  men,  long  after  it  had  taken 
its  place  among  the  established  truths  of  science ;  because, 
probably,  it  was  a  condition  of  mind  not  described  by  meta- 
physical writers.  All  this,  however,  is  in  accordance  with  a 
well-known  law  of  the  human  mind,  which  resists  important 
innovations  upon  the  common  modes  of  thinking  till  long 


68  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

after  they  shall  have  been  required  by  the  general  progress  of 
knowledge.  The  dominant  philosophy  has  prevailed  so  long 
and  so  extensively,  and  has  become  so  firmly  rooted  in  men's 
minds  that  they  who  refuse  to  take  it  on  trust  and  who  seri- 
ously inquire  into  its  foundations,  and  after  finding  them  too 
narrow  and  imperfect,  are  bold  enough  to  endeavor  to  remedy 
its  defects  by  laying  foundations  of  their  own,  are  stigmatized 
as  visionaries,  and  overwhelmed  with  ridicule  and  censure. 
The  only  metaphysical  system  of  modern  times  which  pro- 
fesses to  be  founded  on  the  observation  of  nature,  and  which 
really  does  explain  the  phenomena  of  insanity  with  a  clear- 
ness and  versimilitude  that  strongly  corroborate  its  proofs, 
was  so  far  from  being  joyfully  welcomed,  that  it  is  still  con- 
fined to  a  sect,  and  is  regarded,  by  the  world  at  large,  as  one 
of  those  strange  vagaries  in  which  the  human  mind  has 
sometimes  loved  to  indulge.  So  true  it  is,  that,  in  theory,  all 
mankind  are  agreed  in  encouraging  and  applauding  the  hum- 
blest attempt  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  our  ideas,  while,  in 
practice,  it  often  seems  as  if  they  were  no  less  agreed  to  crush 
them  by  means  of  every  weapon  that  wit,  argument,  and 
calumny  can  furnish.  In  the  course  of  this  work,  the  reader 
will  have  frequent  occasions  to  see  how  the  popular  miscon- 
ceptions, —  which  are  too  much  adopted  by  professional  men 
—  of  the  nature  of  various  forms  of  mental  derangement, 
have  been  produced  and  fostered  by  the  current  metaphysical 
doctrines,  and  thus  may  have  some  means  of  judging  for  him- 
self, how  far  the  imperfect  notions  of  insanity,  that  are  yet 
prevalent,  may  be  attributed  to  the  cause  above  assigned. 


CHAPTER   I. 


MENTAL   DISEASES   IN   GENERAL. 

§  47.  CORRECT  ideas  of  the  pathology  of  insanity  are  not 
unessential  to  the  progress  of  enlightened  views  respecting 
its  legal  relations.  If  it  be  considered  as  withdrawn  from 
the  influence  of  the  common  laws  of  nature  in  the  produc- 
tion of  disease,  and  attributed  to  the  direct  visitation  of  God ; 
if  the  existence  of  physical  changes  be  overlooked  or  denied, 
and  be  referred  exclusively  to  some  mysterious  affection  of 
the  immaterial  spirit  for  its  cause ;  then  is  it  in  vain  to  hope, 
that  such  a  condition  can  ever  be  the  object  of  discriminating, 
salutary  legislation.  In  the  prevalence  of  such  views  in  past 
times,  however,  we  may  look  for  the  cause  of  much  of  the 
error  and  absurdity  that  pervade  the  law  of  insanity,  and  that 
are  equally  at  variance  with  the  principles  of  science  and  the 
dictates  of  humanity.  It  is  an  undoubted  truth,  that  the 
manifestations  of  the  intellect,  and  those  of  the  sentiments, 
propensities,  and  passions,  or  generally,  of  the  intellectual  and 
affective  powers,  are  connected  with  and  dependent  upon  the 
brain.  It  follows,  then,  that  abnormal  conditions  of  these 
powers  are  equally  connected  with  abnormal  conditions  of 
the  brain ;  but  this  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  inference.  The 
dissections  of  many  eminent  observers,  among  whom  it  is 
enough  to  mention  the  names  of  Greding,  Gall,  and  Spurz- 
heim,  Calmeil,  Foville,  Falret,  Bayle,  Esquirol,  and  Georget, 
have  placed  it  beyond  a  doubt;  and  no  pathological  fact  is 
better  established  —  though  its  correctness  was  for  a  long 
while  doubted  —  than  that  deviations  from  the  healthy  struc- 
ture are  generally  presented  in  the  brains  of  insane  subjects. 


70  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

In  the  few  cases  where  such  appearances  have  not  been 
observed,  it  is  justly  concluded  that  death  took  place  before 
the  deviation  was  sufficiently  great  to  be  perceptible,  —  a 
phenomenon  not  rare  in  affections  of  other  organs. 

§  48.  These  pathological  changes  are  not  sufficiently 
definite  to  admit  of  classification,  or  of  practical  applica- 
tion in  the  treatment  of  the  various  kinds  of  insanity.  To  us 
they  are  chiefly  valuable,  as  showing  the  frequent  liability 
to  disease,  either  from  excessive  exertion  or  disuse  of  its  own 
powers,  or  from  its  proneness  to  be  affected  by  morbid  irri- 
tations that  radiate  from  other  parts  of  the  body.  We  learn 
from  them,  also,  that  changes  of  structure  may  proceed  in  the 
brain,  as  in  other  organs,  to  an  incurable  degree,  without  giv- 
ing rise  to  much,  if  any,  very  perceptible  disturbance  of  its 
functions,  until  some  striking  and  unexpected  act  leads  the 
enlightened  physician  to  suspect  its  existence,  and  draws 
down  upon  the  unfortunate  subject  the  restraints  and  penal- 
ties of  the  law. 

§  49.  A  natural  classification  of  the  various  forms  of 
insanity,  though  of  secondary  importance  in  regard  to  its 
medical  treatment,  will  be  of  eminent  service  to  the  legal 
inquirer,  by  enlarging  his  notions  of  its  phenomena,  and 
enabling  him  to  discriminate,  where  discrimination  is  neces- 
sary to  the  attainment  of  important  ends.  The  deplorable 
consequences  of  knowing  but  one  kind  of  insanity,  and  of 
erecting  that  into  a  standard,  whereby  every  other  is  to  be 
compared  and  tested,  are  too  common  in  the  records  of 
criminal  jurisprudence ;  and  it  is  time  that  it  were  well 
understood,  that  the  philosophy  of  such  a  method  is  no 
better  than  would  be  that  of  the  physician  who  should 
recognize  no  diseases  of  the  stomach,  for  instance,  but  such 
as  proceeds  from  inflammation,  and  reject  all  others  as 
anomalous  and  unworthy  of  attention.  The  various  diseases 
included  in  the  general  term  insanity,  or  mental  derange- 
ment, may  be  conveniently  arranged  under  two  divisions, 
founded  on  two  very  different  conditions  of  the  brain ;  the 
first  being  a  want  of  its  ordinary  development,  and  the 
second,  some  lesion  of  its  structure  subsequent  to  its  devel- 


MENTAL   DISEASES   IN   GENERAL. 


71 


opment.  In  the  former  of  these  divisions,  we  have  IDIOCY 
and  IMBECILITY,  differing  from  each  other  only  in  degree. 
The  various  affections  embraced  in  the  latter  general  divis- 
ion may  be  arranged  under  two  subdivisions,  MANIA  and 
DEMENTIA,  distinguished  by  the  contrast  they  present  in  the 
energy  and  tone  of  the  mental  manifestations.  Mania  is 
characterized  by  unnatural  exaltation  or  depression  of  the 
faculties,  and  may  be  confined  to  the  intellectual  or  to  the 
affective  powers,  or  it  may  involve  them  both,  and  these 
powers  may  be  generally  or  partially  deranged.  Dementia 
depends  on  a  more  or  less  complete  enfeeblement  of  the 
faculties,  and  may  be  consecutive  to  injury  of  the  brain,  to 
mania,  or  to  some  other  disease ;  or  it  may  be  connected  with 
the  decay  of  old  age.  These  divisions  will  be  more  con- 
veniently exhibited  in  the  following  tabular  view. 


INSANITY.  < 


Defective 
develop- 
ment of 
the  facul- 
ties. 


Lesion  of 
the  facul- 
ties sub- 
sequent 
to  their 
develop- 
ment. 


IDIOCY. 


IMBECILITY. 


MANIA. 


DEMENTIA. 


:1.  Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 
2.  Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 

'1.  Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 
2.  Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 


Intellectual.     <  2* 
Affective.         •]  „' 


General. 
Partial. 

General. 
Partial. 


1.  Consecutive  to  mania,  or  injuries 

of  the  brain. 

2.  Senile,  peculiar  to  old  age. 


§  50.  It  is  not  pretended  that  any  classification  can  be 
rigorously  correct ;  for  such  divisions  have  not  been  made 
by  nature,  and  cannot  be  observed  in  practice.  Diseases  are 
naturally  associated  into  some  general  groups  only ;  and  if 
these  be  ascertained  and  brought  into  view,  the  great  end  of 
classification  is  accomplished.  We  shall*  often  find  them 
running  into  one  another,  and  be  puzzled  to  assign  to  a 
particular  disease  its  proper  place;  but  since  such  is  the 


72  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

order  of  nature,  we  must  make  the  most  of  the  good  it  pre- 
sents, and  remedy  its  evils  in  the  best  manner  we  can.  The 
above  arrangement,  with  the  exception  of  some  slight  modi- 
fications, is  that  adopted  by  Esquirol,  and  has  this  advantage 
over  some  others,  that  it  preserves  the  divisions  made  by 
nature,  and  will  thus  be  serviceable  to  our  present  purpose. 
Several  other  conditions  of  mind  in  which  moral  freedom 
is  impaired,  will  also  be  considered,  though  they  cannot  be 
strictly  called  insanity. 


CHAPTER    II. 


IDIOCY. 

§  51.  IDIOCY  is  that  condition  of  mind,  in  which  the  re- 
flective, and  all  or  a  part  of  the  affective  powers,  are  either 
entirely  wanting,  or  are  manifested  to  the  slightest  possible 
extent.  As  the  organic  defects  on  which  idiocy  depends, 
are  various  in  kind  and  degree,  and  also  as  it  regards  the 
parts  of  the  brain  affected,  we  should  be  led  to  expect,  what 
observation  shows  is  actually  the  case,  considerable  variety 
in  the  manifestations  of  this  condition.  The  individual  may 
hardly  rise  to  the  level  of  some  of  the  brutes,  his  movements 
being  confined  to  the  necessities  of  the  automatic  life ;  or  he 
may  be  capable  of  performing  some  useful  services,  of  ex- 
ercising some  talent,  or  of  displaying  some  of  the  higher 
moral  sentiments.  In  short,  there  is  even  more  diversity 
in  the  characters  of  the  idiotic  and  imbecile,  than  in  those 
of  the  sound,  and  this  truth  must  not  be  forgotten,  if  we 
would  avoid  -the  flagrant  error  of  regulating  judicial  decisions 
by  rules,  which,  though  perfectly  correct  in  regard  to  one 
case  or  set  of  cases,  may  be  wholly  incorrect  in  regard  to 
others. 

§  52.  No  particular  physical  trait  can  be  considered  as 
inseparable  from  idiocy,  although  after  the  period  of  infancy, 
the  physical  organization  never  fails  to  give  notice  of  its 
presence.  In  a  small  number  of  cases,  the  head  presents  no 
deviation  from  the  normal  form  and  size,  but  with  this  excep- 
tion, the  head  is  either  too  large  or  too  small ;  the  tables  of  the 

7 


- 
74  MEDICAL  JUBISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

skull  being  thin  and  distended  with  water,  or  thick,  indu- 
rated, and  uneven.  In  the  former  class,  the  forehead,  though 
prominent,  is  always  depressed,  and  the  posterior  part  of  the 
head  is  apparently  of  the  regular  size,  while  the  middle  region 
is  more  or  less  distended,  either  laterally  or  upwards.  In  the 
latter  class,  the  depression  is  equally  destitute  of  uniformity. 
Sometimes  it  affects  principally  the  superior  and  anterior 
parts  of  the  head,  producing  a  narrow  and  retreating  fore- 
head ;  in  other  instances,  it  affects  the  posterior  or  occipital 
parts,  the  occipital  curve  being  reduced  to  an  almost  straight 
line ;  in  others,  the  lower  parts  of  the  skull  are  tolerably 
regular,  while  the  upper  appear  to  be  diminished  arid  flat- 
tened ;  in  others,  finally,  the  two  sides  of  the  skull  are  exceed- 
ingly unequal.  In  all  these  cases,  the  head  is  found,  by 
measurement,  below  the  ordinary  size.  The  circumference, 
measured  immediately  over  the  orbitar  arch  and  the  most 
prominent  part  of  the  occiput,  is  fixed  by  Gall  at  between 
eleven  and  one  third  and  fourteen  and  a  half  inches,  the  brain, 
consequently,  equalling  that  of  a  new-born  infant,  that  is, 
about  one  fourth,  one  fifth,  or  one  sixth  of  the  cerebral  mass 
of  an  adult.  The  senses  of  idiots  are  more  or  less  imperfect, 
if  not  entirely  wanting.  Some  are  blind,  and  in  nearly  all 
who  see,  the  eye  is  either  in  constant  motion,  unable  to  fix 
its  regards  on  any  particular  object,  or  unnaturally  fixed  and 
not  easily  changing  its  look  from  one  point  to  another.  Many 
are  entirely  deaf,  and  many  more  are  incapable  of  listening. 
Many  are  mute,  and  many  utter  only  wild,  inarticulate  cries. 
Some  speak  slowly  and  with  difficulty,  others  tolerably  well. 
The  sense  of  touch  frequently  exhibits  an  excess  or  defect  of 
sensibility.  Many  are  incapable  of  perceiving  odors,  and 
have  so  little  taste  as  to  show  no  discrimination  in  their 
choice  of  food,  swallowing  whatever  comes  to  hand.  Their 
movements  are  constrained  and  awkward ;  they  walk  badly, 
easily  falling  down ;  and  are  constantly  dropping  whatever  is 
placed  in  their  hands.  Sometimes  the  limbs  are  crooked  and 
feeble,  and  limited  in  their  motions.  Idiots  are  often  affected 
with  rickets,  epilepsy,  scrofula,  or  paralysis,  their  whole  phy- 


IDIOCY.  75 

sical  economy  indicating  a  depraved  and  defective  consti- 
tution. 

§  53.  In  reasoning  power,  many  idiots  are  below  the  brute. 
Unable  to  compare  two  ideas  together,  nothing  leads  them 
to  act  but  the  faint  impressions  of  the  moment,  and  these 
are  often  insufficient  to  induce  them  to  gratify  even  their  in- 
stinctive wants.  It  frequently  happens,  however,  that  some 
one  or  more  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  always  excepting 
the  reflective,  are  manifested  in  more  or  less  perfection. 
Among  the  moral  sentiments,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find 
self-esteem,  love  of  approbation,  religious  veneration,  and 
benevolence,  bearing  a  prominent  part,  if  not  constituting 
the  entire  character,  and  thus  producing  a  slight  approxima- 
tion to  humanity.  Rush l  speaks  of  one  who  was  remarka- 
ble for  kindness  and  affection,  and  spent  his  life  in  acts  of 
benevolence,  though  he  showed  no  one  mark  of  reason.  Dr. 
Combe 2  saw  two  who,  though  differing  much  in  other  re- 
spects, agreed  in  evincing  a  strong  predilection  for  religious 
worship,  and  for  listening  to  sermons  and  prayers.  Some 
can  recollect  names,  numbers,  or  historical  facts ;  some  are 
capable  of  repeating  what  they  have  frequently  heard  ;  others 
are  able  to  sing  a  few  airs,  and  even  to  play  on  musical 
instruments.  Gall 3  saw  one  at  Hamburgh,  sixteen  years  old, 
who  learned  names,  dates,  numbers,  history,  and  repeated 
them  all  mechanically,  but  was  destitute  of  all  power  of  com- 
bining and  comparing  his  ideas,  and  was  incapable  of  being 
engaged  in  any  employment.  Various  propensities,  such  as 
the  sexual  feelings,  cunning,  and  destructiveness,  they  often 
manifest  in  an  inordinate  degree  of  vigor  and  activity. 

§  54.  It  has  been  reserved  for  our  own  times  to  prove,  on  a 
large  scale,  that  these  defective  beings  are  not  beyond  the 
reach  of  education.  Under  the  united  efforts  of  science  and 
philanthropy,  the  lowest  have  been  raised  some  steps  in  the 
scale  of  being,  and  those  less  unhappily  endowed  have 


1  Medical  Inquiries.  2  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  243. 

3  Sur  les  Fonctions  I.  193. 


76  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

showed  an  improvement  in  their  personal  habits,  in  the 
number  of  their  ideas,  and  their  capacity  for  useful  employ- 
ment, that  would  once  have  appeared  quite  incredible.  It  is 
not  supposed  that  education  can  ever  efface  the  distinction 
between  them  and  ordinary  men,  but  small  as  its  results  may 
be  comparatively,  they  are  enough  to  be  of  some  medico- 
legal  importance. 

§  55.  In  that  form  of  idiocy  called  cretinism,  which  is 
endemic  in  the  Alps  and  some  other  mountainous  countries, 
opportunities  of  observing  its  phenomena  are  offered  on  a 
grand  scale.  The  difference  in  the  degrees  of  this  affection 
has  led  to  its  division  into  three  classes,  namely,  cretinism, 
semi-cretinism,  and  cretinism  of  the  third  degree.  In  the 
first,  life  seems  to  be  almost  entirely  automatic ;  most  of  its 
subjects  are  unable  to  speak,  their  senses  are  dull,  if  not 
altogether  wanting,  and  nothing  but  the  most  urgent  calls  of 
nature  excite  their  attention.  To  good  or  to  bad  treatment 
they  are  equally  insensible.  The  semi-cretins  show  some 
glimmering  of  a  higher  nature;  they  note  what  passes 
around ;  they  remember  simple  events ;  and  make  use  of 
language  to  express  their  wants.  They  are  capable  of  little 
else,  however,  for  they  have  no  idea  of  numbers,  and,  though 
taught  to  repeat  certain  passages,  they  learn  nothing  of  their 
meaning.  The  actions  of  those  of  the  third  kind  indicate  a 
still  higher  degree  of  intellect ;  they  have  a  stronger  memory 
of  events,  and  they  learn  to  read  and  write,  though  with 
scarcely  any  conception  of  the  purposes  of  either.  Particular 
talents  are  often  displayed  by  them  in  a  very  respectable 
degree.  Music,  drawing,  painting  machinery,  etc.,  have  each 
had  its  followers  in  a  humble  way,  among  these  cretins.  In 
the  construction  of  some  parts  of  a  watch,  they  are  often 
employed  in  Geneva,  and  their  work  is  characterized  by  neat- 
ness. Others  have  executed  drawings  of  some  merit,  and 
some  have  even  studied  several  languages,  in  which  their 
acquisitions  were  by  no  means  insignificant;  while  others 
have  even  attempted  poetry,  though  succeeding  in  nothing 
but  the  rhyme.  Though,  in  all  degrees  of  idiocy,  the  intel- 


IDIOCY.  77 

lectual  powers  are  so  deficient  as  hardly  to  be  recognized, 
and  therefore  these  distinctions  can  be  of  little  practical  im- 
portance, yet  they  may  serve  to  teach  us  how  independent  of 
one  another  are  the  various  moral  and  intellectual  faculties, 
and  lead  us  to  be  cautious  how  we  infer  the  soundness  or 
capacity  of  the  whole  mind,  from  the  perfection  manifested 
by  one  or  two  of  its  faculties. 


CHAPTER  III. 


IMBECILITY. 

§  56.  BY  imbecility  is  meant  an  abnormal  deficiency 
either  in  those  faculties  that  acquaint  us  with  the  qualities 
and  ordinary  relations  of  things,  or  in  those  which  furnish  us 
with  the  moral  motives  that  regulate  our  relations  and  con- 
duct towards  our  fellow  men ;  and  frequently  attended  with 
excessive  activity  of  one  or  more  of  the  animal  propensities. 
In  imbecility  the  development  of  the  moral  and  intellectual 
powers  is  arrested  at  an  early  period  of  existence.  It  differs 
from  idiocy  in  the  circumstance,  that  while  in  the  latter 
there  is  an  almost  utter  destitution  of  every  thing  like  reason, 
the  subjects  of  the  former  possess  some  intellectual  capacity, 
though  far  less  than  is  possessed  by  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind. Imbeciles  can  never  attain  that  degree  of  knowledge 
which  is  common  among  people  of  their  own  rank  and 
opportunities,  though  it  is  very  certain  that  they  are  not 
entirely  unsusceptible  of  the  influences  of  education.  They 
are  capable  of  forming  a  few  simple  ideas  and  of  expressing 
them  in  language ;  they  have  some  memory  and  a  sense  of 
the  conveniences  and  proprieties  of  life.  Many  of  them  learn 
to  read,  write,  and  count,  and  make  some  progress  in  music, 
though,  for  the  most  part,  they  are  untaught  and  employed  in 
the  coarsest  and  rudest  labors.  Their  moral  and  intellectual 
character  presents  the  same  infinite  variety  that  is  witnessed 
in  the  normal  state  of  the  mind.  While  some  are  changing 
their  plans  and  resolutions  with  the  fickleness  of  the  winds, 
others  have  some  favorite  project  which  they  are  bent  on 
accomplishing.  While  nothing  can  arrest  the  attention  of 


IMBECILITY.  79 

some  for  a  moment,  others  pertinaciously  retain  some 
crotchet  that  occupies  nearly  all  their  thoughts.  Some  en- 
gage in  certain  occupations,  and  manage  to  take  care  of 
themselves  and  their  property,  though  frequently  obliged  to 
resort  to  others  for  advice  and  assistance.  They  talk  but 
little,  and  will  answer  questions  correctly,  provided  they  are 
not  without  the  circle  of  their  customary  thoughts  and  habits, 
and  are  not  required  to  follow  a  conversation.  They  are 
particularly  deficient  in  forethought  and  in  strong  and  dura- 
ble affections,  and  they  generally  labor  under  a  certain  unea- 
siness and  restlessness  of  disposition  that  unfit  them  for 
steady  employment.  They  are  thus  easily  induced  by  bad 
men  to  assist  in  the  execution  of  their  criminal  enterprises.  It 
is  also  worthy  of  notice  that  the  same  physical  imperfections 
and  a  tendency  to  the  same  diseases  which  accompany 
idiocy,  are  generally  observed,  though  in  a  less  degree,  in 
imbecility. 

§  57.  Much  as  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers  vary  in 
the  different  cases,  but  little  has  been  done  towards  distin- 
guishing the  various  degrees  of  imbecility,  by  a  system  of 
classification,  though  it  must  be  obvious  at  first  sight,  that 
something  of  this  kind  is  absolutely  necessary  before  its  legal 
relations  can  be  determined  with  much  correctness  or  con- 
sistency. Hoffbauer1  alone  has  made  an  attempt  to  supply 
this  want,  and  though  perhaps  not  perfectly  satisfactory,  as 
might  have  been  expected  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  yet 
it  evinces  such  a  correct  appreciation  of  mental  diversities, 
and  so  much  ability  in  the  analysis  of  deficient  understand- 
ings, that  it  would  be  doing  injustice  to  the  subject,  to 
neglect  giving  some  account  of  his  views  in  this  place. 

§  58.  Mental  deficiency  is  manifested  under  two  different 
forms  which  Hoffbauer  designates  by  the  terms  imbecility 
(Blodsinn),  and  stupidity  (Dummheit).  The  former  consists 
in  a  defect  of  the  intensity,  the  latter  in  a  defect  of  the  ex- 
tensity,  necessary  to  a  sound  and  healthy  mind.  By  intensity 

1  Die  Psychologic  in  ihren  Hauptanwendungen  auf  die  Rechtspflege,  §§  26 
—  46. 


80  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

is  meant  the  power  of  the  mind  to  examine  the  data  pre- 
sented to  it  by  the  senses,  and  therefrom  to  deduce  correct 
judgments;  by  its  extensity,  the  mind  perceives  and  em- 
braces these  data,  and  suffers  none  to  escape,  —  one,  it  may 
be  added,  is  the  reflective  ;  the  other,  the  perceptive  power. 

"  In  reference  to  the  faculty  of  judgment,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that  the  stupid  person  is  more  liable  than  the  imbecile 
to  form  erroneous  decisions;  the  latter  experiences  great 
difficulty  in  bringing  himself  to  any  conclusion.  Secondly, 
the  stupid  person  sometimes  judges  very  correctly  on  subjects 
to  which  his  attention  has  been  strongly  applied ;  occasion- 
ally he  surpasses,  in  this  respect,  those  of  superior  intelligence. 
When  he  judges  wrongly,  it  is  through  neglect  of  some  of 
the  considerations  which  ought  to  have  formed  the  ground- 
work of  his  judgment,  and  he  will  say,  in  order  to  excuse 
himself,  that '  he  never  should  have  dreamed  of  this  or  that 
circumstance.'  To  the  imbecile,  on  the  contrary,  the  most 
simple  act  of  judgment  is  difficult.  A  lady,  for  instance,  who 
said  she  was  twenty-five  years  of  age,  and  had  been  married 
six  years,  could  not,  after  many  efforts,  tell  how  old  she  was 
at  the  period  of  her  wedding ;  at  one  time  calling  it  twenty, 
at  another,  twenty-two.  Thirdly,  the  stupid  man  may  often 
be  induced  to  correct  his  mistake ;  some  simple  reason,  or 
particular  circumstance  being  suggested  to  him  which  leads 
to  its  detection.  The  imbecile  man  can  scarcely  rectify  his 
errors,  being  unable  sufficiently  to  concentrate  his  attention 
on  any  particular  subject.  Fourthly,  the  stupid  man,  in 
recovering  from  his  error,  frequently  falls  into  the  opposite 
extreme,  passing  from  the  blindest  confidence  to  the  most 
jealous  distrust,  because  he  views  every  subject  on  one  side 
only,  and  is  embarrassed  by  every  complex  idea. 

§  59.  "  In  relation  also  to  memory,  there  is  a  decided 
difference  between  the  stupid  and  the  imbecile.  The  latter 
appear  to  be  almost  entirely  deficient  in  this  faculty,  while 
the  former  recollect  after  a  long  interval  of  time,  and  with 
tolerable  accuracy,  §ome  insulated  circumstances. 

§  60.  "  Weakness  of  intellect  is  displayed  in  both  these 
classes,  when  their  defect  is  excessive,  by  a  propensity  to  talk 


IMBECILITY.  81 

to  themselves.  This  is  mostly  observable  when  the  individ- 
ual is  alone,  or  supposes  himself  alone.  In  reality,  we  em- 
ploy words,  not  merely  for  purposes  of  intercourse,  but  as 
an  instrument  of  thought ;  and  when  the  mind  is  morbidly 
enfeebled,  the  silent  and  unperceived,  or  mental  employment 
of  words  is  insufficient ;  they  must  be  repeated  more  or  less 
audibly.  This  practice  is  not  uncommon  with  imbecile  and 
stupid  people,  but  when  in  company,  they  generally  perceive 
its  incongruity  and  abstain  from  it.  If,  however,  such  indi- 
viduals talk  to  themselves,  knowing  that  they  are  in  the  pre- 
sence of  company,  it  is  a  proof  of  greater  deficiency. 

§  61.  "  Another  distinction  between  the  imbecile  and  the 
stupid  person  is,  that  the  latter  imagines  himself  equal,  if  not 
superior,  to  other  men  in  intelligence  ;  whereas  the  former  is 
sensible  of  his  defect,  and  even  exaggerates  it.  Hence  results 
another  difference  between  the  stupid  and  the  imbecile  per- 
son. The  former  acts  precipitately  and  without  reflection ; 
the  latter  never  can  make  up  his  mind,  even  on  the  simplest 
affair,  from  the  fear  that  there  may  be  consequences  which 
he  is  incapable  of  foreseeing.  The  imbecile  is  frequently 
timid,  and  even  misanthropic ;  not  only  because  he  is  con- 
scious of  his  deficiency,  but  because  he  has  a  disagreeable 
experience  of  the  superiority  of  others.  When  this  is  the 
cause  of  his  jealous  distrust,  we  observe,  first,  that  he  reposes 
unlimited  confidence  in  those  whose  benevolence  he  has  ex- 
perienced ;  secondly,  that  when  his  condition  in  society  places 
him  beyond  the  reach  of  injury,  he  has  none  of  this  mis- 
anthrophy  of  which  we  speak,  and  is  at  peace  with  all  the 
world.  The  pusillanimity  and  misanthropy  of  the  imbecile 
lead  them  to  a  species  of  devotion,  if  such  it  may  be  called ; 
for  it  is  natural  that,  on  seeing  themselves  repulsed,  or  ill- 
treated  by  men,  they  should  apply  to  the  deity  for  support, 
The  stupid,  more  confident  in  themselves,  fancy  that  they 
acquire  merit  by  their  devotions,  or  confer  an  honor  on  the 
divinity." 

§  62.  Hoffbauer,  while  he  acknowledges  the  various  and 
almost  imperceptible  shades  of  difference  between  one  case 
of  imbecility  and  another,  has  reduced  its  numberless  grada- 


82  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tions  to  five  degrees,  and  those  of  stupidity  to  three.  To 
these,  as  described  and  explained  by  him,  he  looks  for  the 
means  of  a  consistent  and  rational  application  of  the  legal 
principles  that  should  regulate  their  civil  and  criminal  rela- 
tions. 

"  The  first  degree  of  imbecility  manifests  itself  in  the  ina- 
bility to  form  a  judgment  respecting  any  new  object,  even 
when  the  necessary  data  are  furnished,  and  the  question  is 
one  which,  in  itself,  presents  no  difficulties.  In  this  degree 
of  the  affection,  the  individual  can  very  well  judge  respecting 
objects  to  which  he  is  daily  accustomed,  and  in  familiarity 
with  which  he  may  be  said  to  have  grown  up.  In  the  pur- 
suit of  his  daily  concerns,  he  often  shows  a  minute  exactness 
that  appears  to  him  a  matter  of  absolute  necessity.  His 
memory  is  very  limited;  not  that  he  loses  absolutely  the 
remembrance  of  things,  but  because  he  cannot  apply  his 
recollections  according  to  his  wishes.  He  scrupulously 
observes  whatever  he  thinks  becoming  in  his  situation, 
because  he  fears  to  offend  by  neglecting  it.  When  he  gives 
himself  up  to  avarice,  there  is  observed  in  him  rather  an  ap- 
prehension of  losing  than  a  desire  of  accumulating.  The 
propensity  to  talk  to  himself,  and  the  species  of  devotion  to 
which  we  have  alluded,  is  seldom  to  be  met  with  in  this 
instance ;  the  former,  because  the  routine  of  daily  occupa- 
tions, above  which  the  individual  seldom  raises  himself,  makes 
but  small  demands  on  his  intelligence;  the  latter,  because 
his  infirmity  is  not  so  remarkable  in  ordinary  society  as  to 
render  it  a  subject  of  general  observation,  and  entail  upon 
him  frequent  annoyance,  and  thus  make  him  feel  the  neces- 
sity of  seeking  support  elsewhere.  He  is  very  subject  to 
gusts  of  passion,  which,  nevertheless,  are  as  easily  appeased 
as  they  are  excited." 

The  description  of  the  second  degree  of  imbecility  applies 
to  the  subjects  of  dementia,  which  will  be  considered  in 
another  place ;  and  it  may  therefore  be  omitted  here. 

§  63.  "  A  person  affected  with  imbecility  in  the  third 
degree,  is  unfitted  for  all  matters  that  require  more  than  a 
mechanical  mode  of  action;  but  he  preserves  sufficient  in- 


IMBECILITY.  83 

telligence  to  be  aware  of  his  weakness  and  of  the  intellectual 
superiority  of  others.  "We  may  likewise  remark  in  him  that 
propensity  to  devotion  and  misanthropy  of  which  we  have 
spoken  above.  His  mind  is  not  completely  inactive,  although 
it  cannot  raise  itself  to  any  elevated  views ;  hence  he  has  the 
propensity  to  talk  to  himself.  He  has  not  the  power  of  seiz- 
ing an  idea  so  clearly  as  to  impress  it  on  his  mind ;  hence  a 
very  marked  defect  of  memory  and  a  great  propensity  to 
pass  rapidly  from  one  topic  to  another.  He  is  very  irrita- 
ble and  suspicious,  fancies  a  design  to  insult  him  where  it  is 
impossible,  because  his  state  yet  permits  him  to  feel  and 
resent  injuries  —  of  which  susceptibility  those  about  him 
often  take  advantage  in  order  to  annoy  him. 

§  64.  The  fourth  degree  of  imbecility  is  marked  by  a 
clouded  state  of  the  understanding  and  memory,  with  a  great 
insensibility,  which  nevertheless  leaves  the  patient  a  confused 
idea  of  his  weakness.  He  eagerly  seeks  excitement  by  vari- 
ous stimuli." 

§  65.  The  fifth  degree  of  imbecility,  as  described  by  Hoff- 
bauer,  corresponds  to  the  last  stage  of  dementia,  or  the 
fatuity  which  results  from  some  cerebral  diseases,  and  there- 
fore does  not  belong  to  this  condition  of  mind  according  to 
the  arrangement  above  adopted. 

§  66.  Stupidity,  generally  speaking,  is  a  defect  less  severe 
than  imbecility,  according  to  the  definition  given  of  each. 
The  slightest  degree  of  imbecility,  however,  indicates  an  im- 
perfection of  the  intellectual  powers,  less  severe  than  the 
greatest  degree  of  stupidity. 

"  In  the  first  degree  of  stupidity,  the  individual  is  only 
incapable  of  judging  and  deciding,  when  it  is  necessary  to 
weigh  opposing  motives.  Then  he  feels  his  incapacity,  and 
resorts  to  the  intelligence  of  others,  unless  too  proud,  which 
often  happens.  If  he  acts  absurdly,  it  is  often  because  he 
applies  to  his  actions  a  rule  good  in  itself,  but  the  application 
of  which  requires  other  considerations. 

§  67.  "  The  subject  of  the  second  degree  of  stupidity 
judges  accurately  and  sometimes  even  promptly,  respecting 
things  by  which  he  is  habitually  surrounded ;  but  he  com- 


84  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mits  serious  errors  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  exert  a  certain 
vigor  of  judgment.  He  is  embarrassed  in  any  train  of  rea- 
soning, however  simple  it  may  be.  His  memory  is,  perhaps, 
faithful,  but  it  is  slow ;  he  cannot,  without  great  difficulty, 
express  a  complex  idea,  if  it  is  the  result  of  his  own  reflec- 
tions, and  has  not  been  received  from  another.  When  his 
faculties  have  been  somewhat  developed  by  education,  he  is 
an  obstinate  partisan  of  any  thing  which  is,  as  we  say,  good 
in  theory,  but  useless  in  practice ;  because  he  cannot  observe 
the  circumstances  that  distinguish  particular  cases,  and  ap- 
preciate them  according  to  their  just  value.  These  two  con- 
ditions are  indispensable,  however,  to  the  proper  application 
of  general  rules. 

§  68.  "  In  the  highest  degree  of  stupidity  the  individual 
cannot  go  beyond  one  single  idea ;  and  he  must  completely 
lose  that  one  before  he  can  pass  to  another.  Hence  he  is  less 
capable  of  judging  than  the  imbecile,  because  the  comparison 
of  several  ideas  is  necessary  to  form  a  judgment.  Individu- 
als who  are  affected  with  stupidity  in  the  third  degree,  often 
express  themselves  in  half-uttered  words,  return  incessantly 
to  the  same  subject,  make  known  their  ideas  by  sentences, 
short,  incoherent,  and  unfinished,  like  children  who  can  retain 
words  but  do  not  know  how  to  connect  them  together ;  they 
often  express  the  subject  and  the  attribute  without  connect- 
ing the  one  to  the  other  by  the  affirmative  or  negative.  If 
they  wish  to  say, '  the  rose  is  beautiful,'  they  will  say,  '  rose 
beautiful,'  or  only  '  rose,'  or  '  beautiful,'  according  as  the  sub- 
ject or  attribute  strikes  them  most.  Often  they  reverse  the 
natural  order  of  words,  and  say,  for  example,  '  rose  beautiful 
is ; '  and  when  they  perceive  an  omission  which  they  wish 
to  repair,  they  become  still  more  perplexed." 

§  69.  It  does  not  need  the  high  authority  of  Esquirol  to 
convince  us,  that  these  distinctions  are  drawn  with  a  minute- 
ness and  show  of  accuracy  that  savor  more  of  the  labors  of 
the  closet  than  of  the  rigid  and  faithful  observation  of  nature. 
This  objection,  however,  which  might  not  have  been  unsus- 
pected by  the  author  himself,  does  not  entirely  destroy  the 
utility  of  his  attempt,  so  long  as  it  is  admitted  to  be  an 


IMBECILITY.  85 

approximation  to  the  truth ;  for,  with  all  its  defects,  it  estab- 
lishes the  important  fact  that  mental  deficiency  is  distin- 
guished by  various  grades  of  intensity,  instead  of  being 
invariably  the  same  condition,  and  therefore  that  it  cannot 
properly  be  always  subjected  to  the  same  legal  regulations. 
It  is  a  material  defect  in  the  above  descriptions,  that  the 
state  of  the  moral  faculties  is  seldom  adverted  to,  though 
their  deviations  from  the  normal  condition  are  no  less  strik- 
ing than  those  which  the  intellectual  powers  exhibit.  What- 
ever may  be  their  character,  it  is  obvious  that  their  ordinary 
relations  to  the  intellect  must  be  affected,  and  thus  the  idea 
is  forced  upon  us,  that,  as  accountable  beings,  the  subjects  of 
mental  deficiency  must  be  viewed  in  a  very  different  light 
from  that  in  which  we  are  accustomed  to  regard  those  of 
sound  and  well-developed  minds.  The  observations  of 
Georget  on  the  moral  faculties  of  imbeciles,  partially  supply 
this  defect  in  Hoffbauer's  descriptions,  and  therefore  are 
worthy  of  notice  in  this  connection. 

§  70.  "  In  hospitals  for  the  insane,"  says  he,  "  there  is 
always  a  certain  number  of  imbeciles  who  do  the  coarser 
work  of  the  house,  or  serve  as  domestics  and  assistants  to 
the  regular  officers.  They  become  sufficiently  intelligent,  at 
last,  to  perform  their  duties  well,  to  sweep  the  courts,  carry 
burdens,  move  machines,  execute  simple  commissions,  know 
the  use  of  money,  and  procure  various  enjoyments.  But 
they  have  no  idea,  or  a  very  imperfect  one,  of  society,  laws, 
morality,  courts  and  trials  ;  and  though  they  may  have  the 
idea  of  property,  they  have  no  conception  of  the  conse- 
quences of  theft.  They  may  have  been  taught  to  refrain  from 
injuring  others,  but  they  are  ignorant  of  what  would  be  done 
to  them  if  guilty  of  incendiarism  or  murder.  Indeed,  it  is 
well  known  how  common  theft  is  among  imbeciles  and 
idiots,  and  for  a  very  obvious  reason.  Some  of  them  have 
no  conception  of  property,  nor  of  the  distinctions  of  meum 
and  tuum ;  their  conduct  is  actuated  solely  by  the  fear  of 
punishment,  when  capable  of  experiencing  this  sentiment, 
and  by  their  own  desires.  Others  have  some  notions  of  prop- 
erty, but  neither  a  sense  of  morality,  nor  a  fear  of  punish- 

8 


86  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

ment  furnishes  motives  sufficiently  powerful  to  prevent  them 
from  stealing.  The  sentiment  of  cunning,  too,  may  be  very 
much  developed,  while  the  other  faculties  are  more  or  less 
deficient.  Among  the  lower  orders  of  society  are  many 
imbeciles  a  little  more  intelligent  than  these,  and  not  consid- 
ered as  utterly  devoid  of  understanding,  who,  nevertheless, 
have  but  vague  and  imperfect  notions  of  social  duties  and  of 
justice.  They  engage  in  occupations  that  require  no  great 
extent  of  intellect,  and  even  in  the  simplest  of  the  mechanic 
arts.  If  they  do  not  pass  among  their  acquaintances  for 
imbeciles,  they  are  at  least  regarded  as  singular  beings  with 
feeble  understandings,  and  are  teazed  and  tormented  in  innu- 
merable ways.  Many  of  them,  for  want  of  some  powerfully 
restraining  motive,  indulge  in  drinking,  and  become  lazy, 
drunken,  and  dissipated,  and  finally  fall  into  the  hands  of 
justice  in  greater  numbers  than  is  generally  suspected. 
They  steal  adroitly,  and  hence  are  considered  as  very  intelli- 
gent ;  they  recommence  their  offences  the  moment  they  are 
released  from  confinement,  and  thus  are  believed  to  be 
obstinately  perverse ;  they  are  violent  and  passionate,  and 
the  slightest  motive  is  sufficient  to  plunge  them  into  deeds  of 
incendiarism  and  murder.  Those  who  have  strong  sexual 
propensities,  soon  become  guilty  of  outrages  on  female  chas- 
tity. I  have  had  occasion  to  see  many  examples  of  this  class 
in  prisons,  who  had  been  judicially  decided  to  be  rational, 
but  whose  demi-imbecility  was  manifest  enough  to  me."  1 

If  this  is  a  correct  representation  of  the  moral  character  of 
the  lesser  grades  of  imbecility  —  and  the  accuracy  and  good 
faith  of  Georget  are  not  to  be  doubted  —  it  may  be  easily 
imagined,  without  the  help  of  further  description,  what  it 
must  be  in  the  higher  degrees. 

§  71.  By  imbecility  is  ordinarily  understood  a  deficiency 
of  intellect ;  but  it  has  been  seen  above  (§  56)  that  its  signi- 
fication is  here  extended,  in  order  to  include  that  class  of 
subjects  in  whom  the  mental  defect  consists  in  a  great  defi- 

1  Discussion  me'dico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  140;  and  Des  maladies  mentales, 
conside're'es  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation  civile  et  criminelle,  8. 


IMBECILITY.  87 

ciency,  if  not  utter  destitution  of  the  higher  moral  faculties, 
the  intellectual,  perhaps,  not  being  sensibly  affected.  The 
following  case  will  illustrate  this  form  of  the  disorder. 

E.  S.,  aged  thirty-four,  who  had  been  ten  years  an  inmate 
of  the  Richmond  Lunatic  Asylum  in  Dublin,  was  brought 
before  Mr.  George  Combe,  during  a  visit  to  that  institution, 
on  the  20th  of  April,  1829,  to  be  subjected,  with  several 
others,  to  a  phrenological  examination.  A  few  months  after, 
Dr.  Crawford,  the  physician  of  the  asylum,  addressed  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Combe  respecting  this  patient,  from  which  the  follow- 
ing description  is  taken.  "  You  observe  in  your  notes,  '  I 
am  surprised  he  was  not  executed  before  he  became  insane.' 
This  would  lead  to  the  supposition  that  he  had  been  afflicted 
with  some  form  of  insanity,  in  addition  to  a  naturally 
depraved  character.  Such,  however,  is  by  no  means  the 
t  case ;  he  never  was  different  from  what  he  now  is ;  he  has 
never  evinced  the  slightest  mental  incoherence  on  any  one 
point,  nor  any  kind  of  hallucination.  It  is  one  of  those 
cases  where  there  is  great  difficulty  in  drawing  the  line 
between  extreme  moral  depravity  and  insanity,  and  in  decid- 
ing at  what  point  an  individual  should  cease  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  responsible  moral  agent,  and  amenable  to  the 
laws.  The  governors  and  medical  gentlemen  of  the  asylum 
have  often  had  doubts  whether  they  were  justified  in  keep- 
ing E.  S.  as  a  lunatic,  thinking  him  a  more  fit  subject  for  a 
Bridewell.  He  appears,  however,  so  totally  callous  with 
regard  to  every  moral  principle  and  feeling  —  so  thoroughly 
unconscious  of  ever  having  done  anything  wrong  —  so  com- 
pletely destitute  of  all  sense  of  shame  or  remorse  when 
reproved  for  his  vices  or  crimes  —  and  has  proved  himself 
utterly  incorrigible  throughout  life,  that  it  is  almost  certain 
that  any  jury  before  whom  he  might  be  brought  would  sat- 
isfy their  doubts  by  returning  him  insane,  which,  in  such  a 
case,  is  the  most  humane  line  to  pursue.  He  was  dismissed 
several  times  from  the  asylum,  and  sent  there  the  last  time 
for  attempting  to  poison  his  father;  and  it  seems  fit  he 
siiould  be  kept  there  for  life  as  a  moral  lunatic',  but  there  has 
never  been  the  lest  symptom  of  diseased  action  of  the  brain, 


88  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

which  is  the  general  concomitant  of  what  is  usually  under- 
stood as  insanity" 1 

§  72.  Nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  this  indi- 
vidual was  denied  by  nature  the  possession  of  those  moral 
faculties,  the  due  development  and  exercise  of  which  consti- 
tute an  essential  element  of  responsibility.  By  the  aid  of 
kind  and  intelligent  friends,  he  was  secluded  from  scenes  in 
which  he  was  unfitted  to  mingle ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he 
had  been  suffered  to  go  at  large,  with  his  animal  propensities 
uncontrolled  by  the  higher  powers  of  our  moral  nature,  and 
constantly  meeting  with  opportunities  for  indulgence,  what 
else  could  have  been  expected  but  some  deed  of  violence  that 
would  have  brought  upon  him  the  tender  mercies  of  the  law  ? 
Dr.  Crawford  is  altogether  too  sanguine  in  believing  that  a 
jury  would  have  pronounced  E.  S.  insane ;  for  the  melan- 
choly termination  of  the  cases  above  given,  teaches  how  little 
we  can  here  rely  on  the  intelligence  of  courts  and  juries. 
Had  he  committed  a  capital  crime,  he  would  probably  have 
been  condemned  and  executed,  while  the  intelligent  and  the 
educated,  the  philosopher  and  the  man  of  the  world,  would, 
for  the  most  part,  have  joined  the  unthinking  populace,  in 
thanking  God,  that  a  monster  of  wickedness  had  fallen 
beneath  the  arm  of  the  law. 

§  73.  In  a  class  of  cases  by  no  means  unfrequent,  this 
moral  imbecility  is  particularly  manifested  in  a  morbid  ac- 
tivity of  the  destructive  propensity.  An  interesting  case  of 
this  kind  is  related  at  length  by  Parent  Duchatelet.2  The 
subject  of  it  was  a  little  girl  fourteen  years  old,  who  lived 
with  her  grandmother,  a  very  respectable  and  religious  woman, 
till  the  age  of  seven,  when  she  returned  to  the  charge  of  her 
parents.  At  this  time,  she  is  described  as  never  playing,  nor 
crying,  nor  laughing.  She  had  been  taught  to  read,  sew,  and 
knit,  though  quite  averse  to  all  instruction.  Her  mother 
being  sick,  she  expressed  regret  that  she  was  not  dead,  be- 
cause in  that  case  she  would  inherit  her  mother's  clothes 

1  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  147. 

2  Annales  d'Hygiene,  vii.  173. 


IMBECILITY.  89 

which  she  would  alter  so  as  to  wear  them  herself.  She  de- 
clared that  she  would  have  killed  her  while  sick  if  she  could 
have  evaded  the  observation  of  the  attendants,  and  told  her 
mother,  who  asked  how  she  would  have  accomplished  her 
purpose,  that  she  would  have  plunged  a  poignard  into  her 
bosom.  She  said  she  was  aware  her  father  would  put  her 
in  prison,  but  that  would  not  deter  her.  A  few  months  after- 
wards, on  the  occasion  of  the  murder  of  a  child,  she  told  her 
mother  that  if  she  had  killed  her  with  a  knife  she  would 
have  got  blood  on  her  clothes,  which  would  have  led  to 
discovery,  and  therefore  she  would  have  taken  care  to  undress, 
before  committing  the  act.  Subsequently  she  said,  she  would 
use  poison,  in  order  to  kill  her  mother.  She  frequently  de- 
clared that  she  never  loved  her  father,  nor  mother,  nor  grand- 
mother. It  appears  that  from  the  age  of  four  years  she  was 
addicted  to  the  practice  of  self-abuse,  and  no  precautions  nor 
persuasions  could  deter  her  from  this  dreadful  habit.  Such  was 
the  moral  state  of  this  child,  now  eight  years  old,  when  she  was 
examined  by  a  commissary  of  the  police,  and  sent  to  a  con- 
vent. At  the  age  of  fourteen,  she  appears  to  have  abandoned 
her  murderous  designs,  but  continued  dejected  and  silent. 

§  74.  This  form  of  insanity,  which  is  above  denominated 
moral  imbecility,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  that  in  which 
the  intellect  is  affected,  is  not  very  rare  in  receptacles  for  the 
insane,  and  is  more  common  in  society  than  is  generally  sus- 
pected. It  is  seldom  regarded  in  its  true  light,  and  when  its 
subjects  have  occupied  a  high  place  in  society,  and  thus 
been  enabled  to  indulge  more  freely  their  mischievous  pro- 
pensities, they  have  often  been  consigned  by  the  historian  to 
the  eternal  execrations  of  mankind.  Count  Charolais,  brother 
of  the  duke  de  Bourbon  Conde",  whose  sanguinary  character 
has  been  commemorated  by  Lacretelle,  was  undoubtedly  a 
case  of  this  kind.  He  manifested  an  instinct  of  cruelty  in 
the  very  sports  of  his  childhood.  He  took  a  pleasure  in  tortur- 
ing animals,  and  committing  the  most  ferocious  acts  of  vio- 
lence against  his  domestics.  He  would  stand  at  his  window 
and  shoot  the  artizans  at  work  upon  the  neighboring  build- 
ings, merely  for  the  pleasure  of  seeing  them  tumble  from  the 

8* 


90  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

roofs  and  ladders.  It  is  said  that  he  loved  to  stain  even 
his  debaucheries  with  blood,  and  committed  many  murders 
from  no  motive  of  interest  or  anger.1  Dr.  Rush  says  that  in 
the  course  of  his  life  he  had  been  consulted  in  three  cases  of 
moral  imbecility ;  and  nothing  can  better  express  the  true 
characters  of  their  physiology,  than  his  remark  respecting 
them.  "  In  all  these  cases,"  he  observes,  "  there  is  probably 
an  original  defective  organization  in  those  parts  of  the  body 
which  are  occupied  by  the  moral  faculties  of  the  mind,"2  — 
an  explanation  that  will  receive  but  little  countenance  in  an 
age  that  derives  its  ideas  of  the  mental  phenomena  from  the 
exclusive  observation  of  mind  in  a  state  of  acknowledged 
health  and  vigor.  To  understand  these  cases  properly, 
requires  a  knowledge  of  our  moral  and  intellectual  consti- 
tution, to  be  obtained  only  by  a  practical  acquaintance  with 
the  innumerable  phases  of  the  mind,  as  presented  in  its  vari- 
ous degrees  of  strength  and  weakness,  of  health  and  disease, 
amid  all  its  transitions  from  brutish  idiocy  to  the  most  com- 
manding intellect. 

§  75.  The  prevalent  error  of  looking  at  mind  in  the  ab- 
stract, as  a  unique  principle  endowed  with  a  certain  apprecia- 
ble measure  of  strength  and  activity,  has  been  the  cause  of 
much  dispute  and  discrepancy  of  opinion,  in  cases  where  the 
acts  of  persons  affected  with  Hoffbauer's  first  degree  of  im- 
becility, have  been  made  the  object  of  judicial  investigation. 
One  witness  has  observed  a  range  and  tenacity  of  memory 
which  he  could  not  square  with  his  notions  of  mental  weak- 
ness ;  another,  perhaps,  has  seen  the  party  whose  acts  are  in 
question  conducting  himself  with  the  utmost  propriety,  and 
observing  the  social  usages  proper  to  his  station,  and  this  he 
has  deemed  incompatible  with  imbecility  of  mind;  while 
another  has  heard  him  replying  to  questions  on  common- 
place subjects,  readily  and  appropriately,  and  he  also  draws 
similar  conclusions.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  seen  engag- 
ing in  occupations  and  amusements,  and  associating  with 
company  seemingly  below  the  dignity  of  his  age  or  station, 

1  Histoire  de  France,  ii.  59.  2  Diseases  of  the  mind,  357. 


IMBECILITY.  91 

by  one  who  desires  no -further  proof  of  an  imbecile  mind;  or 
he  may  be  so  extravagantly  vain  of  some  personal  accom- 
plishments, as  to  impress  another  with  the  idea,  that  his  un- 
derstanding has  scarcely  the  strength  of  a  child's.  And  it  is 
worthy  of  notice,  that  oftentimes  the  very  fact  which  fur- 
nishes undoubted  proof  of  imbecility  to  one  observer,  conveys 
an  unshaken  conviction  of  mental  soundness  to  another. 
Few,  indeed,  are  capable  of  sounding  the  depths  of  another's 
intelligence,  because  few  are  aware  of  the  necessity,  or  have 
the  ability  if  they  were,  of  scrutinizing,  not  one  act  or  trait  of 
character  alone,  but  every  intellectual  manifestation  as  it 
appears  in  the  conduct,  conversation,  and  manners,  as  the 
only  means  of  obtaining  an  insight  into  his  real,  mental  ca- 
pacity. Scarcely  a  case  comes  up  in  which  the  understanding 
of  an  imbecile  is  judicially  investigated,  that  does  not  furnish 
striking  illustrations  of  this  fact,  as  might  be  shown  by  numer- 
ous instances  in  point.  The  following,  however,  the  first  of 
which  was  adjudicated  in  1832,  may  serve  as  examples. 

§  76.  "  Miss  Bagster  was  a  young  lady  of  fortune,  and 
perpetrated  a  runaway-match  with  Mr.  Newton.  An  appli- 
cation was  made  by  her  family  to  dissolve  the  marriage,  on 
the  ground  that  she  was  of  unsound  mind.  The  facts  urged 
against  her  before  the  commissioners  were,  that  she  had  been 
a  violent,  self-willed,  and  passionate  child ;  that  this  continued 
till  she  grew  up ;  that  she  was  totally  ignorant  of  arithmetic, 
and  therefore  incapable  of  taking  care  of  her  property ;  that  she 
had  evinced  a  great  fondness  for  matrimony,  having  engaged 
herself  to  several  persons ;  and  that,  in  many  respects,  she 
evinced  little  of  the  delicacy  becoming  her  sex.  Dr.  Suther- 
land had  visited  her  four  times,  and  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  she  was  incapable  of  taking  care  of  herself  or  of  her  prop- 
erty. She  had  memory,  but  neither  judgment  nor  reasoning 
power.  Dr.  Gordon  did  not  consider  her  capacity  to  exceed 
that  of  a  child  of  seven  years  of  age.  Several  non-medical 
witnesses,  who  had  known  her  from  infancy,  spoke  of  her 
extremely  passionate,  and  occasionally  indelicate  conduct. 
On  her  examination,  however,  before  the  commissioners,  her 
answers  were  pertinent  and  in  a  proper  manner.  No  indeli- 


92  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

cate  remark  escaped  from  her.  Drs.  Morrison  and  Haslam 
had  both  visited  her,  and  were  not  disposed  to  consider  her 
imbecile  or  idiotic.  She  confessed  and  lamented  her  igno- 
rance of  arithmetic,  but  said  that  her  grandfather  sent  excuses 
when  she  was  at  school,  and  begged  that  she  might  not  be 
pressed.  Her  conversation  generally  impressed  these  gentle- 
men in  a  favorable  manner  as  to  her  sanity.  The  jury 
brought  in  a  verdict,  that  Miss  Bagster  had  been  of  unsound 
mind  since  November  1,  1830,  and  the  marriage  was  conse- 
quently dissolved."1 

§  77.  There  would  seem  to  have  been  no  doubt  as  to  the 
existence  of  some  degree  of  mental  deficiency  in  this  young 
lady ;  the  question  was,  whether  it  was  constitutional,  or 
merely  the  result  of  a  neglected  education  and  misplaced  in- 
dulgences, and  consequently  capable  of  being  remedied.  In 
proof  of  its  constitutional  nature,  we  have  the  opinion  of  a 
respectable  physician  that  she  was  incapable  of  taking  care 
of  herself  or  of  her  property ;  and  of  another,  that  her  ca- 
pacity did  not  exceed  that  of  a  child  seven  years  old,  which 
opinion  is  corroborated  by  the  facts  in  evidence,  that  she  was 
extremely  passionate,  and  often  indelicate  in  her  conduct ; 
that  her  mind  ran  greatly  upon  matrimony ;  and  that  she  had 
not  made  the  most  ordinary  attainments  in  knowledge.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  appears  that  her  education  was  unquestion- 
ably neglected ;  that,  before  the  commissioners,  her  answers 
were  pertinent  and  in  a  proper  manner ;  and  that  two  emi- 
nent physicians  were  not  disposed  to  consider  her  idiotic  or 
imbecile.  It  is  obvious,  that  in  cases  like  this,  the  opinions 
of  the  medical  witnesses  will  depend  very  much,  if  not  alto- 
gether, on  the  extent  of  their  previous  acquaintance  with  the 
manifestations  of  the  mind,  both  in  its  normal  and  abnormal 
conditions.  Hence  it  is  that  a  trait  by  no  means  incompati- 
ble with  imbecility  was  considered,  in  this  case,  as  indicative 
of  a  proper  soundness  of  mind.  Persons  laboring  under 
far  more  imbecility  than  Miss  Bagster,  are  capable,  on  occa- 
sions, of  controlling  themselves  and  concealing  their  more 

1  1  Beck,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  579. 


IMBECILITY.  93 

prominent  faults  to  such  a  degree  that  a  stranger  finds  it 
difficult  to  believe,  that  in  point  of  understanding,  they  are 
much  below  the  level  of  ordinary  people.  It  should  be  recol- 
lected that  imbecility  is  manifested  in  the  conduct  and  man- 
ners, as  well  as  the  thoughts  and  language;  and  when  it 
is  considered  that  persons  like  Miss  Bagster  are  confes- 
sedly of  narrow  understandings,  and  often  of  defective  edu- 
cation, it  could  not  be  expected  that  strong  indications  of  im- 
becility would  be  observed  in  their  conversation  alone.  Her 
answers,  it  seems,  were  pertinent,  and  properly  delivered,  as 
they  might  well  have  been,  if  they  related  to  things  in 
which  she  was  particularly  interested,  and  were  not  beyond 
her  powers  of  comprehension,  and  she  still  have  been  imbecile 
or  stupid.  In  the  description  of  the  first  degree  of  imbecility, 
already  quoted  (§  62),  Hoffbauer  expressly  says  that  "the 
individual  can  very  well  judge  respecting  objects  to  which  he 
is  daily  accustomed,  and  in  familiarity  with  which  he  may 
be  said  to  have  grown  up."  It  may  be  also  added,  that  their 
answers  are  sometimes  not  only  pertinent,  but  characterized 
by  considerable  pith  and  shrewdness.  Miss  Bagster's  educa- 
tion was,  no  doubt,  grossly  neglected,  but  this  circumstance 
could  not  have  produced  so  much  mental  deficiency  as  to 
have  impressed  a  careful  and  intelligent  observer  with  the 
conviction  that  her  capacity  did  not  exceed  that  of  a  child 
seven  years  old.  Neglected  or  vicious  education  is  a  cause  of 
ignorance,  but  can  never  degrade  the  mind  into  a  state  of  im- 
becility or  stupidity,  which  are  always  either  congenital  or 
the  effect  of  disease.  Dr.  Morrison  indeed  stated  under  oath, 
that  he  would  undertake  to  teach  her,  in  six  months,  arith- 
metic and  the  use  of  money,  but  his  success  would  have  been 
far  from  disproving  the  existence  of  imbecility.  It  is  not 
doubted  that  in  this  condition  of  mind,  there  is  some  sucepti- 
bility  of  education,  and  the  cases  are  not  unfrequent  where, 
in  regard  to  one  or  two  particular  powers,  the  individual  is 
quite  on  a  level  with  his  more  happily-endowed  fellow  men.1 

1  I  regret  that  the  drift  of  these  remarks  on  Miss  Bagster's  case  has  been 
entirely  misunderstood.    In  a  notice  of  this  work  in  the  British  and  Foreign 


94  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

§  78.  In  the  case  of  Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth,  which 
was  a  suit  of  nullity  of  marriage,  on  the  ground  of  the  men- 
tal unsoundness  (which  was,  in  fact,  imbecility  in  the  first 
degree)  of  the  husband,  the  Earl  of  Portsmouth,  numerous 
facts  were  deposed  to  by  witnesses,  in  proof  that  he  pos- 
sessed a  capacity  and  understanding  fully  equal  to  the  ordi- 
nary transactions  of  life.  It  appeared  that  when  at  school 
he  evinced  a  very  good  memory,  and  made  respectable  pro- 
ficiency in  arithmetic  and  the  languages;  and  that,  after 
coming  of  age,  he  settled  accounts  with  his  agents  ;  attended 
public  meetings  and  committees;  prosecuted  an  offender, 
and  was  examined  as  a  witness ;  and  that  his  friends  had 
failed  in  making  him  the  object  of  a  commission  of  lunacy. 
In  regard  to 'these  circumstances,  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl, 

Medical  Review  (July,  1840),  they  are  pronounced  to  be  in  contradiction 
•with  the  views  subsequently  expressed  in  the  chapter  on  Interdiction,  and 
charged  with  favoring  legal  oppression.  This  case  was  quoted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  illustrating  that  discrepancy  of  opinion  and  irrelevancy  of  facts  so 
often  witnessed  in  medico-legal  investigations  of  cases  of  mental  imbecility 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  In  the  comments  which 
follow,  my  object  was  merely  to  examine  the  value  of  certain  evidence  and 
show  how  far  it  proved  or  disproved  mental  imbecility  generally.  I  contend 
that  certain  facts  alleged  in  disproof  of  imbecility,  are  not  incompatible  with 
that  condition,  and  it  may  be  inferred,  no  doubt,  from  my  remarks,  that  I  con- 
sidered Miss  B.  as  laboring  under  some  degree  of  imbecility,  a  point  which 
the  reviewer  himself  admits.  Whether  the  imbecility  were  of  such  a  kind  as 
to  incapacitate  her  from  being  a  party  to  the  marriage  contract,  is  a  question 
very  different  from  that  of  imbecility  in  the  abstract,  and  one  which  I  did  not 
pretend  to  discuss.  For  any  thing  I  have  said  to  the  contrary,  it  may  have 
been  the  height  of  injustice  to  annul  this  marriage.  What  foundation,  then, 
has  the  reviewer  for  his  assertion,  that  the  author  "  comes  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  verdict  was  correct,  and  that  this  lady  was  really  imbecile  to  a  degree 
requiring  legal  interference  ?  "  A  closer  examination  of  my  remarks  on  this 
case  would  have  satisfied  the  reviewer,  I  think,  that  they  are  nowise  contra- 
dictory to  the  general  principle  prominently  set  forth  in  various  parts  of  this 
•work,  —  that  the  legal  consequences  of  the  various  forms  of  insanity,  are  to 
be  determined  by  no  general  arbitrary  rule,  but  always  in  reference  to  the 
particular  act  in  question.  I  have  since  carefully  read  the  report  of  this  case 
in  the  Medical  Gazette,  vol.  x.,  and  have  no  hesitation  in  concluding  that  the 
verdict  was  correct,  and  that  this  lady  was  really  imbecile  to  a  degree 
requiring  legal  interference. 


IMBECILITY.  95 

observed  in  substance,  that  the  capacity  for  instruction  and 
improvement  is  possessed  even  by  the  brute  creation,  and 
therefore  did  not  of  itself  disprove  the  fact  of  imbecility; 
that  when  he  appeared  as  a  witness  in  a  court  of  justice,  it 
was  only  a  simple  fact  he  had  to  state,  requiring  little,  if 
any  thing,  more  than  memory,  and  that  his  cross-examina- 
tion could  require  nothing  more  than  the  recollection  of 
facts  —  not  any  considerable  exercise  of  the  understanding 
and  of  the  reasoning  powers  ;  that  his  behavior  in  company, 
and  his  few  observations  on  the  state  of  the  weather,  horses, 
and  farming,  were  not  incompatible  with  great  imbecility  of 
mind,  because,  under  the  restraint  produced  by  formal  com- 
pany and  by  the  sense  of  being  observed,  the  more  promi- 
nent features  of  imbecility  would  be  shaded,  and  the  indi- 
vidual might  pass  as  possessing  a  considerable  degree  of 
understanding.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  satisfactorily  proved 
that  he  had  always  been  treated  by  his  family  as  one  of  fee- 
ble capacity,  and  by  a  family-arrangement,  he  was  married, 
when  thirty-two  years  of  age,  to  a  lady  of  forty-seven,  evi- 
dently for  the  purpose  of  saving  him  from  improper  con- 
nections, and  obtaining  for  him  suitable  care  and  protection. 
It  appeared  that  his  servants  were  his  play-fellows,  and  that 
he  played  all  sorts  of  tricks  with  them ;  that  he  was  fond  of 
driving  a  team,  and  that  his  wife  so  far  indulged  him,  as  to 
have  a  team  of  horses  kept  for  his  amusement  as  a  toy  and 
a  plaything,  with  which  he  carted  dung,  timber,  and  hay ; 
that  he  had  a  propensity  for  bell-ringing,  was  fond  of  slaugh- 
tering cattle,  and  indulged  in  wanton  cruelty  towards  man 
and  beast,  never  expressing  regret,  but  merely  observing, 
"  serves  him  right,"  on  his  own  acts  of  cruelty.  It  also  ap- 
peared that  a  medical  man  was  taken  into  the  family  to 
assist  in  superintending  the  earl,  and  that  he  obtained  com- 
plete ascendency  over  him,  the  mention  of  his  name  being 
sufficient  to  intimidate  him  and  exact  his  obedience.  This 
gentleman  at  last  thought  it  prudent  to  deliver  up  his  charge 
to  the  earl's  trustees  in  London,  one  of  whom,  within  one 
week  after,  married  him  to  his  own  daughter.  This  mar- 


96  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

riage  was  declared  by  the  court  null  and  void.1  In  the  above 
statement  a  few  facts  only  have  been  selected  from  a  mass 
of  evidence  given  by  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  witnesses ; 
but  this  is  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  general  principle  that 
proof  of  imbecility  is  not  to  be  found  in  a  few  isolated  facts, 
but  in  an  investigation  of  the  whole  character  and  conduct 
of  the  party. 

§  79.  A  similar  diversity  of  views  on  the  value  of  evidence 
respecting  mental  imbecility,  was  strikingly  displayed  in  the 
Lispenard  case  which  was  finally  decided  in  the  New  York 
Court  of  Errors  in  1841.  It  arose  out  of  the  refusal  of  the 
Surrogate  of  New  York  to  approve  the  will  of  Alice  Lispen- 
ard, on  the  ground  of  mental  incompetence.  This  woman 
was  born  in  1781 ;  her  father  died  in  1806,  leaving  her  an  an- 
nuity of  $500 ;  her  brother  died  in  1808,  leaving  her,  as  one  of 
his  heirs  at  law,  considerable  property,  and  in  1834  she 
made  her  will,  whereby  she  gave  all  her  estate  to  A.  L.  Stew- 
art, her  sister's  husband,  and  appointed  him  sole  executor. 
In  1836  she  died.  The  probate  of  the  will  having  been 
refused  by  the  Surrogate,  an  appeal  was  made,  first  to  the 
circuit  Judge  and  from  him  to  the  Chancellor,  both  of  whom 
sustained  his  decision.  The  case  was  then  carried  into  the 
Court  of  Errors  by  which  these  decisions  were  overruled,  and 
probate  of  the  will  decreed. 

It  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  devisor  was  always 
regarded  by  her  family  as  mentally  deficient,  and  that  her 
father  left  her  only  an  annuity  of  $500,  because,  as  he  states 
in  his  will,  "  it  had  pleased  Almighty  God  that  my  daughter 
Alice  should  have  such  imbecility  of  mind  as  to  render  her 
incapable  of  managing  or  taking  care  of  property."  By 
several  persons  who  lived  or  were  intimate  in  the  family,  it 
was  testified  that  she  was  washed,  nursed,  and  put  to  bed 

1 1  Haggard,  359.  The  reader  who  wishes  to  extend  his  inquiries  farther, 
will  find  in  the  judgment  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  Ingram  v.  Wyatt,  1  Hag- 
gard, 384,  some  excellent  observations  on  the  characters  of  imbecility,  besides 
a  masterly  analysis  of  evidence  relative  to  this  condition,  ranging  through  a 
life  of  seventy-four  years. 


IMBECILITY.  97 

the  same  as  a  child,  until  she  was  twenty-two  years  old ;  that 
she  had  a  vacant  expression  of  countenance,  and  a  silly 
laugh  when  spoken  to ;  that  she  dribbled  at  the  mouth,  had 
an  awkward  and  unnatural  carriage  of  the  body,  and  a  violent 
temper ;  that  she  was  not  permitted  to  see  company  like  the 
other  children,  but  was  kept  out  of  sight ;  that  no  one  thought 
of  entering  into  conversation  with  her ;  and  that  all  attempts 
to  teach  her  beyond  spelling  short  words  of  two  syllables, 
were  abandoned  as  impracticable.  While  at  board,  which 
was  from  1817  to  1827,  she  was  washed,  dressed,  and  put  to 
bed  like  a  child ;  cried  when  the  children  of  the  family  refused 
to  share  their  cake  and  candy  with  her ;  ate  her  food  vora- 
ciously ;  would  strike  those  around  her  when  in  a  rage,  which 
was  not  seldom ;  and  could  not  be  taught  the  Lord's  prayer. 
Although  placed  in  the  charge  of  a  teacher  in  the  house,  she 
was  found  incapable  of  being  taught  to  read,  and  forty  years 
afterwards,  when  the  attempt  was  renewed  by  her  sister,  it  met 
with  no  better  success.  One  .witness  stated,  that  when  six- 
teen or  eighteen  years  of  age,  she  preferred  a  sixpence  to  a 
dollar.  Another  could  not  teach  her  to  distinguish  a  two 
shilling  piece  from  a  half  dollar.  Once  she  was  found  chok- 
ing a  child  six  years  old,  until  he  was  black  in  the  face.  In 
the  selection  of  boarding-places  she  was  never  consulted,  and 
it  appeared  that  the  families  with  whom  she  was  placed, 
were  in  humble  and  narrow  circumstances,  without  those 
conveniences  and  accommodations  which  she  had  a  right  to 
expect.  Even  when  under  the  kind  and  judicious  manage- 
ment of  her  sister,  she  submitted  to  be  imprisoned  in  her  room 
whenever  it  was  ordered,  and  was  frequently  subjected  to 
confinement  as  a  punishment  for  misbehavior. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  stated  that  much  of  her  deficiency 
might  be  attributed  to  the  excessive  indulgence  of  her  parents, 
and  especially  to  habits  of  intemperate  drinking  they  had 
allowed  her  to  contract.  It  appeared  that  she  carried  simple 
messages  from  one  part  of  the  establishment  to  another,  and 
that  she  performed  the  duty  of  delivering  out  clothes  for  the 
wash,  and  soap,  candles,  starch,  etc.,  to  the  servants.  By 
her  sister  she  was  taught  to  perform  some  little  offices  about 

9 


98  MEDICAL  JUKISPKUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

her  own  person  and  clothes,  and  to  distinguish  small  pieces 
of  money.  Another  witness  had  seen  her  washing  cups  and 
saucers.  Another  stated  that  when  she  wanted  any  thing  she 
asked  for  it,  and  if  medicine  was  given  to  her  she  would  take 
it.  On  a  very  cold  day  when  somebody  was  to  be  baptized, 
she  said  she  would  not  be  a  baptist,  to  be  baptized  on 
such  a  day,  and  asked  if  they  dipped  them  as  they  dip 
candles.  She  also  told  the  witness  that  when  her  sister  died, 
they  put  her  into  a  coffin  with  a  silver  plate  having  her  name 
and  age  upon  it,  and  that  when  she  (Alice)  died,  she  would 
like  to  be  put  into  such  a  coffin  and  laid  in  the  same  room. 
It  was  stated  that  while  living  in  her  brother's  family,  which 
was  during  the  last  fifteen  years  of  her  life,  she  had  charge  of 
the  clothes  that  were  sent  to  the  wash,  would  give  the  neces- 
sary directions,  and  correct  mistakes  when  they  were  re- 
turned ;  that,  she  took  charge  of  her  own  clothes,  was  very 
careful  of  them,  and  would  send  them  to  the  sempstress  if 
they  needed  repairing.  In  the  absence  of  other  members  of 
the  family,  she  would  give  directions  to  masons  and  carpen- 
ters employed  in  making  repairs  and  alterations  about  the 
house,  who  obeyed  her,  and  invariably  found  that  her  direc- 
tions were  approved.  She  sent  messages  by  the  servants, 
kept  an  eye  upon  them,  and  reported  their  misconduct.  She 
recognized  persons  whom  she  had  known  in  her  youth,  but 
had  not  seen  for  many  years,  called  them  by  name,  made  in- 
quiries respecting  particular  members  of  their  families,  and 
recurred  to  the  scenes  and  amusements  of  her  youth.  She 
would  inquire  of  visitors  as  to  the  health  of  particular  mem- 
bers of  their  families  with  whom  she  was  acquainted.  Several 
other  facts  of  similar  importance  were  also  related  by  the 
same  witness.  Another  stated  that  when  the  children  played 
school,  Alice  would  act  the  mistress,  and  punish  the  others 
if  they  did  not  know  their  lesson.  A  clergyman  who  was 
somewhat  acquainted  with  her,  thought  well  of  her  under- 
standing, on  the  score  of  her  religious  attainments.  "  Her 
confession  of  guilt,"  he  says,  "  might  have  implied  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  depravity  of  nature,  the  necessity  of  forgiveness, 
and  the  ability  of  God  to  forgive  in  any  circumstances, 


IMBECILITY.  99 

and  might  (when  instruction  had  been  received,  as  was  the  fact 
in  her  case)  imply  a  knowledge  of  the  atonement  of  Jesus 
Christ.  Prayer  is  a  means  by  which  we  receive  the  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit ;  and  as  she  said  she  constantly  prayed,  it 
may  naturally  be  inferred  that  it  was  for  that  influence." 
This  opinion  is  hardly  corroborated  by  the  statement  of 
another  witness  who  said  that  when  she  read  the  Bible  to 
her,  "she  would  ask  the  meaning  of  Christ,  and  ask  who 
Christ  was.  She  would  then  turn  round  and  laugh,  and  say, 
'  O,  you  devil ; '  and  then  would  go  down  stairs  laughing,  and 
perhaps  she  would  laugh  till  she  got  down  to  her  room." 
A  physician  who  was  also  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses 
of  the  will,  and  had  often  conversed  with  the  testator,  thought 
her  natural  powers  were  sufficiently  good  for  any  transaction 
requiring  memory  or  judgment;  and  that  if  her  education 
had  been  carefully  attended  to,  she  would  have  become  a 
highly  useful  member  of  society.  On  cross-examination,  he 
stated  that  he  did  not  regard  her  of  ordinary  understanding ; 
he  believed  her  to  be  a  weak  woman,  but  whether  capable  of 
buying  or  selling,  could  not  answer,  not  knowing  that  the 
duty  was  ever  put  upon  her.  Another  physician,  who  enter- 
tained a  similar  opinion  of  her  capacity,  in  answer  to  the 
question  whether  she  could  read,  replied  that  he  did  not 
know  and  did  not  inquire  ;  he  would  have  thought  it  an  in- 
sult to  ask  her. 

It  did  not  appear  that  she  had  any  idea  of  the  nature  and 
extent  of  her  property,  or  even  called  her  brother-in-law,  who 
had  charge  of  it,  to  an  account.  Neither  did  it  appear  that 
she  gave  any  instructions  for  the  will  which  was  prepared  by 
the  executor  himself.  At  the  time  of  the  execution,  however, 
and  previously  at  different  times,  she  declared  her  intention  to 
give  all  her  property  to  the  executor,  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  members  of  the  family. 

That  there  was  great  mental  deficiency  in  this  woman  was 
not  questioned,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  perceive  from  the  pub- 
lished statement  of  the  evidence,  how  any  one  can  believe 
that  the  will  in  question  was  her  will,  and  not  wholly  and 
exclusively 'the  will  of  the  executor.  If  by  means  of  any  con- 


* 
100  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

siderations,  legal,  medical,  or  psychological,  the  validity  of 
such  an  act  could  be  established,  the  decision  of  the  court  of 
appeals  might  be  justified.  It  is  worthy  of  especial  notice 
that  the  ground  of  this  decision  was  a  technical  construction 
of  the  phrase  unsoundness  of  mind,  if  the  views  of  the  court 
were  fairly  represented  by  the  two  senators  who  expressed 
their  opinions.  The  law  of  the  State  permits  every  male 
person  eighteen  years  old,  and  every  female  (not  married) 
sixteen  years  old,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  to  give  and  be- 
queath his  or  her  personal  estate  by  will  or  testament.  Now, 
the  mental  deficiency  of  the  testator,  not  being  embraced  in 
either  of  the  kinds  of  unsoundness  as  defined  by  Coke  (§  3), 
it  follows  that  she  was  not  incapacitated  by  law  from  mak- 
ing her  testament.  Her  mind  was  weak  but  not  unsound, 
and  courts  cannot  measure  the  extent  of  people's  understand- 
ing or  capacities,  however  feeble  they,  may  be  without  being 
positively  unsound.1  Such  a  distinction,  however  tolerable  in 
the  plea  of  an  advocate  laboring  under  the  difficulties  of  a 
weak  cause,  could  hardly  have  been  expected  in  a  judicial 
decision. 


1  26  Wendell,  256.    Stewart's  executor  vs.  Lispenard. 


CHAPTER    IV. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MENTAL  DEFICIENCY. 

§  80.  THE  general  principles  that  determine  the  legal 
relations  of  idiocy  are  so  obvious,  and  the  fact  of  its  exis- 
tence so  easily  established,  that  little  occasion  has  been 
afforded  for  doubt  or  diversity  of  opinion.  The  maxims  of 
the  law  have  sprung  from  the  suggestions  of  common  sense, 
and  its  provisions  have  equal  reference  to  the  best  interests 
of  its  wretched  subjects  and  of  those  who  are  about  them. 
It  may  be- mentioned  as  a  curious  fact,  however,  that  while 
the  idiot  is  denied  the  enjoyment  of  most  of  the  civil  rights, 
he  is  quietly  left  by  the  constitutions  of  the  several  States  of 
the  union,  in  possession  of  one  of  those  political  rights,  that 
of  suffrage,  the  very  essence  of  which  is  the  deliberate  and 
unbiased  exercise  of  a  rational  will.  How  this  anomaly  has 
arisen,  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive.  A  natural  jealousy  of  any 
attempt  to  encroach  upon  the  popular  right,  might  appre- 
hend evils  to  this  institution  in  allowing  the  mental  qualifica- 
tions of  voters  to  be  too  closely  scrutinized,  but  such  fears 
could  hardly  have  been  expected  in  view  of  the  unlimited 
control  maintained  by  the  law  over  the  property  and  personal 
liberty  of  idiots. 

§  81.  The  little  indulgence  shown  to  imbecility  in  crim- 
inal courts,  sufficiently  indicates  that  either  the  psychological 
nature  of  this  condition  of  mind  is  very  imperfectly  under- 
stood, or  the  true  ground  on  which  the  idea  of  responsibility 
reposes  is  not  clearly  perceived.  Whichever  it  may  be,  it 
may  no  doubt  be  attributed  to  the  prevalent  habit  of  study- 
ing the  moral  and  intellectual  phenomena  in  sound  and 

9* 


102  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

healthy  minds  only,  without  a  suspicion,  apparently,  of  the 
great  modifications  they  present,  when  the  development  of 
the  cerebral  organism  is  interrupted  by  disease.  It  will  be 
necessary,  therefore,  before  coming  to  any  positive  conclu- 
sions relative  to  the  legal  accountability  of  imbeciles,  to 
bring  into  view  some  considerations  on  this  point,  which 
have  been  too  much,  if  not  altogether,  overlooked. 

§  82.  Our  moral  and  intellectual  constitution  is  con- 
structed in  harmony  with  the  external  world  on  which  it  acts 
and  by  which  it  is  acted  upon ;  the  result  of  this  mutual 
action  being  the  happiness  and  spiritual  advancement  of  an 
immortal  being.  Thus  endowed  with  the  powers  of  perform- 
ing the  part  allotted  us,  and  placed  in  a  situation  suitable  for 
exercising  and-  developing  them,  we  become  accountable  for 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  used,  —  to  our  Maker,  under 
all  circumstances ;  to  our  fellow  men,  when  the  institutions 
of  society  are  injured.  All  legal  responsibility,  therefore,  is 
founded  on  this  principle  of  adaptation,  and  ceases  whenever 
either  of  its  elements  is  taken  away.  The  intellect  must  not 
only  be  sufficiently  developed  to  acquaint  the  individual 
with  the  existence  of  external  objects  and  with  some  of  their 
relations  to  him,  but  the  moral  powers  must  be  sound  enough 
and  strong  enough  to  furnish  each  its  specific  incentives,  to 
pursue  that  course  of  conduct  which  the  intellect  has  already 
approved.  It  is  nothing  that  the  mind  is  competent  to  dis- 
cern some  of  the  most  ordinary  relations  of  things,  and  is 
sensible  of  the  impropriety  of  certain  actions ;  for  so  long  as 
the  individual  is  incapable,  by  defect  of  constitution,  of  feeling 
the  influence  of  those  hopes  and  fears  and  of  all  those  senti- 
ments and  affections  that  man  naturally  possesses,  an  essen- 
tial element  of  legal  responsibility  is  wanting,  and  he  is  not 
fully  accountable  for  his  actions. 

§  83.  In  the  normal  mind  the  idea  of  crime  is  associated 
with  those  of  injury  and  wrong  ;  can  we  then  impute  crime 
where  there  is  neither  intention  nor  consciousness  of  wrong  ? 
For  want  of  the  higher  and  nobler  faculties,  the  actions  of 
the  imbecile  are  contemplated  by  him  solely  in  relation  to 
himself;  not  a  thought  enters  his  mind  respecting  their  con- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  103 

sequences  to  others.  For  the  same  reason  that  he  puts  to 
death  a  brute,  that  of  mere  personal  gratification,  he  mur- 
ders a  fellow  being,  and  is  constitutionally  unable  to  appre- 
ciate any  difference  in  the  moral  character  of  the  two  actions. 
In  the  latter  case,  as  in  the  former,  he  has  a  selfish  object  in 
view,  and  is  restrained  from  pursuing  his  purpose  by  none  of 
the  considerations  that  actuate  the  sound  and  well-developed 
mind.  The  natural  right  of  every  one  to  the  undisturbed 
possession  of  his  own  life,  and  the  sentiment  of  wrong 
awakened  by  the  infliction  of  injury,  are  things  as  far  beyond 
the  sphere  of  his  contemplations,  as  the  most  difficult  pro- 
blem in  mathematics,  and  he  merely  feels  the  anknal  im- 
pulse—  which  to  him  has  the  strength  of  a  natural  right  — 
to  appropriate  to  himself  whatever  will  conduce  to  his 
momentary  gratification.  The  thought  of  the  wounds  in- 
flicted on  the  friends  and  connections  of  his  victim  by  his 
decease,  cannot  restrain  him,  because  the  feelings  of  benevo- 
lence and  sympathy  which  they  suppose,  are  utter  strangers 
to  his  own  bosom ;  and  it  would  be  preposterous  to  expect 
him  to  be  influenced  by  a  regard  to  feelings  which  he  never 
experienced  himself.  The  sense  of  future  accountability  can- 
not restrain  him,  for  the  idea  of  an  Almighty,  All-seeing 
Being,  ever  witnessing  his  actions,  is  too  confused  and  too 
limited  in  his  mind,  to  present  the  slightest  check  to  the  in- 
dulgence of  his  caprices  and  passions.  The  fear  of  punish- 
ment cannot  restrain  him,  because  his  intellect  can  discern 
no  necessary  connection  between  his  crime  and  the  penalty 
attached  to  it,  even  if  he  were  aware  of  the  existence  of  the 
penalty.  To  make  such  a  person  responsible  for  his  actions 
to  the  same  degree  as  one  enjoying  the  full  vigor  and  sound- 
ness of  the  higher  faculties,  is  therefore  manifestly  unjust; 
because  an  essential  element  of  responsibility  is  a  power  to 
refrain  from  evil-doing,  which  power  is  furnished  by  the 
exercise  of  those  faculties  that  are  but  imperfectly,  if  at  all, 
developed  in  the  imbecile.  The  law  looks  only  to  the  inten- 
tion, not  to  the  amount  of  injury  committed;  and  since  there 
can  be  no  criminal  intention  where  there  is  no  consciousness 
of  wrong,  it  cannot  properly  reach  those  wretched  objects, 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

who,  to  use  the  expression  of  one  of  them,  whose  case  will 
be  shortly  noticed,  "  can  see  no  difference  between  killing  an 
ox,  and  killing  a  man." 

§  84.  Many,  it  is  true,  find  it  hard  to  be  convinced  that 
one  who  labors  under  no  delusion,  and  enjoys  a  certain  de- 
gree, at  least,  of  moral  liberty,  may  still  not  be  responsible 
for  his  criminal  acts.  They  see,  perhaps,  that  he  has  intelli- 
gence enough  to  perform  the  inferior  kinds  of  employment, 
and  feel  assured  that  observation  must  have  made  him  ac- 
quainted with  the  consequences  of  such  acts,  even  though  a 
stranger  to  that  high  moral  power  which  instinctively  teaches 
the  distinctions  of  right  and  wrong.  "  He  knew  better," 
is  their  language,  "  and  therefore  justice  requires  his  punish- 
ment." The  error  of  this  reasoning  arises  in  the  vulgar  habit 
of  estimating  the  strength  and  extent  of  the  moral  faculties 
by  the  ability  to  go  through  certain  mechanical  duties,  and 
provide  for  the  wants  and  exigencies  of  the  present  moment. 
Not  only  has  this  ability  no  connection  with  the  moral  senti- 
ments, but  it  is  not  even  an  index  of  the  measure  of  intelli- 
gence ;  any  more  than  the  skill  of  the  bee  or  beaver  in  erect- 
ing their  structures,  is  indicative  of  great  intellectual  re- 
sources. These  degraded  specimens  of  our  race  are  not  with- 
out the  capacity  of  being  educated  in  a  limited  degree ;  and 
thus  like  those  inferior  animals  which  man  has  made  con- 
ducive to  his  comfort,  they  are  trained  to  perform  some  kinds 
of  service  with  tolerable  merit.  This,  however,  no  more 
proceeds  from  the  kind  of  intelligence  that  discerns  moral 
truth,  than  the  isolated  talent  for  music  or  construction  not 
unfrequently  met  with  in  the  complete  idiot. 

§  85.  For  the  purpose  of  illustrating  and  confirming  the 
above  views,  some  account  will  now  be  given  of  a  few 
criminal  trials,  the  subjects  of  which  seem  to  have  been  affect- 
ed with  mental  imbecility,  stating  very  briefly  the  facts  as 
they  are  found  recorded,  and  accompanying  them  with  such 
reflections  as  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  re- 
quire. They  are  well  worth  the  consideration  of  every 
honest  and  unprejudiced  inquirer,  for  he  will  find  in  them  a 
kind  of  information  which  he  can  obtain  from  no  other 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   IMBECILITY.  105 

quarter,  and  he  will  be  able  to  see  for  himself,  how  little  of 
true  philosophy  has  presided  over  this  department  of  crimi- 
nal jurisprudence. 

§  86.  In  November,  1821,  John  Schmidt,  aged  17,  was 
tried  at  Metz  for  parricide.  He  had  manifested,  from  an 
early  age,  a  proneness  to  mischief  and  even  cruelty.  As 
soon  as  he  was  old  enough  to  run  in  the  streets,  he  would 
amuse  himself  by  throwing  stones  into  the  rivulet,  that  ran 
through  the  village,  in  order  to  spatter  and  hurt  the  people 
who  were  passing  by,  many  of  whom  were  injured  by  him. 
They  contented  themselves,  however,  with  charging  his 
parents  to  take  care  of  him,  for  he  was  even  then  considered 
to  be  mad. 

The  first  count  in  the  indictment  charged  him  with  wound- 
ing on  the  head  his  sister-in-law,  in  one  of  their  domestic 
quarrels.  The  second  charged  him  with  an  attempt  on  the 
life  of  one  of  his  cousins,  whom  he  pushed  into  the  water 
while  fishing  by  the  side  of  a  pond,  and  then  laughed  at  his 
struggles  to  extricate  himself.  When  he  finally  succeeded, 
Schmidt  approached  him  and  asked  if  he  were  wet,  and  if 
the  water  had  reached  his  skin  ;  the  boy,  to  show  that  it  had, 
opened  his  shirt,  when  Schmidt  plunged  a  knife  in  his  bosom. 
Happily,  the  wound  was  not  severe. 

On  the  night  of  the  parricide,  the  father  was  boiling  pot- 
ashes. At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  called  to  his  wife 
to  come  and  assist  him  in  lifting  the  kettle  from  the  fire,  but 
she  refused  and  ordered  John  to  go.  John  went  in  his  shirt, 
and  set  the  kettle  on  the  floor,  and  while  his  father  was 
bending  over  to  stir  the  potashes,  he  struck  him  a  blow  with 
a  hatchet  lying  near,  that  felled  him  senseless  to  the  ground. 
He  then  ascended  to  the  garret,  where  his  brother  and  sister 
were  sleeping,  and  severely  wounded  the  latter  with  the 
hatchet.  On  being  seized  by  his  brother  soon  after,  he 
asked  to  see  his  father,  who  had  just  expired ;  and  when 
gratified  in  this  wish,  he  uttered  these  remarkable  words  : — 
"  Ah,  my  dear  father,  where  are  you  now  ?  What  will  be- 
come of  me  ?  You  and  my  mother  are  the  cause  of  my 
misfortunes.  I  predicted  it  long  ago,  and  if  you  had  brought 


106  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

me  up  better,  this  would  not  have  happened."  When  asked 
what  had  induced  him  to  commit  such  an  atrocious  crime, 
he  replied  that  the  devil  undoubtedly  instigated  him.  He 
also  declared  that  the  itch,  which  he  had  taken  from  his 
sister-in-law,  was  repelled,  and,  in  consequence,  frequently 
occasioned  a  mental  derangement  and  fits  of  fury  which 
impelled  him  to  sacrifice  every  thing.  Several  witnesses 
testified  that  he  had  always  been  remarkable  for  profound 
piety  and  religious  habits.  He  confessed  to  his  counsel  that 
whenever  he  saw  a  cutting  instrument,  such  as  a  hatchet,  a 
knife,  etc.,  he  felt  the  strongest  desire  to  seize  it,  and  wound 
the  first  person  that  came  in  his  way.  His  counsel  unsuc- 
cessfully pleaded  in  his  defence  mental  derangement,  though 
Schmidt  interrupted  him  by  declaring  that  he  was  not  mad. 
Shortly  before  the  fatal  hour,  food  was  brought  to  him,  but 
observing  it  to  be  meat,  he  refused  to  eat  it,  saying  that  in 
a  few  minutes  it  would  be  Friday.  As  he  walked  barefoot- 
ed to  the  place  of  execution,  his  confessor  asked  him  if  the 
pavement  did  not  hurt  him  ?  "I  wish,"  he  replied,  they  had 
made  me  walk  on  thorns."  When  he  arrived  at  the  scaffold, 
they  cut  off  his  hand,  but  he  uttered  not  a  word  or  a  cry, 
and  remained  firm  to  the  last. 

§  87.  Dr.  Marechal,  of  Metz,  who  communicated  this 
case,  observes  that  he  was  struck  with  the  smallness  of  the 
head,  and  its  singular  shape,  and  that  on  carefully  examining 
his  skull,  he  found  the  forehead  very  narrow  and  retreating, 
the  sinciput  tolerably  high,  and  a  marked  prominence  over 
the  ears.  He  said  it  had  the  same  shape  as  those  of  all  the 
idiots  mentioned  by  Pin  el. 

§  88.  In  Schmidt  we  have  ample  confirmation  of  the  other 
indications  of  imbecility,  in  the  physical  structure  which 
speaks  a  language  that  cannot  deceive.  If  his  cranium  were 
shaped  like  those  of  the  idiots  described  by  Pinel,  what  better 
manifestations  of  mind  or  morals  could  have  been  expected 
from  one  thus  stamped  by  nature  with  the  impress  of  inferi- 
ority? This  furnishes  an  explanation  of  his  early  indul- 
gence in  brutal  propensities,  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  be  re- 
garded mad ;  and  gives  us  a  clew  to  the  cause  of  his  attempts 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  107 

on  life,,solely  for  the  momentary  gratification  they  afforded; 
of  the  motiveless  and  cold-blooded  murder  of  his  father  ;  and 
of  that  regard  of  religious  observances  which  had  no  better 
foundation  than  the  merest  superstition.  His  inclination  to 
kill  on  seeing  a  cutting  instrument,  shows  some  morbid 
action  in  the  brain  not  uncommon  in  imbecility,  which  is 
also  indicated  by  the  paroxysms  of  fury  in  which  he  felt  him- 
self urged  on  to  indiscriminate  slaughter.  These  vehement 
impulses,  even  the  slight  consciousness  of  wrong,  denoted  by 
his  exclamation  on  seeing  the  corpse  of  his  father,  was  totally 
unable  to  restrain ;  and,  by  a  process  unknown  to  himself, 
and  which  he  could  only  explain  on  the  popular  notion  of  the 
instigation  of  the  devil,  they  would  burst  forth  with  fatal 
violence.  His  extraordinary  proneness  to  mischief  and  cruelty, 
and  the  early  age  at  which  it  began  to  appear,  point  distinctly 
to  an  original  defect  of  constitution,  which,  though  not 
attended  by  what  is  probably  called  mania,  deprived  him  of 
all  controlling  influence  over  the  purely  animal  propensities. 
Ferocity  of  disposition  in  imbeciles  no  more  implies  respon- 
sibility for  criminal  acts,  than  it  does  in  the  brutes ;  and 
affords  but  an  indifferent  reason  for  ridding  the  world  of  their 
presence.  To  conclude,  then,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  believe 
with  MM.  Marechal  and  Georget,  that  Schmidt  was  one  of 
those  wretched  beings  who  are  disgraced  by  nature  from 
their  very  birth,  and  whose  vicious  propensities  are  counter- 
balanced, neither  by  a  sense  of  justice  and  morality,  nor  a  fear 
of  punishment. 

§  89.  Pierre  Joseph  Delepine,  aged  sixteen,  was  tried  at 
Paris  for  eight  different  incendiary  acts,  committed  in  the 
Faubourg  St.  Antoine,  in  1825.  The  first  time,  a  bird,  with 
burning  tow  dipped  in  spirits  attached  to  its  tail,  was  let  loose 
in  a  garden  adjoining  that  of  the  accused.  At  another  time, 
August  17th,  a  fire  broke  out  in  the  adjoining  garden,  two 
heaps  of  straw  being  burnt  and  a  part  of  the  wall  destroyed. 
Three  days  afterwards,  a  grange  belonging  to  Delepine's 
garden  was  burned,  and  three  days  after  this,  a  cousin  of  his 
was  awakened  by  a  dense  smoke,  and  soon  discovered  that 
a  chest  containing  his  effects  was  on  fire.  The  next  night, 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

a  person  passing  through  the  street,  observed  a  heap  of  straw 
in  flames  at  the  farther  end  of  the  garden  which  laid  on  the 
street.  He  sprang  over  into  the  garden  to  render  assistance, 
when  Delepine  and  his  family  rose  and  finally  extinguished 
the  fire.  While  this  was  doing,  a  bucketful  of  burning 
charcoal  was  discovered  in  the  garret,  in  time,  however,  to 
be  extinguished.  In  the  morning  of  the  7th  September,  a 
piece  of  burning  canvas  was  found  in  a  wood-closet  under 
the  staircase ;  and  Delepine,  who  expressed  his  astonish- 
ment, helped  to  extinguish  the  flames.  Soon  after,  there 
was  found  under  the  two  mattresses  in  his  sister's  room,  a 
handful  of  burning  flax  by  which  the  bed-furniture  had  been 
already  set  on  fire,  and  some  was  also  discovered  in  his  own 
chamber,  placed  under  his  pillow,  and  an  hour  or  two  after- 
wards, a  heap  of  straw  in  a  neighboring  garden  was  observed 
to  be  on  fire.  He  was  also  charged  with  having  committed 
several  thefts. 

§  90.  On  the  trial,  his  father  stated  that  the  prisoner's 
intellectual  faculties  were  not  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected from  one  of  his  age ;  and,  in  support  of  his  assertion, 
he  adduced  the  nature  of  the  criminal  acts  themselves,  and 
the  absence  of  sufficient  motives  to  excite  him  to  so  many 
attempts,  both  against  his  own  family,  and  people  who  were 
indifferent  to  him.  He  also  produced  a  certificate  signed 
by  nine  of  his  neighbors,  which  purported  that  Delepine's 
thoughts  and  feelings  were  frequently  in  a  disordered  con- 
dition; that  he  would  often  wander  in  his  conduct  and 
conversation  ;  that  he  would  sometimes  strip  himself  naked 
and  run  like  a  madman  through  his  father's  garden ;  that 
they  heard  his  parents  say  that  in  the  January  previous,  he 
attempted  to  hang  himself,  and  sometime  after,  to  jump  into 
a  well.  It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  he  led  an  irregular 
life,  was  jealous  of  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  caused  his 
father  much  uneasiness.  At  various  times  he  had  stolen 
from  his  parents,  and  it  was  for  having  stolen  a  horse  that 
he  met  in  the  street,  without  its  owner,  that  he  was  first 
arrested  by  the  police. 

§  91.     On  his  trial,  Delepine  replied  to  the  questions  put 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  IMBECILITY.  109 

to  him  with  calmness ;  his  countenance  was  devoid  of  ex- 
pression and  presented  a  picture  of  stupidity.  He  denied 
the  facts  charged  in  the  indictment,  and  could  not  conceive 
how  they  happened.  The  newspapers  described  him  as 
having  a  low  forehead;  and  all  the  witnesses  who  had  an 
opportunity  of  knowing,  agreed  in  believing  that  there  was 
some  singular  defect  in  his  mental  organization.  His  mother 
testified  that  for  some  time  previous  his  parents  had  had 
occasion  to  reprove  him  for  his  conduct,  and  that  they  had 
'intended  to  seclude  him.  She  said  he  was  odd,  addicted  to 
the  strangest  tricks,  and,  in  short,  showed  that  "  there  was 
something  wrong  about  his  head,"  though  he  was  not  mad 
nor  idiotic.  This  testimony  of  the  mother  was  confirmed  by 
that  of  eight  or  nine  other  witnesses,  who  agreed  in  repre- 
senting him  as  having  been  always  very  odd  and  strange  in 
his  conduct,  and  addicted  to  mischief,  though  not  mad,  nor, 
properly  speaking,  idiotic.  He  was,  notwithstanding,  con- 
victed, and  condemned  to  death  ;  but  he  heard  the  sentence 
as  unmoved  as  he  had  continued  to  be  during  the  trial. 

§  92.  In  a  memoir  addressed  to  the  king  by  his  counsel, 
M.  Cleveau,  he  is  described  as  being  "  weak  in  body,  his  face 
pale,  his  eye  dull,  and  his  mind  infirm ;  as  manifesting  no 
disposition  for  employment,  wrapped  in  silence,  and  subject 
to  convulsive  agitations.  He  was  in  the  habit  of  shunning 
his  companions,  and  when  he  did  incline  to  join  them,  he 
proposed  only  the  most  frightful  sports.  Once,  in  the  middle 
of  the  night,  he  placed  baskets  on  his  head,  wrapped  himself 
in  his  bed-clothes,  and  ran  through  the  garden,  uttering  the 
most  fearful  bowlings.  On  one  occasion  he  kindled  a  fire 
in  a  stove  with  thirty  crackers,  and  though  covered  with 
the  ruins,  he  was  not  astonished  at  the  result.  After  the 
trial,  while  in  prison  and  in  irons,  and  under  the  eyes  of  his 
keepers,  he  contrived  to  place  burning  coals  in  his  bed,  and 
then  laid  down  upon  it  while  actually  on  fire.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  he  is  enslaved  by  a  passion  for  conflagrations, 
incessantly  haunted  by  images  of  flames,  cinders,  and  ruins, 
and  would  not  mind  perishing  himself,  provided  he  could 
enjoy  the  sight  of  them,  in  the  act.  He  belongs  to  that 

10 


110  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

class  of  wretched  beings  who  are  doomed  from  the  cradle  ; 
who  live  without  motives,  and  are  cut  off  without  under- 
standing why."  In  consequence  of  this  memorial,  his  pun- 
ishment was  commuted  for  that  of  imprisonment  for  life. 

$  93.  While  in  prison  he  amused  himself  with  scribbling 
his  name  in  every  variety  of  form  on  the  copy  of  the  indict- 
ment that  was  left  with  him ;  by  writing  on  it  unmeaning 
or  disconnected  words,  or  words  formed  by  letters  put  together 
at  random ;  by  drawing  on  it  grotesque  figures,  and  changing 
the  letters  in  such  a  manner  that  some  parts  of  it  could 
scarcely  be  read.  Thus,  the  words,  "  Acte  d'accusation 
contre  Joseph  Delepine,"  were  changed  in  the  following 
manner; — Dacte  deaccusationiss  contre  Josephu  Delapine; 
and  the  first  page  is  filled  with  ink-spots,  and  detached  and 
insignificant  words,  such  as,  Marieux,  meche,  a  mosire  non, 
daceuler,  mosieurje  dit,  bonjour  a  monsieur  lent"  etc.  "  Can 
it  be  conceived,"  says  Georget,  "  that  a  person  who  is  con- 
scious of  the  enormity  of  his  crime,  and  who  cannot  be  with- 
out some  anxiety  respecting  the  result  of  his  trial,  should  be 
absorbed  in  such  puerilities  ?  that  he  should  read  such  grave 
charges,  not  only  without  a  single  emotion  of  horror,  but 
even  with  the  most  perfect  indifference,  and  use  the  paper 
containing  them  for  his  amusement?  Such  conduct  not 
only  displays  insensibility,  which  is  not  rare  in  hardened 
criminals,  but  betokens  the  mind  of  a  child;  and  in  a  lad  of 
sixteen,  indicates  stupidity,  silliness,  and  imbecility."  The 
physical  characters  attributed  to  Delepine,  and  his  manners, 
as  described  by  those  who  were  in  the  habit  of  frequently 
seeing  him,  clearly  indicate  a  natural  deficiency  of  his  moral 
powers;  but  though  his  crimes  were  the  acts  of  a  child  five 
or  six  years  old,  his  imbecility  alone  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
account  for  the  particular  form  his  offences  assumed.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  imbecili ty,  as  in  other  abnormal 
conditions,  there  is  not  only  deficiency  and  irregularity,  but 
also  a  great  tendency  to  diseased  cerebral  action,  manifesting 
itself  in  excessive  uncontrollable  indulgence  of  some  one  or 
more  propensities.  In  Delepine,  it  assumed  the  form  of  that 
monomania  which  consists  in  a  morbid  impulse,  which  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  IMBECILITY.  ,        111 

higher  powers  cannot  restrain,  to  acts  of  incendiarism.  That 
the  incendiary  acts  of  Delepine  arose  from  diseased  action  in 
the  brain,  and  not  from  mere  love  of  mischief,  is  abundantly 
proved  by  the  slightest  examination  of  their  nature.  To  let 
loose  a  bird  with  burning  tow  attached  to  it,  without  know- 
ing or  caring  where  it  would  alight,  is  what,  perhaps, 
might  have  been  expected  from  a  low  and  simple,  .though 
sound  mind,  deliberately  bent  on  mischief;  but  certainly, 
nothing  less  than  genuine,  unequivocal  insanity,  can  account 
for  his  setting  his  own  bed  on  fire,  and  then  calmly  lying 
down  upon  it.  If,  too,  he  had  been  actuated  by  malice  or  a 
pure  love  of  mischief,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  would 
have  chosen  his  own  home  for  its  objects,  and  thus  deliber- 
ately endeavored  to  deprive  himself  of  a  shelter,  as  .well  as 
those  on  whom  he  depended.  In  short,  the  fact  of  imbecility, 
combined  with  mania,  is  so  plainly  written  on  the  history  of 
this  singular  case,  that  it  would  be  hopeless,  by  any- addi- 
tional comments,  to  make  it  more  clear  to  those  who  cannot 
read  it  for  themselves.1 

§  94.  Abraham  Prescott  was  tried  at  Concord, ;  New 
Hampshire,  in  September,  1834,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Sally 
Cochran.2  On  the  morning  of  June  23d,  1833,  he  left  home 
with  the  deceased,  who  was  the  wife  of  his  employer,  for  the 
purpose  of  picking  strawberries  in  a  neighboring  pasture. 
An  hour  and  a  half  afterwards,  the  family  heard  a  whining, 
moaning  sound  in  the  barn,  which  was  found  to  proceed 
from  Prescott,  who,  on  being  asked  what  was  the  matter 
with  him,  said  that  "  he  had  struck  Sally  [Mrs.  Cochran]  with 
a  stake  and  killed  her."  He  then  went  with  them  and  showed 
them  the  body,  which  they  found  had  been  dragged  a  little 
distance  from  the  place  where  the  murder  was  committed, 


1  The  facts  in  the  above  cases  are  taken  from  Georget's  "work,  already 
referred  to,  entitled,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  130,  144. 

2  The  facts  of  this  case  are  derived  from  the  report  of  the  trial,  published 
at  Concord,  in  1834,  and  from  an  article  in  the  Boston  Statesman  of  January 
9th,  1836,  entitled  "  Execution  of  Abraham  Prescott." 


112  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  concealed  among  some  bushes.  On  his  way  thither  he 
asked  the  husband  if  he  would  hang  him ;  he  showed  no  dis- 
position to  escape,  though  not  arrested  till  several  hours  after- 
wards, and  slept  soundly  the  succeeding  night.  He  was 
eighteen  years  old,  had  lived  three  years  in  Mr.  Cochran's 
family,  by  which  he  had  been  always  kindly  treated,  and  his 
conduct  had  been  uniformly  correct  and  satisfactory.  No 
misunderstanding  had  occurred  between  him  and  any  other 
member  of  the  family,  and  they  reposed  unlimited  confidence 
in  his  fidelity  and  attachment,  though  on  one  occasion  it  was 
strongly  tried.  On  the  6th  of  January,  1833,  that  is,  about 
six  months  previously,  he  arose  in  the  night,  procured  an 
axe  from  the  shed,  went  to  the  bed  where  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Cochran  were  sleeping,  and  struck  each  of  them  some  severe 
blows  on  the  side  of  the  head,  which  left  them  senseless. 
He  then  went  to  an  adjoining  room  where  Mr.  Cochran's 
mother  slept,  and  told  her,  he  "  believed  he  had  killed  Mr.  and 
Mrs.  Cochran."  They  recovered,  however,  and  warmly 
repelled  every  suspicion  of  the  truth  of  his  own  statement 
that  he  had  committed  the  act  in  his  sleep,  unconsciously, 
though  he  had  never  been  known  to  walk  in  his  sleep  before. 
For  several  months  after  the  murder,  he  continued  to  explain 
his  conduct  in  regard  to  it,  by  saying  that  while  in  the  pas- 
ture he  had  the  toothache,  that  he  sat  down  on  a  stump,  and 
fell  asleep,  and  that  was  the  last  he  knew,  until  he  found  he 
had  killed  Mrs.  Cochran.  On  being  much  pressed  by  the 
coroner  and  warden  to  confess  the  whole  truth,  for  they  did 
not  believe  that  he  acted  without  a  motive,  and  assured  by 
them  that  he  would  stand  a  better  chance  of  being  pardoned 
if  he  confessed,  he  told  these  officers,  that  he  made  an  insult- 
ing proposal  to  Mrs.  Cochran,  which  she  resented,  and  threat- 
ened to  tell  her  husband  of  and  get  him  punished ;  that  he 
supposed  he  should  have  to  go  to  prison,  and  thinking  he 
would  rather  be  hanged  than  go  there,  he  took  up  a  stake 
and  killed  her.  Subsequently,  he  stated  that  he  did  not 
make  such  proposals  to  Mrs.  Cochran,  and  uniformly  denied 
that  he  had  ever  so  confessed  ;  but  declared  that  the  coroner 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  IMBECILITY.         113 

and  warden  had  troubled  him  so  much  that  he  did  not  know 
what  he  told  them.  To  the  keeper  of  the  jail  and  the  clergy- 
men who  visited  him,  he  invariably  stated,  "that  he  attempt- 
ed to  kill  Mr.  Cochran  and  his  wife,  in  January,  1833,  in 
order  to  get  possession  of  their  property ;  and  that  when  he 
found  he  had  not  despatched  them,  he  feigned  that  he  had 
been  asleep  when  he  did  it.  In  June,  his  intentions  were, 
first  to  kill  Mrs.  Cochran  in  the  hollow,  and  then  call  down 
Mr.  Cochran  and  kill  him." 

§  95.  His  counsel  set  up  in  defence  the  plea  of  homici- 
dal insanity,  which  they  supported  by  quoting  numerous 
cases  of  this  disorder,  and  citing  the  opinions  of  high  medi- 
cal authorities  and  witnesses ;  and,  in  short,  nothing  was 
omitted  by  them  that  could  help  to  render  the  defence  satis- 
factory to  the  jury.  Chief  Justice  Richardson,  in  his  charge, 
strongly  inclined  to  the  belief  of  his  insanity,  and  observed 
that  if  the  prisoner  "  had  been  all  the  time  sane,  his  conduct 
had  certainly  been  most  extraordinary.  And  on  the  other 
hand,  if  he  had  been  otherwise  than  sane,  it  was  a  most  ex- 
traordinary case  of  insanity." 

§  96.  There  certainly  are  strong  reasons  for  believing  that 
Prescott  was  utterly  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing  when 
he  murdered  Mrs.  Cochran,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  careful 
examination  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  presents  us 
with  still  stronger  reasons  for  thinking  that  he  did  know  well 
enough  what  he  was  doing.  It  appears  perfectly  evident 
that  he  belonged  to  that  wretched  class  of  men,  in  whom 
mental  deficiency  is  accompanied  by  more  or  less  perversion 
of  the  moral  faculties.  Upon  any  other  than  this  view  of  his 
mental  condition,  it  is  impossible  to  furnish  a  satisfactory 
explanation  of  his  conduct  and  the  circumstances  attending 
it.  His  original  statement  that  he  was  unconscious  when  he 
committed  the  murder,  is  opposed  by  his  subsequent  confes- 
sions that  he  was  actuated  by  certain  motives ;  so  that  we 
are  presented,  in  the  outset,  with  the  very  unusual  case  of  a 
criminal  defended  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  who  denies  that 
he  was  insane,  and  furnishes  rational  motives  for  his  conduct. 
There  is  good  ground  for  believing  that  his  last  confession 

10* 


114  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

was  the  true  one,  first,  because  he  could  have  had  no  reason 
then  for  inculpating  himself  falsely,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  hope  of  escaping  punishment  was  a  sufficient  reason  for 
his  fabricating  the  story  which  he  told  at  first ;  and,  secondly, 
because  it  furnished  the  same  motive  for  the  attempt  to  kill 
in  January,  and  this  establishes  a  consistent  and  satisfactory 
relation  between  these  two  acts.  To  remove  the  only  doubt 
in  his  favor,  that  of  his  sanity,  and  confess  a  fictitious  motive 
for  his  conduct,  is  of  itself,  considering  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  strongly  indicative  of  mental  imbecility.  We  are 
obliged,  therefore,  to  believe  that  he  was  actuated  by  a  motive, 
and  that  this  motive  was  a  desire  of  gain ;  and  nothing  can 
more  strongly  show  the  imbecility  of  his  mind  than  the 
means  which  he  took  to  obtain  his  object.  It  seems  that  the 
idea  haunted  his  mind  that  the  death  of  the  Cochrans  would 
put  him  in  possession  of  their  property ;  and  with  this  view, 
"  he  thought,"  as  he  said,  "  a  thousand  times  of  killing  them 
along  through  the  fall,  before  the  attempt  on  their  lives  in 
January."  When  asked  if  he  did  not  know  that  the  prop- 
erty would  descend  to  the  children,  he  replied, "  that  he  knew 
it  would  so  descend,  but  he  did  not  think  of  it  at  that 
moment."  In  fact  he  was  not  even  the  most  distantly  rela- 
ted to  the  Cochrans,  and  had  no  reason  whatever  for  sup- 
posing that  they  had  made  testamentary  dispositions  in  his 
favor.  His  imbecility  is  also  strikingly  manifested  in  the 
feebleness  of  spirit  and  want  of  resolution  which  character- 
ized his  criminal  attempts.  He  kills,  as  he  supposes,  both 
husband  and  wife  in  their  bed  ;  but  when  he  returns  to  their 
room  and  finds  them  still  living,  instead  of  completing  his 
work  by  an  additional  blow,  as  the  cool  assassin  would  have 
done,  he  goes  and  arouses  the  rest  of  the  family  and  the 
neighbors,  and  tells  them  what  he  has  done.  Again,  instead 
of  taking  an  opportunity  when  both  his  victims  might  be 
finished  together,  with  some  shade  of  secrecy,  he  despatches 
one  in  open  day,  almost  within  call  of  help,  intending  to 
trust  to  his  chance  of  overpowering  the  other  under  similar 
circumstances.  The  latter  part  of  this  plan  —  that  of  call- 
ing Mr.  Cochran  and  killing  him  —  he  abandons  the  mo- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  IMBECILITY.  115 

ment  he  has  murdered  the  wife ;  and  seems  then  for  the  first 
time  to  have  thought  of  concealing  the  body  and  his  own 
share  in  the  bloody  act.  This  purpose,  too,  he  but  half 
performs,  and  finally  goes  and  discloses  the  whole  transac- 
tion to  the  very  person  most  interested  in  knowing  it.  Such 
conduct  is  perfectly  inexplicable  on  the  supposition  of  his 
possessing  a  soundly-acting  mind  ;  but  it  is  a  fair  specimen 
of  that  vacillation  of  purpose,  feebleness  of  resolution,  and 
capriciousness  of  design,  which  are  among  the  most  com- 
mon features  of  imbecility.  Had  he  belonged  to  the  class 
of  ordinary  criminals,  he  certainly,  after  obtaining  the  ob- 
ject he  had  in  view  in  committing  the  murder,  would  either 
have  fled,  or  taken  some  means  of  turning  suspicion  from 
'  himself  and  provided  for  his  escape  in  this  last  resort.  But 
he  was  an  imbecile,  and  because  he  was  an  imbecile,  he 
immediately  proclaims  his  own  agency  in  the  act,  relying 
for  his  safety  on  the  very  suspicious  excuse  of  being  uncon- 
scious of  what  he  -was  doing,  —  an  excuse  which,  at  best, 
would  not  have  saved  him  from  much  tedious,  perhaps 
perpetual  confinement,  and  the  ineffaceable  stigma  of  hav- 
ing murdered  a  fellow  being.  Even  the  motive  he  assigned 
to  the  coroner  and  warden,  and  on  which  the  attorney-gene- 
ral rested  the  burden  of  his  argument  against  him,  supposing 
it  were  actually  the  true  one,  would  only  strengthen  this 
view  of  his  mental  condition ;  for  none  but  an  imbecile  or 
an  idiot  would  ever  have  imagined  that  he  would  be  sent  to 
jail  for  offering  an  insulting  proposal  to  a  woman,  or  would 
have  preferred  hanging  to  temporary  imprisonment,  and 
then  added  murder  to  insult  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  his 
preference.  Nothing  that  appears  in  what  is  said  of  him 
during  his  confinement,  gives  any  higher  idea  of  his  moral 
and  intellectual  powers.  The  utmost  efforts  of  zealous  and 
judicious  clergymen  failed  to  impress  him  with  a  sense  of  his 
awful  situation,  or  inspire  him,  in  the  least  degree,  with 
those  cheering  hopes  which  even  the  most  abandoned  crim- 
inals often  entertain.  This  did  not  arise  from  a  spirit  of 
bravado,  nor  from  the  utter  recklessness  sometimes  mani- 
fested by  the  hardened  victims  of  the  law ;  but  from  stupid 


116  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

indifference,  or  sheer  inability  to  comprehend  the  simple 
truths  of  religion,  or  imagine  any  thing  beyond  the  present 
worse  than  the  annoyances  to  which  he  was  subjected.  In 
short,  so  obvious  was  his  imbecility,  that  the  writer,  from 
whose  statement  the  foregoing  account  is  partly  taken,  ob- 
serves that  "  no  one  who  has  had  any  intercourse  with  Pres- 
cott  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  is  or  has  been  insane, 
but  they  all  consider  him  to  have  been  deficient  in  intellect 
or  common  sense.1  The  signs  of  imbecility  were  not  want- 
ing even  in  his  physical  constitution.  A  medical  witness, 
who  had  been  physician  of  a  private  asylum  for  the  insane 
for  fifteen  years,  speaking  of  his  appearance  at  the  bar,  said, 
"  the  motion  of  his  eye  is  idiotic,  dull,  lazy,  indifferent ;  no 
appearance  of  fear  or  anxiety  in  his  countenance.  I  noticed 
no  agitation,  nor  anxiety  in  the  prisoner  during  the  examina- 
tion of  the  first  two  government  witnesses."  It  is  also 
worthy  of  notice,  that  insanity  had  been  a  common  disease 
in  the  Prescott  family ;  that  his  mother  was  fifty-six  years 
old  when  he  was  born,  and  his  father  but  one  year  younger  ; 
and  that  the  prisoner,  when  a  child,  had  a  scrofulous  or 
rickety  affection,  for  which  they  used  cold  bathing  and  some 
external  remedies.  Stronger  predisposing  causes  of  imbe- 
cility than  these,  when  combined,  do  not  exist. 2 


1  It  is  true,  that  one  -witness,  with  whom  the  accused  lived  a  year  and  a 
half  pi-evi^us  to  living  with  the  Cochrans,  described  him  as  "  intelligent," 
and  another,  who  had  been  acquainted  with  him  from  a  child,  said,  "  he  was 
as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general ; "  but  when  we  bear  in  mind  how  ill-quali- 
fied most  persons  are  to  estimate  the  intellectual  capacity  of  others,  and  that 
with  them  intelligence  generally  means  only  manual  skill,  or  a  tolerable  apt- 
ness in  performing  the  coarser  labors  of  the  farm  and  the  work-shop,  we  shall 
place  little  reliance  on  these  representations,  more  especially,  too,  as  they 
are  not  sustained  by  other  testimony.     The  keeper  of  the  jail  and  his  wife, 
who  seem  to  have  been  particularly  interested  in  him,  and  to  have  had  con- 
siderable intercourse  with  him,  both  testified  that  they  considered  him  "  not 
as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general." 

2  Before  dismissing  this  case,  it  is  gratifying  to  be  able  to  add,  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  phenomena  of  insanity  in  its  various  forms,  evinced  by  the 
court  and  by  the  counsel  for  the  prisoner,  and  the  general  correctness  of 
their  notions,  were  exceedingly  creditable  to  them,  and  present  a  remarkable 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    IMBECILITY.  117 

Such  are  the  reasons  that  induce  the  belief,  that  Prescott 
was  a  subject  of  imbecility,  not  mania,  —  that  he  belonged 
to  that  unfortunate  class  described  by  Georget  (§  55)  who 
know  no  other  incentive  than  the  gratification  of  animal 
passion ;  and  who  are  restrained  from  evil-doing  by  no 
higher  sentiment  than  the  fear  of  punishment.  This  conse- 
quence he  certainly  should  have  been  made  to  suffer  in  a 
limited  degree ;  but  to  mete  it  out  to  him  in  the  same  meas- 
ure that  is  bestowed  on  ordinary  criminals,  was  manifestly 
contrary  to  the  principles  of  natural  justice. 

§  97.  On  the  14th  of  May,  1833,  a  young  man,  John 
Barclay,  was  executed  at  Glasgow,  for  the  murder  of  Samuel 
Neilson,  for  whom  he  had  previously  shown  some  affection. 
He  took  from  him  three  one-pound  notes  and  a  watch,  to 
obtain  possession  of  which  seems  to  have  been  the  cause  of 
the  murder.  So  little  sense  had  he  of  having  done  wrong, 
or  of  his  own  situation,  that  he  hovered  about  almost  with- 
out disguise,  and,  while  going  to  spend  part  of  the  money 
with  the  first  person  he  spoke  to,  he  dropped  first  one  and 
then  another  note  at  his  feet,  as  a  child  would  have  done. 
He  was  devoid  of  natural  affection,  and  evinced  no  sorrow 
for  what  had  happened.  When  questioned,  he  said  he 
could  see  no  difference  between  killing  a  man,  and  killing  an 
ox,  except  that  he  "  would  never  hear  him  fiddle  again ; " 
and  so  little  did  he  know  of  the  nature  of  the  watch,  that  he 
regarded  it  as  an  animal,  and  when  it  stopped  from  not 
having  been  wound  up,  believed  it  had  died  of  cold  from  the 
glass  being  broken.  His  only  idea  of  God  was,  that  he  was 
a  muckle  horse.  He  had  no  idea  of  time,  and  did  not  know 
the  number  of  days  in  a  week.  So  obvious  was  Barclay's 
mental  deficiency,  that  the  court  of  justiciary  before  whom 
he  was  brought,  declined  proceeding  to  his  trial  till  it  was 
decided  by  medical  evidence,  that  he  was  a  fit  subject  for 
trial.  In  his  parish,  he  was  familiarly  known  as  "  daft  Jock 

contrast  to  the  crude  and  narrow  views  so  commonly  taken  by  men  in  similar 
situations,  who  yet  have  had  far  ampler  means  of  obtaining  information  on 
this  branch  of  medical  jurisprudence. 


118  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

Barclay  ;  "  and  the  clergyman,  who  knew  him  well,  "  always 
regarded  him  as  imbecile,  and  had  never  been  able  to  give 
him  any  religious  instruction,  and  did  not  consider  him  a 
responsible  being."  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Barclay's 
weakness  of  mind  was  recognized  by  all  parties  from  the 
judge  downwards,  and  that  the  jury  strongly  recommended 
him  to  mercy  on  that  account,  he  was  condemned  and  exe- 
cuted.1 It  appears  that  much  stress  was  laid  on  Barclay's 
knowing  right  from  wrong,  as  affording  indisputable  proof 
of  his  being  a  moral  agent.  The  reader  may  judge  for 
himself,  how  extensive  and  accurate  must  have  been  the 
notions  on  this  point,  of  one  who  thought  a  watch  was  a 
live  creature,  and  who  could  see  no  difference  between  killing 
an  ox  and  killing  a  man. 

In  the  above  case  the  imbecility  was  congenital,  and  re- 
sulted from  an  imperfect  development  of  the  cerebral  organ- 
ism. In  the  following,  it  was  the  effect  of  disease,  perverting 
the  normal  action  of  the  brain. 

§  98.  Louis  Lecouffe,  aged  twenty-four  years,  was  tried 
at  Paris,  llth  December,  1823,  for  the  murder  of  a  woman 
whom  he  robbed  of  a  quantity  of  plate.  It  appears  that  he 
was  an  epileptic  from  infancy ;  and  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  always  regarded  him  as  an 
idiot  or  fool.  He  had  some  disease  of  the  head  when  very 
young.  At  fifteen,  he  showed  manifest  signs  of  insanity ; 
and  affirmed  that  God,  from  time  to  time,  came  to  visit  him. 
His  mother  whom  he  strongly  accused,  and  seriously  com- 
promised by  his  disclosures,  declared,  even  while  she  stigma- 
tized him  as  a  monster  and  a  villain,  that  he  had  always 
been  in  bad  health,  and  hardly  ever  in  possession  of  his 
senses.  At  his  first  examination  he  denied  the  charge,  but 
subsequently  he  confessed,  for  the  following  reason.  He 
stated  that  on  the  preceding  night,  while  still  awake,  the 
spirit  of  his  father  appeared  to  him,  with  an  angel  at  his 
right  hand,  and  commanded  him  to  confess  his  crime ;  that 
God  immediately  after,  placed  his  hand  upon  his  heart,  and 

1  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  x.  33. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  119 

said  to  him,  "  I  pardon  thee,"  and  ordered  him  to  confess 
every  thing  within  three  days.  It  appears  that  his  mother, 
of  whom  he  stood  greatly  in  awe,  had  refused  her  consent  to 
a  marriage  he  was  anxious  to  contract ;  that  she  refused  him 
again  on  another  occasion,  and,  according  to  his  confession, 
she  long  teased  him  to  commit  the  murder  and  robbery,  and 
decided  his  resolution  by  promising  no  longer  to  oppose  his 
marriage.  The  plate  was  pawned  for  two  hundred  and 
thirty  francs,  of  which  his  mother  gave  him  only  forty  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  his  marriage*  He  declared  that  his 
victim  was  fond  of  him,  and  that  he  deserved  her  good  will 
by  having  rendered  her  many  little  services.  On  being 
confronted  with  his  mother,  he  did  not  retract  his  assertions, 
but  only  showed  some  hesitation,  saying  he  was  not  himself, 
and  experienced  a  violent  nervous  attack.  He  said,  next 
day,  that  if  placed'  again  in  the  presence  of  his  mother,  he 
would  be  unable  to  answer  for  himself;  that  she  would  give 
him  the  lie,  and  he  would  not  have  firmness  enough  to  main- 
tain the  truth.  Her  unbounded  influence  and  authority  over 
him,  which  were  deposed  to  by  several  witnesses,  were  such, 
that  he  did  whatever  she  ordered  him,  and  absolutely  de- 
prived himself  of  every  thing  to  support  her,  giving  her  all 
his  earnings,  without  daring  to  retain  a  single  sous.  The 
keeper  of  the  prison  testified  that  he  talked  incoherently, 
and  that  he  seemed  idiotical  and  weak-minded.  The  chief 
keeper  said,  that  he  had  often  seen  the  accused  with  haggard 
looks,  and  eyes  filled  with  tears,  complaining  of  headache, 
but  without  manifesting  any  true  derangement  of  mind. 
During  the  trial  he  had  very  frequent  violent  attacks  of  con- 
vulsions, and  he  stated  that  when  he  felt  vexed,  a  kind  of 
flame  or  flash  passed  before  his  eyes.1 

§  99.  The  facts  here  related  may  seem  to  some,  to  estab- 
lish the  imbecility,  or  mania,  or  both,  of  Lecouffe,  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt;  but  not  so  thought  the  court  or  jury, 
and,  accordingly,  he  was  condemned  and  executed  with  his 
mother.  Certainly,  nothing  short  of  great  weakness  of  mind 

1  Georget,  Examen  des  proces  crim. 


120  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

can  account  for  the  entire  submission  of  a  man  twenty-four 
years  old  to  the  despotic  rule  of  his  mother,  to  whom  he 
yielded  the  last  sous  of  his  earnings,  sacrificed  his  matrimo- 
nial scheme,  on  which  he  was  strongly  bent,  and  from 
whom  he  received  only  forty  of  the  two  hundred  and  thirty 
francs,  for  which,  at  her  instigation,  he  had  murdered  his 
benefactress.  That  this  mental  weakness  amounted  to  im- 
becility, is  satisfactorily  proved  by  the  fear  and  convulsive 
agitations  which  he  experienced  when  brought  into  her  pres- 
ence ;  by  the  common,  opinion  of  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  ;  and  by  the  well-known  effects 
of  this  disease  on  the  understanding  of  its  subjects.  If  Le- 
couffe,  after  suffering  the  disease  his  whole  life,  had  still 
possessed  a  sound  mind,  it  would  have  been  a  fact  almost, 
if  not  altogether,  without  a  parallel ;  but  that  he  did  not 
escape  its "  deteriorating  effects,  is  abundantly  proved  by  the 
evidence  adduced.  Occasionally,  his  mental  affection  took 
the  form  of  proper  mania,  as  was  indicated  by  the  wildness 
and  disorder  of  his  looks,  by  talking  incoherently  to  himself, 
by  his  groanings  and  mournful  cries  in  the  night,  observed 
by  one  of  the  witnesses,  by  his  nocturnal  apparitions,  and  by 
the  testimony  of  his  own  mother,  that  he  was  almost  never 
in  possession  of  his  senses. 

§  100.  Against  all  this  array  of  evidence,  the  advocate- 
general  had  nothing  to  offer  but  the  idle  declamation  usually 
resorted  to  on  such  occasions.  The  attempts  of  the  prison- 
er's counsel  to  establish  the  existence  of  imbecility  and  ma- 
ma, he  reprobated  in  the  severest  terms,  as  dangerous  to 
society,  subversive  of  social  order,  destructive  of  morality 
and  religion,  and  affording  a  direct  encouragement  to  crime. 
It  forms  no  part  of  the  plan  of  this  work  to  show  the  utter 
groundlessness  of  these  assertions  ;  and  they  are  mentioned 
here,  merely  that  the  reader  may  see  what  powerful  consider- 
ations succeeded  in  invalidating  the  evidence  in  favor  of 
Lecouffe,  and  consigning  him  to  an  ignominious  end. 

§  101.  If  the  principles  above  laid  down  (§§  69,  70,  74,) 
are  not  entirely  incorrect,  it  follows  that  the  persons  whose 
cases  have  been  related,  were  not  fit  subjects  for  criminal 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES   OP  IMBECILITY.  121 

punishment  —  at  least,  not  that  of  death.  The  usual  treat- 
ment of  such  offenders,  it  is  to  be  feared,  is  prompted  more 
by  prejudice  and  excited  feelings,  than  by  enlarged  views 
of  human  nature  and  of  the  ends  of  criminal  jurisprudence. 
While  the  public  feeling  has  become  too  refined  to  tolerate 
the  infliction  of  blows  and  stripes  on  the  imbecile  and  the 
mad  in  the  institutions  where  they  are  confined,  and  is 
inclined  to  discountenance  altogether  the  idea  of  punishment 
as  applied  to  the  insane,  it  can  still  be  gratified  by  gazing 
on  the  dying  agonies  of  a  being  unable  to  comprehend  the 
connection  between  his  crime  and  the  penalty  attached  to  it, 
and  utterly  insensible  of  the  nature  of  his  awful  situation. 
The  voice  of  reason  and  humanity  which  speaks  successfully 
in  the  first  instance,  is,  in  the  last,  drowned  by  the  more 
imperious  tones  of  prejudice  and  passion.  When  imbeciles 
are  convicted  on  a  charge  of  great  criminal  offences,  the  only 
rational  course  to  be  pursued  with  them,  is  that  of  perpetual 
confinement,  which  at  once  secures  society  from  their  future 
aggressions,  and  is  most  conducive  to  their  mental  and  bodily 
welfare. 

§  102.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  (§  69,)  as  an  essen- 
tial defect  in  Hoffbauer's  description  of  the  various  grades  of 
imbecility  and  stupidity,  that  he  has  almost  entirely  left  out 
of  view  the  state  of  the  moral  faculties,  —  an  omission  that 
is  fatal  to  the  value  of  the  principles  which  he  lays  down 
relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of  this  mental  condition  in 
connection  with  crime.  The  ground  above  taken  (§§  69,  70,) 
obliges  us  to  consider  the  principle  he  has  adopted,  of  gradu- 
ating criminal  responsibility  by  the  strength  and  extent  of 
the  intellect  alone,  as  exceedingly  partial  and  unjust  in  its 
operation.  The  only  conditions  of  culpability  which  he 
recognizes  are,  first,  a  knowledge  that  the  act  is  contrary 
to  law ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  act  is  precisely  the  one  pro- 
hibited by  the  law.  In  the  first  degree  of  imbecility  —  for 
in  the  third  all  legal  culpability  is  annulled  —  the  absence 
of  these  conditions  may  be  alleged  in  excuse ;  but  only, 
first,  when  the  violated  law  neither  forms  a  part  of  those 
general  relations  which  concern  the  offender  in  common  with 

11 


122  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

other  members  of  society,  nor  belongs  to  his  own  particular 
condition  or  circumstances ;  and,  secondly,  when  the  action 
forbidden  by  the  law  is  not  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature. 
Accordingly,  he  considers  "  that  inattention  or  absence  of 
mind,  want  of  foresight,  etc.  are  not  to  be  received  in  excuse 
when  they  have  regard  to  objects  universally  known,  as  to 
fire,  or  to  those  which  are  familiarly  used  by  the  imbecile,  as 
the  tools,  etc.  of  his  profession.  In  all  other  instances  his* 
fault  loses  the  degree  of  culpability  that  belongs  to  it,  in 
abstractor  according  to  the  expression  of  jurists.  This  is  also 
the  case  when  the  act  is  the  result  of  sudden  anger  or  fear, 
to  which  weak  persons  are  prone.1 

§  103.  In  determining  the  civil  responsibilities  and  rela- 
tions of  the  imbecile,  Hoffbauer's  descriptions  are  not  so 
unsuitable  for  practical  application ;  as  these  must  chiefly 
be  determined  by  the  condition  of  the  intellect  alone.  As 
his  observations,  however,  have  reference  in  a  great  measure 
to  the  legal  regulations  of  his  own  country,  they  will  be 
noticed  no  farther  than  merely  to  state  his  opinion  that  when 
imbecility  reaches,  or  approaches  the  third  degree,  the  party 
can  no  longer  be  considered  capable  of  taking  care  of  his 
property,  or  of  bequeathing  it  by  will. 

§  104.  No  cases  subjected  to  legal  inquiry  are  more  calcu- 
lated to  puzzle  the  understandings  of  courts  and  juries,  to 
mock  the  wisdom  of  the  learned,  and  baffle  the  acuteness  of 
the  shrewd,  than  those  connected  with  questions  of  imbe- 
cility. Much  of  the  difficulty  consists,  no  doubt,  in  a  want 
of  that  practical  tact  which  is  obtained  by  experience,  in 
unravelling  their  intricacies,  and  of  that  knowledge  of  the 
psychological  nature  of  this  condition  of  mind,  which  directs 
the  attention  exclusively  to  the  real  question  at  issue,  and 
abstracts  whatever  is  extraneous,  or  without  any  direct  bear- 
ing on  its  merits.  It  is  impossible  to  specify  any  particular 
rules  for  ascertaining  the  mental  capacity  of  imbecile  per- 
sons ;  for  circumstances,  always  proper  to  be  taken  into  the 
account,  are  constantly  varying  with  each  individual  case. 

1  Op.  cit  sup.  §  55. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   B1BECILITY.  123 

The  education  of  the  party,  the  sphere  of  life  in  which  he 
has  moved,  his  capacity  of  acquirement,  his  exposure  to 
improper  influences,  and  especially  the  nature  of  the  act  in 
question,  —  are  points  which  require  a  close  and  thorough 
consideration.  In  questions  of  interdiction  which  present 
the  greatest  difficulty,  some  overt  acts  of  extravagance  or 
indiscretion  generally  appear  in  evidence,  when  the  party  is 
really  incapable  of  managing  his  affairs,  which  will  remove 
the  doubts  that  a  direct  investigation  of  his  intelligence  and 
capacity  may  have  left  behind.  It  ought  to  be  considered  as 
a  general  rule,  that  when  no  acts  of  this  kind  have  been 
committed,  notwithstanding  the  management  of  his  property 
has  been  entirely  in  his  own  hands,  beyond  the  control  of 
others,  the  party  ought  not  to  be  interdicted  on  the  score 
of  imbecility.  In  all  cases  it  will  be  indispensably  necessary, 
as  Mr.  Haslam  advises,  to  investigate  his  comprehension  of 
numbers,  without  which  the  nature  of  property  cannot  be 
understood.  But  the  assertion  of  this  writer,  that  "  if  a  per- 
son were  capable  of  enumerating  progressively  to  the  number 
ten,  and  knew  the  force  and  value  of  the  separate  units,  he 
would  be  fully  competent  to  the  management  of  property,"1 
is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted  as  true ;  for  it  is  very  cer- 
tain that  a  large  proportion  of  those  whose  mental  capacity 
is  unquestionably  inadequate  to  the  management  of  prop- 
erty, have,  nevertheless,  these  arithmetical  acquirements. 
Cases,  even,  are  occasionally  met  with  of  imbeciles  who 
possess  surprising  powers  of  calculation,  but  have  not  the 
competency  of  children  to  manage  pecuniary  affairs  of  any 
extent.  No  doubt  the  converse  of  the  proposition,  in  refer- 
ence to  people  of  doubtful  capacity,  comes  nearer  the  truth. 
When  there  exists  this  inability  of  comprehending  the  value 
of  numbers,  the  individual  ought  to  be  considered,  in  all 
questions  of  property,  as  legally  non  compos  mentis,  notwith- 
standing we  might  hesitate  to  adopt  this  conclusion,  after  an 
investigation  of  his  intellectual  capacity  in  regard  to  the 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  347. 


124  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

general  nature  and  relations  of  property  and  business  trans- 
actions. 

§  105.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree  are  evidently  inca- 
pable of  making  wills ;  but  not  necessarily  so,  HofFbauer 
thinks,1  are  imbeciles  in  the  first  degree,  even  when  subjected 
to  a  curator.  The  purpose  of  this  guardianship  is  to  protect 
them  from  the  damage  they  might  do  themselves  if  left  with 
the  administration  of  their  affairs,  and  to  prevent  them  from 
entering  into  engagements  which  they  would  find  it  impos- 
sible to  perform.  But  as  testamentary  dispositions  depend  on 
a  single  arrangement,  and  one  which  the  testator  may  have 
taken  time  to  think  upon  and  mature,  they  do  not  require 
the  same  degree  of  intelligence  as  the  administration  of 
property,  and  therefore  the  validity  of  a  will  ought  not  to  be 
considered  as  necessarily  incompatible  with  the  interdiction 
of  the  testator.  As  a  general  principle,  the  correctness  of 
Hoffbauer's  doctrine  may  be  admitted,  because  it  places  no 
arbitrary  restriction  on  the  exercise  of*  a  natural  right,  the 
abuse  of  which  can  be  sufficiently  prevented  by  judicial 
interference ;  and  because,  if  it  be  rejected,  we  may  have 
the  curious  spectacle  of  a  person  debarred  from  having  any 
voice  in  the  final  disposition  of  his  property,  —  in  an  act 
which  really  comes  within  the  reach  of  his  understanding,  — 
while  in  the  management  of  his  property,  a  judicious  com- 
mittee is  constantly  paying  all  the  deference  to  his  wishes 
and  suggestions  which  their  reasonableness  deserves.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  nature  and  consequences  of  a 
testament  may  be  sufficiently  understood  by  many  an  imbe- 
cile who  is  utterly  incapable  of  discerning  the  complicated 
relations  that  are  involved  in  the  management  of  property. 
For  this  reason  it  is  said  that,  "if  a  man  be  of  a  mean 
understanding,  neither  of  the  wise  sort,  nor  of  the  foolish, 
but  indifferent  as  it  were,  betwixt  a  wise  man  and  a  fool, 
yea,  though  he  rather  incline  to  the  foolish  sort,  so  that  for 
his  dull  capacity  he  might  worthily  be  called  grossum  caput, 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  73. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  125 

a  dull  pate  or  a  dunce ;  such  a  one  is  not  prohibited  to  make 
a  testament." *  Nothing  can  be  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  be  attached  to  those  who  have  rendered  him  impor- 
tant services,  and  perhaps  have  well-founded  claims  on  his 
bounty ;  and  if  anxious  to  leave  some  substantial  token  of 
his  regard,  no  legal  impediment  ought  to  prevent  him  from 
bequeathing  them  a  reasonable  portion  of  his  property.  The 
danger  anticipated  from  such  an  exercise  of  the  testamentary 
power,  is  probably  more  imaginary  than  real ;  for  it  can 
hardly  be  conceived  that  testamentary  dispositions,  which 
turn  the  descent  of  property  altogether  from  its  natural  chan- 
nels, to  heap  it  up  in  the  lap  of  a  stranger  or  a  favorite,  would 
not  be  attended  by  appearances  of  fraud  or  circumvention, 
that  would  inevitably  destroy  their  validity.  All  that  is 
required  to  establish  the  wills  of  people  of  weak  under- 
standings is  that  they  should  have  been  capable  of  compre- 
hending their  nature  and  effect,2  —  a  point  entirely  indepen- 
dent of  the  accidental  circumstance  of  interdiction.  Much 
injustice,  therefore,  might  be  committed  by  depriving  ah1 
interdicted  imbeciles  of  the  testamentary  power,  compared 
with  which  the  temporary  inconvenience  that  would  arise 
from  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provisions  on  the  subject, 
is  hardly  to  be  mentioned.  Of  course,  the  slightest  appear- 
ance of  interference,  or  improper  influence,  should  be  closely 
scrutinized,  and  as  much  less  evidence  required  to  substan- 
tiate its  existence,  as  the  party  is  more  likely  to  have  been 
affected  by  it.  The  propriety  of  the  practice  here  advocated 
was  recognized  on  the  14th  of  February,  1808,  by  the  Royal 
Court  of  Aix,  who  confirmed  the  will  of  the  Sieur  Beau- 
quaire,  a  person  of  weak  understanding  (though  at  the  time 
of  making  it  he  was  under  the  surveillance  of  a  curator) ;  for 
the  reasons  that  the  dispositions  of  the  will  were  rational, 
and  that  the  mind  of  the  testator  was  capable  f  under- 
standing them,  though  too  weak  to  be  intrusted  with  the 
management  of  his  property.8  The  French  tribunals,  ac- 

1  Swinburne  on  Wills,  part  2,  s.  4.  2  Shelford  on  Lunacy,  275. 

3  Sirey,  Recueil  gen.  des  lois  et  des  arrcts.     viii.  315.     In  coining  to  this 
11* 


126  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

cording  to  Georget,  have  ever  shown  themselves  the  pro- 
tectors of  the  right  of  making  wills,  taking  into  consideration 
the  mental  condition  of  the  testator  and  the  dispositions  of 
the  will  itself. 

§  106.  It  would  seem  to  be  reasonable  that  the  validity 
of  the  contracts  of  imbecile  persons  not  under  guardianship, 
should  be  determined  by  the  same  principles,  as  that  of  their 
wills.  This,  however,  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  law,  which 
does  not  recognize  imbecility  as  a  form  of  insanity.  What- 
ever may  be  the  nature  or  magnitude  of  the  contract,  the 
question  at  law  is  one,  not  of  capacity  or  incapacity,  but  of 
soundness  or  unsoundness  of  mind;  and  on  this  question, 
the  law  "  makes  no  distinction  between  important  and  com- 
mon affairs,  large  or  small  property."1  Courts  of  law  have 
always  refused  to  invalidate  the  contracts  of  imbeciles  and 
others  of  weak  understanding,  and  courts  of  equity  have 
declined  to  interfere,  except  on  the  ground  of  fraud.2  There 
is  this  strong  objection  to  this  doctrine,  that  we  have  no  rule, 
and  cannot  have  in  the  nature  of  things,  by  which  the  ques- 
tion of  compos  or  non  compos  can  be  uniformly  determined ; 
for  one  court  or  jury,  for  instance,  may  range  through  the 
whole  life  and  conversation  of  the  party,  while  another 
may  think  itself  obliged  not  to  go  beyond  the  particular 
act  in  question.  A  surer  and  safer  principle  is,  that  if  the 
imbecile  person  is  capable  of  comprehending  the  nature 
of  the  particular  act,  then  has  he  all  the  capacity  which  the 


decision,  the  Court  considered  the  testator  to  be  one  of  those  persons  whose 
case  is  contemplated  in  the  following  article  (499)  of  the  Civil  Code,  in  which 
the  power  of  making  a  will  is  not  mentioned  among  the  civil  acts,  which  they 
are  rendered  unable  to  perform.  "  In  rejecting  a  petition  for  interdiction, 
the  court  may,  nevertheless,  if  circumstances  require,  decree  that  the  defend- 
ant is  henceforth  incapable  of  appearing  in  suits,  of  making  contracts,  of 
borrowing,  receiving  payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  discharge,  alienating  or 
pledging  his  property,  without  the  aid  of  a  council  which  shall  be  appointed 
in  the  same  judgment." 

1  4  Dane's  Abridgment,  561.     This  point  is  discussed  at  some  length,  in 
Jackson  v.  King,  4  Co  wen,  207. 

2  1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,  238. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   IMBECILITY.  127 

case  requires,  and  the  act  should  be  established;  and  vice 
versa.  Indeed,  whether  the  question  be  one  of  capacity  or 
soundness,  regard  must  always  be  had  to  the  nature  of  the 
subject  to  which  the  mind  is  applied,  and  the  utmost  respect 
for  technical  rules  and  definitions  cannot  prevent  us  from 
being  governed  by  this  rule,  in  the  majority  of  cases.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  unjust  than  to  infer  imbecility  in  general, 
from  facts  that  establish  its  existence  merely  in  regard  to  cer- 
tain subjects  or  relations.  No  one  imagines  a  general  or  a 
statesman  to  be  necessarily  non  compos,  because  the  one  may 
have  shown  himself  incapable  of  conducting  a  campaign, 
and  the  other  of  controlling  the  destinies  of  an  empire.  And 
nothing  can  be  more  absurd,  as  well  as  unjust,  than  to  con- 
clude that  because  a  weak-minded  person  can  be-  shown  to 
have  acted  shrewdly  in  small  and  familiar  matters,  he  must 
possess  a  legal  capacity  for  the  transaction  of  the  most  im- 
portant and  complicated  affairs.  Many  an  imbecile  is  per- 
fectly competent  to  purchase  the  necessaries  of  life,  or  make 
contracts  relative  to  personal  service,  who  could  not  be 
trusted  with  the  disposal  of  an  estate,  or  with  making  an 
investment  of  money.  We  cannot  help  concluding,  there- 
fore, that  the  universal  application  of  the  rule,  compos  or  non 
compos,  is  repugnant  to  the  most  obvious  principles  of  justice. 
§  107.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree,  and  others  of  what- 
ever grade  under  interdiction,  are  legally  incapable  of  con- 
tracting marriage,  for  since  they  are  presumed  to  be  incapa- 
ble of  transacting  business  of  the  smallest  amount,  they  must 
be  equally  so  of  becoming  a  party  to  a  contract  which  is  not 
only  to  affect  their  pecuniary  interests,  but  their  whole  future 
happiness  and  comfort.  When,  however,  the  mental  defi- 
ciency has  not  been  sufficient  to  provoke  interdiction,  though 
plain  enough  to  be  generally  recognized,  it,  very  properly, 
constitutes  no  legal  impediment  to  marriage,  but  on  proof  of 
fraud  or  circumvention,  the  marriage  has  been  pronounced 
by  the  courts,  null  and  void.1  It  is  obvious  that  no  general 


1  1  Haggard  Ecc.  Rep.  355.    Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth ;  Miss  Bagster's 
case,  Ante,  §  76. 


128  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

rule  can  be  applied  to  all  such  cases,  for  while  marriage  might 
conduce  to  the  interests  of  each  party  in  one  case  ;  in  another, 
it  might  be  equally  ruinous  to  the  interests  of  one  or  both 
parties.  Every  case  should  be  judged  on  its  own  merits,  and 
only  annulled  when  the  mind  of  either  party  is  proved  to 
have  been  operated  on  by  improper  influences. 


CHAPTER   V. 


PATHOLOGY   AND   SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA. 

§  108.  WHILE  medical  literature  is  far  from  being  defi- 
cient in  works  on  Insanity  considered  as  one  of  the  most 
serious  maladies  to  which  man  is  liable,  the  popular  notions 
respecting  it  are  peculiarly  loose  and  incorrect.  As  these, 
however,  are  the  source  of  many  of  the  faults  in  the  jurispru- 
dence relating  to  this  affection,  it  is  necessary  to  enter  some- 
what into  its  medical  history,  and  to  discuss  points  which 
might  seem,  at  first  sight,  to  be  of  an  exclusively  professional 
nature,  but  a  proper  understanding  of  which  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  save  us  from  gross  mistakes  on  this  subject. 
Certainly  no  greater  absurdity  can  be  imagined  than  that  of 
fixing  the  legal  relations  of  persons  in  a  particular  state  of 
mind,  while  entertaining  the  most  imperfect  notions  of  what 
that  state  really  is,  —  unless  it  may  be  that  of  pertinaciously 
clinging  to  those  notions  and  discouraging  every  attempt  to 
correct  them,  after  the  progress  of  scientific  knowledge  has 
shown  them  to  be  erroneous.  Before  describing  the  phe- 
nomena of  mania,  it  should  be  distinctly  understood  that  it 
is,  first,  a  disease  of  the  brain  ;  and,  secondly,  that  in  its  vari- 
ous grades  and  forms,  it  observes  the  same  laws  as  diseases 
of  other  organs.  The  importance  of  these  propositions  makes 
it  proper  to  state  the  grounds  on  which  they  rest ;  for  until 
they  are  clearly  recognized  and  appreciated,  it  will  be  in  vain 
to  expect  any  improvements  in  the  medical  jurisprudence  of 
insanity. 

§  109.  I.  Mania  arises  from  a  morbid  affection  of  the 
brain.  The  progress  of  pathological  anatomy  during  the 


130  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

present  century,  has  established  this  fact  beyond  the  reach  of 
a  reasonable  doubt.  It  can  hardly  be  necessary  at  the  present 
time,  to  prove  the  fact  of  the  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the 
brain  for  its  external  manifestations,  —  that,  in  short,  the 
brain  is  the  material  organ  of  the  intellectual  and  affective 
powers.  Whatever  opinion  may  be  entertained  of  the  nature 
of  the  mind,  it  is  generally  admitted  —  at  least  by  all  enlight- 
ened physiologists  —  that  it  must  of  necessity  be  put  in  con- 
nection with  matter,  and  that  the  brain  is  the  part  of  the 
body  by  means  of  which  this  connection  is  effected.  Little 
as  we  know  beyond  this  single  fact,  it  is  enough  to  warrant 
the  inference  that  derangement  of  the  structure,  or  of  the  vital 
actions  of  the  brain,  must  be  followed  by  abnormal  mani- 
festations of  the  mind  ;  and,  consequently,  that  the  presence 
of  the  effect  indicates  the  existence  of  the  cause.  Whether 
the  morbid  action  arises  in  the  digestive,  or  some  other  sys- 
tem, and  is  reflected  thence  to  the  brain  by  means  of  the 
nervous  sympathies,  or  arises  primarily  in  the  brain,  the 
soundness  of  the  above  principle  is  equally  untouched.  This 
leads  us  to  the  source  of  the  hesitation  that  has  been  evinced 
by  pathologists  to  consider  the  brain  as  the  seat  of  insanity. 
§  110.  From  the  fact  that  organic  lesions  are  not  always 
discoverable  after  death  in  the  brains  of  the  subjects  of  in- 
sanity, it  has  been  inferred  that  the  brain  is  not  the  seat  of 
this  disease ;  though,  if  this  fact  were  true,  —  it  being  also 
true  that  no  other  organ  in  the  body  invariably  presents 
marks  of  organic  derangement  in  insanity,  —  the  only  legiti- 
mate inference  would  have  been,  that,  in  some  cases,  it  is 
impossible  to  discover  such  lesions  by  any  means  in  our 
power.  The  strangest  theoretical  error  which  this  apparent 
soundness  of  the  brain  in  some  cases  has  occasioned,  is  that 
of  denying  the  existence  erf  any  material  affection  at  all,  and 
attributing  the  disease  entirely  to  an  affection  of  the  imma- 
terial principle.  If  the  same  pathological  principles  had 
guided  men's  reasoning  respecting  this  disease,  that  they 
have  applied  to  the  investigation  of  others,  this  error  would 
never  have  been  committed.  It  will  scarcely  be  contended, 
at  the  present  day  at  least,  that  the  structural  changes,  found 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA.  131 

after  death  from  any  disease,  are  the  primary  cause  of  the 
disturbances  manifested  by  symptoms  during  life  ;  or  that  if 
the  interior  could  be  inspected  at  the  beginning  of  the  disease, 
any  of  these  structural  changes  would  be  discovered.  It  is 
now  a  well-recognized  principle,  that  such  changes  must  be 
preceded  by  some  change  in  the  vital  actions  of  the  part 
where  they  occur.  This  vital  change  is  now  generally  ex- 
pressed by  the  term  irritation,  and  nothing  is  implied  by  it 
relative  to  the  nature  of  this  change,  more  than  an  exaltation 
of  action.  Irritation,  then,  is  the  initial  stage  of  disease,  —  the 
first  in  the  chain  of  events,  of  which  disorganization  is  the 
last,  —  and,  of  course,  nothing  can  be  more  unphilosophical 
than  to  attribute  disturbances  of  function,  exclusively  to  any 
structural  changes  that  may  take  place  during  the  progress  of 
these  successive  stages.  The  departure  from  the  normal 
course  of  vital  action,  which  is  probably  as  unexceptionable 
a  definition  of  irritation  as  can  be  given,  is  sufficient  to 
derange  the  functions  of  the  part  in  which  it  occurs,  without 
producing  any  visible  change  in  its  appearance ;  and  hence, 
we  may  oftentimes  explore  the  dead  body  with  the  utmost 
minuteness  and  skill,  without  being  enabled  to  infer  from 
any  thing  we  find,  an  adequate  cause  of  death.  Before  this 
can  be  found,  the  initial  stage  must  have  continued  more  or 
less  time ;  and  though  it  always  tends  to  pass  into  the  subse- 
quent stages,  yet  death  may  take  place  from  various  causes, 
before  they  are  developed  and  before  a  trace  of  their  existence 
can  be  detected. 

§  111.  There  is  this  peculiarity  in  the  pathology  of  insan- 
ity, that  while  the  irritation  deranges  the  mental  functions 
so  as  to  be  manifest  to  every  observer,  its  sympathetic  effects 
upon  the  rest  of  the  system  are  so  slight  that  they  contribute 
but  little,  comparatively,  by  their  reaction,  to  develop  the 
stage  of  inflammation.  The  consequence  is,  that  cerebral 
irritation,  sufficient  to  produce  insanity,  may  endure  for  years, 
and  death  occur  at  last  from  other  causes,  without  our  being 
able  to  discover  any  morbid  appearances.  Thus  their  exist- 
ence, instead  of  being  essential  to  the  disease,  is  entirely  the 
result  of  accidental  circumstances.  The  probability  of  find- 


132  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ing  inflammation  or  any  of  its  products,  will  depend  on  the 
duration  of  the  disease,  and  the  share  which  it  had  in  caus- 
ing the  death  of  the  patient.  If  it  have  existed  for  a  short 
time  only,  or  death  have  been  occasioned  by  some  other 
cause,  examination  will  be  likely  to  disclose  no  traces  of  mor- 
bid action ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  if  it  have  been  of  long  stand- 
ing and  have  killed  the  patient  by  the  constitutional  disturb- 
ances it  has  produced,  they  will  generally  be  found  more  or 
less  abundantly.  From  not  properly  attending  to  these  con- 
siderations, pathologists  have  been  led  into  an  egregious 
error  by  the  absence  of  morbid  changes,  —  no  less  a  one 
than  that  of  denying  the  disease  to  be  an  affection  of  matter, 
and  jumping  at  the  absurd  conclusion,  that  it  is  the  spiritual 
principle  alone  that  suffers. 

§  112.  It  is  not  now  denied,  however,  that  the  traces  of 
disease,  when  they  do  occur,  are  oftener  found  in  the  brain 
than  in  any  other  organ ;  nor  that,  in  a  very  large  propor- 
tion of  the  whole  number  of  cases,  the  brain  actually  does 
show  evident  marks  of  having  been  diseased.  And  when 
we  bear  in  mind  the  limited  knowledge  of  the  cerebral 
structure  which  pathologists  have  possessed  till  quite  lately, 
and,  consequently,  the  difficulty  they  must  have  experienced 
in  detecting  changes  from  the  healthy  condition,  it  may  well 
be  concluded  that  the  absence  of  these  changes  might  be 
attributed,  in  not  a  few  instances,  to  the  fault  of  the  inquirer 
rather  than  to  the  nature  of  the  disease.  Certain  it  is,  that 
as  we  have  become  better  acquainted  with  the  anatomy  of 
the  brain  and  with  its  sensible  qualities,  and  been  more 
thorough  and  persevering  in  our  examinations,  the  rarer  it 
has  become  to  find  a  case  of  insanity  presenting  no  organic 
changes  after  death.  The  very  same  observers  who  once 
could  find  nothing  satisfactory  in  their  pathological  re- 
searches in  the  brains  of  the  insane,  have  changed  their 
views,  as  their  field  of  observation  has  enlarged,  and  their 
acquaintance  with  the  whole  subject  has  been  increased  with 
time  and  practice,  so  that  some  have  examined  hundreds  of 
subjects  without  finding  one  entirely  free  from  some  appre- 
ciable change. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  133 

§  113.  II.  Insanity  observes  the  same  pathological  laws  as 
other  diseases.  Notwithstanding  the  air  of  mystery  which 
ignorance  and  superstition  have  thrown  around  this  disease, 
it  cannot  be  said  to  present  any  thing  very  strange  or  pecu- 
liar ;  nor  are  the  discussions  concerning  it  involved  in  the 
obscurity  which  is  generally  imagined.  It  arises  from  a  mor- 
bid affection  of  organic  matter,  and  is  just  as  much,  and  no 
more,  an  event  of  special  providence,  as  other  diseases ;  and 
to  attribute  it  to  the  visitation  of  God  in  a  peculiar  sense,  is 
a  questionable  proof  of  true  piety  as  well  as  of  sound  phi- 
losophy. It  follows  the  same  course  of  incubation,  develop- 
ment, and  termination  in  cure  or  death,  as  other  diseases ; 
sometimes  lying  dormant  for  months  or  even  years,  obscure 
to  others,  and,  perhaps,  unsuspected  by  the  patient  himself; 
at  others,  suddenly  breaking  out  with  little  premonition  of 
its  approach ;  and  again,  after  being  repeatedly  warded  off 
by  precautions  and  remedies,  finally  establishing  itself  in  its 
clearest  forms ;  just  as  consumption,  for  instance,  sometimes 
begins  its  ravages  so  slowly  and  insidiously  as  to  be  percep- 
tible only  to  the  most  practised  observer,  for  years  together, 
while  in  another  class  of  patients,  it  proceeds  from  the  begin- 
ning with  a  progress  as  rapid  as  it  is  painfully  manifest. 
But  its  presence  no  one  thinks  of  denying  in  the  former  case, 
merely  because  its  victim  enjoys  a  certain  degree  of  health 
and  activity,  though  it  would  be  no  greater  error  than  to 
deny  the  existence  of  insanity  while  the  operations  of  the 
mind  are  not  so  deeply  disturbed  as  to  be  perceptible  to  the 
casual  observer.  When  fully  developed,  too,  it  may,  like 
other  diseases,  give  rise  to  severe  constitutional  disturbance, 
or  it  may  scarcely  affect  the  system  at  large ;  as  inflamma- 
tion of  the  digestive  organs  may  occasion  fever  and  intolera- 
ble pain,  or  lead  its  victim  slowly  to  the  grave,  hardly  aware 
of  its  presence,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  comparative  health. 
Like  other  diseases,  insanity  is  made  the  object  of  remedial 
treatment,  and  often  yields  to  judicious  administration  of* 
medicines,  —  a  sufficient  proof  of  its  material  origin,  for 
though  the  rationale  of  the  operation  of  bathing,  bleeding, 
and  digitalis,  is  perfectly  obvious  in  cerebral  disease,  it  is  not 

12 


134  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

so  clear  how  they  restore  the  spiritual  principle  to  its  natural 
vigor.  It  may  proceed  through  its  successive  stages  with  a 
severity  ever  increasing  to  the  end,  or,  like  many  other  affec- 
tions of  the  nervous  system,  its  progress  may  be  interrupted 
by  periods,  more  or  less  long,  of  relaxation  of  its  ordinary 
force,  —  from  a  mere  abatement  of  the  constitutional  excite- 
ment and  mental  extravagance,  to  complete  intermission  of 
the  disease,  when  the  patient  is  apparently  restored  to  all  his 
original  soundness.  In  its  causes,  also,  insanity  is  under  the 
dominion  of  no  extraordinary  pathological  laws.  It  never 
arises  in  a  mysterious  way,  as  if  abstracted  from  the  ordinary 
relations  of  cause  and  effect,  as  it  would  do,  were  it  an  affec- 
tion of  an  immaterial  principle ;  but  its  origin  may  be  readily 
accounted  for  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  other  diseases. 
Whether  proceeding  from  hereditary  predisposition,  or  ma- 
ternal influences  during  gestation ;  from  the  cerebral  irrita- 
tion produced  by  disease  in  other  parts,  or  by  external  inju- 
ries ;  from  excessive  or  deficient  exercise  of  the  mind ;  from 
great  predominance  or  indulgence  of  some  faculties  with  a 
small  endowment  or  neglect  of  the  rest ;  from  improper  or 
insufficient  nourishment  or  air;  from  the  unbridled  license 
of  the  passions ;  or  the  habitual  use  of  intoxicating  drinks ; 
we  see  the  influence  of  causes  precisely  analogous  to  those 
which  give  rise  to  other  diseases.  Mania  also  furnishes  an 
illustration  of  a  well  known  pathological  law,  in  its  tendency 
to  be  affected  by  remedies,  in  proportion  to  the  recency  of 
its  attack,  —  a  fact  which  is  totally  inexplicable  on  the  sup- 
position of  the  mind  itself  being  idiopathically  diseased.  In 
common  with  other  diseases  it  is  benefited  by  proper  air  and 
exercise,  cheerful  conversation,  friendly  sympathy  and  atten- 
tion, and  employments  which  furnish  a  healthful  play  to  the 
actions  of  the  whole  system,  and  abstract  the  patient  from 
the  contemplation  of  his  own  condition.  In  short,  through- 
out the  whole  history  of  mania,  in  its  various  forms,  we 
clearly  discover  the  evidence  of  a  bodily  disease,  —  of  a 
suffering  organ;  and  in  not  a  fact  respecting  it  can  we  dis- 
cover any  thing  anomalous  or  at  variance  with  the  principles 
of  diseased  action.  If  this  truth  be  steadily  borne  in  mind, 


PATHOLOGY  AND    SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  135 

it  will  be  a  faithful  light  to  our  steps ;  and  no  one  at  all 
acquainted  with  the  subject,  can  question  the  importance  of 
the  influence  which  it  will  exert  on  judicial  investigations. 

§  114.  Mania,  then,  being  a  disease  and  governed  by  the 
same  pathological  laws  as  other  diseases,  it  will  be  incum- 
bent on  us  to  give  some  account  of  its  symptoms;  and, 
since  we  consider  a  well-settled  conviction  of  the  above 
views  as  having  an  important  bearing  on  the  course  of  legal 
decisions,  no  further  reason  will  be  necessary  for  going  more 
fully  into  this  part  of  the  subject,  than  at  first  blush  might 
seem  proper  for  our  purpose.  So  closely  are  soundness  and 
unsoundness  of  mind  allied,  that  we  are  met  at  the  outset  by 
the  difficulty  already  hinted  at,  of  discriminating  in  some 
cases  between  mental  manifestations  modified  by  disease, 
and  those  that  are  peculiar,  though  natural  to  the  individual. 
Madness  is  not  indicated  so  much  by  any  particular  extrava- 
gance of  thought  or  feeling,  as  by  a  well-marked  change  of 
character,  or  departure  from  the  ordinary  habits  of  thinking, 
feeling,  and  acting,  without  any  adequate  external  cause. 
To  lay  down,  therefore,  any  particular  definition  of  mania 
founded  on  symptoms,  and  to  consider  every  person  mad 
who  may  happen  to  come  within  the  range  of  its  application, 
might  induce  the  ridiculous  consequence  of  making  a  large 
portion  of  mankind  of  unsound  mind.  Some  men's  ordinary 
habits  so  closely  resemble  the  behavior  of  the  mad,  that  a 
stranger  would  be  easily  deceived ;  as  in  the  opposite  case, 
where  the  confirmed  monomaniac,  by  carefully  abstaining 
from  the  mention  of  his  hallucinations,  has  the  semblance  of 
a  perfectly  rational  man.  Hence,  when  the  sanity  of  an 
individual  is  in  question,  instead  of  comparing  him  with  a 
fancied  standard  of  mental  soundness,  as  is  too  commonly 
the  custom,  his  natural  character  should  be  diligently  investi- 
gated, in  order  to  determine  whether  the  apparent  indication 
of  madness  is  not  merely  the  result  of  the  ordinary  and 
healthy  constitution  of  the  faculties.  In  a  word,  he  is  to  be 
compared  with  himself,  not  with  others,  and  if  there  have 
been  no  departure  from  his  ordinary  manifestations,  he  is  to 
be  judged  sane ;  although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  striking 


\ 

136  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

peculiarities  of  character,  such  as  amount  to  eccentricity, 
furnish  strong  ground  of  suspicion  of  predisposition  to 
madness. 

§  115.  For  the  first  announcement  of  this  great  princi- 
ple, that,  in  doubtful  cases,  the  mind  of  the  supposed  lunatic 
should  be  compared  with  his  own  when  in  its  natural, 
habitual  state,  we  are  indebted  to  the  late  Dr.  Gooch,1 
though  it  has  been  since  developed  and  illustrated  with  an 
ability  worthy  of  its  importance,  by  Dr.  Andrew  Combe.  If 
the  truths  contained  in  the  following  extract  are  faithfully 
considered  by  the  medical  student,  he  may  be  spared  many 
an  awkward  mistake,  which  he  might  otherwise  have  com- 
mitted, and  may  save  many  a  sound  and  worthy  individual 
from  incalculable  pain  and  annoyance.  "  In  investigating 
the  nature  of  insanity,  the  first  caution  to  be  observed  is,  not 
to  confound  disorders  of  mental  functions  with  natural  quali- 
ties, which  sometimes  strongly  resemble  them.  Many  men 
in  the  full  enjoyment  of  health  are  remarkable  for  peculiari- 
ties and  idiosyncrasies  of  thought  and  feeling,  which  con- 
trast strongly  with  the  general  tone  and  usages  of  society ; 
but  they  are  not  on  that  account  to  be  held  as  insane,  be- 
cause the  singularity  for  which  they  are  distinguished  is 
with  them  a  natural  quality,  and  not  the  product  of  disease ; 
and,  from  the  very  unlikeness  of  their  manifestations  to  the 
modes  of  feeling  and  acting  of  other  men,  such  persons  are, 
in  common  language,  said  to  be  eccentric.  It  is  true  that, 
on  the  principle  already  explained,  of  excess  in  size  of  some 
organs  over  the  rest  being  favorable  to  the  production  of 
insanity,  eccentricity  involves,  all  other  things  being  equal,  a 
greater  than  usual  susceptibility  to  mental  derangement; 
but  still  it  is  not  mere  strangeness  of  conduct  or  singularity 
of  mind  which  constitutes  its  presence.  It  is  the  prolonged 
departure,  without  an  adequate  external  cause,  from  the  state 
of  feeling  and  modes  of  thinking  usual  to  the  individual  when 
in  health,  that  is  the  true  feature  of  disorder  in  mind;  and  the 


London  Quarterly  Review,  XLII.  355. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA.  137 

degree  at  which  this  disorder  ought  to  be  held  as  constitut- 
ing insanity,  is  a  question  of  another  kind,  on  which  we  can 
scarcely  hope  for  unanimity  of  sentiment  and  opinion.  Let 
the  disorder,  however,  be  ascertained  to  be  morbid  in  its 
nature,  and  the  chief  point  is  secured,  viz.,  a  firm  basis  for  an 
accurate  diagnosis;  because  it  is  impossible  that  such 
derangement  can  occur  unless  in  consequence  of,  or  in  con- 
nection with,  a  morbid  condition  of  the  organ  of  mind;  and 
thus  the  abstract  mental  states,  which  are  justly  held  to 
indicate  lunacy  in  one,  may,  in  another,  speaking  relatively 
to  health,  be  the  strongest  proofs  of  perfect  soundness  of 
mind.  A  brusque,  rough  manner,  which  is  natural  to  one 
person,  indicates  nothing  but  mental  health  in  him ;  but  if 
another  individual,  who  has  always  been  remarkable  for  a 
deferential  deportment  and  habitual  politeness,  lays  these 
qualities  aside,  and  without  provocation  or  other  adequate 
cause,  assumes  the  unpolished  forwardness  of  the  former, 
we  may  justly  infer,  that  his  mind  is  either  already  deranged 
or  on  the  point  of  becoming  so.  Or,  if  a  person  who  has 
been  noted  all  his  life  for  prudence,  steadiness,  regularity, 
and  sobriety,  suddenly  becomes,  without  any  adequate 
change  in  his  external  situation,  rash,  unsettled,  and  dissi- 
pated in  his  habits,  or  vice  versa,  every  one  recognizes  at 
once  these  changes,  accompanied  as  they  then  are  by  bodily 
symptoms,  as  evidences  of  the  presence  of  disease  affecting 
the  mind,  through  the  instrumentality  of  its  organs.  It  is, 
therefore,  I  repeat,  not  the  abstract  act  or  feeling  which  con- 
stitutes a  symptom ;  it  is  the  departure  from  the  natural  and 
healthy  character,  temper,  and  habits,  that  gives  it  this  meaning; 
and,  in  judging  of  a  man's  sanity,  it  is  consequently  as  essen- 
tial to  know  what  his  habitual  manifestations  were,  as  what 
his  present  symptoms  are." 1 

§  116.  Mania,  under  whatever  form  it  may  appear,  is 
generally  preceded,  except  when  produced  by  injuries  or 
moral  shocks,  by  a  change  in  the  natural  condition  desig- 

1  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  196. 
12* 


138  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

nated  by  writers  as  the  period  of  incubation.  In  the  follow- 
ing paragraphs  by  Georget,  we  have  a  most  accurate  and 
graphic  description  of  this  state.  "  Sometimes,"  says  he, 
"  the  action  of  the  cause  is  strong  and  rapid ;  at  other  times, 
more  moderate  and  slow.  In  the  first  case,  madness  breaks 
out  at  the  end  of  some  hours  or  some  days,  after  a  state  of 
anxiety  and  uneasiness,  with  headache,  sleeplessness,  agita- 
tion, or  depression,  and  threatening  of  cerebral  congestion  ; 
the  patient  begins  to  babble,  cry,  sing,  and  becomes  agitated 
and  wild.  He  is  then  often  taken  for  a  person  in  a  state  of 
intoxication,  and  the  mistake  becomes  apparent  only  after 
examining  the  previous  circumstances  and  the  duration  of 
the  malady.  In  the  other  case,  thought  only  becomes  affected 
gradually,  and  often  very  slowly ;  the  patient  is  generally 
conscious  of  some  disorder  in  his  intellectual  faculties  ;  he  is 
beset  by  new  and  odd  notions,  and  by  unusual  inclinations  ; 
he  feels  himself  changing  in  his  affections  ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  he  preserves  a  consciousness  of  his  condition,  is  vexed 
at  it,  and  tries  to  conceal  it ;  he  continues  his  occupations  as 
much  as  he  can ;  and  lastly,  as  many  people  do  in  the  first 
stage  of  intoxication,  he  makes  every  effort  to  appear  reason- 
able. Meantime  his  health  continues  to  give  way,  and  he 
either  sleeps  less  or  loses  sleep  altogether ;  the  appetite  di- 
minishes or  disappears  ;  sometimes  digestion  is  difficult,  and 
constipation  supervenes ;  embonpoint  decreases,  the  features 
alter,  the  monthly  discharge  becomes  irregular,  weak,  and  at 
last  is  suspended.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  observed 
something  unusual  and  even  extraordinary  in  the  tastes  of 
the  patient,  in  his  habits,  his  affections,  his  character,  and 
aptitude  for  business  ;  if  he  was  gay  and  communicative,  he 
becomes  sad,  morose,  and  averse  to  society, ;  if  he  was  orderly 
and  economical,  he  becomes  confused  and  prodigal ;  if  he 
had  long  abstained  from  the  pleasures  of  love,  he  becomes 
the  victim  of  insatiable  desires,  and  either  seeks  to  associate 
with  the  other  sex,  or  has  recourse  to  disgraceful  practices ; 
if  he  was  moderate  in  his  political  and  religious  opinions,  he 
passes  to  an  extreme  exaggeration  in  both ;  if  he  was  open 
and  candid,  he  becomes  suspicious  and  jealous ;  if  a  wife, 


PATHOLOGY   AND   SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  139 

she  regards  her  husband  and  children  with  indifference  ;  the 
merchant  neglects  his  business ;  tears  and  laughter  succeed 
each  other  without  apparent  motive ;  the  exterior  of  candor 
and  modesty  gives  place  to  an  air  of  conceit  and  assurance, 
which,  especially  in  women,  astonishes  us.  But  all  these 
phenomena  are  less  prominent  than  they  may  appear  to  be 
here,  and  unless  the  individual  have  been  insane  before,  no 
one  may  suspect  the  nature  of  the  ailment  which  torments 
him ;  all  the  questions  put  to  him  lead  to  no  results,  except 
that  of  fatiguing  and  giving  him  pain,  for  the  ignorance  that 
prevails  relative  to  madness  leads  the  friends  to  indulge 
in  offensive  insinuations,  and  to  charge  him  with  frivolous 
accusations,  from  not  perceiving  that  he  is  under  the  in- 
fluence of  disease,  and  not  of  reason.  Sometimes  the 
appetite  either  remains  entire,  or  is  speedily  recovered,  as 
well  as  digestion,  nutrition,  etc.,  and  it  is  in  these  circum- 
stances that  the  conduct  of  the  patient  gives  rise  to  a  host  of 
interpretations  on  the  part  of  his  relatives  and  the  public." 

§  117.  "  This  period  of  incubation  of  mental  alienation, 
during  which  the  true  state  of  the  patient  is  generally  mis- 
understood, or  not  appreciated,  may  last  a  long  time.  Pinel 
relates,  that  a  man  who  believed  his  wife  to  have  been  ill 
only  six  months,  the  period  of  the  invasion  of  furious  de- 
lirium, admitted,  after  a  multiplicity  of  questions,  that  the 
disease  must  have  been  going  on  fifteen  years.  The  same 
author  mentions  elsewhere,  that  in  several  instanced,  the 
maniacal  or  melancholic  state,  has  begun  four,  six,  ten,  or 
even  fifteen  or  twenty  years  previously.  It  is  often  easy  to 
go  back  months,  or  years,  in  this  way ;  and  we  finally  dis- 
cover that  circumstances,  taken  for  causes  by  the  friends,  are 
frequently  only  the  consequences  of  unobserved  disease.  In 
fact,  it  often  happens  at  that  period  of  the  malady,  that  a 
slight  contradiction,  or  paroxysm  of  anger,  or  some  cause 
equally  insignificant  to  a  person  in  good  health,  provokes  the 
immediate  and  complete  subversion  of  reason,  and  gives  rise 
to  mistakes  as  to  its  true  cause  and  duration." 1 

1  Dictionnaire  de  Medecine,  art.  Folie. 


140  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  118.  Sooner  or  later  this  disorder  of  the  cerebral  func- 
tions becomes  of  a  more  obvious  and  positive  character. 
The  struggle  between  the  convictions  of  his  sounder  reason, 
and  the  impulses  of  this  new  condition  ceases,  and  the 
patient,  instead  of  contending  any  longer  against  the  ap- 
proaches of  disease,  or  of  concealing  his  thoughts,  now 
believes  in  their  reality,  and  openly  and  strenuously  avows 
them,  except  when  induced  by  powerful  reasons  to  pursue 
a  contrary  course.  The  governing  principle  in  the  mind  is 
gone ;  ideas  and  perceptions  occur  in  the  utmost  confusion 
and  rapidity,  and  are  connected  by  unnatural  and  incon- 
gruous relations.  The  attention  is  constantly  wandering 
from  one  idea  or  object  to  another ;  external  impressions 
have  lost  their  ordinary  power,  being  overlooked  or  disre- 
garded amid  the  turmoil  that  prevails  within.  The  indi- 
vidual is  excited  to  action  by  strange  and  extraordinary 
motives,  or  by  impulses  that  he  finds  himself  unable  to  resist. 
His  passions  are  easily  aroused,  and  almost  instantly  reach 
their  maximum  of  strength  and  activity.  The  higher  affec- 
tions are  dormant,  while  all  his  relations  to  his  fellow  men 
are  viewed  through  a  medium  of  fear,  suspicion,  jealousy, 
and  distrust.  His  friends  and  relatives  especially,  are  objects 
of  his  suspicions,  and  nothing  can  induce  him  to  view  them 
in  any  other  light,  than  as  enemies  to  his  moral  and  physical 
welfare.  Maniacs,  when  they  recover,  sometimes  remember 
all  thfe  scenes  and  occurrences  of  their  disorder.  They  can 
tell  what  they  saw,  heard,  and  felt,  and  explain  the  motives 
that  governed  their  conduct.  In  some  cases,  however,  the 
exercise  of  memory  seems  to  be  more  or  less  suspended 
during  the  active  stage  of  the  disease,  and  the  patient  may 
recover  his  senses,  like  one  awakening  from  a  deep  sleep, 
unconscious  of  the  lapse  of  time,  and  every  thing  that  has 
happened. 

§  119.  The  symptoms  of  physical  derangement  are  also 
striking  and  numerous.  A  febrile  excitement  pervades  the 
system.  The  pulse  is  accelerated,  the  eye  has  a  wild  and 
glassy  look,  the  sensations  have  become  either  more  acute  or 
more  obscure,  besides  being  frequently  erroneous,  and  the 


PATHOLOGY  AND   SYMPTOMS  OF  MANIA.  141 

patient  sometimes  complains  of  pain  in  the  head,  sense  of 
weight,  giddiness,  ringing  in  the  ears.  The  countenance 
greatly  changes,  and  though  varying  differently  in  the  differ- 
ent forms  of  insanity,  yet  in  all  it  generally  bears  the  expres- 
sion of  physical  pain,  or  mental  disquiet.  A  singular  insen- 
sibility to  external  impressions  is  often  witnessed  in  this 
stage  of  mania,  by  means  of  which,  exposure  to  intense  cold, 
heat,  hunger,  and  thirst,  is  borne  to  a  wonderful  degree,  with- 
out producing  uneasiness,  or  even  consciousness  of  the  fact. 
The  muscular  power  is  sometimes  inordinately  developed, 
the  waking  moments  being  a  scene  of  almost  constant  rest- 
lessness and  agitation ;  while  at  others,  there  is  an  equally 
unnatural  sluggishness  and  indisposition  to  move  about. 
Hunger  and  thirst  are  seldom  unaffected,  the  patient  either 
taking  immense  quantities  of  food,  or  scarcely  sufficient  to 
supply  the  wants  of  nature.  The  maniacal  patient  sleeps 
less,  and  his  slumbers  are  disturbed  by  frightful  dreams. 

§  120.  Although  the  course  of  a  maniacal  attack  is  ordi- 
narily such  as  is  represented  above,  yet  sometimes,  especially 
on  the  application  of  a  powerfully  exciting  cause,  it  breaks 
out  suddenly  and  terminates  in  death  or  recovery  within 
ten  or  fifteen  days.  When  cases  of  this  description  are  sub- 
jected to  judicial  inquiry,  it  is  often  I  difficult  to  satisfy  a  jury 
of  the  genuineness  of  the  disease.  The  proofs,  though  suffi- 
cient for  those  who  are  much  conversant  with  insanity,  are 
very  far  from  striking  others  with  equal  force.  Most  cases 
of  transitory  mania  belong  to  that  form  of  the  disease  to  be 
described  hereafter,  under  the  name  of  homicidal  mono- 
mania, and  are  supposed  to  be  unaccompanied  by  delusion, 
or  other  intellectual  disturbance.  There  is  a  smaller  class, 
however,  characterized  by  violence  and  confusion  of  mind, 
the  patient  being  apparently  under  the  dominion  of  some 
exclusive  and  overpowering  idea.  Their  medico-legal  impor- 
tance renders  no  apology  necessary  for  introducing  several  of 
these  cases. 

§  121.  A  syphilitic  patient  having  recovered  from  his  dis- 
order, was  about  to  quit  the  hospital,  when  suddenly,  with- 
out the  least  premonition,  he  began  to  vociferate,  and  destroy 


142  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  furniture  of  his  room.  He  stripped  off  all  his  clothes,  tore 
out  his  hair,  beat  his  head  against  the  walls,  and  tried  to  bite 
and  strike  all  who  approached  him.  He  seemed  to  be  ex- 
cessively frightened,  as  if  pursued  by  somebody  who  sought 
to  take  his  life.  His  pulse  was  hard  and  quick,  his  body 
was  covered  with  a  cold  sweat,  he  frothed  at  the  mouth,  and 
trembled  violently.  In  the  course  of  a  couple  of  hours,  he 
came  to  himself.  He  then  said  he  had  experienced  a  similar 
attack  four  or  five  years  before,  but  could  assign  ho  cause  for 
either  of  them.1 

A  sober  and  industrious  shoemaker  arose  early  one  morn- 
ing, to  go  to  his  work,  when  his  wife  was  struck  by  his  inco- 
herent discourse  and  wild  looks.  He  seized  a  knife  and 
rushed  upon  her,  when  the  neighbors  seized  him  and  pre- 
vented any  damage.  His  face  was  red,  pulse  frequent  and 
rather  full,  body  covered  with  sweat,  his  eyes  flashed,  and 
his  look  was  wild.  About  noon,  he  became  calm,  and  slept. 
In  the  evening,  he  had  recovered  his  faculties,  but  had  no 
idea  of  what  had  happened  to  him. 

A  young  man  laid  down  one  evening  in  good  health. 
Some  persons  entering  the  room,  he  threw  at  them  whatever 
he  could  lay  his  hands  upon,  until  he  fell  back  upon  his  bed 
exhausted  with  fatigue.  \  He  sang,  cursed,  and  tried  to  get 
at  his  sword.  He  knew  nobody.  His  face  was  not  red,  nor 
his  head  hot ;  but  his  eyes  were  wild,  and  his  pulse  rather 
full.  The  next  day  he  had  not  the  least  recollection  of  what 
had  occurred. 

A  tailor  of  sober  and  industrious  habits,  after  returning  one 
morning  from  a  walk,  sat  down,  refused  to  eat,  then  suddenly 
began  to  upset  every  thing  in  the  room,  and  finally  rushed 
upon  his  wife,  when  the  neighbors  came  in.  The  next  day 
he  had  no  recollection  of  the  occurrence.2 

A  young  Irish  laborer,  on  his  way  from  Stonington  to  Prov- 
idence, R.  L,  went  into  a  farmer's  house  towards  nightfall, 
got  some  bread  and  milk,  and  went  to  bed.  In  the  course  of 


1  Jahn,  in  Berlin  Med.  Gazette,  No.  23,  1834. 

2  These  cases  are  from  Marc.  II.  511. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OP  MANIA.  143 

an  hour  or  two,  he  came  down,  half-dressed,  into  the  kitchen 
where  the  family  still  were,  talking  wildly,  and  as  if  appre- 
hending some  harm.  On  being  prevented  from  going  out, 
he  rushed  through  the  window,  though  closed,  demolishing  it 
entirely,  ran  down  to  a  neighboring  factory  village,  quite 
naked,  and  was  there  secured.  Towards  morning  he  began 
to  come  to  his  senses,  and  in  the  course  of  the  day,  had  com- 
pletely recovered,  with  a  partial  recollection  of  what  had  hap- 
pened. He  had  never  been  so  affected  before. 

§  122.  In  the  two  following  cases,  yet  fresh  in  the  public 
mind,  we  have  examples  of  transitory  mental  disturbance, 
apparently  of  a  maniacal  character.  The*  evidence  is  not  so 
satisfactory  as  would  have  been  the  results  of  the  observation 
of  persons  specially  acquainted  with  insanity.  It  was  suf- 
ficient, however,  to  deter  the  jury  from  a  conviction,  and  in 
the  absence  of  other  evidence,  we  are  obliged  to  share  the 
conclusions  of  the  jury. 

In  March,  1843,  Mercer  was  tried  by  the  court  of  oyer 
and  terminer  of  New  Jersey,  for  the  murder  of  Heberton, 
on  the  10th  of  February  previous.  He  was  defended  by  his 
counsel  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  and  acquitted,  though  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  acquittal  was  on  this  ground.  We  shall 
only  notice  such  facts,  which  appeared  in  evidence,  as  have 
any  bearing  on  Mercer's  mental  condition.  On  the  8th  of 
February  he  was  informed  of  the  seduction  of  his  sister,  a 
young,  simple-minded  girl,  by  Heberton,  a  practised  libertine. 
The  communication  made  a  powerful  impression  upon  his 
feelings,  attended  with  manifestations  of  the  highest  mental 
excitement.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  he  was 
strongly  agitated  —  crying  and  cursing  —  sitting  still  and 
silent  for  a  minute  or  two,  and  then  violently  striding  through 
the  room  —  insisting  on  calling  his  father  to  come  and  shoot 
his  sister,  who  had  ruined  and  disgraced  them  all  —  declaring 
that  he  would  go  and  kill  her  himself,  and  abusing  his 
friends  for  keeping  him  in  the  room.  He  did  not  seem  to 
understand  or  appreciate  any  thing  that  was  said  to  him,  nor 
know  what  he  himself  said  or  did.  On  being  told  that  the  law 
could  not  hold  Heberton,  he  became  quite  furious  and  wild. 


144  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

His  face  had  a  mottled  appearance,  and  his  eyes  were  wild 
and  staring.     He  complained  that  his  head  was  burning,  and 
bound  around   it  a  wet   handkerchief.     This   conduct  con- 
tinued in   the  evening.     Of  his  condition  during  the  next 
day  we  hear  nothing  from  the  witnesses,  until  late  in  the 
evening,  when  he  accosted  the  captain  of  the  watch,  in  an 
oyster-cellar,  and  without  any  previous  acquaintance  with 
him,  insisted  on  telling  him  the  whole  story  of  his  sister's 
disgrace.     He  said  his  sister  was  crazy,  his  father  was  crazy, 
his  mother  was  crazy,  and  they  were  all  ruined.     He  imag- 
ined that  some  trunks  he  saw  in  the  street  were  Heberton's, 
and  wished  to  watch  them,  lest  he  might  elude  him.     His 
manner  was  wild,  and  his  countenance  haggard.     He  called 
for  food  and  drink,  but  scarcely  tasted  of  either.     Another 
witness,  who  saw  him  the  same  evening,  described  his  man- 
ner as  being  very  wild  and  agitated.     He  said  somebody  was 
running  away  with  his  sister.     On  the  10th  he  passed  by  an 
acquaintance  without  seeming  to  notice  him  ;  on  meeting 
him  a   second  time   and   being   addressed,  he  looked  with 
a  vacant   stare,   turned   and  walked   away   in   a  wild  and 
hurried  manner.     Another  witness  saw  him  walking  up  and 
down  the  street,  his  face  red  on  one  side  and  white  on  the 
other,  looking  wild   and   agitated.     Witness  spoke  to  him 
about  some  business  Mercer  and  his  son  had  together,  hoping 
thereby  to   call  his  attention,  but  his  answers  were  quite 
strange  and  irrelevant.     He  spoke  of  men  with  whom  he  had 
no  acquaintance.     While  walking  in  the  streets  he  frequently 
changed  his  course,  and  looked  around  anxiously,  as  if  ex- 
pecting to  see  some  one.     That  evening  he  shot  Heberton, 
while  sitting  in  his  carriage  in  the  ferry-boat.     He  immedi- 
ately confessed  the  act,  and  made  no  attempt  to  escape. 
Soon  after  he  asked  several  different  persons  for  a  fiddle, 
that  he  might  have  a  dance.     During  the  coroner's  inquest 
the  same  night,  he  sat  resting  his  head  on  his  arms  over  the 
back  of  a  chair,  recognizing  no  one.     In  the  night,  he  said 
his  sister  was  in  the  insane  asylum.     Shortly  after  his  com- 
mittal he  was  visited  by  a  physician  who  had  been  previ- 
ously acquainted  with  him.     By  him,  Mercer  was  considered 


PATHOLOGY  AND   SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  145 

insane  on  the  strength  of  the  following  facts.  His  face  was 
flushed,  his  eye  wild  and  wandering,  his  manner  restless,  his 
conversation  was  incoherent  and  rambling,  and  he  miscalled 
persons  and  things,  (this  fact  was  testified  to  by  several 
other  witnesses).  For  two  or  three  days  he  complained  of 
a  pain  in  his  head,  and  was  much  constipated.  Essentially 
the  same  was  the  testimony  of  two  other  witnesses  (not 
medical),  one  of  whom  thought  he  was  not  quite  himself,  till 
the  18th.1 

§  123.  The  nature  of  the  exciting  cause  in  this  case,  ren- 
ders it  not  very  strange  that  Mercer  should  have  become  in- 
sane, and  the  circumstances  above  related,  touching  his  appear- 
ance, furnish  no  light  proof  that  such  was  actually  the  fact.  It 
certainly  is  not  very  far  from  the  ordinary  line  of  occurrences, 
that  a  high-spirited,  nervous  young  man,  suddenly  hearing 
of  the  ruin  of  a  beloved  sister,  should  be  completely  over- 
whelmed and  driven  from  his  propriety,  —  that  reason  should 
depart,  and  the  passions  rage  with  intense  excitement.  Why 
the  disease  should  have  run  its  course  so  rapidly,  we  know 
not.  It  is  a  common  opinion,  however,  that  this  character  of 
short  duration  is  oftener  witnessed  in  cases  which,  like  this, 
have  been  attended  by  some  dreadful  deed  of  violence. 
Unquestionably,  Mercer  was  in  a  towering  passion,  and  to  a 
certain  degree,  at  least,  he  acted  as  if  under  its  influence. 
But  a  storm  of  passion  seldom,  if  ever,  continues  three  or  four 
days  together.  After  the  first  outbreak,  which  spends  its  fury 
in  a  few  hours,  the  mind  settles  down  into  a  state  of  fixed, 
decided  determination,  forming  its  plans,  and  steadily  and 
consistently  pursuing  them.  How  different  from  this  was 
Mercer's  case !  At  no  time,  between  hearing  of  his  sister's 
infamy  and  revenging  her  wrongs,  did  he  act  with  calmness, 
deliberation,  and  coherence.  That  he  was  under  a  high  degree 
of  mental  excitement,  is  undeniable ;  that  he  had  also  lost  his 
reason,  or,  in  scientific  language,  was  laboring  under  a  patho- 
logical irritation  of  the  brain,  is  shown  by  some  facts  that 
cannot  well  be  explained  upon  any  other  ground.  To  talk 

1  The  Dollar  Newspaper. 
13 


146  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

wildly  and  incoherently,  to  imagine  that  a  pile  of  trunks  he 
happened  to  see  in  the  streets  were  Herberton's ;  that  his 
family  were  all  crazy,  and  his  sister  in  a  hospital ;  to  be  con- 
stantly miscalling  persons  and  things ;  to  talk  familiarly  of 
men  whom  he  did  not  know ;  to  return  irrelevant  answers  to 
questions  on  business,  and,  finally,  after  accomplishing  the 
terrible  act  of  revenge,  to  call  for  a  fiddle  that  he  might  have 
a  dance,  —  these  things  are  strongly  indicative  of  insanity. 
In  a  large  portion  of  cases  recently  attacked,  which  come  in- 
to hospitals  for  the  insane,  the  proofs  of  insanity  are  not  more 
strong  and  abundant  than  they  were  in  Mercer's  case.  Very 
often  the  disease  is  evinced,  not  so  much  by  any  particular 
word  or  act,  as  by  incoherent  and  disjointed  discourse,  and 
by  a  course  of  conduct  and  demeanor  at  variance  with  the 
natural  character  of  the  individual.  In  this  case,  too,  if  the 
testimony  may  be  relied  upon,  there  were  delusions,  and  these, 
if  genuine,  can  only  spring  from  insanity. 

.§  124.  Very  similar  to  the  above,  in  many  of  its  features, 
was  the  case  of  Wood,  who  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
daughter,  the  30th  of  September.  1839,  in  Philadelphia.  It 
appears  from  the  testimony,  that  Wood,  who  was  a  confec- 
tioner, and  considered  an  upright,  industrious  man,  had  for 
the  last  fifteen  years  suffered  much  from  diseases  of  a  nervous 
character,  such  as  neuralgia,  dyspepsia,  and  constipation,  and 
exhibited  much  mental  irritability.  About  a  year  before  this 
event,  while  making  some  alterations  in  his  house,  he  inter- 
fered with  his  workmen  in  a  very  unreasonable  manner,  fre- 
quently rubbing  his  hands  together,  and  exclaiming  he  was 
ruined.  Just  before  the  event,  he  went  to  New  York,  where 
he  was  disposed  to  make  some  strange  business  arrangements; 
but  suddenly  left  the  city,  neglecting  to  pay  his  board  and  to 
meet  an  engagement  with  a  person  whom  he  had  engaged  to 
see.  On  the  27th  of  September,  he  heard  of  the  marriage  of 
his  daughter  with  a  man  whom  he  regarded  as  a  great  villain, 
and  was  much  agitated  by  the  communication.  He  walked 
the  room  in  great  distress,  crying  and  moaning,  and  exclaim- 
ing that  he  was  a  lost,  ruined  man.  He  then  shut  up  his  shop 
and  went  running  through  the  streets.  When  he  returned 


PATHOLOGY   AND   SYMPTOMS   OP   MANIA.  147 

home,  he  refused  for  half  an  hour  to  sit  down,  and  when  he 
did,  he  kept  moving  his  head  backwards  and  forwards.  So 
strangely  did  he  appear,  that  his  neighbors  requested  his  wife 
to  remove  his  razors,  and  offered  to  watch  him  through  the 
night.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  he  ordered  his  wife  to  go 
to  the  front  window  and  call  his  daughter  by  name,  for  he 
heard  her  in  the  street  crying  to  get  in.  On  the  23th,  he  was 
very  importunate  to  see  his  daughter,  who  had  not  been  at 
home  since  her  marriage.  When  she  appeared,  he  raised  his 
hands,  uttered  a  wild  scream,  and  fell  down  in  a  sort  of  fit, 
gnashing  his  teeth,  and  appearing  to  be  in  a  great  agony. 
He  manifested  no  anger  towards  her,  but  treated  her  with 
his  usual  affection,  and,  on  parting,  they  kissed  each  other, 
fh  the  afternoon  he  went  into  the  streets,  looking  wild  and 
agitated,  as  the  day  before.  A  colored  man  whom  he  knew, 
he  requested  to  come  to  his  house  the  next  day,  though  it  was 
Sunday,  as  he  was  to  entertain  a  large  party.  In  the  night 
he  arose,  went  to  his  daughter's  room,  laid  his  head  down  by 
the  side  of  hers,  crying  violently  and  manifesting  the  most 
intense  fondness  for  her.  On  the  29th,  he  was  met  in  the 
street,  walking  rapidly  along,  by  his  family  physician,  who, 
noticing  his  strange  conduct,  beckoned  him  to  come  to  him, 
but  he  merely  put  up  his  hand,  made  a  rapid  motion  with  it, 
turned  round  and  went  in  the  opposite  direction.  On  the 
morning  of  the  30th  he  appeared  quite  weak,  and  drank  two 
or  three  glasses  of  brandy.  While  his  wife  and  a  man-ser- 
vant were  talking  in  the  kitchen  about  confining  him,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  his  daughter's  chamber  and  shot  her  dead  with  a 
pistol.  He  made  no  attempt  to  escape,  and  confessed  that 
he  was  the  murderer,  sauntering  about  the  room  apparently 
quite  unconcerned.  Shortly  he  laid  down  upon  a  bed  and 
moaned  heavily.  When  told  that  his  daughter  was  dead,  he 
expressed  himself  as  satisfied ;  said  he  should  not  long  sur- 
vive ;  and  requested  to  be  buried  in  the  same  grave.  He  then 
described  the  manner  in  which  he  had  accomplished  the 
bloody  act.  It  appeared  also,  that  he  was  a  kind,  amiable 
man,  very  fond  of  his  children,  not  intemperate,  nor  accus- 
tomed to  drink  spirituous  liquors  at  all,  and  that  on  the  27th, 


148  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

28th,  29th,  he  took  no  food,  except  a  very  little  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  29th.  On  his  mental  condition  subsequently,  the 
testimony  throws  no  light.  He  was  acquitted  on  the  ground 
of  insanity.1 

§  125.  This  case  differs  from  Mercer's  in  the  important 
fact  that,  for  some  time  previous,  Wood  had  been  laboring 
under  a  certain  degree  of  mental  impairment,  and  was  appar- 
ently on  the  verge  of  insanity.  In  this  state  he  hears  of  the 
marriage  of  his  daughter,  which,  in  his  mind,  was  equivalent 
to  her  ruin  and  the  dishonour  of  himself  and  family.  Over- 
powered by  the  shock,  his  nervous  system  becomes  violently 
agitated,  and  reason  soon  ceases  to  control  his  movements. 
In  this  state  of  bewilderment  and  confusion,  he  wanders 
about,  without  aim  or  object,  till  at  last,  when  the  powers  of 
nature  are  about  to  yield  from  pure  exhaustion,  impelled  by 
no  passion,  and  actuated  by  no  rational  motive,  he  takes  the 
life  of  his  beloved  child.  That  he  did  not  act  from  passion, 
is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he  had  evinced  no  anger  towards 
her,  but,  on  the  contrary,  had  shown  the  strongest  affection. 
The  only  passion  which  could  have  actuated  him  at  that 
moment  was  revenge,  and  in  that  case,  the  object  of  his  fury 
would  have  been  the  daughter's  husband.  It  may  be  sup- 
posed, perhaps,  that  the  bloody  deed  was  perpetrated  under 
the  influence  of  the  liquor  he  drank ;  or,  at  any  rate,  that  it 
would  not  otherwise  have  been  done.  This,  no  doubt,  is 
possible,  but  the  true  question  at  issue  is,  whether  or  not  he 
was  insane  for  two  or  three  days  previous  to  the  criminal  act. 
If  he  were,  then  the  intoxication  was  the  effect  of  insanity, 
and  he  was  no  more  accountable  for  the  former  than  for  the 
latter.  A  fondness  of  strong  drinks  is  a  not  uncommon  ac- 
companiment of  mania,  and  a  person  may  drink  while  insane, 
who  never  drank  before.  The  conditions  of  this  case  were 
all  favorable  to  the  production  of  insanity,  —  a  highly  irritable, 
nervous  temperament,  a  morbid  apprehension  of  coming  ills, 
and  a  powerfully  exciting  cause  of  the  disease.  Where  is 
the  wonder,  then,  that  Wood  should  have  become  insane, 

1  Spirit  of  the  Times,  Philadelphia. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  149 

and  while  so,  that  he  should  have  committed  any  imagina- 
ble folly  or  crime  ? 

§  126.  The  mental  disorders  are,  of  course,  as  numerous 
and  various  as  the  mental  constitutions  of  the  insane  them- 
selves ;  and  to  consider  any  particular  association  of  them 
as  characteristic  of  the  state  of  mind  called  mania,  would 
be  only  to  blend  things  together  that  have  no  uniform  nor 
necessary  relations  to  one  another ;  and  would  convey  no 
more  really  valuable  information,  than  it  would  to  marshal 
forth  every  symptom  that  has  at  any  time  been  observed  in 
the  countless  disorders  of  digestion,  as  the  symptoms  of 
diseased  stomach.  The  only  use  which  the  physician 
makes  of  the  latter  is  to  refer  them  as  they  occur,  to  some 
particular  derangement  of  that  organ,  and  thus  establish  the 
ground  for  an  appropriate  and  efficient  treatment.  There 
is  no  reason,  why  the  same  process  should  not  be  pursued  in 
mania ;  and  it  is  because  a  different  one  has  been  followed, 
that  the  common  notions  of  this  disease  are  so  loose  and 
incorrect,  as  not  only  to  be  of  little  service  in  judicial  discus- 
sions, but  absolutely  in  the  way  of  arriving  at  just  and  phi- 
losophical conclusions.  To  furnish  any  light  on  the  subject, 
it  would  be  our  duty  to  analyze  the  various  phenomena  of 
mania,  associate  them  by  some  natural  relations,  and  refer 
them,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  will  permit,  to  particular  facul- 
ties. It  is  proposed,  therefore,  following  this  idea  as  closely 
as  possible,  to  consider  mania  as  affecting  either  the  intellec- 
tual, or  the  affective  faculties ;  meaning  by  the  former,  those 
which  make  us  acquainted  with  the  existence  and  qualities 
of  external  objects  and  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and 
conduct  us  to  the  knowledge  of  general  truths ;  and  by  the 
latter,  those'  sentiments,  propensities,  and  passions  necessary 
to  man  as  a  social  and  accountable  being.  It  is  not  intended 
to  convey  the  idea  that  mania  is  invariably  confined  to  one 
or  the  other  of  these  two  divisions  of  our  faculties ;  for  though 
they  may  sometimes  be  separately  affected,  the  one  present- 
ing a  chaos  of  tumult  and  disorder,  while  the  other  appa- 
rently retains  its  wonted  soundness  and  vigor,  yet  more 
frequently,  they  are  both  involved  in  the  general  derange- 

13* 


150  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ment.  But  unless  we  study  these  disorders  separately,  and 
recognize  their  independent  existence,  —  and  this  effect  it  is 
the  tendency  of  the  above  classification  to  produce,  —  we 
never  shall  be  able  to  refer  them  to  their  true  source,  nor  dis- 
cover their  respective  influence  over  the  mental  manifes- 
tations. 


CHAPTER    VI. 


INTELLECTUAL  MANIA. 

I 

§  127.  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA  is  characterized  by  certain 
hallucinations  or  delusions,1  in  which  the  patient  is  impressed 
with  the  reality  of  facts  or  events  that  have  never  occurred, 
and  acts  more  or  less  in  accordance  with  such  belief;  or 
having  adopted  some  notion  not  altogether  unfounded, 
carries  it  to  an  extravagant  and  absurd  extent.  It  may  be 
general,  involving  all  or  the  most  of  the  operations  of  the 
understanding ;  or  partial,  being  confined  to  a  particular  idea, 
or  train  of  ideas. 


SECTION  I. 

General  Intellectual  Mania. 

§  128.  The  general  description  of  mania  is  equally  appli- 
cable to  the  acute  state  of  this,  and  sometimes  of  other  forms 
of  the  disease.  It  is  not  generally  till  after  the  excitement 
has  somewhat  subsided,  that  the  distinctive  features  of  each 
become  very  manifest.  In  this  stage  of  general  intellectual 


1  These  terms,  though  they  have  long  held  a  place  in  medical  language, 
have  always  been  used  with  remarkable  diversity  and  vagueness  of  meaning. 
Without  troubling  the  reader  with  an  array  of  nosological  definitions,  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  say,  that  in  this  treatise,  the  former  is  used  as  a  general  desig- 
nation of  all  those  notions  which  are  indicative  of  derangement  of  the  reflec- 
tive, as  the  latter  is  of  the  perceptive  powers. 


152  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mania,  many  glimpses  of  natural  soundness  may  be  discov- 
ered amid  the  intellectual  disorder.1  Questions  on  indifferent 
subjects  may  be  appropriately  answered ;  many  of  the  pa- 
tient's relations  to  surrounding  circumstances  may  still  be 
perceived ;  and  no  little  acuteness  and  ingenuity  are  often 
manifested  in  accommodating  the  real  and  true  to  the  delu- 
sions under  which  he  labors.  The  difficulty  is  to  fix  the 
attention  on  a  particular  point,  the  mind  constantly  running 
from  one  idea  to  another,  or  absorbed  in  the  thoughts  which 
happen,  for  the  moment,  to  predominate  over  every  other. 

§  129.  In  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  the  mental 
constitution,  it  is  not  strange  to  find  considerable  diversity 
of  opinion  respecting  the  nature  or  cause  of  hallucinations  of 
the  senses ;  yet,  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view,  it  is  impor- 
tant that  they  should  be  correctly  understood.  Hoffbauer2 
says  that  they  consist  in  a  vicious  relation  between  the  im- 
agination and  the  senses,  in  consequence  of  which  the  patient 
mistakes  the  creations  of  the  one  for  objects  really  perceived 
by  the  others.  Esquirol,  not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  ex- 
planation, divides  them  into  two  classes,  termed  by  him, 
illusive  sensations,  and  hallucinations.8  The  first  arise  in 
the  senses,  as  when  a  maniac  mistakes  a  window  for  a  door, 
passes  through  it  and  is  precipitated  to  the  ground ;  or  takes 
the  clouds  which  he  sees  in  the  sky  for  contending  armies ; 
or  believes  his  legs  are  made  of  glass ;  or  his  head  turned 
round.  In  all  these  instances,  the  error  refers  to  the  real 
impression  which  is  ill-perceived ;  there  is  an  error  of  sensa- 
tion, a  vicious  relation  between  the  sense  which  actually 
perceives  and  the  intellect  which  judges  falsely  of  the  exter- 
nal object.  In  the  second,  on  the  contrary,  the  senses  have 
no  share ;  the  imagination  alone  is  exalted ;  the  brain  is 
exclusively  the  seat  of  the  disturbance ;  the  patient  mistak- 
ing the  creations  of  his  imagination  for  objects  actually 
present  to  his  senses.  He  sees  images  and  apparitions  amid 
the  thickest  darkness ;  hears  sounds  and  voices  in  the  most 


1  Pinel,  Traite"  sur  1'  alienation  mentale,  142,  §  148. 

2  Op.  cit  sup.  §  84.  8  Idem,  §  82,  note. 


GENERAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  153 

perfect  silence ;  and  smells  odors  in  the  absence  of  all  odor- 
ous bodies.  This  distinction  does  not  seem  to  be  well  sup- 
ported. That  the  functions  of  the  senses  are  sometimes 
greatly  perverted,  there  can  be  no  question ;  but  it  needs 
more  evidence  than  we  yet  have,  to  prove  that  such  per- 
versions bear  much  if  any  part  in  producing  these  illusions  ; 
more  especially  as  Esquirol  admits,  that,  in  what  he  terms 
hallucinations,  an  exalted  imagination  is  sufficient  of  itself 
to  produce  a  very  similar  effect.  In  old  age,  where,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  decay  of  the  senses,  wrong  impressions  are 
being  constantly  received,  they  nevertheless  give  rise  to 
none  of  these  delusions.  When  the  hero  of  Cerventes  did 
battle  with  the  sheep  and  the  windmills,  it  will  not  be  con- 
tended that  he  was  laboring  under  any  special  optical  in- 
firmity which  conveyed  false  impressions  of  outward  objects, 
because  on  most  occasions,  the  action  of  his  senses  was  un- 
dquivocally  sound.  Ready  as  he  was  to  mistake  a  company 
of  peaceable  shepherds  for  the  creations  of  his  disordered 
intellect,  he  never  imagined  Sancho  to  be  any  other  than  his 
faithful  squire,  for  the  reason  that  his  reflective  faculties 
were  not  so  far  subverted  as  to  be  incapable  of  any  healthy 
action.  Besides,  if  erroneous  sensation  has  any  thing  to  do 
with  producing  these  illusions,  we  must  go  the  length  of 
asserting,  that  at  such  times  all  the  senses  are  disordered,  or 
deny  that  the  errors  of  one  may  be  corrected  by  the  others. 
It  is  not  so  strange  that  vision  should  sometimes  be  so 
affected  as  to  deceive  a  person  with  the  idea  that  his  legs  are 
made  of  glass  or  butter,  but  it  certainly  is  very  strange,  that 
on  such  occasions,  the  other  senses  should  all  return  equally 
false  impressions ;  the  touch  being  unable  to  distinguish  the 
feel  of  flesh  and  blood,  and  the  hearing  the  sound  produced 
by  striking  them,  while  they  retain  this  power  in  regard  to 
every  other  part  of  the  body.  These  illusions  appear  to 
result  from  a  morbid  excitement  of  the  perceptive  faculties, 
whereby  they  are  stimulated  by  outward  impressions  to  in- 
voluntary and  irresistible  activity,  while  a  coexistent  impair- 
ment of  the  reflective  faculties  prevents  them  from  being 
considered  as  illusions  and  not  actual  realities.  The  physi- 


154  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

cian  will  not  unfrequently  hear  a  patient  complaining  of 
seeing  colors  of  the  utmost  beauty  and  variety  of  combina- 
tion passing  and  repassing  before  his  eyes,  or  forms  of  ob- 
jects of  every  possible  description,  whether  his  eyes  be  open 
or  shut,  the  room  dark  or  light.  His  understanding  being 
sound,  he  is  not  deceived,  but  believes  them  to  be  what  they 
actually  are,  merely  illusions  ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  were 
unsound,  then  these  illusions  would  be  taken  for  realities, 
and  he  would  conduct  accordingly.  Ben  Jonson  would  keep 
awake  an  entire  night,  gazing  at  armies  of  Turks  and  Tar- 
tars, Carthaginians  and  Romans  contending  around  his 
great  toe;  in  which  amusement  there  is  no  evidence  of 
mania,  but  merely  of  a  morbid  activity  of  the  internal  per- 
ceptive organs.  The  apparitions  of  Nicolai  of  Berlin,  and 
others  of  a  similar  kind,  arose,  no  doubt,  from  the  same 
cause.  Indeed  unnatural  excitement  of  these  organs  in  in- 
sanity is  sometimes  so  obvious  and  well-marked,  as  to  be 
immediately  recognized  and  properly  understood.  Rush 
gives  the  case  of  a  young  woman  who  delighted  her  visitors 
with  her  efforts  in  singing  and  poetry,  though  previously  she 
had  never  manifested  any  talent  for  either ;  and  the  author 
once  attended  an  insane  patient  of  feeble  intellect  and  defect- 
ive education,  who  occupied  much  of  her  time  in  making 
verses,  though  she  had  not  shown  the  slightest  trace  of  such 
a  power  before  the  invasion  of  her  disease.  The  faculty  of 
construction,  too,  is  occasionally  heightened  to  a  wonderful 
degree.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac  who  believed  he  had  dis- 
covered the  perpetual  motion ;  and  in  the  course  of  his  re- 
searches he  constructed  some  very  ingenious  machines. 
The  common  and  essential  element,  then,  in  the  production 
of  hallucinations  and  illusive  sensations,  is  an  impairment  of 
the  reflective  faculties  accompanied  by  morbid  activity  of 
the  perceptive  faculties.  The  only  real  difference  between 
them  is,  that  in  the  latter,  the  morbid  activity  of  the  percep- 
tive faculties  requires  to  be  excited  by  outward  impressions, 
while  in  the  former,  this  effect  is  produced  by  the  remem- 
brance of  past  impressions,  —  a  distinction  that  can  be  of 
but  little  if  any  importance,  in  judicial  investigations.  We 


GENERAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  155 

have  been  thus  particular  in  showing  the  true  origin  of  hal- 
lucinations, that  any  mistake  arising  from  wrong  views  of 
their  nature  might  be  avoided,  —  an  event  not  altogether 
beyond  the  limits  of  possibility,  for  one  instance  has  come 
to  our  own  knowledge,  where  it  was  attempted,  in  a  court  of 
justice  in  a  neighboring  State,  to  measure  the  extent  of  the 
insanity  by  the  comparative  number  of  the  senses  supposed 
to  be  deranged  in  the  hallucination. 

§  130.  Hallucinations  of  the  senses  occur  in  a  large  pro- 
portion of  maniacs.  In  the  early  stage  of  acute  mania  they 
are  generally  numerous  and  changing,  and  somewhat  masked 
by  the  more  conspicuous  symptoms.  In  chronic  mania  they 
are  more  simple,  uniform,  and  obvious.  Occasionally,  how- 
ever, this  rule  is  reversed,  the  hallucinations  being  very  dis- 
tinct and  vivid  from  the  beginning  of  the  disease.  And  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  when  it  is  the  predominant 
feature  of  the  mental  disorder,  the  patient  is  disposed  to 
conceal  it  from  others  as  long  as  he  retains  sufficient  control 
over  his  thoughts.  A  little  strangeness  of  demeanor  may, 
for  months,  be  the  only  perceptible  deviation  from  the  natu- 
ral condition,  the  reason,  in  the  mean  while,  struggling  with 
the  suggestions  of  the  hallucinated  sense,  till  it  finally 
yields,  and  the  patient,  in  obedience  to  some  voice  or  vision, 
commits  a  sudden  and  fearful  act  of  violence.  In  the  still- 
ness of  night  they  are  more  common  and  often  more  vivid 
than  during  the  day.  For  the  most  part  their  occurrence  is 
irrespective  of  times  and  seasons,  and  whether  in  solitude, 
in  the  church,  in  the  gay  assembly,  in  the  midst  of  animated 
conversation,  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  or  of  business,  the 
attention  may  be  arrested  at  once,  and  the  whole  soul  en- 
grossed by  the  powerful  appeal  to  the  senses.  When  the 
patient  describes  his  hallucinations,  there  is  a  remarkable  air 
of  sincerity  and  frankness  in  his  manner,  which  no  art  of 
simulation  can  successfully  imitate. 

§  131.  To  determine  exactly  what  mental  impairment  it 
is  which  is  essential  to  insanity,  metaphysicians  and  physi- 
ologists have  long  and  anxiously  labored  with  hardly  the 
shadow  of  success.  The  various  definitions  and  explana- 


156  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY.       . 

tions  to  which  their  inquiries  have  given  rise,  display  some 
ingenuity,  but  would  scarcely  be  worth  considering  in  this 
place,  were  they  not  capable  of  an  injurious  application  in 
judicial  investigations.  It  has  been  said  that  insanity  con- 
sists essentially  in  diseased  perception,  —  that  this  is  the 
common  attribute  of  its  various  kinds  and  degrees.  We 
have  seen  above,  however,  that  in  a  state  of  perfect  mental 
soundness,  the  perceptions  may  be  deeply  disordered,  inso- 
much as  to  give  rise  to  strange  and  most  extraordinary  im- 
pressions, while  many  a  madman  may  be  found  who  evinces 
no  one  single  error  of  perception.  The  doctrine  that  in- 
sanity consists  in  false  judgments,  conveys  no  more  satisfac- 
tory notion  of  its  essential  characters,  for  though  there  most 
certainly  is  false  judgment  in  every  case  of  insanity,  it  is  far 
from  being  confined  to  this  condition  of  the  mind.  Every 
one  is  occasionally  guilty  of  some  gross  error  of  judgment  on 
which  he  may  reason  accurately  and  arrive  at  specious  con- 
clusions, without  being  considered  at  the  time  madder  than 
his  neighbors.  Locke,  as  if  strongly  impressed  with  the  curi- 
ous fact  of  the  coexistence  of  absurd  fancies  with  the  power 
of  reasoning  smartly  and  pertinently  to  a  certain  extent, 
which  is  occasionally  observed  in  the  insane,  remarked  that 
they  did  not  seem  to  have  lost  the  faculty  of  reasoning,  "  but 
having  joined  together  some  ideas  very  wrongly,  they  mis- 
take them  for  truths,  and  they  err  as  men  do  that  argue  right 
from  wrong  principles."  *  If  Locke  had  possessed  any  prac- 
tical acquaintance  with  insanity,  if  he  had  even  spent  an 
hour  in  a  well-managed  hospital  for  the  insane,  he  never 
would  have  adopted  this  opinion,  for  nothing  can  be  farther 
from  the  truth,  than  the  idea  that  generally  madmen  reason 
correctly  from  wrong  premises.  The  lady  who  imagined 
that  a  tooth  which  a  dentist  had  removed,  had  slipped  from 
his  fingers  and,  stuck  in  her  throat,  and  insisted  that  she 
could  not  swallow  a  morsel,  while  she  ate  and  drank  heartily, 
was  as  wrong  in  her  conclusion  as  she  was  in  her  premises ; 
and  the  man  who,  like  Bellingham,  imagines  that  the  gov- 

1  On  the  Human  Understanding,  Book  II.  ch.  xi.  §  13. 


GENERAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  157 

ernment  has  been  culpably  negligent  of  his  private  interests, 
and  thence  proceeds  to  take  the  life  of  a  person  whom  he 
believes  to  be  perfectly  innocent,  in  order  that  he  may  have  an 
opportunity  of  bringing  his  affairs  before  the  country,  errs  in 
every  stage  of  his  reasoning.  Indeed,  it  is  matter  of  com- 
mon observation,  that  maniacs  display  their  insanity,  not 
more  in  the  delusions  which  they  entertain,  than  in  the  course 
they  pursue  in  order  to  accomplish  their  objects.  The  last 
and  most  ably-supported  speculation  on  this  subject  is  that 
of  Dr.  Conolly,  who  makes  insanity  to  consist  in  "  the  im- 
pairment of  any  one  or  more  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind, 
accompanied  with,  or  inducing  a  defect  in  the  comparing 
faculty." l  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  power  of  compari- 
son is  often,  perhaps  generally,  affected  in  insanity ;  but  it 
may  be  questioned  whether  this  author  has  not  referred  many 
phenomena  to  this  faculty  of  the  mind,  which  more  properly 
belong  to  some  other.  And  even  when  the  mental  disturb- 
ance does  unquestionably  flow  from  defect  in  the  comparing 
power,  it  would  seem  as  if  this  defect  were  but  the  conse- 
quence of  one  affecting  more  deeply  the  secret  springs  of 
thought.  It  is  said  that  the  celebrated  Pascal  sometimes 
believed  that  he  was  near  the  brink  of  a  fearful  precipice,  and 
that  his  attendants,  to  allay  his  apprehension  of  falling  down 
it,  were  accustomed  to  place  a  chair  near  him,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  supposed  precipice.  "  He  then  compared  what 
was  done  with  what  appeared  to  him,"  says  Dr.  Conolly, 
"  and  drew  the  just  conclusion,  that  a  chair  could  not  stand 
upon  air,  beyond  the  brink  of  a  precipice,  and  that  he  was 
not  therefore  in  real  danger."  "  Whenever  the  comparison 
could  be  made,"  he  adds,  "  the  delusion  yet  remaining,  he 
was  not  sane  on  the  subject  of  the  precipice."2  Now  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  in  both  instances,  Pascal  saw  the  chair, 
and  was  sensible  that  it  was  in  the  direction  of  the  precipice, 
and  that  the  real  difference  between  them  was,  that  in  the 


1  Indications  of  Insanity,  300.  2  Idem,  316. 

14 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

former  he  could,  in  the  latter  he  could  not,  draw  the  just  con- 
clusion that  a  chair  could  not  stand  upon  air.  It  is  evident 
that,  in  this  case  at  least,  and  there  is  much  reason  to  believe 
the  fact  is  a  general  one  —  the  faculty  of  the  mind  primitive- 
ly affected  was  that  which  recognizes  the  relations  of  cause 
and  effect.  We  might  multiply  examples  of  this  fondness 
for  definitions,  but  enough  has  been  said  on  this  point,  to  con- 
vince the  student  of  legal  medicine  how  barren  of  all 
practical  benefit  such  speculations  are,  and  to  place  him  on 
his  guard  against  their  admission  in  judicial  investigations, 
as  tests,  or  criteria  of  insanity. 

§  132.  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that,  in  this  form  of 
mania,  the  derangement  is  confined  to  the  intellectual  fac- 
ulties, the  moral  continuing  to  be  exercised  with  their  ordi- 
nary soundness.  On  the  contrary,  the  moral  faculties  sel- 
dom escape  its  influence ;  and  one  of  the  earliest  symptoms  of 
the  disease  is  an  unaccountable  change  in  the  patient's  social 
and  domestic  feelings.  He  becomes  indifferent  to  those 
whom  he  loved  the  most ;  the  mother  thinks  no  longer  of  her 
children,  or  regards  them  with  loathing ;  the  child  forgets  his 
parents ;  the  husband  is  insensible  to  the  endearments  of  his 
wife ;  and  love,  attachment,  and  friendship  are  replaced  by 
hatred,  jealousy,  and  indifference.  These  traits,  however,  are 
not  so  prominent  as  the  intellectual  disorders,  (except  in  the 
earliest  stage  of  the  disease)  and  besides,  are  very  different 
from  those  which  characterize  that  form  of  mental  derange- 
ment to  be  presently  described  under  the  title  of  moral 

mania. 

* 

SECTION    II. 

Partial  Intellectual  Mania. 

§  133.  By  the  ancients  this  form  of  the  disease  was  called 
MELANCHOLIA,  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  always  attended 
by  dejection  of  mind  and  gloomy  ideas.  This  term  was 
used  and  so  understood  by  modern  writers,  till  Esquirol 


PARTIAL  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  159 

proved  its  improper  application  by  showing  that  the  ideas 
are  not  always  gloomy,  but  frequently  of  a  gay  and  cheerful 
nature.  He  substituted  the  term  MONOMANIA,  which  is  now 
in  general  use ;  arid  though  possessing  a  more  correct  and 
definite  signification,  it  embraces,  besides  the  cases  which 
come  under  the  present  division,  a  class  that  will  be  treated 
of  under  a  different  head.  Still,  for  convenience'  sake,  the 
use  of  the  term  will  be  continued,  with  the  understanding 
that  it  always  refers  to  that  form  of  insanity  which  is  the  im- 
mediate subject  of  discussion. 

§  134.  Monomania  is  often  described  as  a  derangement 
of  any  one  or  few  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  but  incorrectly, 
upon  our  views  of  the  constitution  of  those  faculties,  many 
of  which  may  be  simultaneously  deranged  by  the  action  of 
disease,  without  necessarily  producing  insanity.  This  point 
has  been  already  established,  when  speaking  of  those  affec- 
tions of  the  perceptive  faculties  which  give  rise  to  apparitions, 
and  change,  to  appearance,  the  outward  qualities  of  objects. 
(§  129.)  A  multitude  of  cases  are  recorded,  in  which  the 
faculty  of  language  too  has  been  wholly  or  partially  lost, 
while  the  soundness  of  the  reasoning  powers  remained 
unimpaired ;  indeed  there  is  not  a  single  perceptive  faculty 
whose  functions  have  not  been  sometimes  obliterated  or 
diminished,  without  being  accompanied  by  insane  delusion. 
It  is  evident  that  before  a  person  can  be  insane,  partially  or 
generally^,  the  mental  faculty  or  faculties  must  be  deranged, 
by  which  we  discern  the  relations  of  things,  and  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  general  truths. 

§  135.  The  most  simple  form  of  this  disorder  is  that  in 
which  the  patient  has  imbibed  some  single  notion  contradic- 
tory to  common  sense  and  to  his  own  experience,  and  which 
seems  to  be,  and  sometimes  no  doubt  really  is,  attended  by 
errors  of  sensation.  Thus,  thousands  have  believed  their  legs 
were  made  of  glass,  or  that  snakes,  fish,  or  eels  had  taken  up 
their  abode  in  their  stomach  or  bowels.  In  many  such  cases 
the  hallucination  is  excited  and  maintained  by  impressions 
propagated  from  diseased  parts,  the  presence  of  which  has 
been  revealed  by  dissection  after  death.  Esquirol,  in  a 


160  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

memoir  read  before  the  institute,1  a  few  years  since,  has  re- 
lated numerous  cases  in  proof  of  this  proposition,  among  which 
is  that  of  a  woman  who  insisted  she  was  pregnant  with  the 
devil,  in  whose  womb  there  was  found,  after  death,  a  mass  of 
hydatids ;  of  another,  in  the  Salpetri^re,  who  imagined  that 
a  regiment  of  soldiers  lay  concealed  in  her  belly,  and  that  she 
could  feel  them  struggling  and  fighting. with  each  other;  and 
of  another,  who  believed  that  the  apostles  and  evangelists 
had  taken  up  their  abode  in  her  bowels  and  were  occasion- 
ally visited  by  the  pope  and  the  patriarchs  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, in  both  of  whom,  the  intestines  were  found  agglu- 
tinated together  in  consequence  of  chronic  peritonitis.  That 
these  hallucinations  are  not  always  connected  with  corporeal 
impressions  of  this  kind,  seems  to  be  proved  by  the  fact,  that 
they  are  sometimes  dissipated  by  the  skilful  application  of 
arguments,  or  mano3uvres,  by  which  the  patients  are  made  to 
believe  themselves  cured  of  their  complaint.  The  story  of 
the  "  Turned  Head,"  in  the  "  Diary  of  a  Physician,"  ludicrous 
as  it  is,  is  scarcely  a  caricature  of  the  truth ;  and  one  of  M. 
Manry's  patients,  who,  after  thinking  himself  cured  of  a  ser- 
pent in  his  bowels  by  means  of  a  pretended  surgical  opera- 
tion, suddenly  took  up  the  idea,  that  the  creature  had  left  its 
ova  behind  ready  to  be  hatched  into  a  brood  of  young  ones, 
was  again  restored  by  the  dexterous  reply  of  his  physician, 
that  the  snake  was  a  male.2  In  this  class  of  cases,  the  mind 
is  not  observed  to  have  lost  any  of  its  original  vigor,  and  its 
soundness  on  every  other  topic  remains  unimpaired,  though 
there  unquestionably  does  exist  some  derangement  in  the 
reflective  faculties. 

§  136.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  monomania  takes  a 
little  wider  range,  involving  a  train  of  .morbid  ideas,  instead 
of  being  limited  to  a  single  point.  The  patient  imbibes 
some  notion  connected  with  the  various  relations  of  persons, 
events,  time,  space,  resistance,  etc.,  of  the  most  absurd  and 
unfounded  nature,  and  endeavors,  in  some  measure,  to  regu- 


1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  211—213. 

2  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  N.  S.  xxi.  524. 


PARTIAL  INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  161 

late  his  conduct  accordingly;  though,  in  most  respects,  it 
is  grossly  inconsistent  with  his  delusion.  It  is  certainly  not 
one  of  the  least  curious  phenomena  of  our  mental  constitu- 
tion, that  these  hallucinations  will  sometimes  continue  for 
years  together,  unaffected  by  time,  and  proceeding  parallel, 
as  it  were,  with  the  most  sound  and  healthy  operations  of 
the  mind,  though  more  often,  the  predominant  idea  instead 
of  enduring  in  this  manner  is  frequently  changing,  one  in- 
sane notion  disappearing  to  give  place  to  another  and  another. 
Rush  says  that  he  knew  one  clergyman  and  had  heard  of 
another,  who  were  deranged  at  all  times,  except  when  they 
ascended  the  pulpit,  where  they  discovered,  in  their  prayers 
and  sermons,  all  the  usual  marks  of  a  sound  and  correct 
mind ;  and  he  speaks  of  a  judge  who  was  rational  and  sen- 
sible upon  the  bench,  but  constantly  insane  when  off  it.1 
The  celebrated  case  of  the  Rev.  Simon  Browne  is  another 
remarkable  instance  of  this  kind.  For  many  years  before 
his  death,  he  entertained  the  belief  that  "he  had  lost  his 
rational  soul,"  though  during  that  time  he  evinced  great 
ability  both  in  his  ordinary  conversation  and  in  his  writings. 
Having  discontinued  all  public  or  private  worship,  he  ex- 
plained to  his  friends,  that  "  he  had  fallen  under  the  sensible 
displeasure  of  God,  who  had  caused  his  rational  soul  gradu- 
ally to  perish,  and  left  him  only  an  Minimal  life  in  common 
with  brutes ;  that  it  was  therefore  profane  in  him  to  pray, 
and  incongruous  to  be  present  at  the  prayers  of  others."  In 
a  book  of  some  merit  which  he  dedicated  to  the  queen  he 
speaks  of  himself  as  "  once  a  man ;  and  of  some  little  name ; 
but  of  no  worth,  as  his  present  unparalleled  case  makes  but 
too  manifest ;  for,  by  the  immediate  hand  of  an  avenging  God, 
his  very  thinking  substance  has  for  more  than  seventeen 
years  been  wasting  away,  till  it  is  wholly  perished  out  of  him, 
if  it  be  not  utterly  come  to  nothing." 2 

§  137.     The    operations   of  the   understanding,   even   on 
subjects  connected  with  the  insane  belief,  are  sometimes  not 

1  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  204. 

2  An  account  of  this  case  may  be  found  in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine,  1 762. 

14* 


162  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

impaired  in  an  appreciable  degree ;  on  the  contrary,  we  are 
occasionally  struck  with  the  acuteness  of  the  reasoning 
power  displayed  by  monomaniacs.  Muratori  relates  the 
case  of  a  Jesuit,  named  Sgambari,  who  believed  himself  a 
cardinal,  and  claimed  to  be  addressed  by  the  title  of  emi- 
nence. A  friend  was  anxious  to  convince  him  of  his  error, 
and  obtained  a  patient  hearing  of  his  remarks.  When  he  had 
finished,  the  madman  replied ;  "  either  you  consider  me  in- 
sane or  rational ;  on  the  latter  supposition,  you  do  me  injus- 
tice by  your  remonstrances;  on  the  former,  I  hardly  know 
which  is  the  most  mad,  I,  for  believing  myself  a  cardinal,  or 
you,  for  thinking  to  cure  a  madman  by  such  reasonings." 1 

§  138.  Though  monomaniacs  are  generally  ready  enough 
to  declare  their  predominant  idea,  yet  when  sufficient  induce- 
ment exists,  such  as  interest,  fear  -of  ridicule,  etc.,  they  will 
occasionally  conceal  it ;  and  this,  too,  without  the  occurrence 
of  a  lucid  interval,  and  while  they  believe  in  its  reality  as 
firmly  as  ever.  Chambeyron,  the  French  translator  of  Hoff- 
bauer's  treatise,  speaks  of  "  a  woman  who  on  her  admission 
to  the  Salpetriere  told  one  of  the  overseers,  '  that  she  was  an 
apostle,  and  that  Louis  XVIII.  had  remembered  her  in  his 
will.'  "  "  The  next  day,"  says  he,  "  at  my  visit,  I  asked  her 
reasons  for  entering  the  hospital.  '  If  I  tell  you,'  said  she, 
*  you  will  think  me  madv'  On  my  protesting  to  the  contrary, 
however,  she  replied,  '  well  I  am  remembered  in  the  will  of 
Louis  XVIII.'  Of  the  other  notion  whose  absurdity  was 
more  palpable,  she  said  not  a  word.  Now  [a  few  days  after] 
she  denies  that  she  ever  entertained  either  notion,  though  her 
conduct  and  coversation  prove  that  she  still  believes  them 
both."  Some  cases  of  a  similar  kind  are  also  related  in 
Erskine's  speech  in  the  defence  of  Hadfield.  Georget  speaks 
of  a  lady  who  thought  she  was  deprived  of  the  power  of  sen- 
sation, and  professed  to  feel  neither  fatigue  nor  the  ordinary 
wants  of  nature,  comparing  herself  to  a  machine  moved  by 
springs.  Believing  she  never  should  recover,  she  made 
several  attempts  at  suicide ;  at  times  she  was  greatly  agi- 

1  Hoffbauer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  86,  note. 


PARTIAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  163 

tated,  and  abused  her  female  companion.  And  yet  this  lady 
received  visits,  and  sometimes  passed  whole  evenings  with 
persons  of  her  acquaintance  without  manifesting  the  slightest 
disorder  in  her  mental  faculties.1 

§  139.  It  has  just  been  stated,  (§  129)  that  any  one  of 
the  perceptive  faculties  might  be  disordered,  without  any 
derangement  of  the  reflective  or  reasoning  powers.  The 
true  nature  of  these  cases  is  generally  quite  obvious,  but  as 
those  in  which  the  faculty  of  language  is  affected,  might,  by 
the  careless  or  incompetent  observer,  be  mistaken  for  insanity, 
they  require  a  particular  notice  in  this  place.  It  is  a  curious, 
though  well-established  fact,  instances  of  which  are  related 
numerous  enough  to  fill  a  volume,  that  the  faculty  of  language, 
of  the  power  of  representing  thoughts  by  appropriate  articu- 
late or  written  signs,  may  be  utterly  or  partially  lost,  the 
other  mental  powers  remaining  sound.  This  disorder  either 
arises  from  slight  congestion  in  the  brain,  or  is  the  sequel  of 
traumatic  or  pathological  lesions  of  this  organ,  especially  of 
apoplexy.  The  patient  is  observed  to  be  more  or  less  inca- 
pable of  communicating  his  thoughts  and  feelings  by  spoken 
or  written  language,  the  words  appearing  to  be  arbitrary 
signs  totally  unconnected  with  ideas.  When  a  word  is 
pronounced  slowly  and  distinctly,  he  may  be  able  to  repeat 
it  once  or  twice,  seldom  oftener,  or  he  may  be  unable  to 
articulate  at  all.  In  some  cases  the  power  -of  language  is 
soon  and  completely  regained;  in  some,  a  slight  stammer- 
ing or  hesitancy  is  observed,  as  long  as  they  live ;  while  in  a 
few  the  power  never  spontaneously  returns,  the  person  being 
obliged  to  learn  to  read  and  write,  as  if  he  had  never  known 
how  before.  Mr.  Hood  relates  a  case 2  in  which  the  patient, 
a  blacksmith,  lost  the  memory  of  all  words  except  yes  and  no, 
while  he  comprehended  distinctly  whatever  was  said  to  him. 
Though  able  to  understand  what  was  read  to  him  from  a 
book,  he  could  not  himself  read.  When  a  name  was  pro- 
nounced, he  would  repeat  it  once  or  twice,  but  before  he 


1  Nouvelle  discussion  medico,  leg.  23. 

2  Phrenological  Transactions,  255. 


164  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

could  do  it  a  third  time,  it  was  utterly  gone.  Within  a  few 
days  of  the  first  attack,  he  would  go  to  his  shop  and  attend 
to  his  workmen,  but  though  he  lived  three  years  afterwards, 
his  power  of  language  though  much  improved,  was  always 
greatly  impaired.  Another  case  has  been  related l  where  the 
patient  received  an  injury  on  the  head  by  falling  from  a 
coach-box,  one  effect  of  which  was  the  loss  of  the  use  of  all 
language,  but  the  "word  oui.  In  other  respects  his  mind  was 
entirely  sound.  In  some  cases,  this  loss  of  the  memory  of 
words  is  confined  to  common  and  proper  nouns.  This  hap- 
pened to  the  celebrated  naturalist  Broussonnet  who  entirely 
recovered  from  an  attack  of  apoplexy,  except  that  he  could 
never  after  utter  nor  write  the  names  of  persons  or  things, 
though  other  parts  of  speech  were  at  his  command  in  abun- 
dance. When  he  wished  to  designate  an  individual,  he 
described  his  figure,  his  qualities,  and  occupation.  He 
recognized  the  name  at  once,  when  pointed  out  to  him  in  a 
book,  though  it  never  would  occur  spontaneously  to  his 
memory.2  In  other  cases  of  this  kind,  the  patient  is  observed 
to  have  forgotten  every  thing  but  substantives.  One  is 
mentioned  whose  "  apprehension  of  the  use  and  importance 
of  substantives  was  keen 'and  unimpaired,  but  he  could  not 
succeed  in  perceiving  the  modifying  influence  of  articles, 
adjectives,  or  adverbs.  Of  verbs  he  had  a  very  imperfect 
recollection." 8  Esquirol  had  a  patient  who  recollected  no 
words  but  substantives,  and  but  few  of  them,  using 
generally  abstract  terms  corresponding  to  states  of  the  mind, 
the  ordinary  events  of  life,  etc.,  but  not  indicating  the  objects 
by  which  he  was  surrounded,  or  those  presented  to  his  senses. 
Thus  when  asked  how  he  was,  he  would  reply :  —  "  malheur, 
injustice,  audacite",  courage,  piete",  mort."  8 

§  140.  In  the  simplest  form  of  monomania,  the  under- 
standing appears  to  be,  and  probably  is,  tolerably  sound  on 
all  subjects  but  those  connected  with  the  hallucination. 


1  Jour,  de  la  Soc.  Phrenol.  no.  2,  art.  5. 

2  Cuvier,  Eloges  historiques,  i.  341. 

8  W.  A.  F.  Browne.    Edin.  Phrenol.  Jour.  viii.  415.  *  Idem. 


PARTIAL   INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  165 

When,  however,  the  disorder  is  more  complicated,  involving 
a  longer  train  of  morbid  ideas,  we  have  the  high  authority  of 
Georget  for  believing,  that  though  the  patient  may  reason 
on  many  subjects  unconnected  with  the  particular  illusion 
on  which  the  insanity  turns,  the  understanding  is  more  exten- 
sively deranged,  than  is  generally  suspected.  If  we  could 
follow  these  people  to  the  privacy  of  their  own  dwellings, 
narrowly  observe  their  intercourse  with  their  friends  and 
neighbors,  and  converse  with  them  on  the  subjects  nearest  to 
their  thoughts,  we  should  generally  detect  some  perversity  of 
feeling  or  action,  altogether  foreign  to  the  ordinary  character. 
Cases  illustrative  of  this  remark  will  frequently  occur  to  the 
reader  in  the  course  of  this  work ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
insist  on  the  importance  of  this  fact  in  estimating  the  degree 
of  criminal  responsibility  remaining  in  monomaniacs.  It  is 
a  fact  that  must  never  be  forgotten,  that  the  phenomena  of 
insanity  do  not  lie  on  the  surface,  any  more  than  those  of 
other  diseases,  but  oftentimes  can  be  discovered  only  by 
means  of  close  and  patient  examination. 


CHAPTER    VII. 


MORAL   MANIA. 

§  141.  THUS  far  mania  has  been  considered  as  affecting 
the  intellectual  faculties  only;  but  a  more  serious  error  on 
this  subject  can  scarcely  be  committed,  than  that  of  limiting 
its  influence  to  them.  It  will  not  be  denied  that  the  propen- 
sities and  sentiments  are  also  integral  portions  of  our  mental 
constitution  ;  and  no  enlightened  physiologist  can  doubt  that 
their  manifestations  are  dependent  on  the  cerebral  organism. 
Here,  then,  we  have  the  only  essential  conditions  of  insanity, 
—  a  material  structure  connected  with  mental  manifesta- 
tions ;  and  until  it  is  satisfactorily  proved  that  this  structure 
enjoys  a  perfect  immunity  from  morbid  action,  we  are  bound 
to  believe  that  it  is  liable  to  disease,  and,  consequently,  that 
the  affective,  as  well  as  intellectual  faculties  are  subject  to 
derangement.  In  fact,  it  has  always  been  observed,  that 
insanity  as  often  affects  the  moral,  as  it  does  the  intellectual 
perceptions.  In  many  cases  there  is  evinced  some  moral 
obliquity  quite  unnatural  to  the  individual,  a  loss  of  his  ordi- 
nary interests  in  the  relations  of  father,  son,  husband,  or 
brother,  long  before  a  single  word  escapes  from  his  lips, 
"  sounding  to  folly."  Through  the  course  of  the  disease,  the 
moral  and  intellectual  impairments  proceed  pari  passu,  while 
the  return  of  the  affections  to  their  natural  channels,  is  one 
of  the  strongest  indications  of  approaching  recovery.  Such 
being  the  fact,  it  ought  not  to  be  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  in 
some  cases  the  aberration  should  be  confined  to  the  moral 
impairment,  the  intellectual,  if  there  be  any,  being  too  slight 
to  be  easily  discerned. 


MOKAL  MANIA.  167 

§  142.  To  moral  mania,  as  a  distinct  form  of  the  disease,  the 
attention  of  the  profession  was  first  directed  by  the  celebrated 
Pinel  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  century.  Previously  to 
that  time  it  was  a  matter  of  universal  belief,  that  insanity  is 
always  accompanied  by  derangement  of  the  reasoning  powers, 
and  a  recognition  of  this  fact  entered  into  every  definition  of 
the  disease.  Participating  in  the  common  belief,  he  found, 
to  his  great  surprise,  on  resuming  his  researches  at  the  Bi- 
cetre  that  there  were  many  maniacs  who  betrayed  no  lesion 
whatever  of  the  understanding,  but  were  under  the  dominion 
of  instinctive  and  abstract  fury,  as  if  the  affective  faculties 
alone  had  sustained  injury.  This  form  of  mental  disorder 
he  designated  as  manie  sans  delire.  The  examples  which 
he  gives,  being  chiefly  characterized  by  violent  anger  and 
unbounded  fury,  by  no  means  furnished  suitable  illustrations 
of  the  affection  now  styled  moral  insanity,  though  they  do 
illustrate  a  particular  form  of  that  disorder.  This  defect, 
however,  has  been  amply  supplied  by  the  researches  of 
others,  which  have  made  us  acquainted  with  a  great  number 
and  variety  of  cases,  in  which  the  affective  faculties,  either 
singly  or  collectively,  were  deranged,  independently  of  any 
appreciable  lesion  of  the  intellect.  The  reality  and  impor- 
tance of  this  distinction  which  thus  establishes  two  classes  of 
mania,  is  now  generally  acknowledged  by  practical  observers, 
among  whom  it  is  sufficient  to  mention  Esquirol,  Georget, 
Gall,  Marc,  Rush,  Reil,  Hoffbauer,  Andrew  Combe,  Conolly, 
and  Prichard,  though  some  of  them  are  inclined  to  doubt 
whether  the  integrity  of  the  understanding  is  so  fully  pre- 
served in  moral  mania,  as  Pinel  believed.  Still,  its  apparent 
soundness,  and  the  difficulty,  at  least,  of  establishing  the 
existence  of  any  intellectual  derangement,  while  the  moral 
powers  are  unequivocally  and  deeply  deranged,  render  it  no 
less  important  in  its  legal  relations,  than  if  the  understanding 
were  unequivocally  affected.  It  is  defined  by  Prichard,  who 
has  strongly  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  assigning  it  a  more 
distinct  and  conspicuous  place,  than  it  has  hitherto  received, 
as  "  consisting  in  a  morbid  perversion  of  the  natural  feelings, 
affections,  inclinations,  temper,  habits,  and  moral  dispositions, 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

without  any  notable  lesion  of  the  intellect  or  knowing  and 
reasoning  faculties,  and  particularly  without  any  maniacal 
hallucination."1  It  will  be  convenient,  even  if  not  scientifi- 
cally precise,  to  consider  it  under  two  divisions,  according 
as  it  is  general  or  partial. 


SECTION  I. 

General  Moral  Mania. 

§  143.  One  form  of  this  condition  is  thus  vividly  des- 
cribed by  Prichard.  "  There  are  many  individuals  living  at 
large,  and  not  entirely  separated  from  society,  who,  are  affect- 
ed in  a  certain  degree  by  this  modification  of  insanity.  They 
are  reputed  persons  of  singular,  wayward,  and  eccentric  char- 
acter. An  attentive  observer  may  often  recognize  something 
remarkable  in  their  manner  of  existence,  which  leads  him  to 
entertain  doubts  of  their  entire  sanity,  and  circumstances  are 
sometimes  discovered  on  inquiry  which  assist  in  determining 
his  opinion.  In  many  instances  it  is  found  that  there  is  an 
hereditary  tendency  to  madness  in  the  family,  or  that  seve- 
ral relatives  of  the  person  affected  have  labored  under  dis- 
eases of  the  brain.  The  individual  himself  is  discovered  in 
a  former  period  of  life  to  have  sustained  an  attack  of  mad- 
ness of  a  decided  character.  His  temper  and  dispositions 
are  found  on  inquiry  to  have  undergone  a  change ;  to  be  not 
what  they  were  previously  to  a  certain  time ;  he  has  become 
an  altered  man ;  and  this  difference  has  perhaps  been  noted 
from  the  period  when  he  sustained  some  reverse  of  fortune, 
which  deeply  affected  him,  or  since  the  loss  of  some  beloved 
relative.  In  other  instances,  the  alteration  in  his  character 
has  ensued  immediately  on  some  severe  shock  which  his 
bodily  constitution  has  undergone.  This  has  either  been  a 
disorder  affecting  the  head,  a  slight  attack  of  paralysis,  a 
fit  of  epilepsy,  or  some  fever  or  inflammatory  disorder,  which 

1  Cyclop.  Prac.  Med.  HI.  826. 


GENERAL   MORAL  MANIA.  169 

has  produced  a  perceptible  change  in  the  habitual  state  of  the 
constitution.  In  some  cases  the  alteration  in  temper  and 
habits  has  been  gradual  and  imperceptible,  and  it  seems  only 
to  have  consisted  in  an  exaltation  or  increase  of  peculiarities 
which  were  always  more  or  less  natural  or  habitual."  "  Indi- 
viduals laboring  under  this  disorder  are  capable  of  reasoning 
or  supporting  an  argument  on  any  subject  within  their  sphere 
of  knowledge  that  may  be  presented  to  them,  and  they  often 
display  great  ingenuity  in  giving  reasons  for  their  eccentric 
conduct,  and  in  accounting  for  and  justifying  the  state  of 
moral  feeling  under  which  they  appear  to  exist.  In  one 
sense,  indeed,  their  intellectual  faculties  may  be  termed 
unsound,  but  it  is  the  same  sense  in  which  persons  under  the 
influence  of  strong  passions  may  be  generally  said  to  have 
their  judgment  warped,  and  the  sane  or  healthy  exercise  of 
then*  understandings  impeded.  They  think  and  act  under  the 
influence  of  strongly  excited  feelings,  and  a  person  sane  is 
under  such  circumstances  proverbially  liable  to  error  both  in 
judgment  and  conduct."1  It  was  this  class  of  persons,  un- 
doubtedly, that  suggested  the  following  description  in  a  work 
published  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  century.  "  Among 
the  varities  of  maniacs  met  with  in  medical  practice,  there  is 
one,  which,  though  by  no  means  rare,  has  been  little  noticed 
by  writers  on  this  subject:  I  refer  to  those  cases  in  which  the 
individuals  perform  most  of  the  common  duties  of  life  with 
propriety,  and  some  of  them,  indeed,  with  scrupulous  exact- 
ness, who  exhibit  no  strongly  marked  features  of  either  tem- 
perament, no  traits  of  superior  or  defective  mental  endowment, 
but  yet  take  violent  antipathies,  harbor  unjust  suspicions,  in- 
dulge strong  propensities,  affect  singularity  in  dress,  gaitr 
and  phraseology ;  are  proud,  conceited,  and  ostentatious ; 
easily  excited  and  with  difficulty  appeased ;  dead  to  sensi- 
bility, delicacy,  and  refinement ;  obstinately  riveted  to  the  most 
absurd  opinions ;  prone  to  controversy,  and  yet  incapable  of 
reasoning ;  always  the  hero  of  their  own  tale,  using  hyper- 
bolic, high-flown  language  to  express  the  most  simple  ideas, 

1  Op.  cit»  sup.  p.  826. 
15 


170  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

accompanied  by  unnatural  gesticulation,  inordinate  action, 
and  frequently  by  the  most  alarming  expression  of  counte- 
nance. On  some  occasions  they  suspect  sinister  intentions 
on  the  most  trivial  grounds ;  on  others  are  a  prey  to  fear  and 
a  dread  from  the  most  ridiculous  and  imaginary  sources ;  now 
embracing  every  opportunity  of  exhibiting  romantic  courage 
and  feats  of  hardihood,  then  indulging  themselves  in  all  man- 
ner of  excesses.  Persons  of  this  description,  to  the  casual 
observer,  might  appear  actuated  by  a  bad  heart,  but  the  ex- 
perienced physician  knows  it  is  the  head  which  is  defective. 
They  seem  as  if  constantly  affected  by  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree of  stimulation  from  intoxicating  liquors,  while  the 
expression  of  countenance  furnishes  an  infallible  proof  of 
mental  disease.  If  subjected  to  moral  restraint,  or  a  medical 
regimen,  they  yield  with  reluctance  to  the  means  proposed, 
and  generally  refuse  and  resist,  on  the  ground  that  such 
means  are  unnecessary  where  no  disease  exists ;  and  when, 
by  the  system  adopted,  they  are  so  far  recovered,  as  to  be 
enabled  to  suppress  the  exhibition  of  the  former  peculiarities, 
and  are  again  fit  to  be  restored  to  society,  the  physician,  and 
those  friends  who  put  them  under  the  physician's  care,  are 
generally  ever  after  objects  of  enmity  and  frequently  of 
revenge." l 

§  144.  Heinroth  and  Hoffbauer  both  recognize  a  form  of 
mental  alienation  consisting  exclusively  of  morbid  excitement 
of  the  passions  and  feelings.  "  It  is  clear,"  says  the  latter, 
"  that  mania  may  exist  uncomplicated  with  mental  delusion ; 
it  is  in  fact  only  a  kind  of  moral  exaltation  (tollheit),  a  state 
in  which  the  reason  has  lost  its  empire  over  the  passions  and 
the  actions  by  which  they  are  manifested,  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  individual  can  neither  repress  the  former,  nor  abstain 
from  the  latter.  It  does  not  follow  that  he  may  not  be  in 
possession  of  his  senses  and  even  his  usual  intelligence,  since, 
in  order  to  resist  the  impulses  of  the  passions,  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient that  the  reason  should  impart  its  counsels ;  we  must 
have  the  necessary  power  to  obey  them.  The  maniac  may 

1  Cox,  J.  M.,  Practical  Observations  on  Insanity.    London,  1804. 


GENERAL  MORAL   MANIA.  171 

judge  correctly  of  his  actions  without  being  in  a  condition  to 
repress  his  passions,  and  to  abstain  from  the  acts  of  violence 
to  which  they  impel  him." *  Subsequently  he  observes,  that 
when  mania  proceeds  from  inordinate  passions,  "its  more 
immediate  cause  lies  in  the  physical  temperament,  or  in  cer- 
tain moral  affections  which  induce  frequent  occasions  of 
anger.  In  every  other  respect,  the  maniac  may  be  master  of 
his  propensities  and  the  actions  to  which  they  lead ;  he  may 
judge  and  act  rationally.  He  is  irrational  only  in  his  par- 
oxysms of  fury,  and  then  his  errors  of  judgment  are  rather 
the  effect  than  the  cause  of  his  furious  transports."  2 

§  145.  There  is  another  very  common  and  well-marked 
form  of  insanity,  the  manifestations  of  which  are  chiefly 
confined  to  the  moral  sentiments.  Its  characteristic  feature 
is  that  of  excitement  alternating  with  depression,  the  two 
conditions  varying  considerably,  in  different  cases,  in  point 
of  intensity,  and  also  —  as  well  as  the  intervening  interval  — 
in  point  of  duration.  The  general  tAits  of  the  first-mentioned 
condition,  are  an  unusual  flow  of  spirits,  great  self-confidence, 
sanguine  anticipations  of  the  future,  restlessness  both  of 
body  and  mind,  and  untiring  loquacity.  Usually,  these  traits 
are  only  strong  enough  at  first  to  modify  the  ordinary  char- 
acter of  the  individual,  without  raising  the  slightest  sus- 
picion, and  not  uncommonly  giving  the  impression  that  the 
person  has  been  indulging  too  freely  in  drink.  Sooner  or 
later,  they  become  more  strikingly  developed,  and  exert  an 
unmistakable  influence  upon  the  conduct  and  discourse.  He 
engages  in  enterprises,  moral,  social,  or  commercial,  either 
manifestly  beyond  his  means,  or  in  one  way  or  another, 
inappropriate  to  his  condition.  Especially  is  he  bent  on 
speculation,  and  nothing  comes  amiss  capable  of  gratifying 
this  passion.  Whether  it  be  a  farm  or  a  ship,  a  mill-privilege 
or  a  city  lot,  a  parcel  of  trumpery  jewelry,  or  the  odds  and 
ends  of  a  twopenny  auction,  he  is  equally  ready  to  buy,  and 
equally  sanguine  of  getting  a  good  bargain.  He  is  con- 
stantly yielding  to  some  new  fancy,  and  ardently  prosecuting 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  122.  2  Ibid.  §  126. 


172  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

some  of  the  countless  schemes  that  swarm  in  his  teeming 
brain.  He  frequents  company  either  above  or  below  his 
own  grade,  while  perhaps  he  amazes  and  mortifies  his  friends, 
by  the  levity  of  his  manners,  if  not  the  laxity  of  his  morals. 
His  movements  are  abrupt,  rapid,  and  unseasonable.  He  is 
fond  of  taking  long  journeys,  and  horse-flesh  suffers  under  his 
hands.  He  sleeps  much  less  than  he  usually  does,  and  is 
fond  of  being  up  at  night,  roaming  about  the  house  or  neigh- 
borhood. He  is  always  ready  with  plausible  reasons  for  his 
strangest  conduct  sufficient  to  silence,  if  not  to  satisfy  any 
troublesome  inquirer,  while  his  discourse  is  entirely  free  from 
delusion,  or  obvious  incoherence.  With  all  this  there  is 
generally  an  utter  disregard  of  the  feelings  of  others,  an  impe- 
rious and  even  tyrannical  deportment  towards  those  who  are 
dependent  upon  him,  and  a  disposition  to  trample  upon  all 
domestic  conveniences  and  proprieties.  The  slightest  attempt 
to  restrain  or  control  his  movements,  or  even  to  administer 
advice,  is  met  by  the  fiercest  hostility,  and  any  intimation  of 
mental  infirmity  provokes  his  hottest  wrath. 

§  146.  To  this  the  state  of  depression  presents  a  complete 
contrast,  every  trait  here  mentioned  being  replaced  by  its 
opposite.  Seldom  speaking  except  when  spoken  to,  and 
apparently  absorbed  in  his  own  gloomy  reflections,  he  is 
silent  and  quiet  in  the  midst  of  company,  and  as  if  over- 
whelmed by  a  sense  of  inability,  he  reluctantly  engages  in 
any  occupation  beyond  the  most  ordinary  routine,  and  often 
is  scarcely  persuaded  to  perform  the  most  necessary  duties. 
All  nature  without  and  within  him  is  shrouded  in  gloom,  a 
terrible  evil  seems  to  be  impending  over  him,  the  future 
reveals  not  a  single  gleam  of  hope,  and  were  he  called  on  to 
lay  down  his  life,  he  would  hardly  hesitate  to  obey.  His 
conduct  during  the  excited  state  is  now  viewed  in  its  true 
light,  and  is  the  subject  of  bitter  reflections.  He  wonders 
that  he  should  have  done  such  things,  and,  in  some  instances, 
begs  his  friends  to  keep  him  in  future  from  similar  exhibi- 
tions by  seasonable  measures  of  restraint.  With  the  mental 
dejection  there  is  often  some  bodily  ailment,  and  he  loses 
both  flesh  and  strength.  Either  this  or  a  total  paralysis  of 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  173 

the  will  may  keep  him  in  bed  much  of  the  time,  and  inca- 
pacitate him  for  the  slightest  effort. 

§  147.  In  point  of  duration  the  two  states  are  generally 
equal  as  compared  with  each  other  in  the  same  case,  though 
varying  in  different  cases,  from  one  month  to  a  couple  of 
years.  In  point  of  severity,  too,  they  are  subject  to  the  same 
rule.  The  excitement  may  be  confined  to  an  unusual  flow 
of  spirits,  to  an  increase  of  self-confidence,  and  a  fondness 
of  self-magnification,  while  the  patient  attends  to  his  ordi- 
nary duties,  evincing  no  loss  of  his  usual  intelligence  and 
discretion.  Or  it  may  be  manifested  by  boisterous  and  vio- 
lent conduct,  by  a  disposition  to  engage  in  foolish  enterprises, 
and  an  utter  abandonment  of  all  regular  and  appropriate 
employment.  So,  too,  the  state  of  depression  may  vary  from 
what  passes  merely  for  low  spirits,  to  the  most  profound  and 
painful  melancholy,  attended  with  the  keenest  distress  and 
disposing  to  suicidal  attempts. 

§  148.  The  interval  between  these  two  conditions,  when 
the  individual  appears  to  be  perfectly  rational  and  natural, 
also  presents  the  same  kind  of  uniformity,  in  the  same  case, 
and  the  same  kind  of  diversity  in  different  cases.  In  many, 
and  perhaps  the  majority  of  cases,  it  has  no  appreciable 
duration  as  a  distinct  condition,  the  periods  of  excitement 
and  depression  passing  into  each  other,  with  scarcely  an 
interval  between.  In  others  it  may  continue  as  long,  or  even 
longer,  than  either  of  these  states,  although,  as  is  more  fre- 
quently the  case,  it  is  considerably  shorter.  Generally,  the 
lucid  interval  follows  the  excitement  and  precedes  the  de- 
pression, but  sometimes  the  excitement  passes  abruptly  into 
depression,  and  this  more  gradually  is  followed  by  the  lucid 
interval. 

§  149.  Another  feature  worthy  of  notice,  is  that  the  dura- 
tion of  these  several  states  occasionally  changes,  in  the 
same  individual.  In  one  case  that  came  under  observation, 
they  gradually  changed  within  four  or  five  years,  from  one 
month  to  eight  or  ten.  Generally,  the  longer  the  duration  of 
the  excitement  and  depression,  the  less  prominent  and  dis- 
tinct is  the  lucid  interval. 

15* 


174  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  150.  This  form  of  mental  disease,  when  the  periodicity 
is  once  fairly  established,  is  peculiarly  intractable  to  treat- 
ment, and  may  continue  for  years ;  but  then  it  finally  as- 
sumes a  more  continuous  and  uniform  character,  until  its 
original  phasis  entirely  disappears. 

§  151.  The  contrast  often  presented  in  moral  mania  be- 
tween the  state  of  the  intellectual  and  that  of  the  moral 
faculties,  is  one  of  its  most  striking  features.  These  patients 
can  reason  logically  and  acutely  on  any  subject  within  their 
knowledge,  and  extol  the  beauties  of  virtue,  while  their  con- 
duct is  filled  with  acts  of  folly,  and  at  war  with  every  princi- 
ple of  moral  propriety.  Their  moral  nature  seems  to  have 
undergone  an  entire  revolution.  The  sentiments  of  truth, 
honor,  honesty,  benevolence,  purity,  have  given  place  to  men- 
dacity, dishonesty,  obscenity,  and  selfishness,  and  all  sense  of 
shame  and  self-control  have  disappeared,  while  the  intellect 
has  lost  none  of  its  usual  power  to  argue,  convince,  please, 
and  charm.  We  once  asked  a  patient  who  was  constantly 
saying  or  doing  something  to  annoy  or  disturb  others,  while 
his  intellect  was  apparently  as  free  from  delusion  or  any 
other  impairment  as  ever,  whether,  in  committing  his  aggres- 
sive acts,  he  felt  constrained  by  an  irresistible  impulse,  con- 
trary to  his  convictions  of  right,  or  was  not  aware,  at  the 
moment,  that  he  was  doing  wrong.  His  reply  should  sink 
deep  into  the  hearts  of  those  who  legislate  for,  or  sit  in  judg- 
ment on  the  insane.  "  I  neither  acted  from  an  irresistible 
impulse,  nor  upon  the  belief  that  I  was  doing  right.  I  knew 
perfectly  well  I  was  doing  wrong,  and  I  might  have  refrained 
if  I  had  pleased.  I  did  thus  and  so,  because  I  loved  to  do  it. 
It  gave  me  an  indescribable  pleasure  to  do  wrong."  Yet  this 
man  when  well,  is  kind  and  benevolent,  and  in  his  whole 
walk  and  conversation  a  model  of  propriety. 

§  152.  In  nothing,  however,  is  the  intellectual  soundness 
more  strikingly  evinced  than  in  the  ingenuity  with  which  these 
persons  endeavor  to  explain  the  folly  and  absurdity  of  their 
acts,  and  reconcile  them  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  human 
action.  By  denying  entirely  some  alleged  circumstances  in  a 
particular  transaction,  adding  a  little  to  one  and  subtracting 


GENERAL   MORAL  MANIA.  - 

a  little  from  another,  and  giving  a  peculiar  coloring  to  the 
whole,  they  will  convince  the  unguarded  observer  that  there 
is  some  mistake  about  the  matter,  —  that  they  acted  precisely 
as  any  one  else  would  under  similar  circumstances,  and  that 
they  are  the  victims  of  misrepresentation  and  unkindness. 

§  153.  There  is,  unquestionably,  a  great  tendency  in  this 
affection  to  pass  into  intellectual  mania,  which  we  have  seen 
is  no  less  strongly  characterized  by  moral  perversities  than 
by  hallucinations ;  and  Georget  actually  describes  it  as  be- 
longing to  the  initiatory  stage  or  incubation  of  the  latter  dis- 
order. Without  stopping  to  discuss  the  correctness  of  this 
view,  the  fact  that  it  may  continue  for  an  indefinite  length  of 
time  and  become  the  object  of  judicial  investigation,  gives 
it  incalculable  importance  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view, 
and  entitles  it  to  a  prominent  place  in  a  work  like  the 
present. 

§  154.  The  form  of  mental  disorder  which  we  are  now 
considering,  has  been  so  little  noticed  by  writers  until  quite 
recently,  while  an  ample  knowledge  of  its  phenomena  is  es- 
sential to  the  correct  administration  of  justice,  that  no  farther 
apology  is  needed  for  illustrating  it  with  several  examples 
collected  from  the  observations  of  others.  The  first  is  re- 
lated by  Pinel  as  belonging  to  his  manie  sans  delire.  "  An 
only  son  of  a  weak  and  indulgent  mother  was  encouraged 
in  the  gratification  of  every  caprice  and  passion  of  which  an 
untutored  and  violent  temper  was  susceptible.  The  impetii- 
osity  of  his  disposition  increased  with  his  years.  The 
money  with  which  he  was  lavishly  supplied  removed  every 
obstacle  to  the  indulgence  of  his  wild  desires.  Every  in- 
stance of  opposition  or  resistance  roused  him  to  acts  of  fury. 
He  assaulted  his  adversaries  with  the  audacity  of  a  savage ; 
sought  to  reign  by  force,  and  was  perpetually  embroiled  in 
disputes  and  quarrels.  If  a  dog,  a  horse,  or  any  other  animal 
offended  him,  he  instantly  put  it  to  death.  If  ever  he  went 
to  a  fete  or  any  other  public  meeting,  he  was  sure  to  excite 
such  tumults  and  quarrels  as  terminated  in  actual  pugilistic 
encounters,  and  he  generally  left  the  scene  with  a  bloody 
nose.  This  wayward  youth,  however,  when  unmoved  by 


176  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

passions,  possessed  a  perfectly  sound  judgment.  When  he 
became  of  age,  he  succeeded  to  the  possession  of  an  exten- 
sive domain.  He  proved  himself  fully  competent  to  the 
management  of  his  estate,  as  well  as  to  the  discharge  of  his 
relative  duties,  and  he  even  distinguished  himself  by  acts  of 
beneficence  and  compassion.  Wounds,  law-suits,  and  pecu- 
niary compensations  were  generally  the  consequences  of  his 
unhappy  propensity  to  quarrel.  But  an  act  of  notoriety  put 
an  end  to  his .  career  of  violence.  Enraged  with  a  woman 
who  had  used  offensive  language  to  him,  he  precipitated  her 
into  a  well.  Prosecution  was  commenced  against  him ; 
and  on  the  deposition  of  a  great  many  witnesses  who  gave 
evidence  to  his  furious  deportment,  he  was  condemned  to 
perpetual  confinement  in  the  Bicetre." *  In  this  instance 
there  was  something  more  than  the  unrestrained  indulgence 
of  strong  passions,  though,  no  doubt,  the  passions  of  this 
person  were  naturally  remarkably  strong  and  active;  the 
understanding,  though  sound,  was  incapable  of  restraining 
their  impulses,  for  the  reason  that  they  were  excited  by 
disease,  and,  therefore,  beyond  its  control.  The  constant  ex- 
citement of  passions  already  too  much  developed  by  means 
of  a  vicious  education,  led  to  that  condition  of  mind  in  which 
the  healthy  balance  of  the  affective  and  intellectual  faculties 
is  destroyed,  —  in  other  words,  to  moral  mania.  A  case  of 
a  very  similar  character  to  this,  and  to  which  the  rank  of  the 
person  and  the  disastrous  results  of  the  affection  have  given 
a  melancholy  preeminence  over  all  others  in  the  medico-legal 
history  of  the  disease,  is  that  of  Earl  Ferrers,  who  was  exe- 
cuted in  1760,  for  the  murder  of  his  steward.  It  differs 
from  the  above  in  exhibiting  a  more  advanced  stage  of  the 
disease,  and  in  more  distinctly  revealing  its  approximation  to 
intellectual  mania  by  the  unfounded  notions  which  the 
patient  had  imbibed.  Though  his  reasoning  powers  were 
sound  and  his  conversation  rational,  he  imagined  that  his 
relatives  had  formed  a  conspiracy  against  him  in  which  his 
victim  was  an  accomplice ;  and  his  conduct  in  many  respects 

1  Sur  1' Alienation  Mentale,  156,  §  159. 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  177 

was  so  wild  and  strange,  as  to  excite  in  those  who  were  in 
the  habit  of  meeting  him,  a  suspicion,  and  even  conviction 
of  his  insanity.1 

§  155.  The  following  case  which  came  under  the  obser- 
vation of  the  writer,  strikingly  exhibits  the  prominent  fea- 
tures of  moral  mania.  This  person,  while  yet  a  youth,  had 
several  paroxysms  of  mental  disorder,  which  were  accompa- 
nied by  such  a  spirit  of  violence  and  mischief,  as  to  require 
his  close  confinement  at  home.  He  got  married,  however, 
went  into  the  back  settlements,  and,  by  means  of  his  industry 
and  energy,  he  accumulated  some  property,  while  he  was 
respected  for  his  many  virtues.  Every  two  or  three  years 
he  had  an  attack  of  his  mental  disorder,  when  he  neglected 
his  usual  employments,  launched  into  speculations  of  every 
kind,  and  projected  schemes  for  making  money.  He  talked 
loud  and  fast,  became  irritable  and  despotic,  impatient  of 
contradiction  and  easily  offended.  At  the  same  time,  he 
conceived  a  high  idea  of  his  religious  attainments,  and  fre- 
quented religious  meetings  where  he  was  distinguished  by 
the  fervor  of  his  exhortations  and  prayers.  Finally,  having 
squandered  the  most  of  his  property,  and  treated  his  wife 
quite  roughly,  she  had  him  placed  in  a  hospital.  He  came 
in  breathing  out  threatenings  and  slaughter  against  all  who 
had  any  hand  in  the  measure,  while  he  explained,  with  great 
plausibility,  every  incident  which  had  been  represented  as 
indicative  of  insanity.  He  continued  to  be  wild  and  turbu- 
lent, and  was  a  perpetual  source  of  strife  and  trouble.  His 
principal  employment  was  to  make  mischief,  by  fomenting 
troubles  between  fellow-patients,  disaffecting  them  towards 
the  physicians  and  attendants,  and,  in  one  way  05  another, 
annoying  every-body  around  him.  He  set  at  nought  every 

i  A  report  of  Earl  Ferrers's  trial  may  be  found  in  Hargrave's  State  Trials, 
and  it  is  noticed  at  considerable  length  in  Smollet's  Continuation  of  Hume's 
History  of  England.  Some  valuable  comments  on  this  case,  are  contained  in 
Combe's  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  204,  to  which  every  reader  is 
referred,  who  is  more  anxious  to  enlighten  his  rnind  by  correct  facts  and 
philosophical  views,  than  to  confirm  his  errors  and  gratify  his  prejudices  by 
obstinately  shutting  his  eyes  against  the  progress  of  scientific  improvement. 


178  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

rule  of  propriety,  while  incessantly  charging  others  with  mis- 
behavior, and  representing  himself  as  an  object  of  persecution 
and  abuse.  From  cursing  and  swearing,  it  was  an  easy 
transition  to  praying ;  and,  whether  entertaining  others  with 
coarse  and  vulgar  talk,  or  a  strain  of  religious  discourse 
calculated  to  deceive  the  very  elect,  he  seemed  to  be  equally 
pleased.  He  stole  whatever  he  could  lay  his  hands  upon, 
and  hoarded  all  kinds  of  worthless  things.  In  the  course  of 
four  or  five  months,  his  natural  character  began  to  return, 
and  in  two  or  three  more  he  went  home  quite  restored.  In 
about  two  years,  he  was  again  attacked,  and  again  was 
placed  in  the  hospital. 

§  156.  The  following  case  from  Metzger  is  cited  by 
Hoffbauer,  who  observes  that  the  patient  labored  under  no 
delusion,  properly  speaking,  but  was  only  not  master  of  his 
actions. 

A  Russian  colonel  came  to  Konigsberg  to  receive  an 
inheritance,  and  committed  there  so  many  acts  of  violence, 
that  he  was  summoned  before  the  ,tribunal  of  justice.  His 
conduct  before  the  magistrates  was  equally  unreasonable. 
He  had  become  so  much  an  object  of  dread  at  Konigsberg, 
that  nobody  would  execute  any  commission  for  him,  —  the 
very  chimney-sweepers  required  a  guard  if  sent  to  sweep  his 
chimneys.  At  last,  after  several  complaints  made  against 
him,  he  was  arrested  because  he  had  threatened  to  stab  his 
landlord  with  a  pitchfork  for  demanding  his  rent,  and  pursued 
him  with  that  intent.  "  In  going  into  the  prison,"  says 
Metzger,  "  I  saw  an  old  man  with  white  hair,  of  a  respect- 
able appearance,  who  received  me  politely.  I  first  inquired 
concerning  his  health.  '  I  am  ill,  through  old  age,'  he  replied, 
'  and  tormented  with  gout,  with  the  stone,  and  with  the 
scurvy,  evils  for  which  I  can  have  no  remedy.'  He  desired 
to  know  who  had  sent  me  to  see  him  ;  I  told  him  it  was  the 
tribunal.  'I  ought  to  be  judged,'  he  replied,  'by  a  French 
tribunal,'  and  he  pretended  that  I  should  find  proof  of  what 
he  said  in  a  writing  which  he  forced  me  to  take.  At  last 
I  informed  him  of  the  reason  of  his  arrest.  His  eyes  then 
sparkled,  and  he  said  in  French,  with  much  volubility,  that 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  179 

M.  M. and  were  his  mortal  enemies ;    that 

they  had  several  times  tried  to  ruin  him  ;  that  he  had  expe- 
rienced much  injustice  and  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
tribunal ;  and  that  they  had  disposed,  as  they  pleased,  of  his 
brother's  inheritance.  Being  asked  what  were  his  occupa- 
tions, he  replied,  '  that  he  was,  as  every  honest  man  should 
be,  free  and  content,  even  in  prison  ;  that  he  amused  himself 
with  poetry,  and  copied  verses  relating  to  his  situation.' " l 

§  157.  The  following  cases  are  taken  from  Prichard. 
"  I.  K.,  a  farmer,  several  of  whose  relatives  had  been  the 
subjects  of  mental  derangement,  was  a  man  of  sober  and 
domestic  habits,  and  frugal  and  steady  in  his  conduct,  until 
about  his  forty-fifth  year,  when  his  disposition  appeared  to 
have  become  suddenly  changed  in  a  manner  which  excited 
the  surprise  of  his  friends  and  neighbors,  and  occasioned 
grief  and  vexation  in  his  family.  He  became  wild,  excitable, 
thoughtless,  full  of  schemes  and  absurd  projects.  He  would 
set  out  and  make  long  journeys  into  distant  parts  of  the 
country  to  purchase  cattle  and  farming-stock,  of  which  he 
had  no  means  of  disposing ;  he  bought  a  number  of  carriages, 
hired  an  expensive  house  ready  furnished,  which  had  been 
inhabited  by  a  person  much  above  his  rank,  and  was  unsuit- 
able to  his  condition ;  he  was  irascible  and  impetuous,  quar- 
relled with  his  neighbors,  and  committed  an  assault  upon 
the  clergyman  of  the  parish,  for  which  he  was  indicted  and 
bound  to  take  his  trial.  At  length  his  wife  became  con- 
vinced that  he  was  mad,  and  made  application  for  his 
confinement  in  a  lunatic  asylum,  which  was  consequently 
effected.  The  medical  practitioners  who  examined  him  were 
convinced  of  his  insanity,  by  comparing  his  late  wild  habits 
and  unaccountable  conduct  with  the  former  tenor  of  his 
life,  taking  into  consideration  the  tendency  to  disease  which 
was  known  to  prevail  in  his  family.  The  change  in  his  char- 
acter alone  had  produced  a  full  conviction  of  his  madness  in 
his  friends  and  relatives.  When  questioned  as  to  the  motives 
which  induced  him  to  some  of  his  late  proceedings,  he  gave 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  126. 


MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

clear  and  distinct  replies,  and  assigned,  with  great  ingenuity, 
some  plausible  reason  for  almost  every  part  of  his  conduct." 
§  158.  "  Abraham  B.,  a  working  tradesman  of  industri- 
ous and  sober  habits,  conducted  himself  with  propriety  until 
about  forty-six  years  of  age,  and  had  accumulated  a  con- 
siderable property  from  the  fruits  of  his  exertions.  About 
that  period  he  lost  his  wife,  and  after  her  death  became  more 
and  more  penurious.  At  length  he  denied  himself  the  comforts, 
and  in  a  great  measure,  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  became 
half-starved  and  diseased ;  his  body  was  emaciated  and  beset 
with  scaly  eruptions.  Mr.  S.,  a  gentleman  who  had  long 
known  him,  hearing  of  the  condition  into  which  he  had  sunk, 
sent  a  medical  practitioner  to  visit  him,  by  whose  advice  B. 
was  removed  from  a  miserable  dirty  lodging  to  a  lunatic 
asylum.  Mr.  S.,  who  wras  present  on  the  occasion,  observed 
that  Abraham  B.,  previously  to  his  quitting  the  room  in 
which  he  had  immured  himself,  kept  his  eyes  fixed  on  an  old 
trunk  in  the  corner  of  the  apartment.  This  was  afterwards 
emptied  of  its  contents,  and  in  it  were  found,  in  the  midst  of 
various  articles,  dirty  bank-notes,  which  had  been  thrown  into 
it  apparently  at  different  times  to  the  value  of  more  than  a 
thousand  pounds.  Abraham  B.,  after  his  removal  to  an  asy- 
lum where  he  had  wholesome  food  and  exercise,  soon  began 
to  recover  from  his  bodily  infirmities,  and  at  length  became 
anxious  to  be  at  large.  The  writer  of  this  article  visited  him 
and  conversed  with  him  for  some  time,  in  order  to  ascertain 
his  mental  condition.  He  betrayed  no  sign  of  intellectual 
delusion,  nor  did  it  appear  that  any  thing  of  that  description 
had  ever  been  a  part  of  his  complaint.  His  replies  to  ques- 
tions were  rational  according  to  the  extent  of  his  natural 
capacity.  He  was  determined  to  go  and  manage  his  prop- 
erty, and  get  a  wife  who  should  take  care  of  him.  In  a  few 
days  after  his  release  he  was  married  to  a  servant  belonging 
to  the  lunatic  asylum  where  he  had  been  confined.  His  new 
wife  found  after  some  months  that  it  was  impossible  to  endure 
the  strange  conduct  of  her  husband,  and  after  various  expedi- 
ents, brought  him  back  to  tfie  asylum,  with  a  certificate  from 
a  medical  man,  who  had  examined  him  and  declared  him  to 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  181 

be  insane.  He  still  remains  in  confinement,  and  his  derange- 
ment is  now  more  complete  than  formerly,  as  it  plainly  in- 
volves his  intellect." l 

§  159.  These  are  no  uncommon  instances  of  that  con- 
dition of  mind  so  often  mistaken  for  any  thing  rather  than 
what  it  really  is  —  mental  derangement.  Its  true  nature 
was  here  recognized  by  intelligent  practitioners  who  looked 
beyond  the  circle  of  a  definition,  and  might  have  been  re- 
cognized, perhaps,  by  others  of  narrower  views,  in  a  calm 
investigation  for  therapeutical  purposes ;  but,  amid  the  excite- 
ment produced  by  great  criminal  acts,  and  the  struggles  be- 
tween knowledge  and  ignorance,  truth  and  prejudice,  that 
spring  up  in  judicial  investigations,  how  seldom,  alas,  has  it 
been  discerned.  The  following  cases  in  which  this  perver- 
sion of  the  moral  faculties  was  accompanied  in  its  latter 
stages,  by  some  delusions,  furnishes  a  striking  illustration  of 
this  form  of  disease,  as  well  as  its  intimate  connection 
with  intellectual  mania. 

§  160.  Col.  M.  was  a  man  of  superior  intellectual  powers, 
and  moved  in  the  higher  walks  of  society.  He  was  a  lawyer 
by  profession,  and  was  appointed  District  Attorney  in  one  of 
the  South-western  States  by  President  Jackson  whom  he  had 
previously  served  in  a  military  capacity.  Towards  the  me- 
ridian of  life,  his  conduct  became  so  disorderly  and  boister- 
ous, that  he  was  often  confined  in  jails  or  hospitals  for  the 
insane.  On  one  of  these  occasions  he  cut  off  his  nose,  and 
subsequently  came  to  Boston  in  order  to  have  it  replaced  by 
Dr.  J.  Mason  Warren,  by  means  of  the  rhinoplastic  operation 
which  proved  quite  successful.  While  in  Boston  he  made 
the  acquaintance  of  Dr.  Bell  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  for  the 
purpose,  as  he  declared,  of  getting  his  aid  in  obtaining  redress 
for  the  wrongs  he  had  sustained,  in  being  placed  under 
guardianship,  and  confined  in  jails  and  hospitals,  his  object 
being  not  to  retaliate,  but  to  protect  his  future  reputation. 
The  Dr.  has  kindly  furnished  such  particulars  of  his  case  as 
came  to  his  knowledge  from  various  sources.  "  I  inferred 

1  Op.  cit  sup.  831. 
16 


182  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

that  he  was  naturally  of  a  proud,  arrogant,  and  extravagant 
spirit  which  was  kept  in  check,  while  she  lived,  by  the  discre- 
tion of  his  wife.  He  was  sensual,  but  not  intemperate  until  his 
nervous  system  had  become  excited.  His  peculiar  theory  was, 
that  while  he  admitted  that  he  had  held  —  and,  towards  the 
last  of  my  interview,  avowed  that  he  then  held  —  certain  fan- 
ciful notions  which  we  might  term  delusions,  if  we  pleased, 
still  they  were  such  as  did  not  interfere  with  his  right  to  en- 
tire liberty  of  action.  '  For  instance,'  said  he,  '  I  feel  that  I 
am  cousin  to  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  to  Napoleon.  It 
seems  ridiculous.  I  can't  make  it  out  by  any  kind  of  proof. 
I  even  laugh  at  it.  But  still,  I  dwell  upon  it  as  a  reality.  It 
concerns  nobody  else.  It  has  in  it  no  dangerous  element. 
Why,  then,  should  I  be  interfered  with  for  harboring  a  delu- 
sion, if  you  choose  to  call  it  so,  no  more  absurd  than  a  thou- 
sand religious  sects  feel  themselves  happy  in  resting  upon.' 
He  would  often  argue  thus  :  '  I  protest  against  being  called 
insane  on  account  of  my  ideas.  For  my  actions  I  am 
accountable.  I  never  yet  claimed  —  I  never  will  claim  — 
immunity  as  an  irresponsible  being.  I  will  permit  no  one  to 
set  up  such  a  defence  for  me.  Try  me  by  the  laws  of  the 
land  and  the  strict  rules  of  evidence,  and  I  will  abide  by  the 
result,  as  a  good  citizen,  but  I  must  have  opportunity  to 
argue  my  own  cause,  and  examine  the  witnesses  brought 
against  me.' 

"  He  had  often  been  arrested  for  assault  and  battery,  but 
always  continued  to  beat  the  complainants,  by  his  familiarity 
with  legal  proceedings,  and  by  his  quick  perception  of  whatever 
made  for  or  against  himself.  If,  in  his  best  estate  he  had 
been  counsel  for  another  party,  he  could  not  have  managed 
the  case  better  than  he  did  his  own.  However  wild,  extrava- 
gant, and  boisterous  at  hotels  and  such  places,  of  which  he 
was  the  terror,  as  soon  as  he  was  in  the  atmosphere  of  a 
court  of  justice,  he  became  calm,  dignified,  and  respectful,  but 
tenacious  to  the  last  degree.  For  example,  when  carried 
before  the  police-judge  in  New  York,  on  a  warrant,  the  print- 
ed form  of  which  had  been  in  use  for  twenty  years,  setting 
forth  that  in  consequence  of  insanity  '  or  otherwise,'  he  was 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  183 

dangerous  to  be  at  large,  he,  at  once,  advocated  successfully 
his  constitutional  right  to  have  the  offence  set  forth  specifi- 
cally and  precisely. 

"  He  had  most  carefully  considered  the  extent  of  his  rights, 
—  the  precise  amount  of  force  justifiable  in  ejecting  an  un- 
welcome guest,  or,  what  was  a  more  common  event,  in  resist- 
ing an  ejectment;  the  obligation  of  inn-holders  to  receive  ap- 
plicants, and  the  value  of  proving  the  first  blow  in  defence 
of  assaults.  On  one  occasion,  thinking  the  hack-men  and 
cab-men  of  New  York  were  insolent  and  exacting  in  regard 
to  the  right  of  way,  he  armed  himself  with  a  heavy  whip, 
took  a  good  witness  by  his  side,  and  drove  through  Broad- 
way in  a  strong  carriage,  running  against  every  charioteer 
who  failed  to  give  him  his  exact  half  of  the  road.  This  of 
course  produced  a  collision  of  tongues  as  well  as  wheels. 
His  peculiarly  sarcastic  language  tempted  a  touch  of  the 
whip  from  some  of  his  opponents,  and  upon  this,  our  hero 
turned  to  and  thrashed  them  within  an  inch  of  their  lives. 
They  appealed  to  the  courts,  but  his  witness  soon  and  truly 
proved  the  aggression  on  them. 

"  While  in  the  Pennsylvania  hospital  for  the  insane,  and 
again,  I  believe,  while  in  the  jail  in  Washington,  he  got  dis- 
charged by  means  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  which  he  was 
allowed  to  sue  out.  When  thus  brought  before  the  court,  he 
argued  his  case  upon  the  settled  legal  doctrine,  that  an  ability 
to  distinguish  right  from  wrong  is  the  sole  test  of  sanity.  Of 
course,  no  judge  did  or  could  hesitate  in  opinion,  that  a 
gentleman  who  was  able  to  make  an  elegant  and  an  astute 
argument  on  the  nature,  origin,  and  protection  of  the  rights 
of  the  subject,  could,  by  any  means,  be  within  the  category 
of  individuals  intellectually  incapable  of  discriminating  be- 
tween right  and  wrong.  In  fact,  processes  of  detention  as  a 
lunatic,  held,  in  his  case,  only  until  he  could  get  before  some 
tribunal.  And  yet  when  thus  turned  loose  upon  society,  he 
was  a  passionate,  dangerous  lunatic.  When  hard  pushed 
by  evidence  of  extravagant  and  boisterous  conduct,  he  would 
attribute  the  fact  to  his  having  unfortunately  taken  a  little 
too  much  wine,  (which  was  probably  true  to  some  extent,) 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

comprehending  perfectly  that  an  offence  of  that  kind  would 
be  followed  by  a  much  lighter  consequence  —  a  mere  fine,  in 
fact  —  than  seclusion  as  a  lunatic.  When  the  self-mutila- 
tion was  alluded  to,  he  would  most  frankly  attribute  it  to  his 
ignorance  of  physiological  laws,  and  allege  that  his  lost  organ 
being  covered  with  blotches  and  carbuncles,  he  cut  it  off', 
absurdly  supposing  that  nature  had  a  renewing  power,  as  in 
the  growth  of  the  hair. 

"  After  he  became  so  wild  in  his  conduct  in  Boston,  as  to 
be  a  universal  annoyance,  I  advised  his  friends  in  Missouri 
to  place  him  under  care  as  a  lunatic.  They  replied  that  the 
thing  was  impracticable ;  that  no  institution  had  been  found 
able  to  hold  him,  and  they  would  not  arouse  his  vindictive 
feelings  by  any  farther  trials  of  that  sort.  His  intemperate 
habits  increased,  and  his  delusions  became  more  palpable, 
yet  without  affecting  his  intellectual  power.  The  idea 
returned,  that  parts  of  his  face,  if  removed,  would  grow  again, 
and  he  cut  out  the  cicatrix  on  his  forehead  whence  the 
nasal  flap  had  been  taken.  Fortunately,  death  stepped  in 
at  this  point,  and  removed  a  man  whose  fate  was  so  melan- 
choly, for  under  all  the  ravages  of  mental  disease,  there  were 
traces  of  noble  sentiments  and  lofty  aspirations." 

§  161.  There  is  another  form  of  moral  insanity  deeply 
interesting  in  its  medico-legal  relations,  that  has  been  almost 
entirely  overlooked.  It  is  a  fact  "well-established  in  this 
country  at  least,  that  masturbation,  or  self-pollution  is  a  pro- 
lific cause  of  mental  derangement  in  young  subjects.  It 
deserves  our  especial  attention  for  the  reason,  that  although 
the  intellect  finally  suffers  deeply  and  rapidly,  yet  in  its  ini- 
tiatory stage,  the  moral  and  affective  powers  may  be  seri- 
ously perverted,  while  the  conduct  and  conversation  of  the 
individual  may  be  outwardly  marked  by  his  usual  propriety. 
Long  before  any  intellectual  aberration  is  observed,  and 
while  the  patient  is  merely  moody  and  reserved,  his  mind 
may  be  tortured  by  fears  and  suspicions  that  mar  his  peace 
and  sometimes  lead  him  to  acts  of  violence.  Dr.  Bell,  the 
accomplished  physician  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massa- 
chusetts, observes  that  he  knew  "  a  pious,  intelligent  student, 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  185 

pursuing  his  daily  avocations  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  friends 
and  instructors,  who  nightly  slept  with  a  weapon  under  his 
pillow  to  protect  himself  from  an  attack  from  one  whom  he 
had  scarcely  seen,  and  to  whom  he  had  never  spoken ;  and 
when  convinced  of  his  delusion  by  proofs  so  overpowering 
that  his  mind  was  obliged  to  acknowledge  its  assent,  he 
merely  transferred  his  suspicions  to  another  equally  innocent 
individual."  Had  this  young  man  met  the  object  of  his 
suspicions  and  shot  him  dead,  how  few  could  have  been 
brought  to  believe  that  he  acted  under  the  influence  of  in- 
sanity, and  was  consequently  irresponsible!  How  feeble 
would  have  been  any  evidence  of  his  insanity  but  such  as 
had  reference  expressly  to  the  particular  form  under  which 
he  was  laboring !  Such  a  case  as  this  should  make  a  strong 
impression  on  the  mind  of  the  medical  jurist.  When  an  act 
of  violence  is  committed  by  a  young  subject  without  any 
apparent  motive,  and  without  any  obvious  signs  of  insanity, 
it  should  always  be  ascertained,  if  possible,  whether  he  has 
been  addicted  to  masturbation,  and  whether  he  has  shown 
any  of  those  changes  of  temper  and  habit  which  generally 
accompany  the  incipient  stage  of  this  form  of  mental 
derangement.  If  it  appear  that  he  has  practised  this  vice, 
and  especially  if  he  have  also  manifested  its  usual  moral 
effects,  then  is  there  strong  ground  for  believing  that  his  mind 
was  possessed  by  a  delusion  which  farther  inquiry  may  bring 
to  light.  This  form  of  disease  is  not  yet,  perhaps,  sufficiently 
understood,  to  warrant  us  in  furnishing  an  exact  detail  of  its 
phenomena.  Reference  must  be  had  to  the  opinions  of  those 
who  have  had  opportunities  of  observing  it,  and  to  the  few 
valuable  contributions  that  have  been  made  to  the  subject.1 
§  162.  A  very  common  feature  of  moral  mania,  as  has 
been  already  stated,  is  a  deep  perversion  of  the  social  affec- 


1  An  Hour's  Conference  with  Fathers  and  Sons  in  relation  to  a  common 
and  fatal  Indulgence  of  Youth.  By  L.  V.  Bell,  M.  D.,  Superintendent  of  the 
McLean  Asylum,  1840.  Hints  to  the  Young,  in  relation  to  Health  of  Body 
and  Mind.  By  S.  Woodward,  M.  D.,  Superintendent  of  the  Mass.  Lun. 
Hospital.  See  also  Dr.  Bell's  last  Report,  (1843),  pp.  39,  40. 

16* 


186  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tions,  whereby  the  feelings  of  kindness  and  attachment  that 
flow  from  the  relations  of  father,  husband,  and  child,  are 
replaced  by  a  perpetual  inclination  to  tease,  worry,  and  em- 
bitter the  existence  of  others.  The  ordinary  scene  of  its 
manifestations  is  the  patient's  own  domestic  circle,  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  which  are  effectually  destroyed  by  the  out- 
breakings  of  his  ungovernable  temper,  and  even  by  acts  of 
brutal  ferocity.  Frederic  William  of  Prussia,  father  of  Fred- 
eric the  Great,  undoubtedly  labored  under  this  form  of  moral 
mania ;  and  it  furnishes  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  his 
brutal  treatment  of  his  son  and  his  utter  disregard  of  the 
feelings  or  comfort  of  any  other  member  of  his  family. 
About  a  dozen  years  before  his  death,  his  health  gave  way 
under  his  constant  debauches  in  drunkenness,  he  became 
hypochondriacal,  and  redoubled  his  usual  religious  austeri- 
ties. He  forbade  his  family  to  talk  of  any  subject  but  reli- 
gion, read  them  daily  sermons,  and  compelled  them  to  sing, 
punishing  with  the  utmost  severity  any  inattention  to  these 
exercises.  The  prince  and  his  eldest  sister  soon  began  to 
attract  a  disproportionate  share  of  his  hostility.  He  obliged 
them  to  eat  and  drink  unwholesome  or  nauseous  articles, 
and  would  even  spit  in  their  dishes,  addressing  them  only  in 
the  language  of  invective,  and  at  times  endeavoring  to  strike 
them  with  his  crutch.  About  this  time  he  attempted  to 
strangle  himself,  and  would  have  accomplished  his  design, 
had  not  the  queen  come  to  his  assistance.  His  brutality 
towards  the  prince  at  last  arrived  to  such  a  pitch,  that  he, 
one  morning,  seized  him  by  the  collar  as  he  entered  his  bed- 
chamber, and  began  beating  him  with  a  cane  in  the  crudest 
manner,  till  obliged  to  desist  from  pure  exhaustion.  On 
another  occasion,  shortly  after,  he  seized  his  son  by  the  hair 
and  threw  him  on  the  ground,  beating  him  till  he  was  tired, 
when  he  dragged  him  to  a  window  apparently  for  the  pur- 
pose of  throwing  him  out.  A  servant,  hearing  the  cries  of 
the  prince,  came  to  his  assistance,  and  delivered  him  from  his 
hands.  Not  satisfied  with  treating  him  in  this  barbarous 
manner,  he  endeavored,  though  unsuccessfully,  by  a  similar 
course  of  conduct,  to  make  him  sign  an  act  renouncing  his 


GENEKAL  MORAL   MANIA.  187 

claim  to  the  succession  of  the  Prussian  throne,  in  favor  of 
his  brother.  To  obtain  this  end,  though  in  a  different  man- 
ner, he  connived  at  the  prince's  attempts  to  escape  from  his 
tyranny,  in  order  that  he  might  procure  from  a  court-martial 
a  sentence  of  death,  and  this  even  he  was  anxious  to  antici- 
pate, by  endeavoring  to  run  him  through  the  body  with  his 
sword.  Not  succeeding  in  procuring  his  death  by  judicial 
proceedings,  he  kept  him  in  confinement,  and  turned  all  his 
thoughts  towards  converting  him  to  Christianity.  At  this 
time,  we  first  find  mention  of  any  delusion  connected  with 
his  son,  though  it  probably  existed  before.  In  his  correspond- 
ence with  the  chaplain  to  whom  he  had  intrusted  the  charge 
of  converting  the  prince,  he  speaks  of  him  as  one  who  had 
committed  many  and  heinous  sins  against  God  and  the  king, 
as  having  a  hardened  heart  and  being  in  the  fangs  of  satan. 
Even  after  he  became  satisfied  with  the  repentance  of  the 
prince,  he  showed  no  disposition  to  relax  the  severities  of  his 
confinement.  He  was  kept  in  a  miserable  room,  deprived  of 
all  the  comforts  and  many  of  the  necessaries  of  life,  denied 
the  use  of  pens,  ink,  and  paper,  and  allowed  scarcely  food 
enough  to  prevent  starvation.  His  treatment  of  the  princess 
was  no  less  barbarous.  She  was  also  confined,  and  every 
effort  used  to  make  her  situation  thoroughly  wretched,  —  and 
though,  after  a  few  years,  he  relaxed  his  persecution  of  his 
children,  the  general  tenor  of  his  conduct  towards  his  family 
and  others,  evinced  little  improvement  in  his  disorder,  till  the 
day  of  his  death.1 

§  163.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  affection  above 
described,  is  far  more  common  in  the  ordinary  walks  of 
society,  than  is  generally  imagined.  .It  is  so  imperfectly 
understood,  however,  that  those  singular  freaks  of  conduct 
and  whimsical  notions  which  would  unquestionably  subject 
a  person  to  the  imputation  of  insanity,  were  there  the  slight- 
est aberration  of  reason,  are  set  down  to  eccentricity  of  tem- 
per, or  inherently  vicious  dispositions.  The  suspicion  that 

1  Lord  Dover's  Life  of  Frederic  IT.  King  of  Prussia,  vol.  1,  B.  1,  chap. 
2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7. 


188  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

they  spring  from  insanity,  is  immediately  dispelled  by  calling 
to  mind  the  general  correctness  of  his  views,  and  the  steadi- 
iness  and  sagacity  with  which  he  pursues  his  daily  avoca- 
tions. And  so  intimately  connected  are  the  ideas  of  insanity 
and  delusion  in  the  common  mind,  that  it  requires  no  little 
courage  and  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  practitioner  who 
ventures,  in  a  given  case,  to  declare  the  existence  of  the 
former,  independently  of  the  latter.  The  consequences  of 
these  erroneous  views  are  often  strikingly  and  painfully 
exhibited,  when  a  person  thus  affected  becomes  the  object  of 
a  legal  procedure.  While  he  may  be  described  by  one,  as 
acute  and  methodical  in  his  business,  and  rational  in  his 
discourse,  and  believed  to  be  perfectly  sane ;  another  will 
testify  to  the  strangest  freaks  that  ever  a  madman  played, 
and  thence  deduce  the  conviction  of  his  insanity ;  while  one 
represents  him  as  social  and  kindly  in  his  disposition,  ready 
to  assist  and  oblige,  and  to  accommodate  himself  to  the 
varying  humors  of  those  about  him,  it  will  be  testified  by 
another,  that  in  his  domestic  relations,  his  former  cheerful- 
ness has  given  way  to  gloom  and  moroseness,  that  equa- 
nimity of  temper  has  been  replaced  by  frequent  gusts  of  pas- 
sion, and  that  the  warm  affections,  which  spring  from  the 
relations  of  parent  and  child,  husband  and  wife,  have  been 
transformed  into  indifference  or  hate.  These  are  the  cases 
that  confound  the  wise  and  defy  the  scrutiny  of  the  skilful, 
while  they  tempt  the  superficial  and  conceited  to  betray  their 
ignorance,  under  the  delusion  of  superior  penetration ;  which 
tarnish  many  a  professional  reputation,  and  expose  even  the 
pretensions  of  true  science  to  popular  mockery  and  derision.1 

1  Many  striking  cases  of  moral  mania  might  have  been  related  which  have 
come  under  the  author's  own  observation,  but  as  this  could  not  be  done 
without  giving  pain,  probably,  to  the  patients  themselves  or  their  friends,  it 
was  deemed  advisable  to  draw  entirely  from  foreign  sources. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  189 

SECTION   II. 

Partial  Moral  Mania. 

§  164.  In  this  form  of  insanity,  the  derangement  is  con- 
fined to  one  or  a  few  of  the  affective  faculties,  the  rest  of  the 
moral  and  intellectual  constitution  preserving  its  ordinary 
integrity.  An  exaltation  of  the  vital  forces  in  any  part  of 
the  cerebral  organism,  must  necessarily  be  followed  by  in- 
creased activity  and  energy  in  the  manifestations  of  the  fac- 
ulty connected  with  it,  and  which  may  even  be  carried  to 
such  a  pitch  as  to  be  beyond  the  control  of  any  other  power, 
like  the  working  of  a  blind,  instinctive  impulse.  Accord- 
ingly, we  see  the  faculty  thus  affected,  prompting  the  indi- 
vidual to  action  by  a  kind  of  instinctive  irresistibility,  and 
while  he  retains  the  most  perfect  consciousness  of  the  im- 
propriety and  even  enormity  of  his  conduct,  he  deliberately 
and  perseveringly  pursues  it.  With  no  extraordinary  temp- 
tations to  sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  with  every  inducement  to 
refrain  from  it,  and  apparently  in  the  full  possession  of  his 
reason,  he  commits  a  crime  whose  motives  are  equally  inex- 
plicable to  himself  and  to  others.  The  ends  of  justice  re- 
quire that  this  class  of  cases  should  be  viewed  in  their  true 
light ;  and  while  it  is  not  denied  that  their  similarity  to  other 
cases  in  which  mental  unsoundness  is  never  supposed  to 
have  existed,  renders  such  a  view  difficult,  yet  this  very 
difficulty  is  a  fresh  reason  for  extending  our  inquiries  and 
increasing  our  information.  In  the  account  now  to  be  given 
of  partial  moral  mania,  those  forms  of  it  only  will  be  noticed 
which  have  the  most  important  legal  relations. 

§  165.  Instances  of  an  irresistible  propensity  to  steal, 
unaccompanied  by  any  intellectual  alienation,  are  related  on 
good  authority,  and  are  by  no  means  rare.  "  There  are 
persons,"  says  Dr.  Hush,  "who  are  moral  to  the  highest 
degree  as  to  certain  duties,  but  who,  nevertheless,  live  under 
the  influence  of  some  one  vice.  In  one  instance,  a  woman 


190  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

was  exemplary  in  her  obedience  to  every  command  of  the 
moral  law,  except  one,  —  she  could  not  refrain  from  stealing. 
What  made  this  vice  more  remarkable  was,  that  she  was  in 
easy  circumstances,  and  not  addicted  to  extravagance  in 
any  thing.  Such  was  the  propensity  to  this  vice,  that  when 
she  could  lay  her  hands  on  nothing  more  valuable,  she  would 
often  at  the  table  of  a  friend,  fill  her  pockets  secretly  with 
bread.  She  both  confessed  and  lamented  her  crime." l  Cases 
like  this  are  so  common,  that  they  must  have  come  within 
the  personal  knowledge  of  every  reader  who  has  seen  much 
of  the  world,  so  that  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  mention  them 
more  particularly.2  It  would  be  difficult  to  prove  directly, 
that  this  propensity,  continuing  as  it  does  during  a  whole 
life,  and  in  a  state  of  apparently  perfect  health,  is,  notwith- 
standing, a  consequence  of  diseased  or  abnormal  action  in 
the  brain,  but  the  presumptive  evidence  in  favor  of  this 
explanation  is  certainly  strong.  First,  it  is  very  often  ob- 
served in  abnormal  conformations  of  the  head,  and  accom- 
panied by  an  imbecile  condition  of  the  understanding.  Gall 
and  Spurzheim  saw  in  the  prison  of  Berne  a  boy  twelve 
years  old,  who  could  never  refrain  from  stealing.  He  is 
described  as  "  ill-organized  and  rickety."  At  Haina  they 
were  shown  an  obstinate  robber  whom  no  corporal  punish- 
ment could  correct.  He  appeared  about  sixteen  years  of 
age,  though  he  was  in  fact  twenty-six  ;  his  head  was  round, 
and  about  the  size  of  a  child's  one  year  old.  He  was  also 
deaf  and  dumb,  a  common  accompaniment  of  mental  imbe- 
cility. An  instructive  case  has  been  lately  recorded,  in  which 
this  propensity  seemed  to  be  the  result  of  a  rickety  and 
scrofulous  constitution.8  Secondly,  this  propensity  to  steal 
is  not  unfrequently  observed  in  undoubted  mania.  Pinel 
says  it  is  a  matter  of  common  observation,  that  some  mani- 
acs who,  in  their  lucid  intervals,  are  justly  considered  models 
of  probity,  cannot  refrain  from  stealing  and  cheating  during 

1  Medical  Inquiries  and  Observations,  1. 

2  In   Gall's  large  work,   On  the  Functions  of  the  Brain,  iv.  131,  Boston 
edition,  the  reader  will  find  a  considerable  number  of  these  cases  related. 

8  Phrenological  Journal,  x.  459. 


PAKTIAL   MORAL  MANIA.  191 

the  paroxysm.1     Gall  mentions  the  case  of  two  citizens  of 
Vienna,  who,  on  becoming  insane,  were  distinguished  in  the 
hospital   for   an   extraordinary  propensity   to    steal,  though 
previously  they  had  lived  irreproachable  lives.     They  wan- 
dered over  the  house  from  morning  to  night,  picking  up 
whatever  they  could   lay  their   hands   upon,  —  straw,  rags, 
clothes,  wood,  etc.,  which  they  carefully  concealed  in  their 
room.2     A  propensity  to  theft  is  recognized  by  Prichard,  as 
being  often  a  feature  of  moral  mania,  and,  sometimes,  the 
leading  if  not  the  sole  character  of  the  disease,  and  he  men- 
tions a  lunatic  who  would  never  eat  his  food,  unless  he  had 
previously  stolen  it,  and  accordingly  his  keeper  was  obliged 
to  put  it  into  some  corner  within  his  reach,  in  order  that  he 
might  discover  and  take  it  furtively.8     Thirdly,  it  has  been 
known  to  follow  diseases  or  injuries  of  the  brain,  and  there- 
fore to  be  dependent  on  morbid  action.     Acrel  mentions  the 
case  of  a  young  man,  who  after  receiving  a  severe  wround 
on  the  temple,  for  which  he  was  trepanned,  manifested  an 
invincible  propensity  to  steal,  which  was  quite  contrary  to 
his  ordinary  disposition.     After  committing  several  larcenies, 
he  was  imprisoned,  and  would  have  been  punished  according 
to  law,  had  not  Acrel  declared  him  insane,  and  attributed 
his  unfortunate  propensity  to  a  disorder  of  the  brain.     In  the 
Journal  de  Paris,  March  29th,  1816,  appeared  the  following 
paragraph :  "  An  ex-commissary  of  police  at  Toulouse,  Beau- 
Conseil,  has  just  been  condemned  to  eight  years  confinement 
and  hard  labor,  and  to  the  pillory,  for  having,  while  in  office, 
stolen  some  pieces  of  plate  from  an  inn.     The  accused  per- 
sisted to  the  last  in  an  odd  kind  of  defence ;  he  did  not  deny 
the  crime,  but  attributed  it  to  mental  derangement  produced 
by  wounds  he  had  received  at  Marseilles  in  1815." 4     The 
late  Dr.  Smith,  of  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  once  observed 
a  similar  effect  consecutive  to  an   attack/  of  typhus  fever. 
"  One  patient  in  particular,  who  had  been   extremely  sick 
with  this  disease,  after  his  recovery,  had  a  strong  propensity 


1  Op.  cit  sup.  §  132.  2  Ibid.  iv.  131. 

3  Ibid.  829.  *  Quoted  by  Gall  in  Ibid.  141. 


192  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

to  steal,  and  did  in  effect  take  some  articles  of  clothing 
from  a  young  man  to  whom  he  was  under  great  obligations 
for  the  care  which  he  had  taken  of  him  during  his  sickness. 
He  at  length  stole  a  horse  and  some  money,  was  detected 
and  punished.  I  took  some  pains  to  inquire  into  the  young 
man's  former  character,  and  found  it  good,  and  that  his 
family  were  respectable." 1  Fourthly,  this  propensity  to  steal 
is  sometimes  followed  by  general  mania.  Foderd  relates  the 
case  of  a  female  servant  in  his  own  family,  who  could  not 
help  stealing  secretly  from  himself  and  others,  articles,  even 
of  a  trifling  value ;  though  she  was  intelligent,  modest,  and 
religious,  and  was  all  the  while  conscious  of  and  admitted 
the  turpitude  of  her  actions.  He  placed  her  in  a  hospital, 
considering  her  insane,  and  after  apparent  restoration  and  a 
long  trial,  he  again  took  her  into  his  service.  Gradually,  in 
spite  of  herself,  the  instinct  again  mastered  her,  and  in  the 
midst  of  an  incessant  struggle  between  her  vicious  propen- 
sity on  the  one  hand  and  a  conscientious  horror  of  her  con- 
dition on  the  other,  she  was  suddenly  attacked  with  mania, 
and  died  in  one  of  its  paroxysms.2  Fifthly,  this  propensity 
is  sometimes  produced  by  certain  physiological  changes  in 
the  animal  economy.  Gall  met  with  four  examples  of  wo- 
men who,  when  pregnant,  were  violently  impelled  to  steal, 
though  perfectly  upright  at  other  times.  Friedreich  gives 
the  case  of  a  pregnant  woman  who,  otherwise  perfectly 
honest  and  respectable,  suddenly  conceived  a  violent  longing 
for  some  apples  from  a  particular  orchard,  two  or  three  miles 
distant.  Notwithstanding  the  entreaties  of  her  parents  and 
husband  not  to  risk  her  character  and  health,  and  their 
promises  to  procure  the  apples  for  her  in  the  morning,  she 
started  off  in  company  with  her  husband,  at  nine  o'clock  of 
a  cold  September  night,  and  was  detected  by  the  owner  in 
the  act  of  stealing  the  apples.  She  was  tried  and  convicted 
of  theft,  but  subsequently  a  medical  commission  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  supreme  court  to  examine  and  report  upon 

1  Medical  and  Surgical  Memoirs,  62. 

2  Traite  de  medicine  legale,  i.  237. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  193 

her  case.  Their  inquiries  resulted  in  the  opinion  that  she 
was  not  morally  free,  and  consequently  not  legally  respon- 
sible while  under  the  influence  of  those  desires  peculiar  to  preg- 
nancy ;  adding  that  if  Eve  had  been  in  the  condition  of  the 
accused,  when  she  plucked  the  forbidden  fruit  from  the  tree, 
the  curse  of  original  sin  would  never  have  fallen  on  the  race.1 

§  165.  An  inordinate  propensity  to  lying  is  also  of  no 
uncommon  occurrence  in  society ;  and  most  of  the  readers 
of  this  work  have  probably  met  with  instances  of  it  in  people 
whose  morals  in  other  respects  were  irreproachable,  and 
whose  education  had  not  been  neglected.  The  maxim  of 
Jeremy  Bentham,  that  it  is  easier  for  men  to  speak  the  truth, 
and  therefore  they  are  more  inclined  to  do  so  than  to  utter 
falsehood,  seems,  in  them,  to  be  completely  reversed,  for 
they  find  nothing  more  difficult  than  to  tell  the  truth.  In 
repeating  a  story  which  they  have  heard  from  others,  they 
are  sure  to  embellish  it  with  exaggerations  and  additions, 
till  it  can  scarcely  be  recognized,  and  are  never  known  to 
tell  the  same  story  twice  alike.  Not  even  is  the  slightest 
groundwork  of  truth  necessary,  in  order  to  call  forth  the 
inventions  of  their  perverted  minds ;  for  they  as  often  flow 
spontaneously,  in  the  greatest  profusion,  as  when  based  on 
some  little  foundation  in  fact.  This  propensity  seems  to 
result  from  an  inability  to  tell  the  truth,  rather  than  from 
any  other  cause ;  as  it  can  be  traced  to  no  adequate  motive, 
and  is  often  indulged  when  truth  would  serve  the  interests 
of  the  individual  better.  Like  that  last  mentioned,  it  is 
liable  to  degenerate  into  unequivocal  mania,  of  which  it  is 
sometimes  a  preliminary  symptom,  and  is  also  quite  a  com- 
mon feature  in  this  disease,  —  a  circumstance  which  Rush 
considers  as  proof  of  its  physical  origin. 

§  166.  We  are  not  prepared  to  go  the  length  of  referring 
all  the  instances  of  these  two  propensities  thus  manifested, 
to  the  influence  of  disease,  but  they  cannot  all  be  attributed 
to  faults  of  education,  to  evil  example,  or  to  innate  depravity, 
without  doing  violence  to  the  testimony  of  every  day's  ex- 

1  Handbuch  der  gericht.  Psychologic,  691. 
17 


194  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

perience.  It  may  be  difficult  no  doubt,  in  many  cases,  to 
distinguish  them  in  respect  to  their  physical  or  moral  origin, 
but  the  distinction  is  no  less  real  on  that  account;  the  same 
principles  are  to  guide  us  that  regulate  our  decision  in  ques- 
tions touching  any  other  form  of  insanity ;  and  if  common 
sense  and  professional  intelligence  preside  over  our  delibera- 
tions, the  final  judgment  will  not  often  be  wrong.  Where 
the  propensity  to  steal  is  manifested  in  a  person  whose 
moral  character  has  previously  been  irreproachable,  and 
whose  social  position  and  pecuniary  means  render  indul- 
gence in  this  vice  peculiarly  degrading  and  unnecessary, 
his  plea  of  having  committed  the  larceny  while  deprived, 
in  a  measure,  of  his  moral  liberty,  deserves  to  be  respectfully 
considered.  If  the  object  stolen  is  of  trifling  value,  or  inca- 
pable of  being  turned  to  any  purpose  of  use  or  ornament ; 
if  the  offence  have  been  preceded  by  others  of  a  similar 
kind ;  and  especially  if,  in  addition  to  these  circumstances, 
the  individual  be  a  woman  in  a  state  of  pregnancy,  there 
can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  the  plea  should  be  admitted. 
We  must  not  overlook  the  fact,  however,  that  objects  which 
are  utterly  valueless  to  some  men,  are  exceedingly  prized  by 
others  ;  and  it  is  a  lamentable  truth  that  some  persons,  in 
their  eagerness  to  get  possession  of  certain  objects  that 
gratify  a  favorite  passion  or  taste,  seem  to  lose  sight  all  at 
once  of  the  ordinary  distinctions  of  meum  and  tuum.  A  cele- 
brated anatomist  of  irreproachable  character  was  so  anxious 
to  enrich  his  cabinet  with  a  valuable  specimen  of  patho- 
logical anatomy  which  had  smitten  his  fancy,  that  he  actu- 
ally directed  one  of  his  pupils  to  visit  the  place  and  steal  it 
for  him.  The  commission,  however,  was  not  executed.  "  If 
the  larceny  had  been  attempted  only,"  says  Marc,  who  relates 
the  anecdote,  and  was  himself  the  pupil  charged  with  the  com- 
mission, "  and  the  attempt  had  been  discovered,  neither  the 
professor  or  the  pupil  could  have  been  deemed  excusable."  * 

§  167.      Morbid  activity  of  the  sexual    propensity  is  un- 
fortunately  of  such  common  occurrence,   that   it   has  been 

1  Marc,  de  la  Folie,  etc.  ii.  259. 


PARTIAL   MORAL  MANIA.  195 

generally  noticed  by  medical  writers,  though  its  medico- 
legal  importance  has  never  been  so  strongly  felt  as  it  de- 
serves. This  affection,  in  a  state  of  the  most  unbridled 
excitement,  filling  the  mind  with  a  crowd  of  voluptuous 
images,  and  ever  hurrying  its  victim  to  acts  of  the  grossest 
licentiousness,  though  without  any  lesion  of  the  intellectual 
powers,  is  now  known  and  described  by  the  name  of  aidol- 
omania.  We  cannot  convey  a  better  notion  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  this  disorder,  than  by  quoting  a  few  examples 
from  Gall,  by  whom  it  was  first  extensively  observed  and  its 
true  nature  discovered.  Its  milder  forms  and  early  stages, 
when  not  beyond  the  control  of  medical  and  moral  treat- 
ment, are  illustrated  in  the  following  cases. 

§  168.  "A  robust  and  plethoric  young  man  came  to 
reside  in  Vienna.  Having  no  liaisons,  he  was  unusually 
continent,  and  was  soon  attacked  with  erotic  mania."  Gall, 
pursuing  the  treatment  indicated  by  his  peculiar  views  of 
the  origin  of  the  disease,  succeeded  in  restoring  him  in  a  few 
days  to  perfect  health. 

§  169.  "  A  well  educated,  clever  young  man,  who,  from 
his  infancy  almost,  had  felt  strong  erotic  impulses,  suc- 
ceeded in  controlling  them  to  a  certain  extent,  by  means  of 
equally  strong  devotional  feelings.  After  his  situation  per- 
mitted him  to  indulge  without  constraint  in  the  pleasures  of 
love,  he  soon  made  the  fearful  discovery,  that  it  was  often 
difficult  for  him  to  withdraw  his  mind  from  the  voluptuous 
images  that  haunted  it,  and  fix  it  on  the  important  and  even 
urgent  concerns  of  his  business.  His  whole  being  was 
absorbed  in  sensuality."  He  obtained  relief  by  an  assiduous 
pursuit  of  scientific  objects,  and  by  finding  out  new  occupa- 
tions. 

§  170.  "  A  very  intelligent  lady  was  tormented,  like  the 
subject  of  the  last-mentioned  case,  from  infancy,  with  the 
most  inordinate  desires.  Her  excellent  education  alone 
saved  her  from  the  rash  indulgences  to  which  her  tempera- 
ment so  violently  urged  her.  Arrived  at  maturity,  she 
abandoned  herself  to  the  gratification  of  her  desires,  but  this 
only  increased  their  intensity.  Frequently,  she  saw  herself 


196  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

on  the  verge  of  madness,  and  in  despair,  she  left  her  house 
and  the  city,  and  took  refuge  with  her  mother  who  resided 
in  the  country,  where  the  absence  of  objects  to  excite  desire, 
the  greater  severity  of  manners  and  the  culture  of  a  garden, 
prevented  the  explosion  of  the  disease.  After  having  changed 
her  residence  for  that  of  a  large  city,  she  was,  after  a  while, 
threatened  with  a  relapse,  and  again  she  took  refuge  with 
her  mother.  On  her  return  to  Paris,  she  came  to  me,  and 
complained  like  a  woman  in  perfect  despair.  '  Everywhere,' 
she  exclaimed,  '  I  see  nothing  but  the  most  lascivious  images  ; 
the  demon  of  lust  unremittedly  pursues  me,  at  the  table,  and 
even  in  my  sleep.  I  am  an  object  of  disgust  to  myself,  and 
feel  that  I  can  no  longer  escape  either  madness  or  death.' " 1 

§  171.  In  the  following  cases,  the  mind  was  finally  over- 
whelmed by  the  force  of  this  frightful  propensity,  and  sunk 
into  complete  aYid  violent  madness.  "  A  man  had  lived 
many  years  in  a  happy  and  fruitful  union,  and  had  acquired 
by  his  industry  a  respectable  fortune.  After  having  retired 
from  business  and  led  an  idle  life,  his  predominant  propen- 
sity gradually  obtained  the  mastery  over  him,  and  he  yielded 
to  his  desires,  to  such  a  degree,  that,  though  still  in  posses- 
sion of  his  reason,  he  looked  on  every  woman  as  a  victim 
destined  to  gratify  his  sensual  appetite.  The  moment  he 
perceived  a  female  from  his  window,  he  announced  to  his 
wife  and  daughters,  with  an  air  of  the  utmost  delight,  the 
bliss  that  awaited  him.  Finally,  this  partial  mania  degene- 
rated into  general  mania,  and  shortly  after,  he  died  in  an 
insane  hospital  at  Vienna."  2 

§  172.  Pinel  has  related  a  very  similar  case.  "  A  man 
had  creditably  filled  his  place  in  society  till  his  fiftieth  year. 
He  was  then  smitten  with  an  immoderate  passion  for  vene- 
real pleasures  ;  he  frequented  places  of  debauchery,  where 
he  gave  himself  up  to  the  utmost  excesses ;  and  then  re- 
turned to  the  society  of  his  friends,  to  paint  the  charms  of 
pure  and  spotless  love."  His  disorder  gradually  increased  ; 

1  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iii.  317-319. 

2  Op.  cit.  sup.  iii.  320. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  197 

his   seclusion   became   necessary ;  and   he   soon  became   a 
victim  of  furious  mania. 

Many  more  cases  like  these  might  be  quoted,  particu- 
larly from  the  writings  of  Esquirol,  Georget,  and  Marc,  but 
the  above  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  a  truth  as  generally 
recognized  as  any  other  in  pathology,  and  to  convince  the 
most  skeptical  mind,  that  if  insanity,  —  or,  in  more  explicit 
terms,  morbid  action  in  the  brain  inducing  a  deprivation  of 
moral  liberty,  —  ever  exists,  it  does  in  what  is  called  aidoio- 
mania. 

§  173.  A  morbid  propensity  to  incendiarism,  or  pyro- 
mania,  as  it  has  been  termed,  where  the  person,  though  other- 
wise rational,  is  borne  on  by  an  irresistible  power,  to  the 
commission  of  this  crime,  has  received  the  attention  of  medi- 
cal jurists  in  Europe,  by  most  of  whom  it  has  been  regarded 
as  a  distinct  form  of  insanity,  annulling  responsibility  for  the 
acts  to  which  it  leads.  Numerous  cases  have  been  related, 
and  their  medico-legal  relations  amply  discussed  by  Platner,1 
Vogel,2  Masius,3  Henke,4  Gall,5  Marc,6  Friedreich,7  and  others. 
In  a  few  of  these  cases  the  morbid  propensity  is  excited  by 
the  ordinary  causes  of  insanity ;  in  a  larger  class,  it  is  excited  by 
that  constitutional  disturbance  which  often  accompanies  the 
menstrual  periods ;  but  in  the  largest  class  of  all,  it  occurs  at 
the  age  of  puberty,  and  seems  to  be  connected  with  retarded 
evolution  of  the  sexual  organs.  The  case  of  Maria  Franc, 
quoted  by  Gall  from  a  German  journal,  who  was  executed 
for  house-burning,  may  be  referred  to  the  first  class.  She 
was  a  peasant  of  little  education,  and,  in  consequence  of  an 
unhappy  marriage,  had  abandoned  herself  to  habits  of  in- 
temperate drinking.  In  this  state  a  fire  occurred  in  which 
she  had  no  share.  "  From  the  moment  she  witnessed  this 

1  Quasstiones  Medicinae  Forensis,  1824. 

2  Beitr.  zur  gerichtsarztl  Lehere  d.  Zurechnungsfahigkeit,  p.  10.  1825. 
8  System  der  gerichtlichen  Arzneykunde  fiir  Rechtsgelehrte,  1818. 

4  Abhandl.  gerichtl.  Medic,  iii.  1824. 

5  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iv.  157-160. 

6  Annales  D'Hygiene,  x.  357. 

7  Handbuch  der  gericht.  Psychologie,  393-435. 

17* 


198  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

fearful  sight,  she  felt  a  desire  to  fire  houses,  which,  whenever 
she  had  drunk  a  few  coppers'  worth  of  spirit,  was  converted  in- 
to an  irresistible  impulse.  She  could  give  no  other  reason, 
nor  show  any  other  motive  for  firing  so  many  houses  than 
this  impulse  which  drove  her  to  it.  Notwithstanding  the 
fear,  the  terror,  and  the  repentance  she  felt  in  every  instance, 
she  went  and  did  it  afresh."  In  other  respects  her  mind  was 
sound.  Within  five  years  she  fired  twelve  houses,  and  was 
arrested  on  the  thirteenth  attempt.1 

§  174.  Among  numerous  other  cases  of  this  kind  that 
have  been  reported,  we  have  room  for  only  two  more.  Eve 
Schebomska,  twenty-two  years  of  age,  was  guilty  of  four 
incendiary  acts,  to  which  she  said  she  was  impelled  by  an 
inward  agitation  that  tormented  her.  This  agitation  which, 
however,  did  not  prevent  her  from  performing  her  domestic 
labors,  was  greatly  augmented,  according  to  the  testimony 
of  her  mistress,  when  she  had  been  some  time  without 
seeing  her  lover.2  A  peasant  girl,  named  Kalinovska,  seven- 
teen years  of  age,  while  returning  from  a  dance,  where  she 
had  got  quite  heated,  was  suddenly  seized  with  a  desire  to 
burn  a  building.  She  struggled  with  the  desire  for  three  days, 
when  she  yielded,  and  she  declared  that  on  seeing  the  flames 
burst  out  she  experienced  a  joy  such  as  she  had  never  felt 
before.8 

§  175.  In  the  following  cases  the  incendiary  propensity 
was  excited  by  disordered  menstruation,  accompanied  in 
some  of  them  by  other  pathological  conditions.  A  servant 
girl,  named  Weber,  aged  twenty-two  years,  committed  three 
incendiary  acts.  Her  mistress  had  observed  that  she  was  sad ; 
that  she  would  frequently  seem  as  if  buried  in  thought,  and 
would  cry  out  in  her  sleep.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that  she 
had  had  a  disease  two  years  before,  that  was  accompanied 
by  violent  pains  in  the  head,  disordered  circulation,  insensi- 
bility, and  epileptic  fits ;  and  that  since  then  menstruation  had 
ceased.4  The  servant  girl  of  a  peasant,  seventeen  years  old, 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  158.  2  Klein.  Annalen,  xvi.  141. 

8  Ibid.  B.  xii.  53.  *  Ibid.  B.  xiii.  131. 


PARTIAL   MORAL  MANIA.  199 

that  had  been  guilty  of  two  incendiary  acts,  declared  that 
she  was  constantly  beset  by  an  inward  voice  that  com- 
manded her  to  burn  and  then  destroy  herself.  The  first  fire 
she  regarded  with  calmness  and  even  pleasure.  The  second 
time,  she  gave  the  alarm  herself,  and  immediately  after  tried 
to  hang  herself.  She  had  never  manifested  any  mental  dis- 
order, but  from  her  fourth  year  she  had  been  subject  to 
spasms  which  finally  degenerated  into  epileptic  fits  that  were 
unusually  violent  whenever  they  coincided  with  the  menstrual 
period.  A  very  severe  fit  occurred  but  a  few  days  previous 
to  the  second  incendiary  act.  The  faculty  of  Leipzig,  who 
were  consulted  respecting  the  case,  terminate  their  report 
with  saying,  that  "  in  consideration  of  the  physical  state  of 
the  accused,  they  do  not  consider  it  probable,  that,  at  the 
periods  wrhen  she  committed  the  incendiary  acts,  she  enjoyed 
the  free  use  of  her  mental  faculties." l 

§  176.  The  following  examples  of  the  last  class  of  cases 
will  show  the  nature  of  the  exciting  causes  of  the  incendiary 
impulse,  and  the  physical  imperfections  of  its  subjects.  "  A 
servant  girl  was  committed  for  two  incendiary  attempts  on 
the  premises  of  her  master,  in  a  German  village,  in  1830. 
On  her  examination  before  the  magistrate  she  denied  the 
charge,  but  subsequently  confessed  it  while  in  prison.  She 
assigned  no  reason  for  her  conduct,  acknowledged  that  she 
had  been  well  treated  by  her  employers,  and  they  expressed 
themselves  perfectly  satisfied  with  her.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence that  she  was  in  her  twentieth  year ;  that  she  had  never 
menstruated;  that  since  her  thirteenth  year,  she  had  'fre- 
quently had  epileptic  fits,  two  of  which  occurred  on  the  day 
these  attempts  were  made,  one  in  the  interval  between  them, 
the  other  after  the  last;  and  that  for  several  days  subsequent- 
ly she  had  two  fits  daily  in  prison.  It  also  appeared  that  she 
had  been  guilty  of  other  incendiary  acts  when  in  the  service 
of  a  different  family.  On  one  occasion  she  declared  "  that 
she  felt  badly,  and  that  when  she  felt  so,  she  knew  not  what 
she  did."  The  physicians  by  whom  she  was  examined,  and 


1  Plainer,  Op.  cit  sup.  P.  ii. 


200  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

who  made  reports  to  the  proper  authorities,  stated  that  she 
was  quiet  in  her  demeanor,  betraying  no  indication  of  a 
malicious  disposition,  inclined  to  talk  to  herself,  and,  in 
regard  to  mental  capacity,  obviously  stupid  and  dull.  They 
concluded  that  she  was  not  responsible  for  criminal  acts,  and 
that  those  she  was  charged  with  proceeded  from  an  incendi- 
ary impulse  which  was  a  consequence  of  "  interrupted  phy- 
sical evolution."  She  was  accordingly  released  by  the  court. 
Under  appropriate  treatment  the  menses  were  soon  establish- 
ed, after  which  she  had  no  return  of  her  epilepsy,  nor  her 
pyromania.1 

A  girl,  fifteen  years  old,  named  Graborkwa,  while  suffer- 
ing from  nostalgia,  or  homesickness,  made  two  incendiary 
attempts  in  order  that  she  might  be  able  to  leave  the  service 
of  her  employers.  She  stated  that  from  the  moment  she 
entered  their  service,  she  was  unceasingly  beset  by  the  de- 
sire of  burning  buildings.  It  seemed  as  if  a  shade  that  was 
constantly  before  her,  impelled  her  to  acts  of  incendiarism. 
It  appeared  that  she  had  long  suffered  violent  pains  in  her 
head,  and  had  never  menstruated.2 

A  servant  girl,  seventeen  years  old,  was  guilty  of  incen- 
diarism, for  the  purpose,  as  she  stated,  of  being  sent  back 
to  her  parents.  She  exhibited  no  sign  of  mental  derange- 
ment, though  of  very  limited  capacity.  She  was  unusually 
short  in  stature,  the  sexual  organs  showed  no  signs  of  devel- 
opment, and  the  menses  had  never  appeared.8 

§  177.  That  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  functions  is  very 
often  attended  by  more  or  less  constitutional  disturbance, 
especially  in  the  female  sex,  is  now  a  well-established  physi- 
ological truth.  The  shock  seems  to  be  felt  chiefly  by  the 
nervous  system,  which  experiences  almost  every  form  of 
irritation,  varying  in  severity  from  the  slightest  hysteric 
symptoms,  to  tetanus,  St.  Vitus's  dance,  and  epilepsy.  And 
when  we  bear  in  mind,  also,  that  general  mania  is  sometimes 
produced  by  this  great  physiological  change,  it  cannot  be 

1  Neues  Archiv  dps  Criminalrechts.  xiv.  393. 

2  Klein,  Annalen,  xii.  126.  3  Plainer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  xv. 


PAETIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  201 

deemed  an  extraordinary  fact  that  partial  mania,  exciting  to 
acts  of  incendiarism  or  murder,  should  be  one  of  its  effects. 
Still  we  would  not  be  understood  as  favoring  the  opinion 
that  every  youth  between  the  age  of  twelve  and  fifteen, 
guilty  of  incendiarism,  is  a  subject  of  pyromania.  The 
general  principle  of  the  power  of  the  change  in  question  to 
produce  this  disorder,  is  not  alone  sufficient.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  trace  the  connection  between  them  in  the  particular 
case,  and  unless  this  can  be  done,  we  have  no  right  to  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  general  truth.  To  aid  us  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  this  point,  it  will  be  well  to  bear  in  mind  the  follow- 
ing considerations,  laid  down  by  Henke,1  and  adopted  by 
Marc,  in  his  excellent  paper  on  this  disorder.2 

§  178.  1.  To  proye  the  existence  of  pyromania,  pro- 
duced by  the  sexual  evolution,  the  age  should  correspond 
with  that  of  puberty,  which  is  between  twelve  and  fifteen. 
Sometimes,  however,  it  may  occur,  especially  in  females,  as 
early  as  the  eleventh  or  tenth  year,  and,  therefore,  if  the 
symptoms  are  well  marked,  we  have  a  right  to  attribute 
them  to  this  cause. 

2.  There  should  be  present  symptoms  of  irregular  develop- 
ment ;  of   marked  critical  movements,  by  means  of  which 
nature   seeks   to   complete   the  evolution.       These    general 
signs  are,  either  a  rapid  increase  of  stature,  or  a  less  growth 
and  sexual  development  then  is  common  at  the  age  of  the 
individual ;  an  unusual  lassitude  and  sense  of  weight  and 
pain   in   the   limbs ;    glandular  swellings ;    cutaneous  erup- 
tions, etc. 

3.  If,  within  a  short  time  of  the  incendiary  act,  there  are 
symptoms   of  development  in  the  sexual   organs,  such    as 
efforts  of  menstruation  in  girls,  they  deserve  the  greatest 
attention.     They  will  strongly  confirm  the  conclusions  that 
might  be  drawn  from  the  other  symptoms,  that  the  work  of 
evolution  disturbed  the  functions  of  the  brain.     Any  irregu- 

1  Op.  cit.  sup. 

2  Considerations  medico-legales  sur  la  monomania  et  particulierement  sur 
la  monomania  incendiaire.     Annales  D'Hygiene,  x.  357-473. 


202  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

larity  whatever  of  the  menstrual  discharge,  is  a  fact  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  determining  the  mental  condition  of 
incendiary  girls. 

4.  Symptoms   of  disturbance  in  the   circulating  system, 
such  as  irregularity  of  the  pulse,  determination  of  blood  to 
the  head,  pains  in  the  head,  vertigo,  stupor,  a  sense   of  op- 
pression and  distress  in  the   chest,  are  indicative  in  young 
subjects  of  an  arrest  or  disturbance   of  the  development  of 
the  sexual  functions,  and  therefore  require  attention. 

5.  For  the  same  reason,  symptoms  of  disturbance  in  the 
nervous  system,  such  as  trembling,  involuntary  motions  of 
the  muscles,  spasms  and  convulsions  of  every  kind,  even  to 
epilepsy,  are  no  less  worthy  of  attention. 

6.  Even  in  the  absence  of  all  other  symptoms,  derange- 
ment of  the  intellectual  or  moral  powers  would  be  strong 
proof,  in  these  cases,  of  the  existence  of  pyromania.     Of  the 
two,  the  latter  is  far  the  more  common,  and  is  indicated  by 
a  change  in  the  moral  character.     The  patient  is  sometimes 
irascible,  quarrelsome ;  at   others,  sad,  silent,  and  weeping 
without  the  slightest  motive.     He  seems  to  be  buried  in  a 
profound  revery,  and  suddenly  starts  up  in  a  fright,  cries  out 
in  his  sleep,  etc.     These  symptoms  may  have  disappeared 
and   reappeared,   or   degenerated   at    last,   into   intellectual 
mania. 

7.  The  absence  of  positive  symptoms  of  mental  disorder, 
as  well  as  the  presence  of  those  which  appear  to  show  that 
the  reason  is   sound,  is  not  incompatible  with  the  loss  of 
moral  liberty.     The  remarks  of  Marc  on  this  point  deserve 
to  be  quoted  in  full.     "  Even  when,  previously  to  the  incen- 
diary act,  they  have  shown  no  evident  trace  of  mental  aliena- 
tion, and  been  capable  of  attending  to  their  customary  du- 
ties ;  when,  on  their  examinations,  they  have  answered  per- 
tinently to  questions  addressed  to  them ;  when  they  have 
avowed  that  they  were  influenced  by  a  desire   of  revenge  ; 
we  cannot  conclude  with  certainty,  that  they  were  in  posses- 
sion of  all  their  moral  liberty,  and  that,  consequently,  they 
should  incur  the  full  penalty  of  the  crime.     These  unfortu- 
nates may  be  governed  by  a  single  fixed  idea,  not  discovered 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  203 

till  after  the  execution  of  the  criminal  act.  Pyromania  re- 
sulting from  a  pathological  cause,  may  increase  in  severity, 
as  this  cause  itself  is  aggravated,  and  suddenly  be  converted 
into  an  irresistible  propensity,  immediately  followed  by  its 
gratification." 1 

§  179.  If  the  above  considerations  are  carefully  pondered 
by  the  medical  jurist,  he  will  be  in  little  danger  of  mistake, 
in  determining  the  question  whether  or  not  the  incendiary 
act  is  excited  by  a  pathological  condition  of  the  nervous 
system,  incident  to  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  functions.  If 
it  be  decided  in  the  affirmative,  the  acquittal  of  the  accused 
should  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  though  it  might  not 
square  with  the  technical  definitions  of  insanity,  and  the 
usual  subtleties  respecting  moral  liberty  and  freedom  of  the 
will.  In  the  north  of  Germany,  where  pyromania  in  young 
subjects  is  remarkably  frequent,  the  court  is  generally  gov- 
erned by  the  opinions  of  the  medical  experts,  and  thus  the 
accused  escapes  the  ignominious  fate  which  is  almost  inevi- 
table wherever  the  spirit  of  the  English  common  law  pre- 
vails. 

§  180.  The  last  and  most  important  form  of  moral  mania 
that  will  be  noticed,  consists  in  a  morbid  activity  of  the 
propensity  to  destroy;  where  the  individual,  without  provo- 
cation or  any  other  rational  motive,  apparently  in  the  full 
possession  of  his  reason,  and  oftentimes,  in  spite  of  his  most 
strenuous  efforts  to  the  contrary,  imbrues  his  hands  in  the 
blood  of  others ;  oftener  than  otherwise,  of  the  partner  of 
his  bosom,  of  the  children  of  his  affections,  of  those,  in  short, 
who  are  most  dear  and  cherished  around  him.  The  facts 
here  alluded  to  are  of  painful  frequency,  and  the  gross  mis- 
understanding of  their  true  nature,  almost  universally  preva- 
lent, excepting  among  a  few  in  the  higher  walks  of  the  pro- 
fessions, leads  to  equally  painful  results.  In  the  absence 
of  any  pathological  explanation  of  this  horrid  phenomenon, 
the  mind  seeks  in  vain,  among  secondary  causes,  for  a 
rational  mode  of  accounting  for  it,  and  is  content  to  resort  to 

2  Op.  cit  sup.  457. 


204  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

that  time-honored  solution  of  all  the  mysteries  of  human 
delinquency,  the  instigation  of  the  devil.  Of  the  double 
homicide  to  which  this  affection  gives  rise,  there  can  be  no 
question  which  is  most  to  be  deplored,  for,  shocking  as  it  is 
for  one  bearing  the  image  of  his  Maker  to  take  the  life  of  a 
fellow-being  with  brutal  ferocity,  how  shall  we  characterize 
the  deliberate  perpetration  of  the  same  deed,  under  the 
sanction  of  law  and  of  the  popular  approbation  ?  We  trust, 
however,  that  the  ample  researches  of  writers  of  unques- 
tionable veracity  and  ability,  which  are  now  just  reaching 
the  attention  of  the  legal  profession,  will  be  soon  followed 
by  a  conviction  of  past  errors,  and  a  more  rational  adminis- 
tration of  the  criminal  law.  For  the  purpose  of  contributing 
to  this  object,  it  will  be  necessary  to  bring  fully  before  the 
reader  the  results  of  these  researches,  and,  in  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  subject,  to  risk  the  charge  of  prolixity  by 
the  number  and  length  of  the  quotations. 

§  181.  The  form  of  disease  now  under  consideration  was 
first  distinctly  described  by  Pinel ;  and  though  its  existence 
as  a  distinct  form  of  monomania  was  for  a  long  time  after 
doubted,  it  has  subsequently  been  admitted  by  the  principal 
writers  on  insanity ;  by  Gall  and  Spurzheim,  Esquirol,1  Geor- 
get,  Marc,  Andral,  Orfila,  and  Broussais  in  France ;  by  Co- 
nolly,  Combe,  and  Prichard  in  England;  by  Hoffbauer, 
Platner,  Ethmuller,  Henke,  and  Friedreich  in  Germany ;  by 
Otto  of  Copenhagen  ;  and  by  Rush  in  this  country.  It  has 
received  the  various  appellations  of  monomanie-homicide, 
monomanie-meurtriere,  melancholie-homicide,  homicidal  insan- 
ity, instinctive  monomania.  Esquirol,  in  his  valuable  memoir,' 
first  published  in  the  shape  of  a  note  in  the  French  transla- 
tion of  HofFbauer's  work,  observes  that  homicidal  insanity, 
or  monomanie-homicide,  as  he  terms  it,  presents  two  distinct 


1  It  is  worthy  of  mention,  that  though  Esquirol,  in  liis  article  Manie,  in  the 
Did.  Med.  Sci.,  expressed  his  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  homicidal  insanity 
unconnected  with  other  mental  alienation,  he  has  since  not  only  retracted  his 
opinion,  but  has  published  the  very  best  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
subject. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  205 

forms,  in  one  of  which  the  monomoniac  is  always  influenced 
by  avowed  motives  more  or  less  irrational,  and  is  generally 
regarded  as  mad;  in  the  other,  there  are  no  motives  ac- 
knowledged, nor  to  be  discerned,  the  individual  being  im- 
pelled by  a  blind,  irresistible  impulse.  It  is  with  the  latter 
only  that  we  are  concerned,  for  the  other  is  clearly  a  form  of 
partial  intellectual  mania ;  but  as  this  division  has  not  been 
strictly  made  by  nature,  cases  often  occurring  that  do  not 
clearly  come  under  either  category,  the  subject  will  be  better 
elucidated  by  noticing  all  the  forms  of  this  affection,  and 
seeing  how  intimately  they  are  connected  together. 

§  182.  In  the  first  group  of  cases  we  have  the  simplest 
form  of  homicidal  insanity,  —  that  in  which  the  desire  to 
destroy  life  is  not  only  prompted  by  no  motive  whatever, 
and  solely  by  a  violent  impulse,  but  without  any  appreciable 
disorder  of  mind  or  body. 

"  In  a  respectable  house  in  Germany,  the  mother  of  the 
family  returning  home  one  day,  met  a  servant,  against  whom 
she  had  no  cause  of  complaint,  in  the  greatest  agitation ;  she 
begged  to  speak  with  her  mistress  alone,  threw  herself  upon 
her  knees,  and  entreated  that  she  might  be  sent  out  of  the 
house.  Her  mistress,  astonished,  inquired  the  reason,  and 
learned  that  whenever  this  unhappy  servant  undressed  the 
lady's  child,  she  was  struck  by  the  whiteness  of  its  flesh  and 
experienced  the  almost  irresistible  desire  to  tear  it  in  pieces. 
She  felt  afraid  that  she  could  not  resist  the  impulse,  and 
preferred  to  leave  the  house."  "  This  circumstance,"  says  the 
narrator,  "  occurred  in  the  family  of  Baron  Humboldt,  and 
this  illustrious  person  permitted  me  to  add  his  testimony." 1 

§  183.  "  A  young  lady  who  had  been  placed  in  a  maison 
de  sante,  experienced  homicidal  desires,  for  which  she  could 
assign  no  motive.  She  was  rational  on  every  subject,  and 
whenever  she  felt  the  approach  of  this  dreadful  propensity, 
she  shed  tears,  entreated  to  have  the  strait-waiscoat  put  on 
and  to  be  carefully  guarded,  till  the  paroxysm,  which  some- 
times lasted  several  days,  had  passed."2 

1  Marc,  consultation  medico-legale,  pour  H.  Cornier,  p.  52.  2  Idem. 

18 


206  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  184.  "  M.  R.,  a  distinguished  chemist  and  a  poet,  of  a 
naturally  mild  and  sociable  disposition,  committed  himself  a 
prisoner  in  one  of  the  maisons  de  sante  of  the  faubourg  St. 
Antoine.  Tormented  by  the  desire  of  killing,  he  prostrated 
himself  at  the  foot  of  the  altar,  and  implored  the  divine 
assistance  to  deliver  him  from  such  an  atrocious  propensity, 
of  the  cause  of  which  he  could  give  no  account.  When  he 
felt  that  he  was  likely  to  yield  to  the  violence  of  this  inclina- 
tion, he  hastened  to  the  head  of  the  establishment,  and 
requested  him  to  tie  his  thumbs  together  with  a  ribbon. 
This  slight  ligature  was  sufficient  to  calm  the  unhappy  R., 
who  subsequently  endeavored  to  kill  one  of  his  friends,  and 
finally  perished  in  a  fit  of  maniacal  fury."  1 

§  185.  The  following  case  is  recorded  by  Gall,  who 
derived  it  from  a  German  paper  of  April  13th,  1820.  "  A 
carrier,  belonging  to  the  bailiwick  of  Frendenstadt,  who  had 
quitted  his  family  in  perfect  health,  was  suddenly  attacked 
by  a  paroxysm  of  furious  madness,  on  the  route  between 
Aalen  and  Gemunde.  His  first  insane  act  was  to  shut  him- 
self up  in  the  stable  with  his  three  horses,  to  which  he  gave 
no  fodder ;  and  when  departing  he  harnessed  only  two  of 
his  horses,  accompanying  the  carriage,  mounted  on  the  other. 
At  Moglengen  he  abused  a  woman ;  at  Unterbobingen,  he 
alighted,  and  walked  before  his  horses  with  a  hatchet  in  his 
hand.  On  the  route  between  the  last  place  and  Hussenhofen, 
the  first  person  he  met  with  was  a  woman  whom  he  struck 
several  times  with  his  hatchet,  and  left  her  lying  in  a  ditch 
by  the  road  side.  Next,  he  encountered  a  lad  thirteen  years 
old  whose  head  he  split  open ;  and  shortly  after,  he  split  the 
skull  of  a  man,  thirty  years  old,  and  scattered  his  brains  in 
the  road ;  and  after  hacking  the  body,  he  left  his  hatchet 
and  carriage,  and  thus  unarmed  proceeded  towards  Hus- 
senhofen. He  met  two  Jews  on  the  road,  whom  he  attacked, 
but  who,  after  a  short  struggle,  escaped  him.  Near  Hus- 
senhofen, he  assaulted  a  peasant  who  screamed  till  several 
persons  came  to  his  aid,  who  secured  the  maniac  and  carried 

1  Marc,  op.  cit  65. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  207 

him  to  Gemunde.  They  afterwards  led  him  to  the  bodies  of 
his  victims,  when  he  observed,  '  It  is  not  I,  but  my  bad  spirit, 
that  has  committed  these  murders.'"1 

§  186.  William  Brown  was  executed  at  Maidstone,  Eng- 
land, in  1812,  for  strangling  a  child  whom  he  accidentally 
met  one  morning  while  walking  in  the  country.  He  took 
up  the  body  and  laid  it  on  some  steps,  and  then  went  and 
told  what  he  had  done,  requesting  to  be  taken  into  custody. 
On  the  trial,  he  said  he  had  never  seen  the  child  before,  had 
no  malice  against  it,  and  could  assign  no  motive  for  the 
dreadful  act.  He  bore  an  exemplary  character,  and  had  never 
been  suspected  of  being  insane.2  It  is  needless  to  say  that 
he  was  hanged. 

§  187.  A  country  gentleman,  enjoying  good  health  and 
easy  circumstances,  consulted  Esquirol  in  regard  to  his 
singular  and  unhappy  condition.  He  related  that  he  had 
read  the  indictment  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which,  however, 
did  not  very  strongly  excite  his  attention.  In  the  course  of 
the  night  he  suddenly  awoke  with  the  thought  of  killing  his 
wife  who  was  lying  beside  him.  He  left  his  wife's  bed  for 
a  time,  but  within  three  weeks  the  same  idea  seized  upon 
his  mind  three  times,  and  always  in  the  night.  During  the 
day,  considerable  exercise  and  occupation  preserved  him 
from  this  fearful  inclination.  He  evinced  not  the  slightest 
mental  disorder ;  his  business  was  prosperous ;  he  had  never 
experienced  any  domestic  chagrins ;  and  he  had  no  cause  of 
complaint  or  jealousy  in  regard  to  his  wife  whom  he  loved, 
and  with  whom  he  never  had  had  the  least  disagreement. 
With  the  exception  of  a  light  headache  occasionally,  he  had 
always  been  well  and  free  from  pain.  He  is  sad  and  troubled 
about  his  condition,  and  has  quitted  his  wife  for  fear  least  he 
might  yield  to  the  force  of  his  desire.8 

§  188.     In  most  cases  of  homicidal  insanity  the  presence 


1  Sur  les  Fonctions,  etc.  iv.  103. 

2  Knapp  and  Baldwin's  Newgate  Callender,  iv.  80. 
a  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  830. 


208  MEDICAL  JTJKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  some  physical  or  moral  disorder  may  be  detected ;  and 
though  none  is  mentioned  in  those  above  related,  there  is 
reason  to  suppose  that  it  might  have  been  ascertained  by  a 
more  thorough  examination.  It  is  a  curious  Tact,  however, 
that  homicidal  desires  of  the  intensest  kind  will  sometimes 
flit  through  the  mind,  while  the  individual,  though  capable 
of  judging  of  his  feelings,  is  unconscious  of  being  otherwise 
then  perfectly  well.  Marc,  the  distinguished  medical  jurist, 
relates,  that  passing  over  a  bridge  in  Paris  one  day,  he 
observed' a  lad  sitting  on  the  parapet  of  the  bridge,  eating  his 
breakfast,  when  he  was  seized  with  an  almost  irresistible 
desire  to  push  him  over  into  the  river.  The  idea  was  but  a 
flash,  but  it  filled  him  with  such  horror,  that  he  rapidly 
crossed  over  to  the  opposite  trottoir,  and  got  out  of  the  way 
as  quick  as  possible.  Talma,  the  actor,  also  assured  him,  on 
hearing  the  story,  that  he  had  experienced  the  same  pro- 
pensity under  very  similar  circumstances.1  In  the  following 
group  of  cases  the  homicidal  fit  was  obviously  accompanied 
or  preceded  by  disease  or  physical  disorder  of  some  kind. 

§  189.  The  following  case  is  related  by  Gall,  who  ob- 
tained it  from  Dr.  Zimmermann  of  Krumback.  "  A  peasant, 
born  at  Krumback,  Swabia,  who  never  enjoyed  very  good 
health,  twenty-seven  years  old,  and  unmarried,  had  been 
subject  from  his  ninth  year  to  frequent  epileptic  fits.  Two 
years  ago,  his  disease  changed  its  character  without  any 
apparent  cause,  and  ever  since,  instead  of  a  fit  of  epilepsy, 
this  man  has  been  attacked  with  an  irresistible  inclination  to 
commit  murder.  He  felt  the  approach  of  the  fit  many  hours, 
and  sometimes  a  whole  day,  before  its  invasion,  and  from 
the  commencement  of  this  presentiment,  he  begged  to  be 
secured  and  chained  that  he  might  not  commit  some  dread- 
ful deed.  '  When  the  fit  comes  on,'  says  he,  '  I  feel  under  a 
necessity  to  kill,  even  if  it  were  a  child.'  His  parents,  whom 
he  tenderly  loved,  would  be  the  first  victims  of  this  murder- 
ous propensity.  '  My  mother,'  he  cries  out  with  a  frightful 

1  Marc.     De  la  Folie,  etc.  ii.  478. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  209 

voice,  '  save  yourself,  or  I  must  kill  you.'  Before  the  fit  he 
complains  of  being  exceedingly  sleepy,  without  being  able  to 
sleep ;  he  feels  depressed,  and  experiences  slight  twitchings 
of  the  limbs.  During  the  fit,  he  preserves  his  consciousness, 
and  knows  perfectly  well  that  in  committing  a  murder,  he  is 
guilty  of  an  atrocious  crime.  When  he  is  disabled  from 
doing  injury,  he  makes  the  most  frightful  contortions  and 
grimaces,  singing  or  talking  in  rhyme.  The  fit  lasts  from 
one  to  two  days.  When  it  is  over,  he  cries  out,  '  Now 
unbind  me.  Alas!  I  have  cruelly  suffered,  but  I  rejoice  that 
I  have  killed  nobody.'  "  1 

§  190.  On  the  fifteenth  February,  1826,  Jacques  Mounin, 
after  many  acts  of  violence  and  fury,  escaped  from  his 
family  who  wished  to  restrain  him,  scaled  the  walls  of  seve- 
ral adjoining  properties,  and  took  to  the  fields,  without  shoes, 
hat,  or  weapons  of  any  kind.  His  flight  having  excited 
considerable  alarm,  as  after  some  epileptic  attacks  he  had 
formerly  given  many  signs  of  a  blind  fury,  the  local  authori- 
ties were  informed,  and  several  persons  despatched  after  him 
as  quickly  as  possible.  On  arriving  at  a  field,  where  many 
laborers  were  at  work  at  a  distance  from  one  another,  Mou- 
nin first  threatened  a  man  who  was  driving  a  cart,  and  imme- 
diately after  pursued  Joseph  Faucher  and  pelted  him  with 
stones.  The  latter  having  escaped,  he  then  approached  an 
old  man  almost  blind,  named  Mayet,  whom  he  knocked 
down  and  killed  by  beating  on  the  head  with  a  large  stone. 
He  next  attacked  a  man  who  was  digging  at  a  little  distance, 
and  killed  him  with  a  spade.  A  few  minutes  afterwards  he 
met  Propheti  on  horseback,  whom  he  struck  down  with 
stones,  but  was  obliged  to  leave  him  in  consequence  of  the 
cries  of  his  victim.  He  then  chased  some  children  who 
saved  themselves  by  hard  running,  but  he  overtook  a  man 
at  work  and  slew  him.  On  being  questioned  during  his 
confinement,  Mounin  said  he  well  recollected  having  killed 
the  three  men,  and  especially  one,  a  relative  of  his  own, 
whom  he  greatly  regretted ;  he  added  that  in  his  paroxysms 

1  Gall,  op.  cit  iv.  104. 
18* 


210  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  phrensy  he  saw  nothing  but  flames,  and  that  blood  was 
then  most  delightful  to  his  sight.  At  the  end  of  a  few  days' 
imprisonment,  he  seemed  to  have  entirely  recovered  his 
reason,  but  subsequently  he  relapsed.  The  court  declined 
trying  him,  under  the  conviction  that  he  was  insane  while 
committing  the  murders  above  mentioned.1 

§  191.  "  Frederick  Jensen,  a  workman,  thirty-seven  years 
old,  had  for  some  time  suffered  from  fits  of  giddiness,  which 
always  obliged  him  to  seize  hold  of  the  nearest  objects.  In 
the  spring  of  1828,  he  lost  a  beloved  daughter,  which  afflicted 
him  very  much.  The  state  of  his  health  was  nevertheless 
perfect  in  mind  as  well  as  in  body,  when  he,  one  day  (Sun- 
day, 28th  September,  1828)  after  dinner,  told  his  wife  that 
he  would  take  a  walk  with  his  son,  a  boy  ten  years  old.  He 
did  so,  and  went  with  him  to  the  green  which  encircles  the 
citadel.  When  he  came  there,  —  he  now  relates,  '  a  strange 
confusion  came  over  me ; '  it  appeared  like  a  matter  of  ab- 
solute necessity  to  him  to  drown  his  son  and  himself  in 
the  waters  at  the  citadel.  Quite  unconscious  of  what  he 
was  doing,  he  ran  towards  the  water  with  the  boy  in  his 
hand.  A  man,  surprised  at  his  behavior,  stopped  him  there, 
took  the  boy  from  him,  and  tried  to  persuade  him  to  leave 
the  water;  but  he  became  angry,  and  answered  that  he 
intended  to  take  a  waHc,  and  asked,  '  whether  any  body  had 
a  right  to  forbid  him  to  do  so  ? '  The  man  left  him,  but 
took  the  boy  along  with  him.  An  hour  afterwards  he  was 
taken  out  of  the  water,  into  which  he  had  thrown  himself, 
and  taken  to  prison.  As  he  still  showed  symptoms  of  in- 
sanity, he  was  bled  and  purged,  and  two  days  after,  was 
brought  into  the  hospital,  and  committed  to  the  care  of  my 
friend,  Dr.  Wendt,  who  has  perfectly  cured  him,  and  who 
kindly  afforded  me  the  opportunity  to  see  and  to  speak  with 
him.  He  now  very  quietly*  tells  the  whole  event  himself,  but 
is  not  able  to  explain  the  cause  of  the  suddenly  rising  desire 
to  kill  himself  and  the  boy  whom  he  loved  heartily.  This 
cause  is  only  to  be  sought  in  congestion  of  blood  to  the  brain, 

1  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale,  etc.  153. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  211 

the  same  which  before  had  caused  his  giddiness;  and 
whether  we  adopt  an  organ  of  destructiveness  in  the  brain  or 
not,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  the  propensity  to  kill  himself 
and  the  son  arose  from  a  morbid  excitation  of  a  certain  part 
of  the  brain.  The  disposition  to  congestion  originated  from 
a  fall  he  suffered  on  the  head  in  1820."  1 

§  192.  Another  curious  form  of  homicidal  insanity  oc- 
curs in  women,  and  seems  to  be  connected  with  those 
changes  in  the  system  produced  by  parturition,  menstrua- 
tion, and  lactation.  It  is  a  little  remarkable  that  with  few 
exceptions,  the  victim  selected  by  the  patient  is  always  her 
own,  or  some  other  young  child.  Among  several  cases 
which  Esquirol  has  related  at  length,  are  the  two  following, 
which  are  abridged  from  his  memoir. 

§  193.  Madam  N.,  whom  Esquirol  received  into  his  hos- 
pital, and  whom  he  describes  as  being  perfectly  rational  in 
her  conversation  and  conduct,  and  of  a  mild,  affable,  and 
industrious  disposition,  very  calmly  related  to  him  the  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  a  strong  inclination  she  felt  to 
kill  her  child.  After  her  last  accouchement,  fourteen  months 
before,  she  had  several  hysterical  fits,  and  was  much  troubled 
with  pains  in  the  head,  stomach,  and  bowels;  with  vertigo, 
and  ringing  in  the  ears.  These  mostly  disappeared,  but  she 
then  became  exceedingly  capricious  in  her  temper  and  affec- 
tions, being  alternately  gay  and  sad,  confiding  and  jealous, 
resolute  and  weak.  In  this  condition,  she  heard  of  the  mur- 
der committed  by  Henriette  Cornier,  when  she  was  imme- 
diately seized  with  the  idea  of  killing  her  infant,  and  one  day 
when  her  child  entered  the  room,  she  felt  the  most  violent  de- 
sire to  assassinate  it.  '  I  repelled  the  idea,'  said  she, '  and  coolly 
inquired  of  myself,  why  I  should  conceive  such  cruel  designs 
—  what  could  put  them  into  my  imagination  ?  I  could  find 
no  answer.  The  same  desire  returned ;  I  feebly  resisted  it, 
was  overcome,  and  proceeded  to  consummate  the  crime. 
A  new  effort  arrested  my  steps,  I  raised  the  knife  .to  my  own 
throat,  saying  to  myself,  better  perish  yourself,  bad  woman.' 

1  Dr.  Otto,  in  the  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  611. 


212  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

When  asked  the  cause  of  these  evil  thoughts,  she  replied, 
that  something  behind  her  back  urged  her  on.  During  the 
first  fortnight  of  her  stay  in  the  hospital,  she  was  afflicted  by 
a  return  of  the  physical  disturbances  with  which  she  was  at 
first  attacked,  but  at  the  end  of  six  weeks  wTas  so  much 
better,  in  consequence  of  a  proper  medical  treatment,  that 
she  received  her  husband  and  child  with  joy,  and  lavished  on 
the  latter  the  tenderest  caresses.  Suddenly  she  perceived 
a  cutting  instrument,  and  was  seized  with  the  desire  of 
snatching  it  up  and  committing  two  murders  at  once, —  a 
thought  which  she  suppressed  only  by  flying  from  the  room. 
The  symptoms  of  physical  disturbance  now  again  made 
their  appearance,  during  which  she  was  informed  that  her 
child  was  sick,  and  while  extremely  distressed  and  weeping 
at  the  news,  '  she  felt  a  violent  desire,'  to  use  her  own  expres- 
sion, 'to  stab  or  stifle  it  in  her  arms.'  After  about  three 
months'  residence  at  the  hospital,  she  went  away  restored, 
and  continued  well.1  » 

§  194.  A  girl  fourteen  years  old,  of  strong  constitution 
and  difficult  temper,  enjoyed  apparently  good  health,  though 
she  had  not  menstruated.  Once  a  month  she  complained 
of  pain  in  the  head,  her  eyes  were  red,  she  was  irascible, 
gloomy,  and  restless  ;  every  thing  went  wrong  with  her,  and 
she  was  particularly  inclined  to  dispute  with  her  mother 
who  was  always  the  object  of  her  threats  and  abuse ;  and 
finally  she  became  most  violently  angry,  sometimes  attempt- 
ing her  own  life  and  sometimes  her  mother's.  When  the  fit 
arrived  to  this  degree,  the  blood  escaped  from  her  mouth, 
nose,  or  eyes ;  she  wept  and  trembled ;  the  extremities  be- 
came cold,  and  affected  with  convulsive  pains ;  and  her 
mind  was  filled  with  distress.  The  fit,  which  altogether  con- 
tinued one  or  two  days,  being  over,  she  recovered  her  affec- 
tion for  her  mother,  and  asked  her  forgiveness.  She  did  not 
recollect  all  the  circumstances  of  these  fits,  and  denied  with 
feelings  of  surprise  and  regret  some  of  the  particulars  which 
were  related  to  her.  At  the  age  of  sixteen  years,  these  fits 

1  Des  Malad.  Ment.  ii.  821. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  213 

of  anger  were  often  replaced  by  hysteric  convulsions ;  the 
disease  diminished  progressively,  but  did  not  cease  till  she 
was  seventeen  years  old,  when  the  menses  appeared.  She 
afterwards  married,  and  became  an  excellent  mother.1 

§  195.  Almira  Brixey  was  a  maid-servant  in  a  respectable 
English  family,  and  one  day,  in  the  spring  of  1845,  while  the 
nurse  was  out  of  the  room,  she  obtained  a  knife  from  the 
kitchen  and  cut  the  throat  of  her  master's  infant  child.  She 
then  went  down  stairs  and  told  what  she  had  done,  inquiring 
with  some  anxiety  whether  she  would  be  hanged  or  trans- 
ported. No  delusions  were  detected,  nor  had  she  manifested 
any  other  mental  peculiarity  except  some  violence  of  temper 
about  trivial  matters,  a  short  time  before.  She  had  expressed 
a  little  dissatisfaction  with  her  share  of  her  mistress's  cast-off 
dresses,  but  beyond  this,  there  did  not  appear  to  be  a  shadow 
of  a  motive.  There  was  some  proof,  though  not  very  definite, 
that  she.  had  labored  under  some  menstrual  disorders.  She 
was  acquitted  and  sent  to  Bethlehem  hospital. 

§  196.  Esquirol  relates  another  case  communicated  to 
him  by  Dr.  Barbier  of  Amiens,  which  will  be  briefly  noticed. 
This  lady,  Marguerite  Molliens,  twenty-four  years  old,  had 
suffered  for  three  years  past  pains  in  the  epigastrium,  and 
right  side  of  the  abdomen ;  headache,  vertigo,  noise  in  the 
ears,  disturbance  of  vision,  palpitation  of  the  heart,  con- 
strictions of  the  throat,  and  trembling  of  the  limbs.  Her  first 
child,  which  lived  but  three  months,  she  loved  and  deeply 
regretted.  Nine  months  ago  she  had  another  child.  On  the 
fifth  day  of  her  confinement  she  heard  of  Cornier's  case,  and 
was  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  story  that  her  thoughts 
dwelt  upon  it,  and  from  that  moment  she  feared  lest  she  also 
might  be  similarly  tempted.  In  spite  of  all  her  efforts,  she 
gradually  familiarized  herself  with  the  idea  of  killing  her 
child.  One  day  while  dressing  it,  the  thought  of  murdering 
it  seized  upon  her  mind  and  became  a  violent  desire.  She 
turned  around,  and  perceiving  a  kitchen-knife  on  a  table  near 
her,  her  arm  was  involuntarily  carried  towards  it.  She  saw 

1  Idem.  ii.  814. 


214  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

that  she  could  no  longer  control  herself,  and  cried  out  for 
assistance.  The  neighbors  came  in  and  she  soon  became 
calm.  Shortly  after  she  was  separated  from  her  child  and 
sent  to  a  hospital,  where  she  finally  recovered.  It  is  worthy 
of  note  that  when  the  pains  in  the  head  and  epigastrium, 
from  which  she  suffered  greatly  in  the  hospital,  were  worst, 
then  the  bad  thoughts  appeared  to  be  most  imperious.1 

§  197.  Dr.  Otto,  of  Copenhagen,  relates  that  a  female, 
who  was  received  into  a  lying-in-hospital  of  which  he  was 
physician,  requested  a  private  conference  with  him  previ- 
ously to  her  accouchement.  She  appeared  to  be  in  great 
agitation  and  embarrassment,  and  earnestly  begged  of  him 
that  she  might  not  be  left  in  the  same  chamber  with  other 
women  and  their  infants,  as  it  would  be  utterly  impossible 
for  her  to  resist  the  propensity  she  felt  to  destroy  the  latter. 
Her  request  was  granted  and  she  was  carefully  watched. 
Her  delivery  was  easy,  and  the  child  was  kept  from  her  and 
afterwards  sent  to  her  mother.  The  young  woman  on  leav- 
ing the  hospital  went  into  service,  and  would  not  return  to 
her  mother's,  lest  she  might  be  tempted  to  destroy  her  infant. 
She  declared  that  the  sight  of  a  very  young  infant  kindled 
up  an  irresistible  propensity  to  destroy  its  life.  This  woman 
was  a  peasant  who  had  been  seduced,  but  had  never  led  a 
dissolute  life,  nor  was  in  any  way  of  corrupt  manners.  She 
had  not  been  reproached,  nor  ill-treated  by  her  parents, 
during  pregnancy,  nor  was  there  the  least  cause  for  anxiety 
on  account  of  the  child,  as  her  mother  had  engaged  to  pro- 
vide for  it.  She  entered  into  the  service  of  a  clergyman, 
and  enjoyed  good  health.  Sometime  afterwards  she  in- 
formed the  doctor  that  she  had  lost  nearly  all  propensity  to 
infanticide.2 

§  198.  The  next  case  is  recorded  by  Dr.  Michu.  "  A 
country  woman,  twenty-four  years  of  age,  of  a  bilious,  san- 
guine temperament,  of  simple  and  regular  habits,  but  re- 
served and  sullen  manners,  had  been  ten  days  confined 

1  DCS  Malad.  Mcnt.  ii.  825. 

2  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  O.  S.  xiii.  £4 1. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  215 

with  her  first  child,  when  suddenly  having  her  eyes  fixed 
upon  it,  she  was  seized  with  the  desire  of  strangling  it. 
This  idea  made  her  shudder ;  she  carried  the  infant  to  its 
cradle,  and  went  out  in  order  to  get  rid  of  so  horrid  a 
thought.  The  cries  of  the  little  being  who  required  nourish- 
ment, recalled  her  to  the  house ;  she  experienced  still  more 
strongly  the  impulse  to  destroy  it.  She  hastened  away 
again  haunted  by  the  dread  of  committing  a  crime  so  horri- 
ble ;  she  raised  her  eyes  to  heaven,  went  to  the  church  and 
prayed.  The  whole  day  was  passed  by  this  unhappy  mother 
in  a  constant  struggle  between  the  desire  of  taking  away  the 
life  of  her  infant  and  the  dread  of  yielding  to  the  impulse. 
She  concealed  her  agitation  until  evening,  when  her  confes- 
sor, a  respectable  old  man,  was  the  first  to  receive  her  confi- 
dence. He  soothed  her  feelings,  and  counselled  her  to  have 
medical  assistance.  '  When  we  arrived  at  her  house,'  says 
Michu,  '  she  appeared  gloomy  and  depressed,  and  ashamed 
of  her  situation.'  Being  reminded  of  the  tenderness  due  from 
a  mother  to  her  child,  she  replied ;  '  I  know  how  much  a 
mother  ought  to  love  her  child ;  but  if  I  do  not  love  mine,  it 
does  not  depend  upon  me.'  She  soon  after  recovered,  the 
infant,  in  the  meantime,  having  been  removed  from  her 
sight."1 

§  199.  Gall  says  he  knew  a  woman,  then  twenty-six 
years  old,  who  had  experienced,  especially  at  the  menstrual 
periods,  inexpressible  torture,  and  the  fearful  temptation  to 
destroy  herself,  and  to  kill  her  husband  and  children,  who 
were  exceedingly  dear  to  her.  She  shuddered  with  terror, 
as  she  described  the  struggle  that  took  place  within  her 
between  her  sense  of  duty  and  of  religion,  and  the  impulse 
that  urged  her  to  this  atrocious  act.  For  a  long  time,  she 
dared  not  bathe  her  youngest  child,  because  an  internal 
voice  constantly  said  to  her,  '  let  him  slip,  let  him  slip.'  Fre- 
quently she  had  hardly  the  strength  and  time  to  throw  away 
a  knife  which  she  was  tempted  to  plunge  into  her  own  breast 
and  her  children's.  Whenever  she  entered  the  chamber  of  her 

1  Memoire  sur  la  monomanie-homicide,  99. 


216  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

children,  or  husband,  and  found  them  asleep,  she  was  instant 
ly  possessed  with  the  desire  of  killing  them.  Sometimes  she 
precipitately  shut  behind  her  the  door  of  their  chamber  and 
threw  away  the  key,  to  remove  the  possibility  of  returning  to 
them  during  the  night,  if  she  should  fail  to  resist  this  infernal 
temptation." 1 

§  200.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  exciting  cause  of 
the  homicidal  propensity  is  of  a  moral  nature,  operating 
upon  some  peculiar  physical  predisposition,  and  sometimes 
followed  by  more  or  less  physical  disturbance.  Instead  of 
being  urged  on  by  a  sudden,  imperious  impulse  to  kill,  the 
subjects  of  this  form  of  the  affection,  after  suffering  for  a 
certain  period  much  gloom  of  mind  and  depression  of  spirits, 
feel  as  if  bound  by  a  sense  of  necessity  to  destroy  life,  and 
proceed  to  the  fulfilment  of  their  destiny  with  the  utmost 
calmness  and  deliberation.  So  reluctant  have  courts  and 
juries  usually  been  to  receive  the  plea  of  insanity  in  defence 
of  crime,  deliberately  planned  and  executed  by  a  mind  in 
which  no  derangement  of  intellect  has  ever  been  perceived, 
that  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  nature  of  these 
cases  should  not  be  misunderstood.  They  are  of  not  unfre- 
quent  occurrence,  and  are  often  attended  by  such  horrid, 
heart-rending  circumstances,  that  nothing  but  the  plainest 
and  strongest  conviction  of  their  true  character  can  ever  save 
their  subjects  from  the  last  penalty  of  the  law.  The  near 
affinity  of  this  form  of  the  affection  to  those  already  described 
will  be  manifest,  upon  a  careful  consideration  of  the  few 
cases  here  given. 

§  201.  The  following  is  related  by  Dr.  Otto  of  a  surgeon 
who  had  served  in  several  campaigns  against  the  French. 
"  He  always  appeared  of  a  lively  and  cheerful  disposition, 
till  certain  pecuniary  matters  ruffled  his  temper  and  made 
him  thoughtful  and  melancholy.  He  was  now  frequently 
observed  to  be  studying  the  scriptures,  and  reciting  passages 
from  the  bible.  He  was  happily  married,  and  had  four 
children.  One  morning  he  summoned  his  wife  and  chil- 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  110. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  217 

dren  into  the  court  of  the  house,  and  there  informed  them  that 
it  was  his  intention  to  kill  them  all,  and  afterwards  himself. 
He  descanted  coolly  on  the  propriety  of  homicide,  and  told 
his  wife  she  must  first  be  a  spectator  of  the  destruction  of 
her  children,  and  then  her  own  turn  would  come.  The 
woman  appears  to  have  possessed  great  presence  of  mind, 
and  acted  with  great  prudence  on  such  a  trying  occasion. 
She  entirely  coincided  in  the  justness  of  her  husband's  sen- 
timents, and  cheerfully  agreed  to  the  proposed  tragedy.  But 
she  appeared  suddenly  to  recollect  that  it  would  be  proper 
for  herself,  as  well  as  the  children,  to  confess  and  take  the 
sacrament  previous  to  their  appearing  before  their  final 
judge,  —  a  ceremony  which  would  necessarily  require  seve- 
ral days'  preparation.  The  monomaniac  replied  that  this 
was  a  reasonable  and  proper  procedure ;  but,  in  the  mean- 
time, it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  that  he  took  some 
person's  life  that  day.  With  this  purpose  in  view,  he  in- 
stantly set  off  for  Salzbourg.  His  wife,  having  placed  the 
children  in  security,  made  the  best  of  her  way  to  the  above- 
mentioned  town,  and  went  directly  to  professor  O.,  the  friend 
of  her  husband,  for  advice.  The  monomaniac  had  already 
been  there,  and  not  finding  the  professor  at  home,  had  gone 
away.  The  woman  now  recollected  and  told  the  professor, 
that  her  husband  had  threatened  his  life  for  some  imagi- 
nary slight;  but,  at  that  time,  she  thought  he  was  in  jest. 
About  mid-day  the  monomaniac  came  back  to  the  professor's 
residence,  and  appeared  quite  calm  and  peaceable.  The  pro- 
fessor invited  him  to  go  and  see  the  hospital  of  the  town 
where  he  had  a  curious  dissection  to  make,  and  they  sat 
down  to  take  some  refreshments  before  proceeding-  thither. 
At  this  repast,  the  monomaniac  informed  his  host  that  he  had 
lately  been  most  immoderately  disposed  to  commit  homicide, 
and  that  he  had  actually  murdered  a  peasant  that  morning 
on  his  way  to  town.  He  confessed,  also,  that  he  had  entered 
a  coffee-house  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a  second  act  of 
this  kind,  but  had  been  diverted  from  his  purpose.  The 
murder  of  the  peasant  was  a  fiction,  as  was  afterwards  proved. 
The  professor  now  turned  the  discourse  to  other  subjects, 

19 


218  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  on  all  other  topics  the  monomaniac  was  perfectly  ra- 
tional. They  now  set  off  for  the  hospital,  and  in  their  way 
thither  the  monomaniac  met  with  an  old  acquaintance  and 
fellow-campaigner.  While  they  were  greeting  each  other,  the 
monomaniac  suddenly  struck  his  friend  a  violent  blow  on  the 
pit  of  the  stomach,  exclaiming  in  a  burst  of  laughter,  that  he 
had  done  it  for  him,  as  he  had  hit  the  coeliac  plexus.  The 
professor  reprimanded  him  in  strong  terms  for  this  dishonora- 
ble and  cruel  act,  at  which  the  monomaniac  was  much  sur- 
prised, and  informed  his  preceptor  that  he  was  irresistibly  led 
to  commit  homicide,  and  cared  not  who  was  the  victim  of 
this  propensity.  The  professor  now  asked  him,  somewhat 
tauntingly,  if  he  had  not  a  design  against  his  life.  The  mon- 
omaniac acknowledged  it ;  but  added  that  he  had  sufficient 
control  over  himself  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  his  benefac- 
tor. The  professor  took  his  arm  and  they  proceeded  to  the 
hospital,  where  the  monomaniac  was  immediately  confined. 
He  almost  instantly  became  furiously  maniacal,  and  in  a  few 
months  after  died." 1 

§  202.  Gall  quotes  an  account  of  Catherine  Hansterin, 
who,  in  consequence  of  being  detected  in  a  petty  theft  which 
was  reported  to  her  husband,  a  man  of  harsh  and  austere 
manners,  of  whom  she  stood  greatly  in  fear  on  account  of  his 
cruel  treatment  of  her,  became  exceedingly  melancholy  and 
depressed.  After  suffering  much  and  long  from  her  cruel 
husband,  she  determined  to  leave  him,  and  accordingly  de- 
parted, taking  her  infant  two  and  a  half  months  old,  and  her 
little  girl  who  had  declared  she  would  rather  die  than  be 
left  behind  with  her  father.  "  The  thought  which  this  reply 
brought  to  her  mind,  the  distress  that  afflicted  her,  the  fear 
of  what  would  happen  to  her  children  in  case  of  her  death, 
and  at  the  same  time,  her  ardent  desire  to  terminate  her  own 
existence ;  —  all  these  united,  gave  rise  to  the  barbarous 
design  of  drowning  her  two  children.  Having  arrived  at  the 
bank  of  the  Danube,  she  made  her  little  girl  kneel  down 
and  pray  God  for  a  good  death.  She  then  placed  the 

1  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  xlii.  446. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  219 

infant  in  the  hands  of  her  sister,  blessed  them  both,  and  mak- 
ing the  sign  of  the  cross,  pushed  them  into  the  river.  This 
done,  she  returned  to  the  village  and  told  what  had  passed." 1 
§  203.  Dr.  Otto  has  published  the  case  of  Peter  Neilsen, 
a  joiner,  aged  forty-seven  years,  who  drowned  four  of  his 
seven  children.  He  appears  to  have  experienced  some  mis- 
fortunes, but  was  not  in  positive  want  of  the  necessaries 
of  life  at  the  moment  when  he  committed  the  horrid  deed. 
Many  persons  who  conversed  with  him  on  the  same  day 
both  before  and  after  the  transaction,  testified  that  Tie  was 
not  intoxicated,  nor  the  least  agitated  in  mind.  He  was,  on 
the  contrary,  placid  and  tranquil.  No  domestic  altercations, 
of  any  moment,  had  occurred,  but  he  was  disconcerted  at 
not  readily  getting  a  new  lodging  on  being  turned  out  of 
that  which  he  previously  occupied.  His  love  to  his  children 
was  testified  to  by  all.  He  confessed  that  the  idea  of  kill- 
ing his  children  came  into  his  head  on  the  morning  of  the 
day  that  he  put  the  idea  into  execution,  and  that  the  impulse 
was  quite  irresistible.  He  determined  to  drown  the  three 
younger  boys  and  spare  the  daughter  who  was  older.  But 
she  insisted  on  accompanying  her  father  and  brothers  in  the 
walk  he  proposed,  and  though  he  endeavored  to  persuade  her 
to  return,  she  would  not.  He  averred  that  his  motive  for 
destroying  the  boys  was  the  fear  of  not  being  able  to  main- 
tain them ;  whereas  he  would  have  spared  the  girl,  not  be- 
cause he  loved  her  more,  but  because  she  was  better  able  to 
maintain  herself.  Having  arrived  at  a  turf-pit  he  first  em- 
braced his  children,  and  then  pushed  them  all  into  the  water. 
He  stood  by  unmoved,  and  saw  them  struggle  and  sink.  He 
then  returned  quietly  to  the  town  and  told  what  he  had  done 
He  was  then  led  back  to  the  turf-pit,  and  beheld  the  dead 
bodies  of  his  children  without  evincing  any  emotion.  For  a 
moment  he  wept,  when  he  saw  the  bodies  opened  (for  the 
purpose  of  medico-legal  proof  of  the  kind  of  death),  but  soon 
regained  his  tranquillity.  He  affirmed  that  he  did  not  des- 
troy his  offspring  in  order  to  procure  happiness  for  them  in 

i  Op.  cit.  iv.  152. 


220  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

heaven,  nor  from  any  desire  to  be  put  to  death  himself,  as  he 
wished  to  live.1 

§  204.  The  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred  in 
Paris  a  few  years  since,  has,  in  consequence  of  the  imposing 
weight  of  medical  opinions  that  were  delivered  on  her  trial, 
and  of  the  discussions  to  which  it  gave  rise  in  the  various 
shapes  of  reports,  newspaper  criticisms,  and  elaborate  treatises 
from  some  of  the  most  distinguished  physicians  of  that 
capital,  contributed,  more  than  any  other  single  event,  to 
advance  our  knowledge  of  homicidal  insanity.  A  case  so 
celebrated  deserves  a  particular  notice  here.  The  facts  as 
related  below  are  contained  in  the  indictment  (acte  d>  accusa- 
tion}^ which  is  given  at  length  by  Georget  in  his  account  of 
the  trial.2 

§  205.  Henriette  Cornier,  a  female  servant  aged  twenty- 
seven  years,  was  of  a  mild  and  lively  disposition,  full  of 
gaiety,  and  remarkably  fond  of  children.  In  the  month  of 
June,  1825,  a  singular  change  was  observed  in  her  character ; 
she  became  silent,  melancholy,  absorbed  in  reverie,  and  finally 
sank  into  a  kind  of  stupor.  She  was  dismissed  from  her 
place,  but  her  friends  could  obtain  from  her  no  account  of 
the  causes  of  her  mental  dejection.  In  the  month  of  Sep- 
tember she  made  an  attempt  to  commit  suicide,  but  was 
prevented.  In  the  following  October  she  entered  into  the 
service  of  dame  Fournier,  but  there  she  still  presented  the 
melancholy  and  desponding  disposition.  Dame  Fournier 
observed  her  peculiar  dejection,  and  endeavored  in  vain  to 
ascertain  its  cause ;  the  girl  would  talk  only  of  her  misfor- 
tune in  losing  her  parents  at  an  early  age,  and  of  the  bad 
treatment  she  received  from  her  guardian.  On  the  4th  of 
November,  her  conduct  not  having  been  previously  different 
from  what  it  usually  was,  she  suddenly  conceived  and  im- 
mediately executed  the  act  for  which  she  was  committed. 

§  206.  About  noon  her  mistress  went  out  to  walk,  having 
told  Cornier  to  prepare  dinner  at  the  usual  hour,  and  to  go  to 

1  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  v.  87. 
a  Discussion  medico-legale,  70. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  221 

a  neighboring  shop  kept  by  dame  Belon,  to  buy  some  cheese. 
She  had  frequently  gone  to  this  shop,  and  had  always  mani- 
fested great  fondness  for  Belon's  little  girl,  a  beautiful  child 
nineteen  months  old.  On  this  day  she  displayed  her  usual 
fondness  for  it,  and  persuaded  its  mother  who  at  first  was 
rather  unwilling,  to  let  her  take  it  out  to  walk.  Cornier  then 
hastened  back  to  her  mistress's  house  with  the  child,  and 
laying  it  across  her  own  bed,  severed  its  head  from  its  body 
with  a  large  kitchen  knife.  She  subsequently  declared  that 
while  executing  this  horrid  deed,  she  felt  no  particular  emo- 
tion—  neither  of  pleasure,  nor  of  pain.  Shortly  after,  she 
said,  the  sight  of  the  horrible  spectacle  before  her  eyes 
brought  her  to  herself,  and  she  expressed  some  emotions  of 
fear,  but  they  were  of  short  duration.  At  the  end  of  two 
hours,  during  which  time  she  had  remained  chiefly  in  her 
own  chamber,  dame  Belon  came  and  inquired  for  her  child, 
from  the  bottom  of  the  staircase.  "  Your  child  is  dead," 
said  Henriette.  The  mother,  who  at  first  thought  she  was 
only  in  jest,  soon  became  alarmed,  and  pushed  forward  into 
the  chamber,  where  she  witnessed  the  bloody  sight  of  the 
mutilated  fragments  of  her  child.  At  that  moment,  Cornier 
snatched  up  the  head  of  the  murdered  child,  and  threw  it  into 
the  street,  from  the  open  window.  The  mother  rushed  out  of 
the  house,  struck  with  horror.  An  alarm  was  raised;  the 
father  of  the  child  and  the  officers  of  justice  with  a  crowd  of 
persons  entered  the  room.  Henriette  was  found  sitting  on  a 
chair  near  the  body  of  the  child,  gazing  at  it,  with  the  bloody 
knife  by  her,  her  hands  and  clothes  covered  with  blood.  She 
made  no  attempt  to  escape,  nor  to  deny  the  crime ;  she  con- 
fessed all  the  circumstances,  even  her  premeditated  design, 
and  the  perfidy  of  her  caresses,  which  had  persuaded  the 
unhappy  mother  to  intrust  her  with  the  child.  It  was  found 
impossible  to  excite  in  her  the  slightest  emotion  of  remorse 
or  grief ;  to  all  that  was  said,  she  replied,  with  indifference, 
"  I  intended  to  kill  the  child."  When  closely  and  earnestly 
interrogated,  as  to  her  motives  for  committing  this  dreadful 
act,  she  replied  that  she  had  no  particular  reason  for  it ;  that 
the  idea  had  taken  possession  of  her  mind,  and  that  she  was 

19* 


222  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

destined  to  do  it.  When  asked  why  she  threw  the  head  into 
the  street,  she  answered  that  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  attract- 
ing public  attention,  so  that  people  might  come  up  to  her 
chamber  and  see  that  she  alone  was  guilty.  The  nature  of 
her  extraordinary  replies,  the  want  of  motives  for  such  an 
atrocious  deed,  the  absence  of  every  kind  of  emotion,  and 
the  state  of  stupor  in  which  she  remained,  fixed  the  attention 
of  the  medical  men  who  were  called  in,  and  impressed  them 
with  the  belief  that  she  was  mad.  On  the  examination 
before  the  magistrate,  she  confirmed  the  above  statements 
respecting  her  mental  condition,  adding,  among  other  things, 
that  she  had  been  unhappily  married  seven  years  before ; 
that  she  attempted  to  drown  herself  "  because  she  was 
ennuied  at  changing  her  place  of  service  so  often ;  "  that  she 
knew  her  crime  deserved  death,  and  she  desired  it. 

§  207.  She  was  tried  for  the  first  time,  on  the  27th  of 
February,  1826.  She  then  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of  great 
nervous  irritation  ;  her  limbs  trembled  ;  her  eyes  were  fixed  ; 
and  her  understanding  was  dull  and  stupid.  A  few  days 
previous,  the  court,  at  the  request  of  her  counsel,  appointed 
a  medical  commission  consisting  of  Adelon,  Esquirol,  and 
LeVeille*,  to  examine  the  accused  and  all  the  documents  of 
the  case,  and  report  on  her  "  present  moral  state."  Accord- 
ingly they  reported  that  they  were  unable  to  detect  any  sign 
or  proof  of  mental  derangement;  but  added  that  it  is  ex- 
tremely difficult  in  some  cases,  to  establish  the  existence  of 
insanity,  it  requiring  a  long  intimacy  with  the  individual  and 
numerous  opportunities  of  watching  him  under  every  variety 
of  circumstance,  none  of  which  they  had  possessed  in  this 
case.  In  fine,  they  reported  that  though  they  could  not 
adduce  any  positive  proof  of  her  insanity,  yet  they  were 
equally  unable  to  pronounce  her  sane. 

§  208.  This  report  not  being  satisfactory,  the  trial  was 
postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  prisoner  was  sent  to 
the  Salpe"triere  to  be  observed  by  the  above-named  physi- 
cians. After  recapitulating  their  observations,  which  were 
continued  three  months,  they  came  to  the  following  con- 
clusions :  "  first,  that  during  the  whole  time  Cornier  was 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  223 

under  examination,  from  the  25th  of  February  to  the  3d  of 
June,  they  had  observed  in  regard  to  her  moral  state  great 
mental  dejection,  extreme  dulness  of  mind,  and  profound 
chagrin ;  secondly,  that  the  present  situation  of  Cornier 
sufficiently  explains  her  moral  state,  and  thus  does  not  of 
itself  indicate  mental  alienation  either  general  or  partial." 
They  also  added  that  it  was  due  to  the  cause  of  justice  and 
to  their  own  conscience,  to  declare  that  their  judgment  of 
her  actual  moral  condition  could  not  be  considered  final,  if 
it  were  proved,  as  stated  in  the  acte  d*  accusation,  that  long 
before  the  4th  of  November,  the  character  and  habits  had 
changed  ;  that  she  had  become  sad,  gloomy,  silent,  and  rest- 
less ;  for  then  that  which  might  be  attributed  to  her  present 
situation,  could  be  only  the  continuation  of  a  melancholy 
state  that  had  existed  for  a  year.1 

Cornier  was  again  brought  to  trial  on  the  24th  of  June, 
and  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  "  committing 
homicide  voluntarily,  but  not  with  premeditation  ; " 2  and  ac- 
cordingly she  was  sentenced  to  hard  labor  for  life. 

§  209.  Sometimes  the  individual  confesses  a  motive  for 
the  homicidal  act,  which  is  rational  and  well  founded,  but 
altogether  inadequate  to  lead  to  such  an  action  in  a  sound 
mind.  There  are  seldom  wanting  other  circumstances  in 
the  previous  conduct,  conversation,  or  bodily  health,  to  con- 
firm and  establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  presence 

1  Georget  justly  observes  that  the  meaning  of  the  committee  would  have 
been  better  expressed  in  the  following  language.     "  The  present  moral  state 
of  Henriette  Cornier  is  doubtful.     It  may  be  the  result  either  of  a  painful 
moral  affection,  or  of  melancholy ;  which  it  really  is,  the  nature  of  the  prior 
circumstances  must  decide.     If,  several  months  before  the  4th  of  November, 
her  character  had  changed ;  if  she  became  sad  and  gloomy  without  cause ; 
if  she  had  a  motiveless  propensity  to  suicide ;  and,  finally,  if  the  homicide 
she  committed  was  without  cause,  and  under  the  circumstances  related  in 
the  acte  <f  accusation,  it  is  certain  that  she  has  been  and  still  is  laboring  under 
a  kind  of  mental  alienation." 

2  This  verdict  is  very  properly  censured  by  Georget,  who  says,  that  if  the 
accused  was  mad  she  ought  to  have  been  acquitted ;  and  that  if  not  mad, 
she  acted  from  premeditation,  and  should  have  suffered  the  punishment  of 
death. 


224  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  insanity,  the  suspicion  of  which  is  thus  excited.  All 
doubt  of  the  correctness  of  this  conclusion  is  removed  in  the 
first  of  the  following  cases,  which  is  introduced  to  illustrate 
this  form  of  the  disorder,  by  the  pathological  changes  dis- 
covered after  death,  and  in  the  second  by  the  previous  exist- 
ence of  insanity. 

§  210.  At  Rouen,  in  1820,  a  young  man,  named  Trestel, 
seventeen  or  eighteen  years  old,  whose  family  was  respecta- 
ble and  in  easy  circumstances.,  obtained  an  almost  complete 
meeting  of  its  various  members  to  the  number  of  thirteen, 
and  endeavored  to  poison  them  all  by  putting  arsenic  into 
the  soup.  The  severe  vomiting  which  it  produced,  however, 
was  the  means  of  saving  all  their  lives.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, that  Trestel  was  so  imbecile  at  fifteen  years  of  age, 
that  he  was  incapable  of  executing  the  slightest  commissions ; 
that  he  had  strange  and  incoherent  ideas ;  that  he  was  sad, 
taciturn,  and  incapable  of  being  instructed ;  that  he  was  in 
the  habit  of  addressing  letters  to  an  imaginary  female  whom 
he  was  in  love  with.  On  the  trial,  as  well  as  on  the  previous 
examination,  Trestel  alleged  as  his  motive  for  committing 
the  crime,  that  his  father  had  frequently  threatened  to  send 
him  to  sea.  Notwithstanding  these  strong  indications  of 
mental  deficiency  and  alienation,  he  was  convicted  and  sen- 
tenced to  be  executed ;  but  on  the  day  appointed  for  the  exe- 
cution, he  killed  himself  by  taking  poison.  His  body  was 
examined  by  Dr.  Vingtrinier,  surgeon  of  the  prisons,  in  the 
presence  of  three  other  medical  men,  and  there  was  found 
inflammation  of  the  arachnoid  membrane  of  the  brain,  char- 
acterized by  thickening,  induration,  and  redness,  and  by  its 
almost  entire  adhesion  to  the  pia  mater.  In  short,  not  one 
of  the  four  physicians  had  the  least  doubt  of  the  existence  of 
arachnoid  inflammation  of  very  long  standing.  However 
uncertain  other  symptoms  and  tests  of  insanity  may  be,  this 
at  least  is  sure ;  and  we  are  left  with  the  comfortable  reflec- 
tion, that  an  unfortunate  youth  paid  the  last  penalty  of 
the  law  for  the  consequences  of  bodily  disease.1 

1  Georget,  Discussion  Medico-legale  surla  Folie,  65,  165. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  225 

§  211.  "  A  Portuguese,  by  the  name  of  Rabello,  was 
employed  by  a  mechanic  in  the  western  part  of  Litchfield 
county,  Connecticut,  to  assist  him  as  a  shoemaker.  He  had 
been  in  the  neighboring  towns,  and  his  conduct  appeared 
singular,  but  usually  inoffensive.  In  the  family  of  the  me- 
chanic he  had  appeared  pleasant,  and  grateful  for  the  kind- 
ness which  had  been  extended  to  him.  One  day  a  little  son 
of  his  new  employer  accidentally  stepped  upon  his  toes. 
The  lad  was  twelve  years  old  only.  Rabello  was  exceed- 
ingly angry,  and  in  the  moment  of  his  rage  threatened  the 
boy's  life.  The  next  day  he  appeared  sullen,  refused  his 
food,  and  looked  wild  and  malicious.  The  following  morn- 
ing, he  went  to  the  barn-yard  with  the  boy,  seized  an  axe, 
and  killed  him  on  the  spot,  mangling  him  in  the  most  shock- 
ing manner.  He  went  deliberately  away  from  the  house, 
but  was  soon  overtaken  by  those  in  pursuit.  He  acknowl- 
edged that  he  killed  the  boy,  and  gave  as  a  reason  that  he 
stepped  on  his  toes.  It  was  found,  from  the  evidence  pro- 
duced at  his  trial,  that  this  was  an  offence  ^considered  most 
heinous  and  not  to  be  forgiven.  Many  instances  were  given 
in  which  the  same  accident  had  produced  the  same  excite- 
ment of  temper,  often  accompanied  with  threats.  One  of 
the  physicians  who  visited  him  in  jail,  stepped,  apparently 
by  accident,  upon  Ms  toes  while  counting  his  pulse.  The 
pulse,  he  declared,  rose  immediately  forty  strokes  in  a  min- 
ute, his  countenance  flashed  up,  and  he  appeared  instantly 
in  a  rage."  *  Insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence  on  his  trial, 
and  on  this  ground  he  was  acquitted  by  the  jury.  It 
appeared  in  evidence  that  his  life  and  conduct  had  been 
marked  by  much  singularity  during  his  residence  in  this 
country ;  and  after  the  trial  it  was  ascertained  from  the 
Portuguese  consul  at  New  York,  that  he  had  been  previously 
deranged.  He  had  been  employed  as  a  clerk  in  a  mercan- 
tile house  at  Madeira,  to  which  place  he  had  returned  a 
"  little  deranged,"  after  having  been  to  Brazil.  From  Ma- 

1  Dr.  Woodward's  Reports  and  other   documents  relating  to  the  State 
Lunatic  Hospital  at  Worcester,  Mass.,  177. 


226  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

deira  he  went  to  Philadelphia,  where  he  got  employment  as 
a  clerk  in  the  house  of  some  merchants,  natives  of  Madeira, 
who  knew  he  had  been  a  little  deranged,  but  supposed  he 
had  recovered.  One  day  one  of  the  house  came  in  and 
asked  him  if  any  body  had  called,  when  Rabello  told  him 
he  would  break  his  head,  if  he  asked  him  any  such  questions. 

§  212.  There  is  another  class  of  homicidal  cases,  not  un- 
frequent  of  late,  which  may,  most  properly,  be  considered  in 
this  connection.  I  refer  to  those  juvenile  delinquents  by 
whom  the  fatal  act  is  committed  before  or  about  the  age  of 
puberty.  Deliberately  and  quietly  they  seek  the  means  and 
opportunity  for  accomplishing  their  purpose,  they  make  no 
attempt  to  escape,  confess  what  they  have  done,  but  give 
no  uniform  or  intelligible  account  of  their  motives.  These 
cases  cannot  be  referred  to  moral  imbecility,  because  the  act 
is  at  variance  with  their  habitual  conduct  and  character  ;  nor 
to  intellectual  mania,  because  they  exhibit  no  trace  of  delu- 
sion or  other  intellectual  disturbance  ;  nor  to  moral  depravity, 
because  their  previous  life  presents  no  indications  of  depravi- 
ty, and  no  apparent  motive  can  be  detected.  In  some,  there 
is  reason  for  suspecting  the  sexual  evolution  described  above, 
(§  178,)  and  in  others,  the  influence  of  physical  disorders ; 
but  there  remains  a  portion  in  which  we  can  find  no  clew  of 
this  kind.  The  following  will  sufficiently  illustrate  this 
form  of  disorder. 

§  213.  A.  B.  a  girl  about  fourteen  years  old,  when  alone, 
one  day,  with  her  infant-half-brother,  gave  it  a  dose  of  arse- 
nic which  she  had  bought  a  short  time  previously.  The  child 
died,  and  she  made  known  her  own  agency  in  the  event,  but 
never  assigned  any  motive  or  explanation  of  her  conduct. 
Her  person  was  well-formed  and  well-developed,  her  counte- 
nance pleasing  and  intelligent,  and  her  manners  modest  and 
respectful.  It  did  not  appear  that  she  had  ever  suffered  any 
physical  or  mental  disorder,  or  expressed  any  feeling  of  dis- 
like towards  the  child  or  any  other  member  of  the  family. 
The  only  facts  that  appeared  in  evidence,  which  could  be 
supposed  to  have  any  bearing  upon  the  event,  were  that  she 
had  received  but  little  education,  had  always  been  exposed 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  227 

to  low  associations,  and  about  this  time  had  taken  an  active 
part  in  spiritual  rappings,  as  a  medium,  in  which  capacity 
she  predicted  the  death  of  this  child  within  a  week  or  two. 
If  her  character  had  not  previously  been  fair,  it  might  be 
supposed  that  she  was  governed  by  the  design  of  verifying 
her  own  prediction,  but  under  the  actual  circumstances,  this 
supposition  requires  a  step  in  crime  scarcely  warranted  by 
our  knowledge  of  human  nature.  She  was  acquitted,  from 
some  defect  in  the  evidence  relative  to  the  act.1 

§  214.  In  the  last  phasis  of  the  murderous  propensity  that 
will  be  noticed,  though  it  is  not  properly  homicidal  mania, 
there  exists  some  delusion,  and  the  individual  acts  from 
motives  —  absurd  and  unfounded  it  is  true  —  but  still  mo- 
tives to  him.  In  consequence  of  the  universal  prevalence, 
in  some  shape  or  other  of  religious  fanaticism,  and  of  the 
excitement  of  the  religious  sentiments  thereby  produced,  a 
perversion  of  these  sentiments  is  one  of  the  most  common 
exciting  causes  of  the  murderous  propensity  in  this  class  of 
cases.  When  thus  excited  its  fury  knows  no  restraints,  and 
whole  families  are  slaughtered  in  a  single  paroxysm.  Pinel 
gives  the  case  of  a  vine-dresser,  who  thought  himself  com- 
missioned to  procure  the  eternal  salvation  of  his  family  by 
killing  them,  or  by  the  baptism  of  blood,  as  he  called  it ;  and 
accordingly  executed  his  commission  so  far  as  to  kill  two  of 
his  children,  when  he  was  arrested  and  confined.  Fourteen 
years  after,  when  he  was  thought  to  be  convalescent,  he  con- 
ceived the  project  of  offering  up  an  expiatory  sacrifice,  by 
killing  all  who  might  come  within  his  reach,  and  he  suc- 
ceeded in  wounding  the  keeper  and  cutting  the  throats  of  two 
other  lunatics  before  he  was  arrested.2 

§  215.  Sometimes  the  individual,  even  when  in  easy 
circumstances,  imagines  that  he  is  coming  to  want,  and  to 
avoid  this  calamity,  he  kills  his  family  and  generally  himself. 
The  following  case  presents  an  illustration  of  this  very  com- 
mon manifestation  of  mental  disorder. 


1  For  other  cases,  see  Taylor's  Med.  Jurisp.  p.  645 ;  Annales  D'  Hygeine, 
viii.  397.  2  gur  i>  Alienation  Mentale,  §  130. 


228  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

"  Captain  James  Purington,  of  Augusta,  Maine,  a  rich, 
independent  farmer,  of  steady,  domestic  habits,  dark  com- 
plexion, grave  countenance,  reserved  in  company,  never 
looking  in  the  face  of  persons  he  addressed,  obstinate 
in  his  opinions,  though  he  frequently  changed  his  religious 
notions  voluntarily,  died  a  decided  believer  in  universal  sal- 
vation, often  expressed  anticipation  of  the  moment  when  his 
family  would  be  happy,  and  sometimes  how  happy  he  should 
be  if  they  should  die  at  once.  He  was  very  avaricious,  and 
elated  or  depressed  as  his  affairs  were  prosperous  or  adverse. 
In  August,  1805,  he  moved  to  a  new  farm  which  he  rapidly 
improved.  He  seemed  happy  till  within  a  few  weeks  of  his 
death.  The  uncommon  drought  depressed  him  greatly,  lest 
his  family  should  suffer  for  want  of  bread,  and  his  cattle 
starve.  On  Sunday,  the  6th  of  July,  1806,  Mrs.  Purington 
and  the  eldest  daughter  being  at  church,  the  second  daughter 
saw  her  father  writing  a  letter  which  he,  perceiving  that  he 
had  been  overlooked,  attempted  to  hide.  She  asked  him 
what  he  had  been  writing.  He  said,  "  nothing,"  and  asked 
for  his  butcher-knife,  saying  he  wanted  to  sharpen  it.  Hav- 
ing made  it  very  sharp,  he  stood  before  the  glass  and  seemed 
preparing  to  cut  his  throat.  His  daughter,  terrified,  cried, 
'what  are  you  doing?'  He  calmly  said,  'nothing;'  and  laid 
the  knife  away.  This  was  told  to  his  wife ;  she  searched  for 
the  letter  and  found  it.  [It  was  addressed  to  his  brother,  and 
stated  that  he  was  about  going  a  long  journey,  and  directed 
him  to  take  charge  of  his  children.]  On  the  7th  of  July,  at 
dinner-time,  he  found  his  wife  sitting  in  the  barn  weeping ; 
she  disclosed  the  cause ;  he  said  he  did  not  intend  suicide ; 
but  he  had  a  presentiment  his  death  was  near.  Towards  the 
close  of  the  following  day,  he  ground  the  axe ;  when  the  fam- 
ily went  to  bed,  he  was  reading  the  bible ;  it  was  found  open 
on  the  table  at  Ezekiel,  chap.  ix.  On  the  9th  of  July,  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  his  eldest  son  alarmed  the  neighbors ; 
they  found  Capt.  Purington  lying  on  his  face,  his  two  sons 
aged  five  and  eight  in  bed,  with  their  throats  cut ;  the  razor 
on  the  table  by  his  side,  the  axe  near ;  in  the  next  room,  Mrs. 
Purington,  aged  forty-four,  in  bed,  her  head  almost  severed 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  229 

from  the  body;  near  her,  on  the  floor,  a  daughter  murdered, 
ten  years  old ;  in  the  other  room  in  bed,  a  daughter  aged 
nineteen,  most  dreadfully  butchered ;  the  second,  aged  fifteen, 
most  desperately  wounded,  reclining  her  head  on  the  infant, 
eighteen  months  old,  whose  throat  was  cut.  The  eldest  son 
was  wounded,  when  Capt.  Purington  attacked  and  dreadfully 
mangled  the  second,  twelve  years  old,  who  attempted  to 
escape ;  Capt.  Purington  did  not  speak  a  word." 1  2 

§  216.  The  various  forms  of  homicidal  insanity  have 
thus  been  illustrated,  by  selecting  a  few  cases  only,  from  a 
mass  that  would  fill  a  considerable  volume.8  Now,  however 
these  cases  may  differ  from  one  another,  whether  the  indi- 
vidual has  succumbed  to  the  propensity  to  kill  after  .a  long 
struggle  with  his  better  nature,  or  has  yielded  to  it  at  once 
and  instantaneously ;  whether  harassed  by  previous  disease 
of  body  or  despondency  of  mind,  or  apparently  in  sound 
health  and  with  a  cheerful  disposition ;  whether  his  passions 
have  been  tamed  by  the  discipline  of  a  good  education,  or 
allowed  to  seek  their  gratification'  without  restraint;  they 
all,  except  the  last  two,  possess  one  feature  in  common,  the 
irresistible,  motiveless  impulse  to  destroy  life.  Before  enter- 
ing upon  any  discussion  relative  to  the  nature  of  these  forms 
of  insanity,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  following  analysis 
of  their  most  important  features. 

§  217.  I.  In  nearly  all,  the  criminal  act  has  been  pre- 
ceded, either  by  some  well-marked  disturbance  of  the  health, 
originating  in  the  head,  digestive  system,  or  uterus,  or  by  an 
irritable,  gloomy,  dejected,  or  melancholy  state,  in  short,  by 


1  Parkman :  Elustrations  of  Insanity. 

2  Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  case  on  record  of  homicidal  insanity 
accompanied  by  delusion,  is  one  related  by  Mr.  Scoresby,  the  Arctic  navi- 
gator, and  copied  into  Waldie's  Circulating  Library,  vol.  xii.  p.  258,  where 
the  captain  of  a  British  vessel  on  the  passage  from  St.  Andrews,  N.  B.  to 
Ireland,  succeeded  in  getting  his  crew  into  his  power,  and  murdering  them 
all  in  detail,  excepting  one,  who  escaped  into  the  hold  desperately  wounded. 

3  They  who  are  desirous  of  extending  their  acquaintance  with  this  class  of 
cases,  will  find  the  later  ones  which  have  appeared  in  the  English  courts, 
noticed  in  Taylor's  Medical  Jurisprudence. 

20 


230  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

many  of  the  symptoms  of  the  incubation  of  mania.  The  ab- 
sence of  particulars  in  some  of  the  cases  we  find  recorded, 
leaves  us  in  doubt  how  general  this  change  really  is ;  but  a 
careful  examination  would,  no  doubt,  often,  if  not  always, 
show  its  existence  where,  apparently,  it  has  never  taken 
place.  , 

II. ,  The  impulse  to  destroy  is  powerfully  excited  by  the 
sight  of  murderous  weapons,  by  favorable  opportunities  of 
accomplishing  the  act,  by  contradiction,  disgust,  or  some 
other  equally  trivial  and  even  imaginary  circumstance. 

III.  The  victims  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac  are  mostly 
either  entirely  unknown  or  indifferent  to  him,   or  they  are 
among    his   most  loved   and   cherished   objects ;  and   it   is 
remarkable  how  often  they  are  children,  and  especially  his 
own  offspring. 

IV.  While  the  greater  number  deplore  the  terrible  pro- 
pensity by  which  they  are  controlled,  and  beg  to  be  subjected 
to  restraint,  a  few  diligently  conceal  it,  or  if  they  avow  it, 
declare  their  murderous  designs,  and  form  divers  schemes  for 
putting  them  in  execution,  testifying  no  sentiment  of  remorse 
or  grief. 

V.  The  most  of  them  having  gratified  their  propensity  to 
kill,  voluntarily  confess  the  act  and  quietly  give  themselves 
up  to  the  proper  authorities  ;  a  very  few  only — and  these,  to 
an  intelligent   observer,  show  the  strongest  indications   of 
insanity  —  fly,  and  persist  in  denying  the  act. 

VI.  While  the  criminal  act  itself  is,  in  some  instances,  the 
only  indication  of  insanity,  the  individual  appearing  rational, 
as  far  as  can  be  learned,  both  before  and  after  the  act ;  in 
others,  it  is  followed  or  preceded,  or   both,  by  strange  be- 
havior, if  not  open  and  decided  insanity. 

VII.  Some  plead  insanity  in  defence  of  their  conduct,  or 
an  entire  ignorance  of  what  they  did ;  others  deny  that  they 
labored  under  any  such  condition,  and  at  most  acknowledge 
only  a  perturbation  of  mind. 

§  218.  Apart  from  the  obvious  similarity  of  all  these 
cases  to  those  where  the  murderous  propensity  coexists 
with  delusions,  as  in  the  last  two,  the  circumstances  under 


PARTIAL   MORAL  MANIA.  231 

which  the  homicidal  act  is  perpetrated,  furnish  strong  ground 
for  believing,  that  they  depend  on  mental  alienation  in  some 
form  or  other ;  so  different  are  these  circumstances  from 
those  which  attend  the  commission  of  crime.  In  homicidal 
insanity,  murder  is  committed  without  any  motive  whatever 
strictly  deserving  the  name;  or  at  most,  with  one  totally 
inadequate  to  produce  the  act  in  a  sane  mind.  On  the 
contrary,  murder  is  never  criminally  committed  without 
some  motive  adequate  to  the  purpose  in  the  mind  that  is 
actuated  by  it,  and  with  an  obvious  reference  to  the  ill-fated 
victim.  Thus,  the  motive  may  be  theft,  or  the  advancement 
of  any  personal  interest,  in  which  case  it  will  be  found  that 
the  victim  had  or  was  supposed  to  have  property,  or  was  an 
obstacle  to  the  designs  or  expectations  of  another.  Or  it 
may  be  revenge,  and  then  the  injury,  real  or  imaginary,  will 
be  found  to  have  been  received  by  the  murderer  from  the 
object  of  his  wrath.  In  short,  with  the  criminal,  murder  is 
always  a  means  for  accomplishing  some  selfish  object,  and  is 
frequently  accompanied  by  some  other  crime ;  whereas,  with 
the  homicidal  monomaniac,  murder  is  the  only  object  in 
view,  and  is  never  accompanied  by  any  other  improper  act. 

§  219.  The  homicidal  monomaniac,  after  gratifying  his 
bloody  desires,  testifies  neither  remorse,  nor  repentance,  nor 
satisfaction,  and  if  judicially  condemned,  perhaps  acknowl- 
edges the  justice  of  the  sentence.  The  criminal  either  denies 
or  confesses  his  guilt ;  if  the  latter,  he  either  humbly  sues  for 
mercy,  or  glories  in  his  crimes,  and  leaves  the  world  cursing 
his  judges,  and  with  his  last  breath  exclaiming  against  the 
injustice  of  his  fate. 

The  criminal  never  sheds  more  blood  than  is  necessary  for 
the  attainment  of  his  object ;  the  homicidal  monomaniac 
often  sacrifices  all  within  his  reach  to  the  cravings  of  his 
murderous  propensity. 

The  criminal  lays  plans  for  the  execution  of  his  designs ; 
time,  place,  and  weapons  are  all  suited  to  his  purpose ;  and 
when  successful,  he  either  flies  from  the  scene  of  his  enor- 
mities, or  makes  every  effort  to  avoid  discovery.  The  homi- 
cidal monomaniac,  on  the  contrary,  for  the  most  part,  con- 


232  '  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

suits  none  of  the  usual  conveniences  of  crime  ;  he  falls  upon 
the  object  of  his  fury,  oftentimes  without  the  most  proper 
means  for  accomplishing  his  purpose ;  and  perhaps  in  the 
presence  of  a  multitude,  as  if  expressly  to  court  observa- 
tion ;  and  then  voluntarily  surrenders  himself  to  the  con- 
stituted authorities.  When,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  he 
does  prepare  the  means,  and  calmly  and  deliberately  executes 
his  project,  his  subsequent  conduct  is  still  the  same  as  in  the 
former  instance. 

The  criminal  often  has  accomplices,  and  generally  vicious 
associates ;  the  homicidal  monomaniac  has  neither. 

The  acts  of  homicidal  insanity  are  generally,  perhaps 
always,  preceded  by  some  striking  peculiarities  in  the  conduct 
or  character  of  the  individual,  strongly  contrasting  with  his 
natural  manifestations ;  while  those  of  the  criminal  are  in 
correspondence  with  the  tenor  of  his  past  history  or  character. 

In  homicidal  insanity,  a  man  murders  his  wife,  children, 
or  others  to  whom  he  is  tenderly  attached ;  this  the  criminal 
never  does,  unless  to  gratify  some  evil  passion,  or  gain  some 
other  selfish  end,  too  obvious  to  be  overlooked  on  the  slight- 
est investigation. 

§  220.  A  stronger  contrast  than  is  presented,  in  every 
respect,  between  the  homicidal  act  of  the  real  criminal  and 
that  of  the  monomaniac,  can  hardly  be  imagined ;  and  yet 
we  are  obliged  to  acknowledge  that  men  of  learning  and 
intelligence  have  been  often  unable  or  unwilling  to  perceive 
it,  though,  undoubtedly,  the  number  of  such  is  fast  diminish- 
ing. Much  of  the  unwillingness  manifested  by  jurors  to 
abide  by  the  result  to  which  the  above  distinctions  would 
necessarily  lead  them,  arises  from  those  feelings  of  horror 
and  indignation  excited  by  the  perpetration  of  cold-blooded 
murders,  which  incapacitate  them  from  discriminating  with 
their  usual  acuteness  between  the  various  causes  and  motives 
of  human  action.  Besides,  notwithstanding  the  great  simi- 
larity, for  the  most  part,  between  these  cases,  one  will 
occasionally  occur,  where,  from  defect  of  information,  no 
little  knowledge  of  insanity  and  of  human  nature  is  required 
to  find  one's  way  through  the  mists  of  doubt  and  obscurity 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  233 

in  which  it  is  involved.  When,  therefore,  as  in  the  case  of 
jurors  generally,  the  mind  is  not  fitted  by  any  of  this  prepara- 
tion so  necessary  to  a  successful  investigation  of  difficult 
cases,  it  seizes  only  on  some  of  the  most  obvious,  though 
perhaps  least  important  points  which  they  present,  and  of 
course  the  verdict  will  often  be  deplorably  at  variance  with 
the  dictates  of  true  science. 


20* 


CHAPTER    VIII. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MANIA. 

§  221.  MAN  being  destined  for  the  social  condition,  has 
received  from  the  author  of  his  being  the  faculties  necessary 
for  discovering  and  understanding  his  relations  to  his  fellow 
men,  and  possesses  the  liberty,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  regu- 
lating his  conduct  agreeably  or  directly  opposed  to  their 
suggestions.  For  the  manner  in  which  this  power  is  used 
he  is  morally  responsible,  the  elements  of  responsibility 
always  being  the  original  capacity,  the  healthy  action,  and 
the  cultivation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties,  —  the 
measure  of  the  former  being  in  proportion  to  the  degree  in 
which  the  latter  are  possessed.  In  legal  responsibility,  the 
last  element  above  mentioned  is  not  admitted,  and  the  first 
to  a  very  limited  extent  only,  the  second  alone  being  absolute- 
ly essential.  The  relation  of  original  incapacity  to  legal 
responsibility  has  already  been  discussed,  when  treating  of 
MENTAL  DEFICIENCY  ;  that  of  cerebral  disease  now  comes  up 
for  consideration. 

§  222..  The  influence  of  this  condition  on  responsibility 
will  obviously  be  proportioned  to  its  severity  and  the  extent 
of  its  action ;  and  though  we  cannot  hope  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  all  its  grades,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  may 
not  be  able  to  recognize  and  identify  some  of  the  more 
common  and  prominent.  If  men  had  agreed  to  receive 
some  particular  analysis  and  arrangement  of  the  affective 
and  intellectual  faculties,  and  to  assign  to  each  a  portion  of 
the  brain  as  its  material  organ,  we  might  then,  by  studying 
the  derangements  of  each  faculty,  ascertain,  in  some  measure, 
how  far  they  affect  the  actions  of  one  another.  But  as  no 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OP   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  235 

such  unanimity  exists,  we  can  only  consider,  as  we  have  in 
a  preceding  chapter,  the  observations  that  have  been  made 
on  the  derangement  of  a  few  particular  faculties,  and  form 
our  opinions  relative  to  their  influence,  by  the  general  tenor 
of  human  experience. 


SECTION  I. 

Legal  Consequences  of  Intellectual  Mania. 

§  223.  The  common  law  relating  to  insanity,  as  before 
intimated,  is  open  to  censure,  not  so  much  on  account  of 
the  manner  in  which  it  modifies  the  civil  and  criminal  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  lunatic,  as  of  the  looseness,  inconsis- 
tency, and  incorrectness  of  the  principles  on  which  the  fact 
of  the  existence  of  the  disease  is  judicially  established.  The 
disabilities  it  imposes  on  this  unfortunate  class  of  our  fellow 
men  are  founded  in  the  most  humane  and  enlightened  views, 
and  have  for  their  object  the  promotion  of  their  highest  wel- 
fare. To  incapacitate  a  person  from  making  contracts, 
bequeathing  property,  and  performing  other  civil  acts,  who 
has  lost  his  natural  power  of  discerning  and  judging,  who 
mistakes  one  thing  for  another,  and  misapprehends  his  rela- 
tions to  those  around  him,  is  the  greatest  mercy  he  could 
receive,  instead  of  being  an  arbitrary  restriction  of  his  rights. 

§  224.  In  opposition  to  that  principle  of  the  common  law, 
which  makes  the  lunatic  who  commits  a  trespass  on  the  per- 
sons or  property  of  others,  amenable  in  damages  to  be  re- 
covered by  a  civil  action,1  Hoffbauer  declares,  that  if  the 
patient  is  "  so  deranged  that  he  is  no  longer  master  of  his 
actions,  he  is  under  no  responsibility,  nor  obliged  to  make 
reparation  for  injuries."  l  He  gives  no  reason  for  this  opin- 
ion, and  we  are  unable  to  see  how  it  can  be  even  plausibly 
supported.  To  the  maniac,  who,  when  restored  to  his 

1  Weaver  v.  Ward,  Hobart's  Reports,  134.     Butterly  v.  Darling,  Com. 
Pleas,  New  York ;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  March  30,  1841. 

2  Op.  cit  §  131. 


236  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

senses,  discovers  that  during  his  derangement  he  has  com- 
mitted an  injury  to  his  neighbor's  property,  indemnity  for 
which  will  strip  him  of  his  own  possessions  and  reduce  him 
to  absolute  beggary,  his  recovery  must  seem  indeed  like 
escaping  from  one  evil  only  to  encounter  a  greater.  Such 
a  possible  consequence  of  madness,  it  is  certainly  painful  to 
think  of;  but  as  the  damage  is  produced  and  must  be  borne 
by  one  party  or  the  other,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  say  which 
it  should  be ;  for  though  it  may  be  hard  for  a  person  thus  to 
suffer  for  actions  committed  while  utterly  unconscious  of 
their  nature,  it  would  manifestly  be  the  height  of  injustice  to 
make  another  suffer,  who  was  equally  innocent  and  perhaps 
equally  unconscious  of  the  act. 

§  225.  There  is  one  operation  of  the  common  law,  how- 
ever, which  is  justly  a  cause  of  complaint,  namely,  that  by 
which  lunatics,  even  when  under  guardianship,  are  subject  to 
be  imprisoned  like  others,  in  default  of  satisfying  a  civil  exe- 
cution obtained  against  them ; *  because,  whether  such  im- 
prisonment be  considered  as  a  penal  or  a  merely  coercive 
measure,  it  is  altogether  inapplicable  to  the  insane.  It  can- 
not coerce  one  who  has  no  control  over  his  own  property, 
and  whose  mental  condition  is  supposed  to  be  such  that  he 
is  unable  to  see  any  relation  between  the  means  and  the 
end ;  and  to  punish  a  person  for  what  he  himself  had  no 
agency  whatever  in  doing,  is  a  violation  of  the  first  princi- 
ples of  justice.  To  incarcerate  some  madmen  in  a  common 
jail  would,  in  all  probability,  aggravate  their  disorder,  and  if 
the  confinement  were  protracted  to  the  extent  which  the  law 
would  allow,  render  it  utterly  incurable. 

§  226.  The  civil  disabilities  above-mentioned  are  not  in- 
curred by  every  one  laboring  under  mental  derangement ;  the 
measure  of  insanity  necessary  to  produce  this  effect,  or  in 
legal  phrase,  the  fact  of  the  party's  being  compos  or  non  com- 
pos mentis,  is  a  question  to  be  submitted  to  judicial  investi- 
gation, the  result  of  which  will  depend  on  the  views  of  indi- 
viduals relative  to  the  effect  of  insanity  on  the  mental  opera- 

1  Shelford  on  Lunacy,  407 ;  Ex  parte  Leighton,  14  Mass.  Rep.  207. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  237 

tions,  and  to  the  respect  due  to  opinions  and  decisions 
already  promulgated.  General  intellectual  mania,  as  we 
have  represented  it,  should  be  followed,  to  the  fullest  extent, 
by  the  legal  consequences  of  insanity ;  but  partial  intellect- 
ual mania  does  not  necessarily  render  a  person  non  compos, 
or  so  impaired  in  mind  as  to  be  no  longer  legally  responsi- 
ble for  his  acts,  any  more  than  every  disease  of  the  lungs  or 
stomach  prevents  a  patient  from  attending  to  his  ordinary 
affairs,  and  enjoying  a  certain  measure  of  health.  The 
question  when  mania  invalidates  a  person's  civil  acts  and 
annuls  criminal  responsibility,  and  when  it  does  not  affect 
his  liability  in  these  respects,  has  occasioned  considerable 
discussion,  and  is  certainly  the  most  delicate  and  important 
that  the  whole  range  of  this  subject  embraces.  No  general 
principles  concerning  it  are  to  be  found  in  the  common  law 
except  lord  Male's  (§  8),  and  cases  seem  to  have  been  decided 
with  but  little  reference  to  one  another,  according  to  the  med- 
ical or  legal  views  which  happened  at  the  time  to  possess  the 
minds  of  the  court  and  jury.  As  insanity  has  become  better 
known,  decisions  have  occasionally  been  more  correct,  but  as 
the  prevalence  of  these  improvements  has  not  been  universal, 
this  branch  of  jurisprudence  has  often  retrograded,  and  thus 
the  mind  of  the  inquirer  is  confused  by  an  array  of  opinions 
diametrically  opposed.  Correct  general  principles  on  this 
subject,  therefore,  are  yet  to  be  established ;  and  in  further- 
ance of  this  object,  we  shall  endeavor  to  lay  down  such  legal 
consequences  of  partial  intellectual  mania,  as  seem  to  be 
warranted  by  correct  medical  knowledge  of  insanity,  and  by 
enlightened  principles  of  justice. 

§  227.  We  see  some  persons  managing  their  affairs  with 
their  ordinary  shrewdness  and  discretion,  evincing  no  extra- 
ordinary exaltation  of  feeling  or  fancy,  and  on  all  but  one  or 
a  few  points,  in  the  perfect  enjoyment  of  their  reason.  It 
has  been  elsewhere  remarked  (§  136),  that  strange  as  it  may 
appear,  it  is  no  less  true,  «that  notwithstanding  the  serious 
derangement  of  the  reasoning  power  which  a  person  must 
have  experienced,  who  entertains  the  strange  fancies  that 
sometimes  find  their  way  into  the  mind,  it  may  still  be  exer- 


238  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

cised  on  all  other  subjects,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  with  no 
diminution  of  its  natural  soundness.  The  celebrated  Pascal 
believed  at  times  that  he  was  sitting  on  the  brink  of  a  preci- 
pice over  which  he  was  momentarily  in  danger  of  falling,  and 
a  German  professor  of  law,  mentioned  by  Hoff  bauer,  thought 
the  freemasons  were  leagued  against  him,  while  he  dis- 
charged the  duties  of  his  chair  with  his  usual  ability ;  and 
numberless  are  the  instances  of  worthy  people  who  have 
imagined  their  heads  turned  round,  or  their  limbs  made  of 
butter  or  glass,  who  nevertheless  manage  their  concerns  with 
their  ordinary  shrewdness.  No  one,  however,  following  the 
dictates  of  his  own  judgment,  would  seriously  propose  to 
invalidate  such  of  these  men's  acts  as  manifestly  have  no 
reference  to  the  crotchets  they  have  imbibed.  To  deprive 
them  of  the  management  of  their  affairs,  under  the  show  of 
affording  them  protection,  would  be  to  inflict  a  certain  and  a 
serious  injury,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  a  much  smaller 
one  that  might  never  occur.  The  principle  that  we  would 
inculcate  is,  that  monomania  invalidates  a  civil  act  only 
when  such  act  comes  within  the  circle  of  the  diseased  opera- 
tions of  the  mind. 

§  228.  It  is  not  to  be  understood,  however,  that  in  every 
case  of  partial  mania  we  have  only  to  ascertain  the  insane 
delusion,  and  then  decide  whether  or  not  the  act  in  question 
could  have  come  within  the  range  of  its  influence.  In  many 
instances  the  delusion  is  frequently  changing,  in  which  case, 
it  is  not  only  difficult  to  determine  how  far  it  may  have  been 
connected  with  any  particular  act,  but  the  mind  in  respect 
to  other  operations,  has  lost  its  original  soundness,  to  such  a 
degree  that  it  cannot  be  trusted  in  the  transaction  of  impor- 
tant affairs.  Still,  this  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  against  apply- 
ing the  general  principle  where  it  can  be  done  without  fear 
of  mistake.  In  doubtful  instances  we  must  be  governed  by 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  arid  this  course,  with  all  its 
objections,  seems  far  more  rational  than  the  practice  of  uni- 
versal disqualification. 

§  229.  The  validity  of  a  marriage  contracted  in  a  state 
of  partial  mania,  is  not  to  be  determined  exactly  upon  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  239 

above  principles.  Here  it  is  not  sufficient  to  consider  merely 
the  connection  of  the  delusion  with  the  idea  of  being  mar- 
ried, nor  should  we  form  any  conclusion  in  favor  of  the 
capacity  of  the  deranged  party,  from  the  propriety  with 
which  he  conducts  himself  during  the  ceremony.  The  mere 
joining  of  hands  and  uttering  the  usual  responses  are  things 
not  worth  considering ;  it  is  the  new  relations  which  the  mar- 
ried state  creates,  the  new  responsibilities  which  it  imposes, 
that  should  fix  our  attention,  as  the  only  points  in  regard  to 
which  the  question  of  capacity  can  be  properly  agitated.  In" 
other  contracts,  all  the  conditions  and  circumstances  may  be 
definite  and  brought  into  view  at  once,  and  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  to  comprehend  them  determined  with  comparative 
facility.  In  the  contract  of  marriage,  on  the  contrary,  there 
is  nothing  definite  or  certain ;  the  obligations  which  it 
imposes  do  not  admit  of  being  measured  and  discussed;  they 
are  of  an  abstract  kind,  and  constantly  varying  with  every 
new  scene  and  condition  of  life.  With  these  views  we  are 
obliged  to  dissent  from  the  principle  laid  down  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts,  in  a  case  of  libel 
for  divorce  for  insanity  of  the  wife  at  the  time  of  the  mar- 
riage, that  "  the  fact  of  the  party's  being  able  to  go  through 
the  marriage  ceremony  with  propriety,  was  primd  facie  evi- 
dence."1 If  by  making  the  contract  is  meant  merely  the 
giving  of  consent  and  the  execution  of  certain  forms,  then 
indeed  the  fact  of  the  party's  going  through  the  ceremony 
with  propriety  may  be  some  evidence  of  sufficient  under- 
standing to  make  it ;  but  if  the  expression  includes  the  slight- 
est idea  of  the  nature  of  the  relations  and  duties  that  follow, 
or  even  of  the  bonds  and  settlements  that  sometimes  accom- 
pany it,  then  the  fact  here  mentioned  is  no  evidence  at  ah1  of 
sufficient  capacity.  Sir  John  Nicholl,  looking  at  the  subject 
in  a  different  light,  has  very  properly  said,  that  "going 
through  the  ceremony  was  not  sufficient  to  establish  the 
capacity  of  the  party ;  and  that  foolish,  crazy  persons  might 
be  instructed  to  go  through  the  formality  of  the  ceremony, 

1  4  Pickering's  Reports,  32. 


240  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

though  wholly  incapable  of  understanding  the  marriage  con- 
tract."1 In  a  similar  case,  Lord  Stowell,  then  Sir  William 
Scott,  had  previously  observed,  on  the  fact  given  in  evidence 
that  the  party  "  had  manifested  perfect  propriety  of  behav- 
iour," during  the  ceremony,  "  that  much  stress  was  not  to  be 
laid  on  that  circumstance;  as  persons,  in  that  state,  will 
nevertheless  often  pursue  a  favorite  purpose,  with  the  com- 
posure and  regularity  of  apparently  sound  minds." 2 

§  230.  Within  a  few  years,  a  class  of  cases  has  made 
its  appearance,  exceedingly  embarrassing  to  the  medical 
jurist.  The  woman,  after  preparing  for  a  union  to  which 
her  head  and  heart  had  apparently  fully  consented,  and 
going  through  the  marriage  ceremony  with  the  utmost  pro- 
priety, manifesting  all  the  while  nothing  unusual  in  her 
deportment,  immediately  after  imbibes  an  insuperable  aver- 
sion towards  her  husband,  shuns  his  company,  and  perhaps 
refuses  to  live  with  him.  In  some  of  the  cases,  other  singu- 
larities of  conduct  soon  appear,  one  after  another,  till  at  last 
the  woman  becomes  a  subject  of  unequivocal  insanity.  In 
others,  however,  this  strong  repugnance  towards  the  husband 
continues  to  be  the  principal,  if  not  the  only  symptom,  of 
mental  disorder,  but  so  closely  do  they  resemble  the  former 
in  other  respects,  that  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in  regarding 
them  as  merely  varieties  of  the  same  affection.  The  patho- 
logical character  of  these  cases  seems  to  be  sufficiently  obvi- 
ous. From  some  cause  or  other,  the  patient  has  been  affected 
with  a  cerebral  irritation  not  sufficient  to  disturb  the  men- 
tal manifestations,  and  which,  under  favorable  circumstances 
might  have  entirely  disappeared.  In  this  condition,  marriage, 
with  the  crowd  of  new  thoughts  and  feelings  with  which  it  is 
preceded,  operates  as  a  powerfully  exciting  cause,  and  under 
its  influence  the  pathological  affection  is  completely  devel- 
oped. It  is  not  strange,  certainly,  that  marriage  should 
occasionally  find  a  female  brain  in  this  morbid  condition  ;  nor 
that,  in  case  of  such  a  conjunction,  the  result  here  mentioned 

1  Browning  v.  Read,  2  Phillimore's  Eccl.  Rep.  69. 

2  Turner  v.  Meyers,  1  Hagg.  Con.  Rep.  414. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     241 

should  follow.  The  legal  relations  of  these  cases  are  not  so 
satisfactorily  settled.  In  some  of  them,  a  close  scrutiny  of 
the  conduct  and  condition  previous  to  marriage,  may  detect 
indubitable  signs  of  insanity ;  while  in  others  no  such  signs 
,can  be  discovered,  though  subsequently  the  mental  disorder 
may  have  become  no  less  obvious.  Now,  are  we  prepared  to 
make  a  distinction  between  them  ?  to  grant  divorce  in  one 
class,  and  refuse  it  in  the  other  ?  This,  no  doubt,  would  be 
highly  convenient,  but  we  are  not  sure  that  it  would  be  strict- 
ly just.  While  we  see  not  how  legal  relief  can  be  withheld 
in  the  former  class,  yet  in  regard  to  the  latter,  we  recoil  from 
the  idea  of  depriving  a  woman  of  her  protection  and  support, 
at  the  very  moment  when  the  severest  of  earthly  calamities 
has  overtaken  her,  merely  on  the  strength  of  what  we  may 
call  a  pathological  abstraction.  How  these  cases  have 
been  regarded  by  the  courts,  we  have  had  no  means  of  ascer- 
taining. 

§  231.  The  principles  that  should  regulate  the  legal  rela- 
tions of  the  partially  insane  are  few  and  simple.  While  they 
should  be  left  in  possession  of  every  civil  right  that  they  are 
not  clearly  incapable  of  exercising,  they  should  be  subjected 
to  the  performance  of  no  duties  involving  the  interests  or 
comfort  of  individuals,  which  may  be  equally  well  discharged 
by  others.  In  the  former  instance  we  continue  the  enjoy- 
ment of  a  right  that  has  never  been  abused ;  in  the  latter, 
we  refrain  from  imposing  duties  011  people  who  may  not  be 
qualified  to  perform  them.  We  cannot,  therefore,  agree  with 
Hoffbauer,  that  a  monomaniac  should  be  allowed  to  manage 
the  affairs  of  another,  or  be  appointed  to  the  office  of  guar- 
dian, however  much  we  might  be  inclined  to  respect  the  va- 
lidity of  his  civil  acts.  In  some  instances  it  is  impossible  to 
know  or  to  conjecture,  beforehand,  how  the  predominant  idea 
in  his  mind  may  be  affected  by  his  connection  with  persons 
and  things  that  have  hitherto  been  foreign  to  his  thoughts ; 
while  in  others,  it  is  far  within  the  range  of  probability  that 
the  consequences  will  be  ruinous  to  himself  and  others. 
Here,  for  example,  is  a  man  who  has  long  believed  that  he 
has  an  eel  in  his  stomach,  but  on  no  other  point  has  he  mani- 

21 


242  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

fested  the  slightest  mental  impairment.  If  a  monomaniac  is 
ever  a  suitable  person  to  manage  the  %  affairs  of  another,  it 
would  seem,  at  first  thought,  that  this  one  certainly  is ;  yet 
nothing  would  be  more  injudicious  than  to  intrust  him  with 
any  such  duty,  for  in  all  probability,  though  perfectly  upright 
in  his  dealings,  he  would  be  irresistibly  impelled  to  dissipate 
the  property  of  others,  as  he  always  has  his  own  earnings,  in 
constant  joumeyings  from  one  empiric  to  another,  in  purchas- 
ing medicines,  and  consulting  physicians,  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  relieved  from  his  fancied  tormenter.  This  exclusion, 
as  Chambeyron,  the  French  translator  of  Hoffbauer,  justly 
remarks,  does  the  monomaniac  no  wrong;  it  frees  him  from 
a  great  responsibility,  and  prevents  dangers,  possible  at  least, 
either  to  the  ward  or  to  him. 

§  232.  The  above  views,  though  not  yet  distinctly  re- 
ceived in  courts,  are  countenanced  by  many  distinguished 
physicians  and  jurists.  Hoffbauer  supports  them  to  the 
fullest  extent;  Esquirol  sanctions  them,  by  interposing  no 
word  of  disapprobation  ;  Georget  admits  them  in  application 
to  civil  cases ;  and  Paris  and  Fonblanque  have  explicitly 
recognized  their  correctness  in  the  following  passage.  "  When 
a  man  suffers  under  a  partial  derangement  of  intellect,  and 
on  one  point  only,  it  would  be  unjust  to  invalidate  acts 
which  were  totally  distinct  from,  and  uninfluenced  by  this  so 
limited  insanity ;  but  if  the  act  done  bear  a  strict  and  evident 
reference  to  the  existing  mental  delusion,  we  cannot  see  why 
the  law  should  not  also  interpose  a  limited  protection,  and 
still  less  why  courts  of  equity,  which  in  their  ordinary 
jurisdiction  relieve  against  mistake,  should  deny  their  aid  in 
such  cases." l 

§  233.  Mr.  Evans,  the  translator  of  Pothier's  Treatise  on 
Obligations,  expresses  an  opinion  on  this  subject,  no  less 
positive  and  precise.  "  I  cannot  but  think,"  he  says,  "  that 
a  mental  disorder  operating  on  partial  subjects,  should,  with 
regard  to  those  subjects,  be  attended  with  the  same  effects  as 
a  total  deprivation  of  reason ;  and  that  on  the  other  hand, 

1  1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  302. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  243 

such  a  partial  disorder,  operating  only  upon  particular  sub- 
jects, should  not,  in  its  legal  effects,  have  an  influence  more 
extensive  than  the  subjects  to  which  it  applies ;  and  that 
every  question  should  be  reduced  to  the  point,  whether  the 
act  under  consideration  proceeded  from  a  mind  fully  capable, 
in  respect  of  that  act,  of  exercising  free,  sound,  and  discrimi- 
nating judgment ;  but  in  case  the  infirmity  is  established  to 
exist,  the  tendency  of  it  to  direct  or  fetter  the  operations  of 
the  mind  should  be  in  general  regarded  as  sufficient  presump- 
tive evidence,  without  requiring  a  direct  and  positive  proof 
of  its  actual  operation."  1 

§  234.  It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  the  practice  of 
the  English  courts  in  regard  to  partial  insanity  has  been 
regulated  by  no  settled  principles.  Of  the  truth  of  this 
remark  we  have  a  striking  illustration  in  Greenwood's  case, 
which  is  so  often  cited.  Mr.  Greenwood  was  bred  to  the 
bar,  and  acted  as  chairman  at  the  quarter  sessions,  but 
becoming  diseased,  and  receiving  in  a  fever  a  draught  from 
the  hand  of  his  brother,  the  delirium,  taking  its  ground  then, 
connected  itself  with  that  idea;  and  he  considered  his 
brother  as  having  given  him  a  potion,  with  a  view  to 
destroy  him.  He  recovered  in  all  other  respects,  but  that 
morbid  image  never  departed ;  and  that  idea  appeared  con- 
nected with  the  will  by  which  he  disinherited  his  brother. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  considered  so  necessary  to  have  some 
precise  rule,  that,  though  a  verdict  had  been  obtained  in  the 
common  pleas  against  the  will,  the  judge  strongly  advised 
the  jury  to  find  the  other  way,  and  they  did  accordingly  find 
in  favor  of  the  will.  Farther  proceedings  took  place  after- 
wards, and  concluded  in  a  compromise.2  No  one.  would  be 
hardy  enough  to  affirm  that  Greenwood's  mind  was  perfectly 
rational  and  sound,  and  as  his  insanity  displayed  itself  on  all 
topics  relating  to  his  brother,  every  act  involving  this  broth- 
er's interests,  to  go  no  farther,  ought  consequently  to  have 
been  invalidated.  A  plainer  case  cannot  well  be  imagined. 

1  2  Pothier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  24. 

2  Lord  Eldon,  in  White  v.  Wilson,  13  Vesey's  Reports,  88. 


244  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  235.  More  enlarged  and  correct  views  prevailed  in  the 
able  and  elaborate  judgment  delivered  by  Sir  John  Nicholl, 
in  the  case  of  Dew  v.  Clark,1  where  the  existence  of  partial 
mania  is  recognized,  and  the  necessity  is  strongly  inculcated 
of  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  of  its  partial  operation  on  the 
understanding,  while  determining  its  influence  on  the  civil 
acts  of  the  individual.  The  point  at  issue  was  the  validity 
of  the  will  of  one  Scott,  (who  left  personal  property  amount- 
ing nearly  to  X40,000,)  in  which  he  bequeathed  the  com- 
plainant who  was  his  daughter  and  only  child,  a  life-interest 
in  a  small  portion  of  his  estate,  the  most  of  which  was 
devised  to  his  nephew.  The  object  of  inquiry  was,  whether 
the  extraordinary  conduct  and  feelings  of  the  deceased 
towards  his  daughter  had  any  real  cause,  or  was  solely  the 
offspring  of  delusion  in  a  disordered  mind ;  and  to  this  end 
an  unparalleled  mass  of  evidence  was  offered  by  each  party. 
It  was  proved  by  the  nephews,  that  the  testator  had  con- 
siderable practice  as  a  surgeon  and  medical  electrician  from 
1785  to  1820,  and  that  at  all  times  down  to  the  latter  period 
when  he  had  a  paralytic  stroke,  he  managed  the  whole  of  his 
pecuniary  and  professional  affairs  in  a  rational  manner,  and 
rationally  conducted  all  manner  of  business.  They  admitted 
that  he  was  a  man  of  an  irritable  and  violent  temper ;  of 
great  pride  and  conceit ;  very  precise  in  all  his  domestic  and 
other  arrangements ;  very  impatient  of  contradiction,  and 
imbued  with  high  notions  of  parental  authority.  They 
represented  him  to  have  entertained  rigid  notions  of  the  total 
and  absolute  depravity  of  human  nature  and  of  the  neces- 
sity of  sensible  conversion,  and  contended  that  all  the 
singularities  of  his  conduct  could  be  attributed  to  his  pe- 
culiar disposition  and  belief,  without  resorting  to  insanity 
for  an  explanation.  By  the  daughter,  it  was  shown,  by  a 
body  of  evidence  that  placed  the  fact  beyond  the  shadow 
of  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  from  an  early  period  of  her 
life,  he  manifested  an  insane  aversion  towards  her.  It  ap- 
pears that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  describing  her,  even  to  per- 

1  3  Addams's  Reports,  79. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  245 

sons  with  whom  he  was  not  intimately  acquainted,  as  sullen, 
perverse,  obstinate,  and  given  to  lying  ;  as  a  fiend,  a  monster, 
a  very  devil,  the  special  property  of  satan  ;  and  charging  her 
with  vices,  of  which  it  was  impossible  that  a  girl  of  her  age 
could  be  guilty.  The  peculiar  and  unequalled  depravity  of 
his  child,  her  vices,  obstinacy,  and  profligacy  were  topics  on 
which  he  was  constantly  dwelling,  and  his  general  deport- 
ment towards  her  not  only  negatived  all  idea  of  natural 
affection,  but  betrayed  a  most  fiend-like  temper.  His  man- 
ner towards  her  was  fiery  and  terrific ;  the  instant  she  ap- 
peared, his  eye  flashed  with  rage  and  scorn,  and  he  spurned 
her  from  him  as  he  would  a  reptile.  He  compelled  her  to  do 
the  most  menial  offices,  such  as  sweeping  the  rooms,  scouring 
the  grates,  washing  the  linen  and  the  dishes ;  to  live  in  the 
kitchen  and  be  sparingly  fed.  He  once  stripped  her  naked, 
when  ten  or  eleven  years  old,  tied  her  to  a  bed-post,  and 
after  flogging  her  severely  with  a  large  rod  intertwisted  with 
brass  wire,  rubbed  her  back  with  brine.  Repeatedly,  and  on 
the  most  trivial  occasions,  he  struck  her  with  his  clinched 
fists,  cut  her  flesh  with  a  horsewhip,  tore  out  her  hair,  and 
once  aimed  at  her  a  blow  with  some  weapon  which  indented 
a  mahogany  table,  and  which  must  have  killed  her,  had  she 
not  avoided  it.  Now  it  was  abundantly  proved  that  there 
existed  no  real  cause  whatever  for  this  strange  antipathy,  but 
that  the  daughter  was  of  an  amiable,  obliging,  and  docile 
disposition,  —  that  she  had  always  shown  a  great  filial  affec- 
tion for  her  father,  —  that  she  conducted  at  home  and  abroad 
with  the  utmost  propriety  and  decorum,  —  that  she  was  a 
person  of  strictly  moral  and  religious  habits,  and  was  so 
considered  and  known  to  be  by  the  friends  of  the  deceased 
and  others  of  high  reputation  and  character.  The  court,  in 
making  up  its  decision,  declared  that  the  question  at  issue 
was,  "  not  whether  the  deceased's  insanity  in  certain  other 
particulars,  as  proved  by  the  daughter,  should  have  the  effect 
of  defeating  a  will,  generally-,  of  the  deceased,  or  even  this 
identical  will,  —  but  whether  his  insanity,  on  the  subject  of 
his  daughter,  should  have  the  effect  of  defeating,  not  so  much 

21* 


246  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

any  will  (a  will  generally)  of  the  deceased,  as  this  identical 
will."  Accordingly,  considering  it  proved  that  the  will  was 
the  direct,  unqualified  offspring  of  that  morbid  delusion  con- 
cerning the  daughter,  thus  put  into  act  and  energy,  it  was 
pronounced  to  be  null  and  void  in  law.  In  this  decision  we 
see  the  prevalence  of  those  more  correct  and  profound  views 
of  insanity,  which  have  resulted  from  the  inquiries  of  the 
last  few  years. 

§  236.  ^he  same  principle  had  been  previously  laid  down 
in  the  following  case  which  was  adjudicated  in  Kentucky, 
in  1822.  George  Moore  made  his  will  in  April,  1822,  and 
shortly  after  died.  It  was  the  validity  of  this  will  which  was 
the  point  at  issue.  About  twenty-four  years  previous  to  his 
death,  he  had  a  dangerous  fever,  during  which  he  imbibed  a 
strong  antipathy  towards  his  brothers,  imagining  that  they  in- 
tended to  destroy  or  injure  him,  though  they  attended  him 
throughout  his  illness,  and  never  furnished  the  slightest  foun- 
dation for  his  belief,  this  antipathy  continued  to  the  day  of 
his  death,  with  a  single  exception,  when  he  made  a  will  in 
their  favor,  but  afterwards  cancelled  it.  When  asked  by  one 
of  the  witnesses  why  he  disinherited  his  brothers  he  became 
violently  excited,  and  declared  that  they  had  endeavored  to 
get  his  estate  before  his  death.  The  court,  in  its  decision, 
observe,  that  "  he  cannot  be  accounted  a  free  agent  in  making 
his  will,  so  far  as  his  relatives  are  concerned,  although  free  as 
to  the  rest  of  the  world.  But  however  free  he  may  have  been 
as  to  other  objects,  the  conclusion  is  irresistible,  that  this 
peculiar  defect  of  intellect  did  influence  his  acts  in  making 
his  will,  and  for  this  cause  it  ought  not  to  be  sustained.  It 
is  not  only  this  groundless  hatred  or  malice  to  his  brethren 
that  ought  to  affect  his  will,  but  also  his  fears  of  them,  which 
he  expressed  during  his  last  illness,  conceiving  that  they  were 
attempting  to  get  away  his  estate  before  his  death,  or  that 
they  were  lying  in  wait  to  shoot  him,  while  on  other  subjects 
he  spoke  rationally ;  all  of  which  are  strong  evidences  of  a 
derangement  in  one  department  of  his  mind,  unaccounta- 
ble indeed,  but  directly  influencing  and  operating  upon  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  247 

act  which  is  now  claimed  as  the  final  disposition  of  the 
estate."1 

§  237.  Esquirol  has  related  a  case  of  a  very  similar  kind, 
where  a  person  conceived  an  antipathy  against  his  brothers, 
sisters,  and  other  relatives,  who,  he  believed,  were  seeking  to 
destroy  him.  Under  the  influence  of  this  delusion  he  made 
testamentary  dispositions,  and  Esquirol  being  consulted 
respecting  their  validity,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  tes- 
tator was  laboring  under  insanity.2 

§  238.  On  the  other  hand  testamentary  dispositions  which 
are  founded  on  motives  that  might  be  supposed  to  govern  a 
sane  mind,  and  present,  on  their  face,  no  indications  of 
insanity,  have  not  been  disturbed,  though  the  mind  were 
confessedly  laboring  under  some  degree  of  derangement. 
The  following  case  was  decided  in  strict  accordance  with 
this  principle. 

At  a  session  of  the  supreme  court  of  Massachusetts,  in 
Worcester  county,  April,  1843,  the  probate  of  a  will  was 
contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of  the  testator  who 
had  bequeathed  the  most  of  his  property  to  a  nephew,  though 
having  children  of  his  own.  It  appeared  in  evidence,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  the  testator,  when  under  the  immediate 
influence  of  strong  drink,  to  which  he  was  intemperately 
addicted,  manifested  some  aberration  of  mind,  and  for  seve- 
ral years  before  his  death  had  persisted  in  the  declaration  that 
his  children  were  not  legitimate,  as  he  had  never  been  mar- 
ried to  their  mother.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appeared,  that 
his  only  son  was  intemperate,  and  neglected  and  abused  his 
parents;  that  his  daughter,  her  husband  and  children  also 
neglected  him  ;  and  that  for  many  years,  there  was  no  inter- 
course among  the  various  members  of  the  family.  The 
nephew  had  always  maintained  friendly  relations  with  the 
testator  and  ministered  to  his  wants  and  infirmities.  Al- 
though he  had  lived  with  the  mother  of  his  children,  as  hus- 
band and  wife,  forty-nine  years,  yet  no  certificate  or  record 


1  Johnson  v.  Moore's  heirs,  1  Little's  Reports,  371. 

2  Annales  d"  Hygiene  Publique,  iii.  370. 


248  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  the  marriage  could  be  found,  and  it  did  not  appear  very 
improbable  that  the  marriage  ceremony  had  never  been  per- 
formed. He  had  always  managed  his  property  which  was 
of  considerable  amount,  prudently  and  intelligently,  and  the 
will  was  properly  drawn  and  executed,  giving  good  reasons 
also  for  its  bequests.  In  short,  it  was  a  rational  act,  ration- 
ally done,  and  was  established  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury.1 

§  239.  Lord  Brougham,  however,  has  laid  down  the  doc- 
trine, that  in  civil  cases,  partial  insanity  should  have  the  same 
legal  consequences,  as  the  general  form  of  the  disease.  The 
idea  of  partial  unsoundness,  in  the  common  acceptation,  is 
incompatible,  he  thinks,  with  the  unity  and  individuality  of 
the  mind.  If  the  mind  were  an  aggregate  of  several  facul- 
ties, one  or  more  of  them  might  certainly  become  unsound, 
while  the  rest  remained  unaffected,  and  it  would  be  very  proper 
to  consider  the  acts  of  the  individual,  in  reference  to  this 
point.  But  if  the  mind  is  indivisible,  we  are  unable  to  limit 
exactly  the  operation  of  any  unsoundness  by  which  it  is 
affected.  Delusion,  as  long  as  it  exists,  whether  much  or  lit- 
tle under  control,  is  a* manifestation  of  insanity,  and  hence  no 
confidence  can  be  placed  in  the  acts  or  any  act  of  a  diseased 
mind,  however  apparently  rational  that  act  may  appear  to  be, 
or  may  in  reality  be,  because  we  have  no  security  that  the 
lurking  delusion,  the  real  unsoundness  does  not  mingle  itself 
with,  or  occasion  the  act.  Hence,  if  a  person  believing  him- 
self to  be  Emperor  of  Germany,  should  make  his  will,  and 
we  were  quite  convinced  that,  had  any  one  spoken  of  the 
German  diet,  or  abused  the  German  emperor,  the  testator's 
delusion  would  have  at  once  broken  forth,  then  we  must  pro- 
nounce the  will  void,  be  it  rational  and  efficacious  in  every 
respect  as  any  disposition  of  property  could  be.  Now,  the 
true  issue  in  the  case,  which  does  not  seem  to  be  very  clearly 
apprehended  by  his  Lordship,  is,  whether  or  not  the  admit- 
ted unsoundness  did  influence  the  testamentary  dispositions, 


i  For  the  facts  in  this  case  I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  S.  B.  Woodward,  Super- 
intendent of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Hospital,  who  gave  his  testimony  on 
the  trial,  as  an  expert. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  249 

and  on  this  point  evidence  is  sought  in  the  character  of  the 
will  itself.  The  attentive  reader  will  not  fail  to  see  the 
lamentable  inconsistency  of  the  doctrine  here  put  forth,  with 
that  which  the  same  person  has  promulgated  in  regard  to 
criminal  cases.  (§§  37,  39.)1 

§  240.  In  criminal  as  well  as  civil  cases,  it  is  important 
to  consider  the  operation  of  the  predominant  idea,  and  its 
influence  on  the  act  in  question.  There  certainly  is  no  rea- 
son why  a  person  should  be  held  responsible  for  a  criminal 
act  that  springs  from  a  delusion  which  would  be  sufficient  to 
invalidate  any  civil  act  to  which  it  might  give  rise.  A  mono- 
maniac's sense  of  the  fitness  of  things  is  not  different  when 
he  signs  a  ruinous  contract,  or  makes  a  will,  from  what  it  is 
when  he  commits  a  criminal  deed.  If  the  inability  to  discern 
the  true  relations  of  things  is  the  ground  on  which  the  for- 
mer are  invalidated,  it  ought  equally  to  annul  criminal  respon- 
sibility ;  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  abstract  conceptions 
of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  crime  are  never  affected  in 
insanity,  or  are  compatible  with  a  degree  of  mental  soundness 
that  would  incapacitate  a  person  from  buying  a  house  or  sell- 
ing a  lot  of  land.  It  is  yet  a  disputed  point,  however, 
whether  partial  mania  should  have  the  full  legal  effect  of  in- 
sanity, in  criminal  cases.  By  Hoffbauer,  Fodere,  and  some 
other  writers,  it  is  contended  that  the  same  principle  which 
determines  the  effect  of  mania  in  civil,  should  also  determine 
its  effect  in  criminal  cases ;  that  is,  that  criminal  responsi- 
bility should  be  annulled  only  when  the  act  comes  within  the 
range  of  the  diseased  operations  of  the  mind.  In  favor  of 
this  view,  it  has  been  urged,  that  the  connection  of  the  mor- 
bid delusion  with  the  criminal  act,  is  generally  very  direct, 
and  not  easily  mistaken.  A  remote  and  circuitous  associa- 
tion of  the  predominant  idea  with  the  deed  in  question,  presents 
fair  ground  for  suspicion,  because  the  farther  the  thoughts  of 
the  monomaniac  wander  from  the  object  of  his  delusion,  the 
less  are  they  affected  by  its  influence.  If  a  man  who 
imagines  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  should  see  another  ap- 

1  Amer.  Jour,  of  Insanity,  vi.  308. 


250  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

preaching  him  with  a  stick  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  them, 
he  could  not  help  resisting  even  to  bloodshed,  in  what  would 
be  to  him  an  act  of  self-defence,  but  it  would  require  a  very 
peculiar  concatenation  of  circumstances  to  warrant  us  in  con- 
sidering a  rape  or  theft  as  the  offspring  of  this  hallucination, 
because  the  idea  of  these  acts  would  carry  the  thoughts  far 
beyond  the  reach  of  its  influence. 

§241.  Against  these  views  it  is  objected,  that  it  is  not 
always  easy  to  trace  the  connection  between  the  predomi- 
nant idea  and  the  criminal  act.  The  links  that  connect  the 
thoughts  which  rise  successively  in  the  sound  mind,  defy  all 
our  penetration,  and  the  few  laws  we  have  established  are 
totally  inapplicable  to  the  associations  of  the  insane  mind 
No  one  will  be  bold  enough  to  affirm  that  a  certain  idea  can- 
not possibly  be  connected  with  a  certain  other  idea,  in  a 
healthy  state  of  the  mind,  least  of  all  when  it  is  disordered 
by  disease ;  so  that  the  existence  of  partial  insanity  once 
established,  it  is  for  no  human  tribunal  arbitrarily  to  circum- 
scribe the  circle  of  its  diseased  operations.  We  must  re- 
member also  that  sometimes  the  predominant  idea  is  fre- 
quently changing,  and  at  others,  is  obstinately  concealed  by 
the  patient,  and  not  ascertained  till  after  his  restoration  to 
health. 

§  242.  Is  it  true  that  the  insane  judge  of  their  relations  to 
persons  and  things  not  immediately  connected  with  their 
delusions,  with  ordinary  clearness  and  accuracy  ?  Does  the 
cloud  that  settles  over  one  portion  of  their  mental  horizon, 
throw  no  shadow  over  the  rest  of  it  ?  This  question  involves 
a  matter  of  fact,  and  must  be  decided  solely  on  the  testi- 
mony of  those  who  have  had  abundant  opportunities  of  ob- 
serving the  insane,  of  learning  their  habits,  their  modes  of 
thinking  and  feeling,  their  motives  and  impulses.  It  is  un- 
questionably true  that  a  person  partially  insane  may,  to  a 
certain  extent,  be  quite  rational  in  his  conduct  and  conversa- 
tion, but  the  same  is  equally  true  of  those  who  are  regarded 
as  wholly  insane.  Let  a  stranger  spend  an  hour  or  two  in 
the  galleries  of  an  asylum,  observing  the  manners  of  the  in- 
mates, and  watching  them  while  engaged  in  their  labors, 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  251 

amusements,  and  conversation,  and  distinguish,  if  he  can,  the 
wholly  from  the  partially  insane.  If  this  limited  power  of 
speaking  and  acting  correctly  does  not  invalidate  the  plea 
of  insanity  as  it  regards  the  one  class,  why  should  it  as  it 
regards  the  other?  Touching  this  phenomenon  there  are 
two  facts  which  should  be  duly  considered,  in  forming  our 
opinion  of  its  relation  to  legal  responsibility.  In  the  first 
place,  this  apparent  rationality  of  the  insane  is  usually  mani- 
fested in  connection  with  matters,  to  them  of  secondary  con- 
sequence, not  calculated  to  excite  much  interest,  nor  to  task 
any  moral  or  intellectual  faculty ;  but  the  moment  their  at- 
tention is  engaged  with  topics  of  an  opposite  character,  we 
perceive  the  influence  of  disease.  A  word,  a  look,  by  some 
bond  of  association,  may  touch  a  discordant  string,  and  this 
individual,  before  so  calm,  so  cool  and  rational,  launches 
into  a  strain  of  absurdities,  or  explodes  in  a  storm  of  passion. 
While  the  sea  is  smooth  and  the  winds  light,  reason  easily 
guides  the  helm  which  is  wrenched  from  its  grasp  by  the  first 
breeze  that  ruffles  the  surface.  The  transition  from  the  ap- 
parently sane  to  the  insane,  is  perfectly  obvious  when  we 
see  the  exciting  ^cause,  and  the  patient  gives  audible  expres- 
sion to  his  thoughts.  But  because  we  do  not  learn  these 
intermediate  steps,  as  they  often  are  not  manifested  by  any 
sensible  marks,  does  it  follow  that  the  final  act  to  which  they 
lead,  is  entirely  free  from  the  taint  of  insanity  ?  This  is 
undoubtedly  possible,  but  since  we  can  never  prove  the  fact, 
and  the  other  event  is  highly  probable,  we  are  bound  to 
abide  by  the  known  general  rule  and  not  the  doubtful  excep- 
tion. The  more  one  sees  of  mental  disorder,  the  more,  we 
apprehend,  is  he  disposed  to  believe  that  this  integrity  of 
some  of  the  functions  in  partial  insanity,  is  rather  apparent 
than  real, — that  the  disease,  however  limited,  seldom,  if 
ever,  fails  to  irradiate  its  morbific  influence  to  a  greater  or 
less  extentt  A  little  acquaintance  with  monomaniacs  almost 
always  brings  to  light  certain  peculiarities  in  their  modes  of 
thinking  or  acting,  or  certain  inequalities  of  temper  which 
they  did  not  manifest  previous  to  their  disease.  So  latent  is 
this  effect  sometimes,  that  it  will  evade  the  closest  observa- 


252  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

tion,  until  a  suitable  opportunity  occurs  for  its  development. 
In  this  respect,  it  seems  to  follow  a  common  law  of  our  men- 
tal constitution  whose  faculties  require  a  certain  combination 
of  /circumstances  to  arouse  them  into  activity,  and  develop 
them  in  all  their  energy  and  power.  How  often  do  we  find 
patients  who,  while  enjoying  the  quiet,  seclusion,  and  kind- 
ness of  an  asylum,  are  correct  in  their  deportment,  circum- 
spect in  their  ways,  punctual  in  their  outgoings  and  incom- 
ings, courteous  and  obliging  in  their  manners  ;  but,  restored 
to  the  bosom  of  their  families,  become  overbearing,  conten- 
tious, and  irascible,  destroying  the  peace  and  threatening  the 
lives  of  those  who  should  be  most  dear  to  them.  In  most 
monomaniacs  —  so  far  indeed  as  our  experience  goes,  the 
fact  is  without  an  exception  —  we  see,  as  it  regards  their 
estimates  of  men  and  things,  less  intellectual  discernment 
and  a  lower  tone  of  moral  feeling  than  they  manifested  in 
their  sound  and  healthy  condition.  Who  that  has  been 
much  conversant  with  the  insane,  has  not  been  surprised  at 
times,  to  hear  persons  who  have  always  talked  sensibly  and 
discreetly  except  on  their  weak  points,  unexpectedly  giving 
utterance  to  sentiments  that  betray  a  radical  perversion  of 
their  moral  perceptions  ?  Is  all  this  to  go  for  nothing  in 
settling  the  measure  of  their  legal  responsibility  ? 

§  243.  We  ought  also  to  bear  in  mind  a  fact  too  much 
overlooked,  that  much  of  the  ordinary  working  of  the  mind, 
whether  sane  or  insane,  becomes  somewhat  instinctive  and 
mechanical,  and  goes  on,  if  not  entirely  independent  of  the 
exercise  of  the  reasoning  powers,  certainly  without  their 
close  and  active  supervision.  In  hospitals  for  the  insane, 
this  phenomenon  is  sometimes  witnessed  in  a  very  remarka- 
ble degree.  There  we  see  men  whose  understandings  are  a 
complete  wreck,  every  day  uttering  certain  mere  common- 
places of  conversation,  performing  certain  acts,  and  continu- 
ing certain  habits  which  to  a  stranger  would  convey  the  im- 
pression that  their  mental  disorder  is  very  partial  in  its  ope- 
ration. How  often  do  we  see  patients  in  that  state  of  fatuity 
which  is  the  sequel  of  long  continued  insanity,  playing  at 
draughts,  or  performing  on  some  musical  instrument  with  a 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     253 

very  creditable  degree  of  skill.  In  accordance,  therefore, 
with  this  law  of  our  intellectual  being,  an  insane  person  may 
be  quite  rational  in  some  respects,  simply  because  his  under- 
standing has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  He  thinks  and  acts  me- 
chanically. But  let  him  be  tried  on  something  th'at  requires  a 
fresh  and  active  exercise  of  thought ;  something  that  requires 
control  of  his  feelings,  and  then  we  shall  see  how  feeble  is 
the  dominion  of  reason.  It  would  be  strange  indeed,  contrary 
to  all  our  analogies  of  morbid  action,  if  a  disease  so  serious  as 
to  completely  distort  the  perceptions  and  pervert  the  evidence 
of  the  senses  on  some  points,  should  leave  all  the  other  mental 
operations  perfectly  intact. 

§  244.  The  views  here  objected  to  have  found  a  strong 
opponent  in  Georget,  whose  practical  knowledge  of  the  subject 
and  acknowledged  acuteness  in  observing  the  manners  of  the 
insane,  entitle  his  opinions  to  great  consideration,  if  not  to 
entire  belief.  The  following  observations  of  his  should  never 
be  forgotten  in  forming  conclusions  on  this  disputed  point. 
"  In  conversing,"  says  he,  "  with  patients  on  topics  foreign  to 
their  morbid  delusions,  you  will  generally  find  no  difference 
between  them  and  other  people.  They  not  only  deal  in 
common-place  notions,  but  are  capable  of  appreciating  new 
facts  and  trains  of  reasoning.  Still  more,  they  retain  their 
sense  of  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  and  of  social  usages, 
to  such  a  degree,  that  whenever  they  come  together,  forget- 
ting their  moral  sufferings  and  delusions,  they  conduct,  as 
they  otherwise  would,  inquiring  with  interest  for  one  another's 
health,  and  maintaining  the  ordinary  observances  of  society. 
They  have  special  reasons  even  for  regarding  themselves  with 
a  degree  of  complacency;  since,  for  the  most  part,  they 
believe  that  they  are  victims  of  arbitrary  measures,  fraudu- 
lent contrivances,  and  projects  of  vengeance  or  cupidity,  and 
thus  they  sympathize  with  one  another  in  their  common  mis- 
fortunes. Accordingly,  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are 
rarely  known  to  commit  those  reprehensible  acts  which  are 
regarded  as  crimes  when  dictated  by  sound  reason,  though 
the  most  of  them  enjoy  considerable  freedom.  They  often 

22 


254  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

talk  very  sensibly  of  their  interests,  and  some  even  manage 
their  property  perfectly  well." 

"  Those  patients  who  are  insane  on  one  point,  only  more 
or  less  limited,  may  have  experienced  some  severe  moral 
disorders  which  influence  the  conduct  and  actions  of  the 
individual,  without  materially  injuring  his  judgment.  Those 
who  conduct  themselves  so  well  in  the  asylum,  in  the  midst 
of  strangers  with  whom  they  have  no  relations,  and  against 
whom  they  have  conceived  no  prejudice  nor  cause  of  com- 
plaint, and  in  quiet  submission  to  the  rule  of  the  house,  are 
no  sooner  at  liberty,  in  the  bosom  of  their  families,  than 
their  conduct  becomes  insupportable ;  they  are  irritated  by 
the  slightest  contradiction,  abusing  and  threatening  those 
who  address  to  them  the  slightest  observation,  and  working 
themselves  up  to  the  most  intolerable  excesses.  And  whether 
the  reprehensible  acts  they  then  commit  are  really  foreign  to 
the  predominant  idea  or  not,  ought  we  to  m,ake  a  being 
responsible  for  them  whose  moral  nature  is  so  deeply  affect- 
ed ? " 1  These  facts,  it  cannot  be  denied,  furnish  strong 
ground  for  the  remark  with  which  Georget  closes  his  obser- 
vations on  this  point,  namely,  that  if,  in  following  the  rule 
that  partial  mania  excludes  the  idea  of  culpability,  "the 
moralist  and  the  criminal  judge  run  the  risk  of  committing 
injustice  by  sparing  a  really  guilty  person,  certainly,  the  op- 
posite course  would  lead  them  into  still  greater  errors." 

§  245.  Hoffbauer  has  not  only  limited  the  exculpatory 
effects  of  partial  mania  to  the  acts  which  clearly  come  within 
its  influence,  but  has  laid  down  the  principle  that  in  the 
criminal  jurisprudence  of  this  condition,  the  predominant 
idea  should  be  considered  as  true  ;  that  is,  that  the  acts  of 
the  patient  should  be  judged  as  if  he  had  really  been  in  the 
circumstances  he  imagined  himself  to  be  when  they  were 
committed.  The  same  view  was  maintained  by  chief  justice 
Shaw,  of  Massachusetts,  in  the  recent  case  of  Rogers.  It  is 
based  on  the  common,  but  erroneous  notion,  that  insane 

1  Discussion  medico-legale  BUT  la  Folie,  10,  14. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  255 

people  always  reason  correctly  from  wrong  premises,  and 
therefore  it  is  inapplicable  to  the  numerous  instances  where 
the  premises  and  inferences  are  all  equally  wrong.  If  a  per- 
son imagines  he  heard  the  voice  of  God  commanding  him 
to  immolate  his  only  child,  and  he  accordingly  obeys,  it  may 
be  said  indeed  that  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  bloody  deed, 
because  it  would  have  been  perfectly  proper,  had  he  really 
heard  the  command  ;  but  are  we  to  be  told,  that  if  he  had  killed 
his  neighbor  for  a  fancied  petty  injury,  he  is  not  to  be  absolved 
from  punishment,  because  the  act  would  have  been  highly 
criminal,  even  though  he  might  have  really  received  the 
injury  ?  In  cases  like  the  latter,  the  insanity  manifests 
itself,  not  only  in  the  fancied  injury,  but  in  the  dispropor- 
tionate punishment  which  is  inflicted  upon  the  offender. 
Nothing  in  regard  to  insanity  is  better  established  than  the 
fact,  that  when  the  mind  is  possessed  by  a  delusion,  the  con- 
clusions it  may  adopt  are  as  likely  to  be  absurd  as  logical  and 
wise.  The  character  of  the  conclusion,  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned, is  an  accidental  feature  in  the  case,  and  therefore 
nothing  can  be  more  unphilosophical  or  unjust,  than  to  make 
it  the  criterion  of  legal  responsibility.  Two  men  in  affluent 
circumstances  imagine  that  they  are  coming"  to  want,  and 
the  belief  fills  them  with  the  keenest  distress.  To  all  appear- 
ance they  are  both  equally  insane,  equally  diseased  in  body, 
and  equally  wretched.  The  one  denies  himself  and  family  the 
necessities  of  life,  and  they  are  indebted  for  their  continued 
existence  to  the  charities  of  others.  The  other  slaughters 
his  family  and  attempts  to  kill  himself.  Upon  the  principle 
in  question,  the  latter  is  held  guilty  of  murder,  while  the 
former  is  held  to  be  irresponsible  for  his  conduct.  The  turn 
which  the  delusion  takes  decides  the  question  of  guilty  or 
not  guilty.  Hadfield's  motive  for  shooting  at  the  king  was, 
that  certain  great  ends  might  be  attained  by  his  own  execu- 
tion which  he  supposed  would  follow.  Lawrence,  who 
attempted  to  take  the  life  of  President  Jackson,  imagined 
that  his  victim  stood  in  the  way  of  his  obtaining  certain 
imaginary  estates.  These  men  were  tried  and  acquitted, 
and  the  public  voice  has  abundantly  comfirmed  the  correct- 


256  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ness  of  the  verdict.  Judged  however,  by  Hoffbauer's  prin- 
ciple, they  must  have  been  deemed  fully  responsible  for  their 
acts,  and  so  must  a  large  portion  of  those  lunatics  who,  for 
their  bloody  deeds,  have  been  consigned  to  the  hospital, 
instead  of  the  gallows.  The  meaning  of  the  principle  is, 
that  when  a  person  who  is  admitted  to  be  insane,  inflicts  an 
injury  which,  in  the  judgment  of  a  benevolent  man,  is  dis- 
proportioned  to  the  provocation,  the  surplus  injury  is  to  be 
attributed  to  passion,  or  some  bad  motive,  and  the  lunatic 
must  be  punished  accordingly.  The  tinsoundness  of  such 
views,  it  might  be  supposed,  would  have  been  shown  by  the 
most  superficial  knowledge  of  insanity.  When  a  person  is 
so  insane  as  to  imagine  that  another  is  disturbing  his  peace 
by  spells  and  incantations,  is  it  strange  that  at  the  same 
time,  his  notions  of  right  and  wrong  should  be  so  confused, 
that  he  thinks  himself  justified  in  sacrificing  his  disturber  ? 
It  certainly  would  be  far  more  strange  —  although  it  is  not 
denied  that  this  is  sometimes  the  case  —  if  a  person,  after 
adopting  a  gross  delusion,  should  reason  respecting  it  with 
all  the  clearness  and  sagacity  of  a  sound  mind. 

§  246.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose,  as  this  principle 
does,  that  the  insane  generally  act  from  well  defined,  tangible 
motives  or  reasons.  Some  unquestionably  do,  while  it  is 
just  as  certain  that  some  do  not.  It  is  often  impossible  for 
them  to  give  a  clear  and  consistent  reason  for  their  conduct. 
Their  discourse  on  this  point  is  vague,  obscure,  and  contra- 
dictory. From  want  of  sufficient  steadiness  or  concentra- 
tion of  mind,  or  both,  they  find  it  difficult  to  express  or 
explain  their  ideas,  and  for  a  similar  reason,  probably,  they 
are  singularly  unstable  and  changing  in  their  views.  They 
may  utter  certain  propositions,  and  may  give  their  assent  to 
others,  but  can  we  believe  that,  laboring  under  the  deficien- 
cies here  indicated,  their  perceptions  have  that  degree  of 
clearness  and  accuracy  which  is  essential  to  the  idea  of 
understanding  and  knowledge  ?  The  law  asks  whether  the 
party  knew  that  the  act  he  committed  was  wrong,  or 
contrary  to  law,  etc.,  implying  that  the  reflective  powers  of 
such  a  person  are  not  essentially  changed,  but  only  conduct  to 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  257 

unsound  conclusions.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  seldom,  if 
ever,  do  the  insane,  before  committing  acts  of  violence,  reflect 
calmly  on  the  subject,  view  it  in  its  different  relations,  and 
thus  deliberately  form  the  simple,  intelligible  conclusion,  that 
the  act  they  meditate,  is  right.  The  notions  which  flit 
through  their  minds  are  too  vague  and  disjointed  to  be  prop- 
erly called  knowledge,  although  they  may  use  that  term 
themselves  in  speaking  their  views.  Were  it  otherwise,  why 
should  they,  on  recovery,  regard  the  whole  aspect  of  the  sub- 
ject in  a  very  different  light,  and  be  as  much  astonished  as 
others  to  find  what  they  have  said  and  done  ?  The  truth  is, 
they  act -from  impulse  and  sudden  suggestions,  without  being 
very  conscious  at  the  time  of  what  they  are  doing,  or  if  they 
are,  without  being  able  to  explain  their  conduct  even  to  their 
own  satisfaction.  Many  of  those  who  attempt  suicide  are 
unable  to  assign  any  thing  like  a  reason  for  the  act.  They 
contemplate  it  but  a  moment,  perhaps,  before  proceeding  to 
carry  the  idea  into  execution,  and  then  sincerely  rejoice  that 
they  were  prevented  from  succeeding.  Homicidal  acts  are 
often  unquestionably  committed  by  the  insane,  in  a  similar 
state  of  mind.  In  general  mania,  especially  the  early  stage, 
the  mind  is  filled  with  vague  fears,  suspicions,  jealousy,  and 
distrust,  and  the  thoughts  are  sadly  confused.  The  patient 
believes  that  enemies  encompass  him  around,  bent  on  de* 
stroying  his  reputation  or  his  life.  With  no  special  plan  in 
view,  he  arms  himslf  with  swords  and  pistols,  and  accident 
or  some  unaccountable  caprice  finally  determines  the  victim. 
The  poor  maniac  can  no  more  give  a  reason  for  his  selection, 
than  he  can  for  the  groundless  fears  that  besiege  his  mind.  It 
is  a  fact  that  should  be  duly  pondered  by  those  who  would 
adopt  the  principle  we  are  now  contending  against,  that  very 
often,  maniacs,  upon  recovery,  have  but  a  shadowy  recollec- 
tion of  the  violence  they  may  have  committed,  though  at 
the  time,  they  may  have  discoursed  about  it  with  some 
degree  of  coherence  and  pertinency. 

§  247.  Another  mistake  often  made  on  this  subject,  is 
sufficient  to  vitiate  any  conclusions  formed  under  its  influ- 
ence, relative  to  moral  responsibility.  This  mistake  is  to 

22* 


258  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF   INSANITY. 

regard  th,e  operations  of  the  insane  mind  as  governed  by 
the  same  laws  of  association,  as  those  of  the  sane  mind. 
Their  motives  are  weighed  in  the  same  balance,  they  are  sup- 
posed to  be  equally  affected  by  the  same  moral  considera- 
tions, and  their  conclusions  are  expected  to  be  equally 
logical.  Such  views  of  the  mental  operations  in  insanity 
are  not  warranted  by  our  knowledge  of  the  disease.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  unsafe  than  to  infer,  from  certain  notions  or 
plans  an  insane  person  may  have,  the  line  of  conduct  or  the 
speculative  conclusions  he  may  adopt.  It  is  a  fact  which 
every  one,  much  conversant  with  the  insane,  must  have 
recognized,  that  their  mental  operations  are  marked  by  a 
kind  of  confusion  that  finds  its  analogy  only  in  dreaming. 
And  this  is  the  case,  not  only  with  the  wild  and  raving,  but 
to  a  degree  with  those  whose  insanity  is  apparently  confined 
within  a  narrow  circle,  and  who  would  not  be  readily 
recognized  to  be  insane,  by  the  world  at  large.  A  man 
was  once  placed  in  the  hospital  under  our  care,  who  con- 
tinued so  calm  and  quiet,  so  correct  in  his  deportment,  so 
gentlemanly  in  his  manners,  and  so  intelligent  and  rational 
in  his  discourse,  that,  for  some  time,  we  were  puzzled 
to  discover  why  he  should  have  been  sent  to  us,  not  having 
then  received  an  exact  history  of  his  case.  It  finally  ap- 
peared that  he  believed  his  wife  had  been  unfaithful  to 
him,  and  that  the  idea  gave  him  much  uneasiness.  When 
reminded  of  the  unsullied  reputation  of  his  wife,  and  the 
improbability  of  some  of  the  incidents  he  related,  he  always 
replied,  that  he  must  believe  what  he  saw  with  his  own 
eyes,  and  then  he  would  give  a  minute  account  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which,  if  he  had  really  witnessed  them,  set  the 
question  at  rest.  For  several  weeks  he  exhibited  the  same 
quiet  and  correct  demeanor,  performing  divers  services  about 
the  house,  and  obtaining  the  favorable  regards  of  all  around 
him.  At  last,  he  became  rather  silent  and  sad,  and  after  a 
day  or  two,  he  was  observed  to  weep  much.  This  continued 
for  three  or  four  days,  when  he  resumed  his  usual  cheerful- 
ness, declaring  that  his  views  had  undergone  a  great  change, 
and  that  some  things  appeared  to  him  in  a  very  different 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  259 

light.  His  whole  belief  about  his  wife's  infidelity,  he  said, 
was  a  delusion,  and  never  had  the  slightest  foundation  in 
fact.  All  the  things  which  he  thought  he  saw,  now  appeared 
to  him  like  a  dream,  and  he  could  give  no  other  account  of 
them.  In  dreaming  and  in  insanity  there  is  the  same  firm 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  false  impressions,  the  same 
patches  of  coherence  and  consistency,  the  same  embroilment 
of  the  thoughts,  the  same  absurdity  in  the  conclusions,  and 
on  recovery  the  patient  often  feels  as  if  just  awoke  from  a 
dream,  wondering  how  he  could  have  had  such  thoughts  and 
done  such  acts.1  With  what  propriety  then  can  we  deem  the 
insane  responsible  for  any  of  the  views  they  may  adopt  ? 


SECTION  II. 
Legal  Consequences  of  Moral  Mania. 

§  248.  General  moral  mania  furnishes  good  ground  for 
invalidating  civil  acts,  for  notwithstanding  the  apparent  in- 
tegrity of  the  intellectual  powers,  it  is  probable  that  theirx 
operation  is  influenced  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  by  a 
derangement  of  the  moral  powers.  The  mutual  independ- 
ence of  these  two  portions  of  our  spiritual  nature  is  not 
absolute  and  unconditional,  but  is  always  liable  to  be  affected 
by  the  operation  of  the  organic  laws.  The  animal  economy 


1  This  character  of  insanity  is  admirably  represented  by  Shakspeare, 
whose  delineations  of  this  disease  are  marked  by  his  usual  fidelity  to  nature. 
Lear,  on  suddenly  recovering,  knows  not,  at  first,  where  he  is,  or  where  he 
has  been ;  he  scarcely  recognizes  his  own  friends,  and  almost  doubts  his  own 
identity. 

"  Pray,  do  not  mock  me. 

I  am  a  foolish,  fond  old  man, 

Fourscore  and  upwards ;  and  to  deal  plainly, 

I  fear  I  am  not  in  my  perfect  mind. 

Methinks  I  should  know  you,  and  know  this  man ; 

Yet  I  am  doubtful ;  for  I  am  mainly  ignorant 

What  place  this  is ;  and  all  the  skill  I  have 

Remembers  not  these  garments ;  nor  I  know  not 

Where  I  did  lodge  last  night." 


260  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

is  a  whole ;  no  part  of  it  can  exist  without  the  rest,  nor  be 
injured  or  abstracted  without  marring  the  energy  or  harmony 
of  the  whole  system ;  and  though  each  part  is  so  far  inde- 
pendent of  the  others  as  to  contribute  its  distinct  share  in  the 
production  of  the  general  result,  even  sometimes  when  sur- 
rounded by  the  ravages  of  disease,  yet  the  general  law  is, 
that  disease  in  one  part  modifies  more  or  less  the  action  of 
all  the  rest,  and  especially  of  those  connected  with  it  by 
contiguity  or  by  resemblance  of  function.  Nature  has  estab- 
lished a  certain  adaptation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual 
faculties  to  one  another,  leading  to  that  harmony  of  action 
which  puts  them  in  proper  relation  to  external  things,  and 
we  can  scarcely  conceive  of  any  disturbance  of  their  equili- 
brium, that  will  not  more  or  less  impair  the  general  result. 
Amid  the  chaos  of  the  sentiments  and  passions  produced  by 
moral  mania,  the  power  of  the  intellect  must  necessarily  suf- 
fer, and  instead  of  accurately  examining  and  weighing  the 
suggestions  of  the  moral  powers,  it  is  influenced  by  motives 
which  may  be  rational  enough,  but  which  would  never  have 
been  adopted  in  a  perfectly  healthy  state.  It  is  hard  to  con- 
ceive, indeed,  that  with  an  understanding  technically  sound, 
the  relations  of  a  person  should  be  viewed  in  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent light,  the  circle  of  his  rights  and  duties  broken  and  dis- 
torted, and  his  conduct  turned  into  a  course  altogether  foreign 
to  that  of  his  ordinary  habits  and  pursuits.  Notwithstanding 
the  correctness  of  his  conversation,  and  his  plausible  reasons 
for  his  singular  conduct,  a  strict  scrutiny  of  his  actions,  if  not 
his  words,  will  convince  us  that  in  particular  cases,  his 
notions  of  right  and  wrong  are  obscured  and  perverted,  and 
that  his  own  social  position  is  viewed  through  a  medium 
which  gives  a  false  coloring  to  its  whole  aspect.  Now, 
though  such  a  person  may  not  be  governed  by  any  blind, 
irresistible  impulse,  yet  to  judge  his  acts  by  the  standard  of 
sanity,  and  attribute  to  them  the  same  legal  consequences  as 
to  those  of  sane  men,  would  be  clearly  unjust,  because  their 
real  tendency  is  not  and  cannot  be  perceived  by  him.  Not 
that  his  abstract  notions  of  the  nature  of  crime  are  at  all  al- 
tered, for  they  are  not,  but  the  real  character  of  his  acts  being 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  261 

misconceived,  he  does  not  associate  them  with  their  ordinary 
moral  relations.  No  fear  of  punishment  restrains  him  from 
criminal  acts,  for  if  not  totally  unconscious  of  violating  any 
penal  laws,  he  thinks  he  is  acting  for  an  end  that  sanc- 
tifies the  means,  and  therefore  the  great  end  of  punish- 
ment, the  prevention  of  crime,  is  wholly  lost  in  his  case.  If 
there  were  no  other  reason  for  withholding  punishment  in 
cases  of  moral  mania,  this  alone  would  be  sufficient, 
that  the  fear  of  it,  which  with  others  is  a  powerful  preven- 
tive of  crime,  or  at  least  is  supposed  to  be,  in  the  most 
popular  theories  of  criminal  law,  does  not  and  cannot  exert 
its  restraining  influence  on  the  mind.  No  one  would  think 
of  attributing  moral  guilt  to  Earl  Ferrers  for  entertaining  the 
insane  idea  that  his  steward  was  a  villain  conspiring  with  the 
the  earl's  relatives  against  his  comfort  and  interests  (§  154) ; 
why  then  should  it  be  charged  to  him  as  a  crime,  that,  amid 
the  tumult  of  his  passions  disturbing  the  healthy  exercise  of 
his  understanding,  he  acted  on  this  belief  and  made  himself  the 
avenger  of  his  own  wrongs  ?  Each  delusion  was  alike  the 
offspring  of  the  same  derangement,  and  it  is  unjust  and  un- 
philosophical  to  regard  one  with  indifference  as  the  crotchet 
of  a  madman,  and  be  moved  with  horror  at  the  other  and 
visit  it  with  the  utmost  penalty  of  the  law,  as  the  act  of 
a  brutal  murderer. 

§  249.  Liberty  of  will  and  of  action  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  criminal  responsibility.  Culpability  supposes  not  only 
a  clear  perception  of  the  consequences  of  criminal  acts,  but 
the  liberty,  unembarrassed  by  disease,  of  the  active  powers 
which  nature  has  given  us,  of  pursuing  that  course  which  is 
the  result  of  the  free  choice  of  the  intellectual  faculties.  It 
is  one  of  those  wise  provisions  in  the  arrangement  of  things, 
that  the  power  of  perceiving  the  good  and  the  evil,  is  never 
unassociated  with  that  of  obtaining  the  one  and  avoiding  the 
other.  When,  therefore,  disease  has  brought  upon  an  indi- 
vidual the  very  opposite  condition,  enlightened  jurisprudence 
will  hold  out  to  him  its  protection,  instead  of  crushing  him  as 
a  sacrifice  to  violated  justice.  That  the  subject  of  homicidal 
insanity  is  not  a  free  agent,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term, 


262  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

is  a  truth  that  must  not  be  obscured  by  theoretical  notions  of 
the  nature  of  insanity,  nor  by  apprehensions  of  injurious 
consequences  from  its  admission.  Amid  the  rapid  and 
tumultuous  succession  of  feelings  that  rush  into  his  mind, 
the  reflective  powers  are  paralyzed,  and  his  movements  are 
solely  the  result  of  a  blind,  automatic  impulse  with  which 
the  reason  has  as  little  to  do,  as  with  the  movements  of 
a  new-born  infant.  That  the  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
continue  unimpaired  under  these  circumstances,  proves  only 
the  partial  operation  of  the  disease ;  but  in  the  internal  strug- 
gle that  takes  place  between  the  affective  and  intellectual 
powers,  the  former  have  the  advantage  of  being  raised  to 
their  maximum  of  energy  by  the  excitement  of  disease,  which, 
on  the  other  hand,  rather  tends  to  diminish  the  activity  of  the 
latter.  We  have  seen  that  generally  after  the  fatal  act  has 
been  accomplished,  and  the  violence  of  the  paroxysm  sub- 
sided, the  monomaniac  has  gone  and  delivered  himself  into 
the  hands  of  justice,  as  if,  overwhelmed  with  horror  at  the 
enormity  of  his  action,  he  either  considered  his  own  life  the 
only  compensation  he  could  offer  in  return  ;  or,  it  may  be,  felt 
that  the  presence  of  his  fellow  men,  though  it  would  seal  his 
own  fate,  would  be  a  welcome  relief  from  the  crushing  agony 
of  his  own  spirit.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  however,  if 
occasionally,  the  tide  of  feeling  takes  a  different  course,  and 
the  murderer  is  prompted  to  avoid  what  he  cannot  help  think- 
ing to  be  the  just  consequence  of  his  act,  by  flying  from  the 
bloody  scene,  and  even  denying  his  agency  in  it  altogether. 
Considering  the  diversity  of  habits,  sentiments,  and  education, 
uniformity  in  an  unessential  phenomenon  like  this,  is  not  to 
'be  expected.  That  flying  from  pursuit  indicates  a  conscious- 
ness of  having  committed  a  reprehensible  act,  and  also  a  fear 
of  punishment,  is  not  denied,  but  it  has  never  been  contended 
that  the  opposite  course  implies  the  absence  of  all  ideas  of 
this  kind  from  the  mind  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac.  The 
real  point  at  issue  is,  whether  the  fear  of  punishment  or  even 
the  consciousness  of  wrong  doing  destroys  the  supposition  of 
insanity,  and  this  is  settled  by  the  well-known  fact  that  the 
inmates  of  lunatic  asylums,  after  having  committed  some 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  263 

reprehensible  acts,  will  often  persist  in  denying  their  agency 
in  them,  in  order  to  avoid  the  reprimand  or  privation  which 
they  know  would  follow  their  conviction.  If  insane  persons 
have  any  rational  ideas  at  all,  and  it  is  not  denied  that  they 
have,  it  is  not  strange  that  they  sometimes  are  conscious  of 
the  penal  consequences  of  their  acts,  and  use  the  intelligence 
of  a  brute  in  order  to  avoid  them.  Besides,  in  moral  insanity 
the  intellectual  faculties  are  supposed  not  to  be  impaired,  and 
when  the  fury  of  the  paroxysm  which  has  borne  him  on,  in 
spite  of  every  attempt  at  resistance,  has  subsided,  the  homi- 
cidal monomaniac  returns,  in  some  degree  at  least,  to  his  or- 
dinary habit  of  thinking  and  feeling.  He  regrets  the  havoc 
he  has  made,  foresees  its  disgraceful  consequences  to  himself, 
shudders  at  the  sight,  and  flies,  like  the  most  hardened  crimi- 
nal, to  avoid  them. 

§  250.  In  medical  science,  it  is  dangerous  to  reason 
against  facts.  Now  we  have  an  immense  mass  of  cases 
related  by  men  of  unquestionable  competence  and  veracity, 
where  people  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  the  commission  of 
criminal  acts  while  fully  conscious  of  their  nature  and  con- 
sequences ;  and  the  force  of  these  facts  must  be  overcome 
by  something  more  than  angry  declamation  against  visionary 
theories  and  ill-judged  humanity.  They  are  not  fictions 
invented  by  medical  men  (as  was  rather  broadly  charged 
upon  them  in  some  of  the  late  trials  in  France,)  for  the  pur- 
pose of  puzzling  juries  and  defeating  the  ends  of  justice,  but 
plain,  unvarnished  facts  as  they  occurred  in  nature  ;  and  to 
set  them  aside  without  a  thorough  investigation,  as  unworthy 
of  influencing  our  decisions,  indicates  any  thing  rather  than 
that  spirit  of  sober  and  indefatigable  inquiry  which  should 
characterize  the  science  of  jurisprudence.  We  need  have 
no  fear  that  the  truth  on  this  subject  will  not  finally  prevail, 
but  the  interests  of  humanity  require  that  this  event  should 
take  place  speedily. 

\  251.  The  distinction  between  crimes  and  the  effects  of 
homicidal  monomania  is  too  well  founded  to  be  set  aside  by 
mere  declamation,  or  appeals  to  popular  prejudices,  as  it  has 
repeatedly  been  in  courts  of  justice.  On  the  trial  of  Papa- 


264  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

voine  for  the  murder  of  two  young  children  near  Paris,  in 
1823,  the  advocate-general,  in  reply  to  the  counsel  of  the 
prisoner  who  had  pleaded  homicidal  insanity  in  his  defence, 
declared  that  Papavoine  committed  the  crime,  in  order  "  to 
gratify  an  inveterate  hatred  against  his  fellow  men,  trans- 
formed at  first,  into  a  weariness  of  his  own  life,  and  subse- 
quently into  an  instinct  of  ferocity  and  a  thirst  of  blood. 
Embittered  by  his  unhappy  condition,  excited  by  a  sense  of 
his  sufferings  and  misfortunes,  irritated  by  the  happiness  of 
others  which  awakened  in  him  only  ideas  of  fury,  and  drove 
him  into  seclusion  which  increased  the  perversity  of  his 
depraved  propensities,  he  arrived  at  that  pitch  of  brutal 
depravity  where  destruction  became  a  necessity,  and  the 
sight  of  blood  a  horrible  delight.  His  hateful  affections, 
after  being  long  restrained,  finally  burst  forth  and  raised  in 
his  bosom  a  necessity  of  killing,  which,  like  a  young  tiger, 
he  sought  to  gratify."  1  That  beings  in  human  shape  have 
lived  who  delighted  in  the  shedding  of  blood,  and  found  a  pas- 
time in  beholding  the  dying  agonies  of  their  victims,  is  a 
melancholy  fact  too  well  established  by  the  Neros  and  Ca- 
ligulas  of  history.  For  such  we  have  no  disposition  to  urge 
the  plea  of  insanity,  for  though  we  are  willing  to  believe 
them  to  have  been  unhappily  constituted,  we  have  no  evi- 
dence that  they  labored  under  cerebral  disease,  and  they 
certainly  exhibited  none  of  its  phenomena.  Motives,  the 
very  slightest  no  doubt,  generally  existed  for  even  their  most 
horrid  atrocities,  and  even  when  they  were  entirely  wanting, 
there  was  still  a  conformity  of  their  bloody  deeds  with  the 
whole  tenor  of  their  natural  character.  They  followed  the 
bent  of  their  dispositions  as  manifested  from  childhood, 
glorying  in  their  preeminent  wickedness,  and  rendered 
familiar  with  crime  by  habit ;  and  though  conscience  might 
have  slumbered,  or  opposed  but  a  feeble  resistance  to  the 
force  of  their  passions,  yet  it  was  not  perverted  by  diseased 
action  so  as  to  be  blind  to  the  existence  of  moral  distinctions. 
In  homicidal  insanity,  on  the  contrary,  every  thing  is  dlffer- 

1  Georget.  Examen  des  proces  criminelles. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  265 

ent.  The  criminal  act  for  which  its  subject  is  called  to  an 
account,  is  the  result  of  a  strong  and,  perhaps,  sudden  im- 
pulse, opposed  to  his  natural  habits,  and  generally  preceded 
or  followed  by  some  derangement  of  the  healthy  actions  of 
the  brain  or  other  organ.  The  advocate-general  himself 
represented  Papavoine,  "  as  having  been  noted  for  his  un- 
social disposition,  for  avoiding  his  fellow  laborers,  for  walk- 
ing in  retired,  solitary  places,  appearing  to  be  much  absorbed 
in  the  vapors  of  a  black  melancholy."  This  is  not  a  picture 
of  those  human  fiends  to  whom  he  would  assimilate  Papa- 
voine, but  it  is  a  faithful  one  of  a  mind  over  which  the  clouds 
of  insanity  are  beginning  to  gather.  Where  is  the  similarity 
between  this  man,  who,  with  a  character  for  probity  and  in 
a  fit  of  melancholy,  is  irresistibly  hurried  to  the  commission 
of  a  horrible  deed,  and  those  wretches  who,  hardened  by  a 
life  of  crime,  commit  their  enormities  with  perfect  delibera- 
tion and  consciousness  of  their  nature. 

§  252.  It  has  been  also  urged  that  the  subjects  of  homi- 
cidal insanity  are,  no  less  than  criminals,  injurious  to  society, 
the  safety  of  which  implicitly  requires  their  extermination, 
upon  the  same  principle  that  we  do  not  hesitate  to  destroy  a 
dog  that  has  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  go  mad.  Sane  or 
insane,  criminal  or  not,  such  monsters  should  be  cut  off  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  it  is  a  misplaced  humanity  to  re- 
serve them  for  a  different  fate.  Such  language  might  have 
been  expected  from  people  who  are  moved  only  by  the 
feelings  that  are  immediately  raised  by  the  sight  of  appalling 
crimes,  but  it  is  an  humiliating  truth  that  the  opinions  of 
those  who  are  in  the  habit  of  discriminating  between  various 
shades  of  guilt,  and  of  canvassing  motives,  are  too  often  but 
an  echo  to  the  popular  voice.  If  the  old  custom  of  smother- 
ing under  a  feather  bed  the  miserable  victims  of  hydropho- 
bia, be  now  considered  as  a  specimen  of  the  most  revolting 
barbarity,  we  cannot  see  why  the  punishment  of  insane 
offenders  should  be  regarded  under  a  more  favorable  aspect. 
Society  has  a  right  to  protect  itself  against  the  aggressions 
of  the  dangerously  insane ;  but  unnecessary  severity  in  its 
protective  measures  often  defeats  the  very  purpose  in  view, 

23 


266  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

and  indicates  a  want  of  humanity  and  intellectual  enlight- 
enment. While  confinement  in  prisons  and  hospitals  fur- 
nishes all  the  restraint  which  the  necessity  of  their  case 
requires,  it  is  idle  to  urge  the  infliction  of  death  as  the  only 
means  by  which  society  can  be  effectually  shielded  from  a 
repetition  of  their  terrible  enormities.1 

§  253.  One  of  the  principal  objects  of  punishment  should 
be  to  deter  from  the  commission  of  crime,  by  impressing  the 
mind  with  ideas  of  physical  and  moral  suffering  as  its  certain 
consequence ;  and  whenever  it  is  found  to  produce  a  very 
different  effect,  it  is  the  part  of  enlightened  legislation  to 
devise  some  other  means  of  prevention.  Nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  than  to  inflict  the  very  punishment  which  the 
delusion  of  the  monomaniac  often  impels  him  to  seek,  —  to 
put  him  to  death,  who  voluntarily  surrenders  himself,  and 
imploringly  beseeches  it  as  the  only  object  he  had  at  heart 
in  perpetrating  a  horrid  crime.  What  is  it  but  converting  a 
dreadful  punishment  into  the  dearest  boon  that  earth  can 
offer  ?  In  religious  monomania,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  the 
patient  to  believe  that  the  joys  of  heaven  are  in  store  for 
him,  and,  under  the  excitement  of  this  insane  idea,  to  murder 
a  fellow  creature,  in  order  that  he  may  the  sooner  enter  on 
their  fruition.  To  execute  one  of  this  class,  is  to  perpetuate 
an  evil  which  needs  only  a  change  of  penal  consequences  to 
be  effectually  remedied.  A  kind  of  delusion  has  sometimes 
prevailed,  in  certain  parts  of  Europe,  which  persuades  its  un- 
fortunate subjects  that  eternal  happiness  can  be  gained  by 
being  executed  for  the  murder  of  some  innocent  person. 
The  idea  is  that  suicide  being  itself  a  sin,  will  not  be  followed 
by  the  happiness  they  seek,  but  that  murder,  though  a  greater 
crime,  can  be  repented  of  before  the  time  of  execution. 
This  delusion  prevailed  epidemically  in  Denmark,  during 


1  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  when  a  person  charged  with  a  capital 
crime,  is  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  admitted  to  be  the 
author  of  the  crime,  it  is  rendered  obligatory  on  the  court  in  England  by  stat. 
89  and  40  Geo.  III.  c.  94,  and  by  similar  provisions  in  most  of  the  United 
States,  to  order  him  into  confinement. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MANIA.  267 

the  middle  of  the  last  century,  and  to  avoid  sending  an  un- 
prepared person  out  of  the  world,  the  victim  generally 
selected  was  a  child.  Death,  of  course,  was  no  punishment 
in  this  case,  and  at  last,  the  king  issued  an  ordinance  direct- 
ing that  the  guilty  should  be  branded  on  the  forehead  with 
a  hot  iron  and  whipped,  and  be  imprisoned  for  life,  with 
hard  labor.  Every  year,  on  the  anniversary  of  their  crime,' 
they  were  to  be  whipped.1  Lord  Dover,  in  his  life  of  Frederic, 
relates  that  such  was  the  severity  of  discipline  to  which  the 
Prussian  troops  at  Potsdam  were  subjected,  that  many  wished 
for  death  to  finish  their  intolerable  sufferings,  and  murdered 
children  whom  they  had  enticed  within  their  power,  in 
order  to  obtain  from  justice  the  stroke  they  dared  not  inflict 
upon  themselves.2  Abolish  capital  punishment  in  such  cases 
and  the  delusion  will  disappear  with  it ;  continue  it,  and  no 
one  can  tell  when  the  latter  will  end. 

§  254.  Not  only  is  the  moral  effect  of  punishment  totally 
lost  when  inflicted  on  the  subjects  of  homicidal  insanity, 
since  it  does  not  deter  other  madmen  from  committing 
similar  acts,  but  by  a  curious  law  of  morbid  action,  the  very 
publicity  obtained  for  them,  by  the  trial  and  execution  of  the 
actors,  leads  to  their  repetition  to  an  almost  incredible  extent. 
At  a  sitting  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Medicine  in  Paris, 
August  8th,  1826,  Esquirol  stated  that  since  the  trial  of 
Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred  not  two  months  before,  he 
had  become  acquainted  with  six  instances  of  a  parallel 
nature.  Among  these  was  a  Protestant  minister  who  became 
affected  with  the  desire  of  destroying  a  favorite  child.  He 
struggled  against  this  terrible  inclination  for  fifteen  days,  but 
was  at  last  driven  to  the  attempt  on  his  child's  life,  in  which 
he  fortunately  failed.  Several  other  physicians,  on  the  same 
occasion,  bore  similar  testimony  relative  to  the  effect  of  that 
trial,  and  the  newspapers  about  that  period  teemed  with 
cases  of  child-murder  which  had  originated  in  the  same  way. 

§  255.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  well-grounded 
suspicion  that  the  homicidal  act,  thus  punished,  was  the 

1  London  Quarterly  Review,  xii.  219.  2  i.  321. 


268  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

\ 

result  of  physical  disease,  instead  of  moral  depravity,  is  so 
horrid  as  to  excite,  in  whatever  mind  it  arises,  feelings  of 
distrust  and  jealousy,  towards  the  law  and  its  ministers, 
infinitely  more  to  be  dreaded  than  the  occasional  acquittal  of 
a  supposititious  maniac.  When,  on  the  contrary,  the  dis- 
tinction is  carefully  made  between  the  acts  of  a  sound  and 
those  of  an  unsound  mind,  and  a  decision  in  doubtful  cases 
is  dispassionately  and  deliberately  formed  upon  every  species 
of  evidence  calculated  to  throw  light  upon  it,  the  mind  is 
impressed  with  a  new  sense  of  the  wisdom  and  majesty  of 
the  laws,  and  with  a  feeling  of  security  under  their  discrimi- 
nating operation.  The  numerous  trials  for  witchcraft  in  a 
former  age,  and  the  occasional  condemnation  of  a  maniac  in 
the  present,  have  done  more  to  lessen  men's  respect  for  the 
laws,  than  all  its  overruled  decisions  have  to  weaken  their 
confidence  in  its  certainty.  Insanity  is  a  disease,  before  the 
prospect  of  which  the  stoutest  heart  may  quail ;  but  how 
much  more  appalling  is  it  made  by  the  reflection,  that  in 
some  wild  paroxysm,  it  may  be  followed  by  legal  conse- 
quences that  will  consign  its  unhappy  subject  to  an  igno- 
minious death.  In  cases  of  simulated  madness,  the  purposes 
of  justice  are  more  fully  answered  by  receiving  and  examin- 
ing all  the  evidence  and  patiently  showing  its  value  and  bear- 
ings, and  thus  laying  open  the  imposition  to  the  conviction 
of  all,  than  by  repelling  the  plea  with  idle  declamation  on  its 
injurious  tendency.  Not  only  does  the  criminal  obtain  his 
deserts,  by  such  a  course,  but  the  most  cunning  device  of 
his  ingenuity  is  seen  to  be  baffled,  and  the  plea  that  should 
ever  shield  innocence  from  destruction  is  ineffectually  urged 
to  protect  the  guilty.  Every  murmur  at  the  injustice  of  the 
sentence  is  hushed,  all  scruples  are  removed  and  all  fears  are 
dissipated,  that  a  fellow  being  has  been  sacrificed,  whose 
only  crime  was  the  misfortune  of  laboring  under  disease  of 
the  brain.  Besides,  what  if  amid  the  obscurity  in  which  a 
case  may  sometimes  be  involved,  a  guilty  person  do  escape, 
—  though  this  event  must  be  of  very  rare  occurrence,  —  is  it 
not  a  maxim  in  legal  practice  that  it  is  better  for  ten  guilty 
persons  to  escape  punishment  than  for  one  innocent  person 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MANIA.  269 

to  suffer  ?  And  though  he  escape  the  sentence  of  the  law, 
yet  society  is  perfectly  secure  from  the  effects  of  mistake, 
because  the  very  plea  by  which  he  obtains  his  acquittal, 
consigns  him  to  confinement  and  surveillance. 

§  256.  In  those  cases  where  there  are  some  but  not  per- 
fectly satisfactory  indications  of  insanity,  the  trial  or  sen- 
tence should  be  postponed,  in  order  that  opportunity  may  be 
afforded  to  those  who  are  properly  qualified,  for  observing 
the  state  of  the  prisoner's  mind.  Where  the  moral  powers 
have  become  so  deranged  as  to  lead  to  criminal  acts,  with- 
out, however,  any  perceptible  impairment  of  the  intellect, 
time  only  is  necessary,  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases,  to 
furnish  indubitable  evidence  of  mental  derangement.  And 
whatever  may  be  the  result,  the  ends  of  justice  are  not 
defeated  by  waiting  a  few  months,  while  the  scruples  of  the 
over  humane  are  removed,  and  the  acquiescence  of  the 
ministers  of  the  law  in  measures  calculated  to  establish 
innocence  rather  than  guilt,  gains  for  them  a  confidence 
and  respect  that  the  conviction  of  guilt  never  can.  Many 
instances  might  be  mentioned  where  the  accused,  whose 
insanity  was  doubtful  on  trial,  has,  during  the  confinement 
subsequent  to  his  acquittal  on  a  criminal  prosecution,  become 
most  manifestly  insane.  Hadfield,  who  was  tried  for  shooting 
at  the  king,  and  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though 
during  the  trial  he  displayed  no  indications  of  disordered 
mind,  spent  the  remainder  of  his  life  in  Bethlem  hospital,  and 
for  thirty  years  showed  scarcely  any  signs  of  mental  aliena- 
tion, except  once,  when  suddenly  and  without  any  known 
cause,  he  became  so  furious  that  they  were  obliged  to  chain 
him  in  his  room.  This  paroxysm  lasted  but  a  short  time, 
when  he  recovered  his  ordinary  state  of  health. l 

§  257.  Another  reason  for  delay  is,  that  insanity  is  some- 
times so  completely  veiled  from  observation,  as  never  to  be 
suspected  even  by  the  most  intimate  associates  of  the 
patient.  An  instructive  case  is  related  by  Georget,  in  which 
the  existence  of  insanity,  though  of  several  years  duration, 

1  Billard,  quoted  by  Georget  in  Nouv.  discuss,  med.  leg.  71. 

23* 


270  MEDICAL   JURISPKUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

was  not  recognized  till  after  the  death  of  the  subject.  The 
circumstances  were  briefly  these.  Bertet,  a  revenue  officer, 
exercised  the  duties  of  his  office  for  three  years,  in  the  manu- 
factory of  MM.  Ador  and  Bonnaire,  at  Vaugirard,  where  he 
was  only  noticed  for  his  unaccommodating  disposition, 
melancholy  temperament,  and  fondness  for  seclusion.  One 
day  while  M.  Ador  was  conversing  with  some  of  the  work- 
men, he  was  requested  by  Bertet  to  affix  his  signature  to  cer- 
tain papers.  He  proceeded  to  his  room  for  this  purpose,  and 
while  in  the  act  of  writing,  was  shot  dead  by  Bertet,  who 
immediately  afterwards  blew  out  his  own  brains.  Among  his 
papers  were  found  several  addressed  to  the  advocate-general, 
bearing  the  most  singular  titles,  such  as  my  last  reflections, 
my  last  sighs,  in  which  he  declared  that  he  had  been  poisoned 
several  years  before,  and  gave  a  minute  account  of  the 
numerous  remedies  he  had  ineffectually  used,  insisting  at  the 
same  time  that  his  head  was  not  turned,  that  he  acted  delibe- 
rately, and  giving  very  coherent  reasons  to  prove  it.  He 
announced  that  four  victims  were  required,  namely,  the  two 
heads  of  the  establishment,  a  woman  who  was  living  in  it, 
and  his  old  housekeeper,  and  that  in  case  he  should  be  con- 
tented with  one,  he  would  leave  to  justice  the  charge  of 
obtaining  the  others.  Some  of  these  papers  he  finishes  with 
saying,  "  To-day  my  pains  are  less  acute,  —  I  feel  better,  — 
my  vengeance  is  retarded,"  or  "  my  pains  are  renewed  — 
with  them  my  thoughts  of  vengeance."  Among  other  wild 
fancies,  he  made  a  description  of  the  funeral  monument  to 
be  raised  to  one  of  his  victims,  which  was  to  be  a  gibbet 
covered  with  figures  of  instruments  of  punishment.  He  also 
described  his  own  funeral  procession.  He  wished  the  four 
corners  of  the  pall  to  be  carried  by  the  four  persons  above- 
mentioned,  in  case  he  should  not  have  sacrificed  them ;  that 
the  advocate-general  should  follow  the  cortege ;  and  that 
when  it  reached  the  cemetery,  the  latter  should  prepare  a 
large  ditch  in  which  they  should  first  cast  him,  Bertet,  and 
then  the  four  pall-bearers.  In  another  paper,  he  said  he 
designed  for  each  of  his  victims  two  gilt  balls,  as  an  emblem 
of  their  ambition  and  thirst  of  gold,  and  some  pulverized 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF  MORAL  MAXIA.  271 

cantharides,  as  an  image  of  the  torments  which  he  suffered. 
Bertet  had  never  shown  any  signs  of  mental  alienation  in 
his  official  letters  and  reports.  He  was  sometimes  abstracted 
and  loved  to  be  alone,  but  his  disposition,  in  this  respect, 
had  been  of  long  standing,  and  seemed  to  be  owing  to  the 
state  of  his  health,  of  which  he  was  constantly  complaining, 
though  judging  from  his  exterior,  he  seemed  to  be  well 
enough.  He  had  always  discharged  the  duties  of  his  office 
satisfactorily,  and,  by  his  own  solicitation,  had  just  before 
obtained  a  more  profitable  place.  Had  not  Bertet  recorded 
his  insane  fancies,  but,  failing  in  his  suicidal  attempt,  had 
been  brought  to  trial  for  the  murder  of  M.  Ador,  the  plea  of 
insanity  would  have  fallen  on  the  most  incredulous  ears,  and 
he  would  have  paid  the  last  penalty  of  the  law.  In  a  state 
of  confinement  and  seclusion,  however,  nothing  but  time 
would  have  been  necessary  to  reveal  the  true  nature  of  his 
case. 

§  258.  Homicidal  monomania  presents  us  with  one  of 
those  remarkable  phenomena,  the  existence  of  which  men 
are  slow  to  believe,  long  after  the  evidence  in  its  favor  has 
accumulated  to  such  an  extent  as  to  render  incredulity  any 
thing  but  a  virtue.  The  facts  themselves  cannot  be  denied, 
and  the  various  methods  of  explaining  them  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  sound  understanding,  though  every  phase  of 
human  character  and  every  spring  of  human  action  have  been 
resorted  to  for  the  purpose,  are  little  calculated  to  diminish 
the  confidence  of  impartial  minds  in  the  correctness  of  the 
abo.ve  views.  Strongly  impressed  as  we  are  with  their  im- 
portance, we  may  have  devoted  more  attention  to  the  objec- 
tions that  have  been  urged  against  them,  than  they  really 
deserve ;  we  shall,  therefore,  say  but  little  more  on  this  part  of 
the  subject.  Against  Georget's  proposition  relative  to  the 
homicide  committed  by  Henriette  Cornier,  that  "  an  act  so 
atrocious,  so  contrary  to  human  nature,  committed  without 
interest,  without  passion,  opposed  to  the  natural  character  of 
the  individual,  is  evidently  an  act  of  madness ; "  *  it  has  been 

1  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  126. 


272  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

seriously  objected  that  though  we  may  be  unable  to  discover 
motives,  yet  this  is  not  a  positive  proof  that  there  actually  are 
no  motives.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  sometimes  the 
character  of  the  act  itself  furnishes  sufficient  evidence  of  its 
having  been  prompted  by  insanity,  even  when  the  closest 
investigation  of  the  bodily  and  mental  condition  of  the  party 
fails  to  detect  other  proofs  of  its  existence.  A  man  named 
Greensmith  was  tried  and  convicted  in  England  in  1837,  for 
the  murder  of  his  four  children.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that 
he  was  a  kind  father,  and  a  sober,  industrious  man ;  that  he 
took  affectionate  leave  of  his  children  before  he  destroyed 
them,  and  again  before  he  finally  left  them ;  that  he  calmly 
and  deliberately  strangled  them  one  after  the  other,  and 
evinced  neither  fear,  nor  repentance,  nor  mental  agitation. 
The  motive  he  assigned  for  the  act  was,  that  he  thought  it 
would  be  better  for  him  and  for  his  family  that  he  should 
destroy  his  children  and  be  executed  for  the  act,  than  let 
them  go  to  the  workhouse.  Stronger  evidence  of  insanity 
than  such  conduct  furnishes,  could  not  be  had.  The  judge 
and  jury,  however,  thought  otherwise,  although  they  had, 
besides,  the  testimony  of  an  eminent  physician  of  a  lunatic 
asylum,  who  stated  his  belief,  as  the  result  of  his  observation 
of  the  accused,  that  he  was  laboring  under  insane  delusion,  and 
that  the  act  was  the  direct  offspring  of  that  delusion.  Does  the 
man,  who  like  Hadfield  imagines  that  he  is  to  be  sacrificed 
for  the  salvation  of  the  world,  and  to  that  end  shoots  at  the 
king,  or  he  who  murders  his  neighbor  in  the  belief  that  his 
victim  and  others  are  conspiring  against  his  life,  (§  10,)  evince 
a  more  extensive  derangement  of  the  mental  powers,  than 
this  poor  creature  who  destroys  his  dear  offspring  in  the 
imaginary  apprehension  of  coming  want  ?  It  seems  as  if 
nothing  but  the  most  slavish  and  puerile  regard  for  techni- 
calities, could  so  blind  one  to  the  clearest  manifestation  of 
truth  as  to  lead  him  to  return  an  affirmative  to  this  question. 
§  259.  By  those  who  delight  not  in  metaphysical  subtle- 
ties, a  more  summary,  if  not  more  philosophical,  explanation 
of  homicidal  monomania  has  been  furnished  in  the  idea  that 
it  is  to  be  attributed  to  an  instinct  of  ferocity ;  to  unnatural 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  273 

depravity  of  character;  to  a  radical  perversity.  That  such 
qualities  do  exist  as  the  too  common  result  of  a  defective  con- 
stitution, or  a  vicious  education,  is  proved  by  the  testimony 
of  every  day's  experience,  even  if  we  had  not  the  best  author- 
ity for  believing  that  the  heart  may  be  "  desperately  wicked." 
But  even  where  they  exist  to  the  fullest  extent,  the  actions 
to  which  they  prompt  have  always  some  immediate  motive, 
slight  as  it  may  be,  of  pleasure  sought,  or  pain  avoided ;  or  if 
they  .can  claim  no  higher  title  than  that  of  instinct^  it  is  one 
of  no  sudden,  transitory  character,  but  a  constant  and  con- 
sistent portion  of  the  constitution.  It  is  an  anomalous  in- 
stinct that  manifests  itself  but  once  or  twice  in  a  person's 
life  ;  and  therefore,  we  cannot,  without  indulging  in  the  most 
unwarrantable  use  of  language,  apply  this  term  to  those  un- 
controllable, abnormal  influences  that  lead  to  acts  of  fury 
and  destruction.  What  resemblance  can  we  detect  between 
the  Domitians  and  Neros  of  history,  and  the  Papavoines 
and  Corniers,  whose  terrible  acts  have  been  commemorated 
in  the  records  of  criminal  jurisprudence  ?  In  the  former,  this 
instinct  of  ferocity  appeared  in  their  earliest  youth ;  it  im- 
parted a  zest  to  every  amusement,  and  excited  ingenuity  to 
contrive  new  means  for  heightening  the  agonies  of  the 
wretched  victims  of  their  displeasure.  In  the  latter,  the  char- 
acter was  mild  and  peaceable,  and  their  days  were  spent  in 
the  quiet  and  creditable  discharge  of  the  duties  belonging  to 
their  station,  till  a  cloud  of  melancholy  enveloped  their  minds, 
and  under  its  shadow  they  perpetrated  a  single  deed,  at  the 
very  thought  of  which  they  would  have  previously  shuddered 
with  horror.  In  short,  all  our  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
all  our  experience  of  the  past,  force  us  to  the  conclusion,  that 
"  the  presence  of  mental  alienation  should  be  admitted  in  him 
who  commits  a  homicide  without  positive  interest,  without 
criminal  motives,  and  without  a  reasonable  passion." 

§  260.  After  what  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  homi- 
cidal monomania,  it  will  be  scarcely  necessary  to  enter  into 
particulars  relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of  the  other 
forms  of  partial  moral  mania.  Completely  annulling,  as  we 
believe  they  do,  all  moral  responsibility  for  acts  committed 


274  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

under  their  influence,  the  law  can  rightfully  inflict  no  pun- 
ishment on  their  unfortunate  subjects,  though  it  should  adopt 
every  measure  of  precaution  that  the  interests  of  society 
require.  To  punish  the  thief  and  the  incendiary  for  acts 
which  are  the  result  of  disease,  is  not  only  unjust,  but  it 
serves  to  aggravate  their  disorder,  and  to  prepare  them,  when 
their  term  of  punishment  has  closed,  for  renewing  their  depre- 
dations on  society  with  increased  perseverance.  The  proper 
course  to  pursue  with  this  class  of  offenders,  when  brought 
into  courts  of  justice,  is  to  place  them,  or  obtain  a  guaranty 
from  their  friends  that  they  shall  be  placed,  where  judicious 
medical  treatment  will  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 
their  moral  powers  to  a  sounder  condition,  and  where  they  will 
be  secluded  from  society  until  this  end  shall  be  accomplished. 
§  261.  If  the  doctrines  here  laid  down  relative  to  moral 
insanity  and  its  legal  consequences  are  correct,  it  would 
seem  to  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  they  should  exert 
their  legitimate  influence  on  judicial  decisions.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  contended,  —  and  that  too  by  some  who  do  not 
question  the  truth  of  these  doctrines,  —  that  they  ought  not  to 
have  this  practical  effect,  for  the  reason  that  insanity  would 
thereby  be  made  the  ground  of  defence  in  criminal  actions, 
to  a  most  pernicious  extent.  Stated  in  the  plainest  and 
strongest  terms,  the  objection  is,  that  if  these  doctrines 
should  be  recognized  in  our  courts  of  justice,  and  suffered  to 
influence  their  decisions,  almost  every  criminal  would  resort 
to  a  defence,  the  tendency  of  which  is  invariably  to  puzzle 
and  distract  the  minds  of  the  jury,  and  to  produce  the 
acquittal  of  many  a  wretch,  who  would  first  hear  the  men- 
tion of  his  own  derangement  from  the  lips  of  ingenious 
counsel.  Now,  even  if  we  were  disposed  to  accord  to  this 
objection  all  the  foundation  that  is  claimed  for  it,  it  would 
not  seem  to  warrant  the  inference  that  is  drawn  from  it. 
Are  we  to  take  from  the  maniac  the  defence  which  the  law 
of  nature  secures  to  him,  because  it  may  sometimes  be 
offered  by  those  who  use  it  as  a  means  of  deception  ?  Are 
the  innocent  to  be  made  to  suffer  for  the  devices  of  the 
guilty  ?  To  avoid  this  cruel  injustice,  therefore,  without  at 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL    MANIA.  275 

the  same  time  inflicting  a  positive  evil  on  society,  we  would 
deduce  from  this  objection  an  inference  of  a  totally  different 
kind.  It  is,  to  let  the  right  of  the  accused  party  to  make 
his  defence  be  cumbered  with  no  restrictions,  expressed  or 
implied ;  to  let  the  plea  of  insanity,  if  he  choose  to  make  it, 
be  attentively  listened  to,  the  facts  urged  in  its  support 
closely  scrutinized,  the  accused  carefully  and  dispassionately 
examined,  and  his  character  and  history  investigated.  If 
this  duty  be  performed  as  it  should  be,  and  always  may  be, 
the  case  will  seldom  happen,  when  the  truth  will  not  be 
established  to  the  satisfaction  of  every  unprejudiced  mind. 
If  the  accused  be  really  insane,  we  have  the  satisfaction  of 
reflecting,  that  an  enlightened  investigation  of  his  case  has 
saved  an  innocent  person  from  an  ignominious  fate,  while 
on  the  other  hand,  if  he  be  simulating  insanity,  every  doubt 
will  be  dissipated  as  to  the  justice  of  his  sentence,  and  the 
conviction  will  be  strengthened  in  the  popular  mind,  that  the 
law  will  prevail  over  every  false  pretence,  and  expose  the 
guilty  even  in  their  most  secret  refuge.1 

§  262.  In  the  form  of  moral  insanity  characterized  by  altef- 

1  The  following  remark  of  chief  justice  Parker  of  N.  H.,  shows  that  this 
objection  is  not  confirmed  by  the  experience  of,  at  least,  one  practical  lawyer, 
the  value  of  whose  testimony  on  this,  or  any  other  point,  need  not  be  indica- 
ted by  any  comment  of  mine.  "  There  are,  undoubtedly,  instances  in  which 
this  kind  of  defence  is  attempted  from  the  mere  conviction  that  nothing  else 
can  avail,  —  cases  in  which  the  advocate  forgets  the  high  duty  to  which  he  is 
called,  and  excites  a  prejudice  against  the  case  of  others,  by  attempting  to 
procure  the  escape  of  a  criminal  under  this  false  pretence ;  but  such  cases 
are  truly  rare,  and  usually  unsuccessful."  Charge  to  the  grand  jury  of  Mer- 
rimack  county,  N.  H.,  1838,  quoted  in  20  American  Jurist,  457.  Dr.  Bell,  the 
Superintendent  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massachusetts,  states,  "  that  for  one 
real  criminal  acquitted  on  the  score  of  insanity,  there  have  been  a  dozen 
maniacs  executed  for  their  criminal  acts."  Dr.  Woodward,  Superintendent 
of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Hospital,  says,  "  of  all  the  cases  that  have  come 
to  my  knowledge,  and  I  have  examined  the  subject  with  interest  for  many 
years,  I  have  known  but  a  single  instance  in  which  an  individual  arraigned 
for  murder,  and  found  not  guilty  by  reason  of  insanity,  has  not  afterwards 
shown  unequivocal  symptoms  of  insanity  in  the  jails  or  hospitals  where  he  has 
been  confined ;  and  I  regret  to  say  that  quite  a.  number  who  have  been  exe- 
cuted, have  shown  as  clear  evidence  of  insanity  as  any  of  these." 


276  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

nate  excitement  and  depression,  (§  145,)  the  patient  is 
strongly  disposed  to  buy  and  sell,  which  fact  joined  with 
equal  eagerness  on  the  part  of  others  to  take  advantage  of  it, 
frequently  make  their  civil  transactions  the  subject  of  litigation. 
In  these  cases  there  are  so  many  points  to  be  considered,  that 
it  is  often  difficult  to  arrive  at  satisfactory  conclusions.  It  is 
to  be  settled,  —  and  perhaps  on  very  meagre  evidence,  — 
whether  the  transaction  occurred  during  the  lucid  interval ; 
or  if  it  occurred  during  the  period  either  of  excitement  or  of 
depression,  whether  the  mental  affection  were  sufficiently 
grave  to  obscure  the  perceptions  or  weaken  the  judgment, 
and  if  so,  whether  the  other  party  took  advantage  of  this 
infirmity  to  obtain  more  favorable  terms  than  he  otherwise 
would.  It  is  also  to  be  considered,  that  although  the  con- 
tracts of  these  persons  may  be  fair  enough  independently 
regarded,  yet  their  number  and  extent  may  be  so  far  beyond 
their  means,  as  to  prove  highly  inconvenient,  if  not  ruinous. 
The  following  account  of  a  suit  arising  out  of  one  of  this 
class  of  contracts,  will  give  a  better  idea  of  the  various  ques- 
tions which  they  open  as  well  as  the  principles  of  law  appli- 
cable to  them,  than  any  general  discussion. 

§  263.  At  a  session  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of 
Massachusetts,  at  Northampton,  August,  1848,  a  suit  was 
brought  by  the  guardian  of  Josiah  Allis,  against  Billings  and 
others,  for  the  purpose  of  annulling  a  contract  made  several 
years  previous,  whereby  the  plaintiff  conveyed  to  the  defend- 
ants his  interest  in  certain  mills,  on  the  ground  that  the  for- 
mer was  then  insane  and  that  the  latter  were  guilty  of  fraud. 
It  appeared  in  evidence  that  Allis,  then  about  fifty  years  old, 
and  the  son  of  a  farmer,  was  attacked  in  1819  with  mania, 
under  the  form  of  high  though  not  furious  excitement.  He 
recovered,  apparently,  in  the  course  of  two  or  three  months, 
but  every  year  since,  had  been  visited  by  a  similar  attack 
which  was  invariably  followed  by  a  period  of  depression,  and 
this  by  a  period  of  apparent  restoration  to  his  natural  condi- 
tion. In  1822  he  married  his  first  wife  by  whom  he  had  two 
daughters  now  married.  In  1829  his  father  died,  leaving 
him  executor  of  his  will  and  residuary  legatee  to  nearly  all 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  277 

his  property.  In  1833  his  wife  died.  In  March,  1834,  he 
made  a  contract  with  Bodwell,  the  husband  of  his  only  sis- 
ter, whereby  the  latter  was  induced  to  move  upon  Allis's 
farm,  and  maintain  him  and  his  family.  At  the  end  of  a 
year  this  contract  was  dissolved  by  mutual  consent.  On 
March  21st,  1834,  he  made  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  the 
mills  which  it  was  the  object  of  this  suit  to  avoid.  For  his 
interest  in  the  property,  being  one-half,  he  received  $4000, 
and  a  release  from  certain  unsettled  claims  which,  he  sup- 
posed, might  amount  to  $500.  In  this  year  his  mother  died. 
In  March,  1835,  he  sold  his  homestead  for  $4,600,  with  the 
expectation  of  receiving  $500  more.  In  the  fall  of  the  next 
year  he  married  his  second  wife.  In  November,  1842,  his 
oldest  daughter,  and  the  next  year  his  other  daughter,  were 
married.  In  1843  he  commenced  a  suit  against  the  pur- 
chaser of  his  homestead,  for  avoidance  of  the  contract.  He 
obtained  a  verdict,  but  subsequent  law  proceedings  were 
instituted,  and  the  matter  was  still  pending.  In  the  latter  part 
of  1843,  he  was  placed  under  guardianship.  On  July  6th, 
1844,  he  was  sent  to  the  Worcester  lunatic  hospital,  where  he 
stayed  six  weeks. 

Bearing  these  incidents  and  dates  in  mind,  we  shall  more 
easily  understand  the  evidence  respecting  his  mental  condi- 
tion, every  particular  of  which  is  here  faithfully  given. 

§  264.  It  was  abundantly  proved  by  the  evidence,  that  Allis 
was  a  subject  of  periodical  insanity,  each  attack  being  char- 
acterized by  a  turn  of  excitement  and  depression,  an  interval 
intervening  between  the  attacks,  quite  free  from  both.  They 
occurred  every  year.  At  most  there  was  but  one  year  in 
which  their  occurrence  was  called  in  question.  It  appears 
that  the  excited  turns  usually  commenced  in  the  middle,  or 
latter  part  of  summer,  continuing  from  one  to  three  months. 
While  under  their  influence,  he  was  noisy,  boisterous,  and 
talkative.  The  various  other  manifestations  of  this  condition, 
as  related  by  the  witnesses,  were,  for  the  most  part,  referred 
to  particular  attacks,  and  were  probably  confined  to  them. 
In  this  manner,  it  was  stated,  that  he  would  drive  about  rap- 
idly and  carelessly,  shouting  and  hallooing ;  that  he  indulged 

24 


278  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

in  wild  and  incoherent  expressions,  and  was  observed  ram- 
bling about  without  hat,  coat,  or  shoes.  At  different  times, 
too,  he  entertained  some  strange  fancies  which  were  not  far 
from  being  real  delusions.  He  professed  to  be  able  to  walk 
on  the  water;  to  catch  a  person's  breath  in  his  teeth;  to 
have  command  of  angels  ;  to  tame  a  ferocious  woodchuck  by 
looking  in  his  eye ;  and  to  hold  up  through  a  storm  a  whole 
broadside  of  a  house  frame  which  they  were  raising.  At 
times  he  had  great  fears  of  thieves  and  devils,  and  would 
carry  about  a  double-barrelled  gun  to  protect  himself.  Once 
he  spoke  of  these  devils  as  brushing  by  him  at  an  evening 
meeting.  At  another,  he  thought  a  fellow  boarder  at  the 
hotel  had  been  robbed  of  a  large  sum.  With  two  or  three 
exceptions,  the  excitement  was  never  so  high  as  to  require 
his  confinement  to  the  house,  nor  did  it  always  prevent  him 
from  managing  his  affairs.  It  was  said  he  was  inclined  to 
make  purchases,  generally  of  fancy  articles  quite  unsuitable 
to  his  condition,  but  only  one  or  two  instances  were  related, 
of  his  indulging  in  foolish  speculations,  and  those  were  of 
trifling  amount. 

§  265.  Depression  immediately  succeeded  the  excitement, 
.  and  continued  until  spring.  Once  it  was  spoken  of  as  dis- 
appearing in  March ;  and  at  another  time,  in  April.  This 
also  seems  to  have  varied  in  severity.  At  one  time,  he  is 
described  as  being  still,  sitting  in  company  for  hours  without 
saying  a  word,  shy,  and  avoiding  his  friends.  In  many  of 
the  depressed  turns  he  was  filled  with  vague  fears  and  appre- 
hensions, thought  he  was  coming  to  want,  and  was  disposed 
to  suicide.  In  others,  he  was  able  to  attend  to  his  customary 
business. 

§  266.  His  daughters  testified  that  within  their  recollec- 
tion, (then  respectively  25  and  23  years  old,)  he  had  never 
been  otherwise  than  excited  or  depressed ;  yet  it  was  abun- 
dantly shown  by  a  cloud  of  witnesses  who  were  in  the  habit 
of  seeing  him,  every  day  or  two,  for  many  years,  that  there 
were  well-marked  intervals  between  his  attacks,  when  he  was 
apparently  free  from  excitement  or  depression.  It  was  their 
concurrent  testimony,  that  in  these  intervals,  his  manners 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  279 

were  natural  and  proper,  his  conduct  and  conversation  cor- 
rect, and  nothing  in  either  to  arrest  the  observation  of  others. 
He  managed  the  farm,  both  before  and  after  his  father's  death, 
with  no  very  obvious  lack  of  prudence  and  intelligence,  and 
creditably  discharged  the  duties  of  a  parent,  husband,  and 
citizen.  Various  business  transactions  of  his  at  one  time  or 
another,  were  described  by  the  witnesses  as  having  been  per- 
formed with  at  least  ordinary  discretion  and  sagacity ;  and 
those  who  had  these  dealings  with  him  observed  nothing 
strange  or  unusual  in  his  appearance.  He  hired  and  paid  his 
workmen,  bought  and  sold  his  cattle,  procured  the  necessary 
supplies  of  food  and  clothing  for  his  family,  placed  his  chil- 
dren at  school  away  from  home  and  paid  the  bills  for  their 
board  and  tuition,  married  twice,  bought  and  sold  real  estate, 
lent  money,  received  payments,  obtained  discounts  at  the 
Bank,  and  once,  (in  1832,)  was  chosen  by  the  parish  as  its 
agent  for  disposing  of  some  lands.  In  all  these  transac- 
tions, the  defendants  undertook  to  show,  that  he  evinced  an 
ordinary  share  of  shrewdness  and  intelligence ;  and  in  regard 
to  many  of  them,  certainly,  this  was  the  fact.  Instances 
were  mentioned  of  his  giving  too  much  for  his  purchases,  and 
of  buying  some  things  which  he  did  not  need,  but  nearly,  if 
not  quite  all,  these  transactions  occurred  when  he  was  con- 
fessedly in  his  excited  state.  One  of  them,  which  occurred 
in  the  spring  of  1842,  referred  to  the  purchase  of  an  old  shop 
for  a  needy  neighbor,  and  \vas  first  related  in  such  a  manner, 
as  to  convey  the  impression  that  it  was  deeply  tinctured  with 
folly.  The  testimony  of  the  neighbor  himself,  however, 
presented  the  matter  in  a  very  different  light.  It  appeared 
that  he  owned  a  lot  of  land,  very  near  Allis's  house,  which  it 
had  been  proposed  to  purchase  for  a  burying-place  for  the 
use  of  the  town.  AUis  being  loath  to  have  a  burying-place 
so  near  him,  suggested  to  the  witness,  that  he  had  better  put 
up  a  house  on  it.  "  I  replied,"  said  the  latter,  "  that  I  had  no 
funds,  and  then  he  offered  to  assist  me.  The  next  morning 
he  came  and  proposed  to  buy  for  me  a  certain  old  shop  near 
by,  which  might  be  made  into  a  house,  and  could  be  obtained, 
he  thought,  for  $100."  He  succeeded  in  getting  it  for  $90, 


280  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  had  it  removed  to  the  lot  in  question,  but  failed  to  sup- 
ply the  funds  necessary  for  converting  it  into  a  house.  Thus 
the  land  was  not  sold  for  a  burying-place,  and  he  did  no 
more  than  was  necessary  to  defeat  the  project.  Many  of  the 
witnesses  who  had  dealings  with  him,  and  spoke  of  him  as 
evincing  nothing  strange  or  unusual  in  his  manner,  and 
appearing  like  other  men,  had  seen  him  in  his  excited  and 
depressed  states,  and  declared  that  in  them,  he  had  appeared 
very  differently.  Instances  of  excitement  were  related,  which 
apparently  occurred  while  in  his  rational  or  lucid  intervals, 
but  they  were  transitory,  and  seemed  to  have  been  caused  by 
sudden  provocations,  or  some  other  special  causes.  In  this 
connection  it  is  proper  to  state,  that  following  the  custom 
of  the  times,  he  frequently,  if  not  excessively,  used  ardent 
spirits ;  and  it  was  testified  that  drinking  always  excited 
him. 

§  267.  The  evidence  respecting  Allis's  mental  condition 
about  the  time  of  the  transaction  in  question,  requires  par- 
ticular attention.  In  August,  1833,  he  went  on  a  pleasure 
excursion  to  Saratoga,  stayed  two  or  three  weeks,  and  came 
back  highly  excited.  In  September  he  bought  a  piece  of 
land  of  his  nephew ;  he  attended  auctions,  and  was  disposed 
to  bid  off  every  thing  that  was  sold.  In  that  month  or  the 
next  he  went  abroad  to  purchase  cattle,  for  the  purpose  of 
fattening  them.  He  was  disposed,  says  a  witness,  to  give 
whatever  was  asked,  and  actually  did  pay  high  prices.  He 
said,  when  he  returned  home,  that  he  had  got  them  for  a 
song.  In  October,  his  wife  died ;  she  was  sick  when  he  left 
home  to  buy  cattle,  and  he  told  a  young  man  who  lived  with 
him,  that  if  she  died,  he  must  procure  a  coffin.  Soon  after, 
he  became  depressed  ;  was  troubled  at  finding  he  had  bought 
more  cattle  than  he  had  the  means  of  feeding,  and  solicited 
his  brother-in-law  to  help  him  out  of  his  troubles.  A  witness 
who  took  some  of  the  cattle  to  keep  for  him,  said  that  Allis 
applied  to  him  and  made  the  bargain.  He  was  to  keep  them 
from  25th  of  November  to  the  early  part  of  February,  at  $1.17 
per  pair,  Allis  furnishing  grain,  and  witness  hay.  "  He  came 
often,"  said  the  witness, "  to  see  the  cattle ;  talked  about  them 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  281 

as  other  men  do ;  appeared,  in  all  respects,  like  other  men. 
Said  he  would  pay  when  he  got  returns,  and  did  pay  in  the 
course  of  two  or  three  weeks.  I  saw  nothing  like  excitement 
or  depression."  In  March,  1834,  he  conversed  with  a  witness 
about  the  mills  ;  said  they  were  not  profitable  ;  that  there  was 
always  something  to  be  done  on  them,  and  that  he  thought 
of  selling  them.  He  said  he  had  been  offered  $4000  for  his 
part,  and  asked  witness's  opinion  about  the  price.  The  wit- 
ness observed  nothing  wild  or  incoherent  in  his  manner ;  he 
was  as  usual  when  about  his  business.  In  March,  if  not 
before,  he  began  to  negotiate  the  arrangement  with  his 
brother-in-law,  referred  to  in  the  beginning  of  this  notice, 
which  ended  in  a  contract  whereby  the  latter  was  to  receive 
all  Allis's  real  estate  excepting  the  mills,  and  which  was  val- 
ued at  between  $8000  and  $9000,  maintaining  him  and  his 
daughters,  and  giving  the  latter  $2000  each.  His  reasons 
for  this  step  were,  as  appears  from  the  evidence,  that  by  the 
death  of  his  wife,  he  was  left  with  two  young  children,  and 
an  aged  mother  sick ;  that  he  was  unable  to  get  any  suitable 
person  to  take  charge  of  his  family ;  and  if  his  brother-in-law 
should  prove  a  gainer  by  the  arrangement,  it  would  only  turn 
a  portion  of  his  father's  property  into  his  sister's  family.  The 
brother-in-law  went  in  March,  and  said  he  thought  Allis  con- 
tinued depressed  until  the  first  of  April,  but  soon  went  out 
to  work  with  him,  and  appeared  to  be  in  his  natural  condi- 
tion during  the  summer.  He  also  consulted  with  his  brother 
respecting  the  sale  of  the  mills  ;  told  him  what  was  offered 
and  his  reasons  for  selling. 

§  268.  The  evidence  respecting  the  character  of  the  act, 
inasmuch  as  it  will  affect  our  estimate  of  his  mental  capaci- 
ty, remains  to  be  considered.  He  felt  perplexed  by  his  busi- 
ness and  overburdened  with  cares.  His  brother,  with  whom 
he  often  spoke  of  his  intention  to  sell  the  mills,  told  him  it 
would  be  a  judicious  step  and  relieve  him  of  care.  Both  this 
witness  and  another  whom  he  consulted,  expressed  their 
satisfaction  with  the  price.  The  fact  of  his  being  indebted 
to  the  defendants  to  the  amount  of  $500,  or  indeed  to  any 
amount,  was  neither  proved  nor  disproved.  If  not  so  in- 

24* 

'• 


282  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

debted,  then  he  received  at  the  rate  of  $8000  for  the  whole 
property ;  otherwise  at  the  rate  of  $9000.  A  few  witnesses 
rated  the  mills  at  $10,000,  in  1834;  one  at  $12,000.  A 
larger  number  fixed  their  value  at  $6000 ;  at  this  sum,  they 
were  assessed  on  the  tax  book  of  the  town  that  year. 

§  269.  Dr.  Lee,  assistant  physician,  of  the  lunatic  hospi- 
tal at  Worcester,  testified  that  Allis  entered  that  institution 
July  6th,  1844 ;  that  he  was  highly  excited,  and  continued  so 
four  days ;  that  this  excitement,  then,  rather  rapidly  passed 
into  depression,  in  which  state  he  continued  as  long  as  he 
remained,  which  was  six  weeks.  His  opinion  upon  the  evi- 
dence was,  that  the  fact  of  periodical  insanity  was  established, 
but  not  that  of  occasional  sanity.  He  was  satisfied  of  Allis's 
insanity  in  the  spring  of  1834.  Dr.  Woodward,  late  super- 
intendent of  the  hospital  at  Worcester,  coincided  with  Dr. 
Lee  in  the  opinion  that  Allis  had  no  lucid  intervals,  and  must 
have  been  insane  in  the  spring  of  1834.  Buying  and  selling, 
he  thought,  no  proof,  one  way  or  the  other,  because  insane 
men  are  capable  of  doing  certain  business.  He  admitted, 
however,  that,  if  Allis  on  his  return  from  the  hospital,  had 
talked  with  his  family  on  the  subject  of  his  will,  and  had  set 
down  coolly  and  deliberately  and  made  a  proper  will,  the 
presumption  would  have  been  in  its  favor.  The  author  testifi- 
ed that  in  his  opinion  the  existence  of  lucid  intervals  was  abun- 
dantly proved ;  that  in  these  intervals  he  was  as  capable  of 
transacting  business  as  a  person  ever  is  in  a  lucid  interval, 
and  that  the  contract  in  question  was  made  in  one  of  them. 
It  should  be  stated  in  this  connection,  that  the  first  two 
medical  witnesses  had  heard  none  of  the  defendants'  wit- 
nesses, and  not  all  of  the  plaintiff's ;  while  the  latter  had 
heard  all  of  the  plaintiff's,  and  most  of  the  defendants'  wit- 
nesses. 

§  270.  The  charge  of  the  court  (Mr.  Justice  Dewey)  to  the 
jury,  contained  some  instructions  that  deserve  the  attention  of 
the  medical  jurist.  The  jury  were  told  that  the  precise  point 
of  inquiry  for  them  was  the  state  of  Allis's  mind  on  the  21st  of 
March,  1834,  and  that  his  previous  and  subsequent  states  were 
only  important  as  elucidating  that  inquiry.  It  was  also  stated 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MANIA.  283 

that  acts  done  in  a  lucid  interval,  will  be  sustained  by  the 
law,  and  that  the  question  of  fraud  is  of  little  weight,  except 
as  connected  with  that  of  sanity  and  of  the  consideration. 
In  regard  to  the  burden  of  proof,  the  ordinary  doctrine  was 
given,  viz.,  that  if  insanity  is  alleged,  it  must  be  proved ; 
that  if  habitual  insanity  be  proved,  the  party  who  contends 
that  the  act  was  done  in  a  lucid  interval  must  prove  it ;  that 
if  a  party  exhibits  only  temporary  ebullitions  of  insanity,  he 
cannot  be  presumed  to  be  always  insane.  The  court  also 
instructed  the  jury  that  Allis  must  have  had  sufficient  capa- 
city to  judge  of  the  character  and  value  of  the  property  sold, 
and  the  law  required  no  more.  On  the  point  of  affirmation, 
the  court  said,  that  the  contract  was  not  void,  but  merely 
voidable,  and  therefore  capable  of  ratification,  and  that, 
though  it  were  the  act  of  an  insane  man,  it  might  stand  if 
confirmed.  If  Allis,  therefore,  after  recovering  his  reason, 
having  in  his  recollection  and  knowledge  the  nature,  extent, 
and  time  of  the  contract,  and  all  the  circumstances  before 
his  mind ;  recognized  the  sale  by  permitting  possession  on 
the  part  of  the  defendants ;  receiving  instalments  on  the 
notes  given  for  the  purchase  money ;  knowing  it  to  be  the 
consideration  of  the  sale  of  his  part  of  the  mills,  he  would 
be  bound  by  it. 

The  jury  returned  a  verdict  for  the  defendants,  and  thus 
the  contract  was  not  disturbed. 

§  271.  In  this  case  the  plaintiff  claimed  relief  on  the 
ground  of  his  own  insanity  and  the  fraud  of  the  other  party, 
and  the  defendants  undertook  to  prove  that  neither  allega- 
tion was  true.  Indeed,  the  whole  course  of  the  proceedings 
showed  that  neither  party  regarded  these  two  points  as  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  and  not  inseparably  involved  in  the 
question  of  the  merits  of  the  case.  The  plaintiff  disclaimed 
any  desire  to  avail  himself  of  his  insanity  ;  whether  sane  or 
insane,  he  was  willing  the  contract  should  stand,  if  a  fair 
price  had  been  paid  for  the  property ;  and  yet  the  burden  of 
his  testimony  had  reference  to  his  mental  condition.  The 
defendants,  on  the  other  hand,  while  they  endeavored  to 
establish  his  competency,  were  equally  careful  to  show  that 


284  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

they  had  paid  the  full  value  of  the  property.  It  was  well 
understood  that  the  stronger  the  proof  of  incompetency,  the 
easier  it  would  be  to  prove  the  fraud ;  and  vice  versa. 

§  272.  It  was  not  denied  that  Allis  was  insane  a  portion 
of  every  year ;  nor  was  it  denied,  except  by  his  daughters, 
that  for  a  portion  of  every  year,  he  showed  no  very  obvious 
manifestations  of  disease,  and  was  apparently,  at  least,  in 
his  natural  condition  of  mind.  The  question  was  whether 
these  restorations  were  real,  and  not  apparent  merely ;  a 
complete  intermission  of  the  disease,  a  lucid  interval,  as  it  is 
somewhat  technically  called,  or  only  a  transitory  remission 
in  the  severity  of  the  symptoms.  The  difference  of  opinion 
on  this  point  between  the  medical  witnesses,  may  be  ac- 
counted for,  perhaps,  in  the  fact,  that  they  formed  their 
judgment  upon  different  data.  Taking  the  evidence  of  both 
parties  together,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  stronger  proof 
than  it  furnished,  that  Allis's  periodical  restorations  fairly 
amounted  to  what  are  called  lucid  intervals.  The  states  of 
excitement  and  depression  were  scarcely  more  strongly  testi- 
fied to,  than  an  interval  which  was  marked  by  neither.  Many 
of  the  same  persons  who  observed  him  in  the  former  states, 
also  observed  him  in  the  latter,  and  were  struck  by  the 
contrast  they  exhibited.  If,  then,  for  months  together,  he  was 
neither  excited  nor  depressed,  and  entertained  no  delusions, 
wherein  was  he  insane?  When  we  consider,  too,  that  he 
resumed  his  customary  duties,  and  appeared  to  his  friends 
and  neighbors  to  be  like  himself,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
we  have,  in  a  great  majority  of  cases,  more  satisfactory  proof 
of  recovery. 

§  273.  The  disbelief  of  two  of  the  experts  in  his  sanity, 
seemed  to  be  a  matter  of  inference,  rather  than  of  direct  proof. 
The  intervals  were  so  short  compared  with  the  duration 
and  frequency  of  the  attacks,  that  there  was  hardly  sufficient 
time,  they  thought,  for  the  mind  to  have  been  restored  to  a 
state  of  sanity.  If  by  sanity  they  meant  the  restoration  of 
the  mind  to  a  state  of  perfect  health,  such  as  those  enjoy 
who  have  never  been  insane,  no  one  would  be  disposed  to 
disagree  with  them.  We  are  not  aware,  however,  that  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  MORAL   MANIA.  285 

lucid  interval  as  understood  by  medical  authorities,  implies 
exactly  such  a  restoration  as  that.  Without  canvassing  the 
various  definitions  that  have  been  given  of  this  state,  it  is 
enough  that  they  agree  that  the  individual  clearly  and  cor- 
rectly recognizes  his  true  conditions  and  relations,  all  delu- 
sions having  vanished,  and  the  affections  returned  to  their 
natural  current.  This  does  not  imply  that  he  has  recovered 
the  original  vigor  of  his  mind  and  his  capacity  for  transact- 
ing unusual  or  important  business,  with  his  original  prompti- 
tude and  correctness.  Indeed,  a  degree  of  restoration  like  this, 
is  possessed  by  few  patients  who  are  discharged  from  our  hos- 
pitals as  recovered.  To  prove  the  occurrence  of  a  lucid  inter- 
val, it  seems  hardly  reasonable  to  require  evidence  of  a  degree 
of  capacity  which  can  only  be  predicated  of  a  mind  that,  for 
years,  has  enjoyed  complete  exemption  from  disease.  Dr. 
Woodward  declared,  as  has  already  been  observed,  that  buying 
and  selling,  even  with  a  certain  degree  of  shrewdness,  was  no 
proof  of  sanity,  as  such  transactions  are  often  performed  by 
the  inmates  of  asylums.  The  fact  thus  broadly  stated,  is  un- 
doubtedly true,  and  we  do  not  recollect  any  particular  transac- 
tion of  Allis  which  might  not  be  performed  by  some 
unequivocally  insane  persons.  But  the  question  of  sanity  or 
competence  cannot  be  settled  by  reference  to  a  single  act,  — 
except  perhaps  as  regards  that  particular  act.  A  broader  view 
of  the  individual  is  necessary  for  this  purpose.  If  he  buys 
and  sells  for  months  together ;  if  he  manages  his  affairs  with 
prudence;  if  no  delusions  possess  his  mind;  if  to  his  friends 
and  neighbors  he  seems  to  have  regained  his  natural  char- 
acter; if,  in  short,  the  indications  of  sanity  appear  in  his 
general  habit  and  not  merely  in  a  particular  act,  he  must  be 
regarded  as  sane.  It  is  because  the  very  reverse  of  this  is 
true,  that  the  inmate  of  the  asylum  is  deemed  to  be  insane, 
though  he  may  occasionally  do  a  very  shrewd  thing.  He  is, 
perhaps,  the  prey  of  delusions,  or  his  affections  are  grossly 
perverted,  or  his  shattered  understanding  needs  the  constant 
support  and  guidance  of  sounder  minds.  To  meet  every 
instance  of  shrewd  transaction  by  the  assertion  that  many 


286  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

persons  of  unquestioned  insanity  do  the  same  things,  can 
only  produce  a  confusion  of  ideas.  There  is  another  fact  of 
the  deepest  significance  in  this  connection.  Year  after  year 
he  had  been  seen  by  his  father,  under  whose  roof  he  lived, 
stricken  down  by  annual  attacks  of  insanity.  And  yet  by 
this  father  who  knew  his  mental  infirmities  better  than  any 
one  else,  he  was  made  the  executor  of  his  will,  and  residuary 
legatee  of  the  burden  of  his  estate,  amounting  to  nearly 
$20,000.  What  stronger  evidence  could  we  have,  that  for  a 
large  part  of  every  year,  he  enjoyed  his  ordinary  health  and 
competence  ?  Besides,  are  his  two  marriages  to  be  regarded 
as  having  no  bearing  on  the  question  of  his  mental  condi- 
tion ?  Had  he  no  lucid  intervals  when  they  were  con- 
tracted ? 

§  274.  The  admission  that  Allis  had  lucid  intervals,  does 
not  necessarily  settle  the  question  of  his  sanity  or  compe- 
tence. True,  the  general  doctrine  of  the  law,  whatever  may 
be  its  practice,  is,  that  in  the  lucid  interval  the  individual  is 
fully  himself  again,  and  restored  to  all  his  privileges  and 
responsibilities.  This  implies  that  the  mind  is  restored  to  a 
degree  of  integrity  which  the  present  state  of  our  pathologi- 
cal knowledge  on  the  subject  fails  to  establish.  For  common 
purposes  and  ordinary  occasions,  it  may  be  abundantly  ade- 
quate, but  the  weakness  and  irritability  which  are  induced 
by  numerous  and  frequent  attacks,  unfit  it  for  extraordinary 
efforts.  So  long  as  the  individual  confines  himself  to  the 
beaten  track  of  his  customary  thoughts  and  pursuits,  he 
shows  no  want  of  capacity ;  but  let  him  embark  in  new  un- 
dertakings, assume  responsibilities  of  unusual  magnitude,  or 
be  subjected  to  provocations  peculiarly  calculated  to  try  his 
power  of  self-control,  and  his  mind  is  very  liable  to  be  led 
astray.  He  may  rightly  appreciate  the  value  of  his  property 
and  manage  it  very  judiciously,  and  yet  be  far  more  easily 
overreached  by  dishonest  men,  than  if  he  had  never  been 
insane.  To  regard  all  persons  in  a  lucid  interval  as  either 
completely  responsible  or  irresponsible  for  their  civil  or 
criminal  acts,  would  be  manifestly  unjust.  A  better  rule 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF  MORAL   MANIA.  287 

would  be  to  permit  them  the  exercise  of  all  legal  rights,  and 
protect  them  from  the  fraudulent  practices  of  those  who 
would  take  advantage  of  their  infirmity. 

§  275.  Admitting  the  general  fact  that  Allis  had  lucid 
intervals,  the  next  question  was  whether  the  period  when  the 
contract  for  the  sale  of  the  property  was  made,  was  embraced 
in  one  of  them.  By  two  witnesses  he  was  described  as 
being  depressed  as  late  as  April,  when  he  began  to  manifest 
his  natural  condition.  Allis's  case  was  not  of  that  kind  in 
which  the  transitions  are  very  rapid  and  abrupt,  —  a  single  day 
or  night  dividing  the  different  states  from  each  other.  The 
change  was  slower,  and  it  was  impossible  1,o  fix  upon  a 
particular  day  as  that  on  which  the  depression  completely 
passed  away,  and  the  individual  resumed  his  natural  charac- 
ter. If  the  plaintiff  were  lying  in  the  deepest  shadow  of 
despondency,  as  he  undoubtedly  had  been  at  times,  then  of 
course,  no  one  would  contend  that  he  was  in  a  lucid  interval. 
If  on  the  other  hand,  the  cloud  had  fairly  rolled  away  from 
his  understanding,  though  his  animal  spirits  had  not  quite 
risen  to  their  natural  buoyancy,  it  certainly  does  admit  of  a 
question  whether  he  may  not  be  correctly  said,  for  any  prac- 
tical purpose,  to  have  been  in  a  lucid  interval. 

§  276.  It  remains,  then,  to  be  ascertained  whether,  on  the 
21st  of  March,  1834,  he  was  suffering  under  a  degree  of  depres- 
sion sufficiently  severe  to  exert  a  controlling  influence  over  his 
views  and  calculations.  On  this  point,  the  testimony  of  the 
man  who  kept  his  cattle  for  him,  and  of  the  other  witnesses 
with  whom  he  conversed  respecting  his  projected  sale  of  the 
mills,  is  conclusive.  They  saw  nothing  in  him  like  excite- 
ment or  depression,  and  thought  his  manifestations  were 
natural.  The  only  controlling  influence  which  this  depres- 
sion could  exert  over  the  contract,  was  supposed  to  arise 
from  the  feeling  of  poverty  by  which  it  was  accompanied. 
Two  witnesses  testified  that  during  the  winter  he  felt  poor, 
but  no  particulars  respecting  the  feeling  were  given,  and  it 
did  not  appear  whether  it  continued  into  March.  Even 
admitting  that  it  did,  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  it 
affected  his  estimates  of  the  value  of  property ;  nor  do  we 


288  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

see  why  it  should  have  induced  him  to  sell  at  a  less  price 
than  he  otherwise  would.  Presumptively  it  would  seem  as 
if  the  poorer  he  felt,  the  more  he  would  endeavor  to  get.  It 
is  difficult,  however,  to  see  any  connection  at  all  between  this 
feeling  and  the  sale  of  the  mills.  Converting  his  mills  into 
promissory  notes  would  make  him  no  richer,  nor  remove  in 
any  degree  the  feeling  of  poverty.  Considering,  therefore, 
that  he  was  admitted  by  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  to  have 
come  out  of  his  depressed  state  by  the  first  of  April ;  that 
other  witnesses  saw  nothing  unnatural  in  his  appearance 
weeks  previously ;  and  that  this  morbid  feeling,  if  it  existed 
at  all,  must  have  been  very  slight,  the  lucid  interval  may  be 
fairly  said  to  have  embraced  the  21st  of  March. 

§  277.  Another  and  a  conclusive  proof  that  the  contract 
was  made  in  a  lucid  interval,  is  to  be  found  in  the  various 
affirmations,  as  the  lawyers  call  them,  by  which  it  was  recog- 
nized. Year  after  year,  until  1841,  he  continued  to  receive 
the  annual  interest  and  instalments  upon  his  notes,  in  the 
month  of  June ;  and  neither  then,  nor  at  any  other  time  during 
those  seven  years,  did  he  complain  that  he  had  made  the 
contract  when  he  was  not  aware  exactly  of  what  he  was 
doing ;  or  that  the  defendants  had  taken  advantage  of  his 
morbid  feeling  of  poverty,  to  obtain  the  property  at  an  inade- 
quate price.  The  effect  of  this  fact  can  be  avoided  only  by 
denying  that  he  enjoyed  a  single  lucid  moment  subsequent 
to  March,  1834,  and  this  would  hardly  be  thought  of. 

§  278.  None  of  these  facts  are  necessarily  incompatible 
with  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  defendants,  because  it  is  safe  to 
presume  that  in  the  lucid  interval,  the  mind  is  deprived  of 
some  of  its  original  vigor,  and  in  consequence  thereof,  the 
individual  may  be  made  the  dupe  of  dishonest  and  designing 
men.  Acts  performed  in  this  state,  therefore,  should  be 
viewed  with  the  utmost  jealousy,  and  much  less  evidence  of 
fraud  should  be  necessary  to  annul  them,  than  if  the  mental 
soundness  had  never  been  called  in  question.  Leaving  out 
of  view  the  amount  of  Allis's  indebtedness  to  the  defendants, 
in  regard  to  which,  however,  there  was  no  direct  evidence  at 
all,  the  contract  was  singularly  clear  from  suspicious  circum- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MAXIA.  289 

stances.  Allis  was  desirous  of  selling  the  mills,  because  he 
regarded  them  as  a  source  of  trouble  and  vexation.  Had  his 
mind  been  in  a  perfectly  healthy  condition,  they  probably 
would  not  have  been  regarded  in  this  light,  but  the  fact  was 
no  less  real,  nor  did  it  furnish  a  less  rational  motive  for  the 
transaction.  It  certainly  was  not  a  very  strange  thing  that 
a  person  who  was  in  a  state  of  excitement  or  depression  a 
considerable  portion  of  every  year,  should  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  his  interests  would  be  promoted  by  having  this 
property  in  some  other  shape.  His  brother-in-law,  who  was 
probably  more  capable  than  any  one  else  of  advising  him, 
thought  it  a  judicious  step.  Under  different  circumstances, 
it  might  have  been  otherwise.  Had  his  health  been  good,  or 
had  he  been  under  guardianship,  the  mill  property  might 
have  been  rendered  more  profitable,  than  its  value  invested 
in  any  other  way.  Here  the  case  was  very  different  — 
sufficiently  so  to  account  for  the  different  course  which  Allis 
pursued.  • 

§  279.  There  was  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the  contract  that 
required  an  extraordinary  mental  effort.  He  had  always  been 
acquainted  with  the  mills ;  they  were  partly  owned  by  him- 
self, as  they  had  been  by  his  father  before  him ;  with  their 
expenses  and  earnings  he  was  perfectly  familiar ;  the  condition 
of  the  buildings  was  obvious ;  mills  had  been  bought  and 
sold  in  the  vicinity,  and  thus  he  was  furnished  with  an  addi- 
tional means  of  comparison  for  judging  of  the  value  of  his 
own ;  in  short,  it  was  a  species  of  property  with  the  value 
and  nature  of  which  he  must  have  been  perfectly  well 
acquainted.  Neither  was  the  idea  of  selling  them  a  sudden 
one.  He  had  contemplated  the  sale  for  some  time  previous, 
mentioned  his  intentions  to  his  friends,  and  deliberately  exe- 
cuted the  contract  for  the  transfer  of  the  property.  On  the 
part  of  the  defendants,  so  far  as  the  evidence  indicated,  the 
transaction  was  an  open  and  an  honest  one.  The  alterna- 
tive before  them  was,  either  to  allow  a  stranger  to  come  into 
the  joint  ownership,  or  to  purchase  Allis's  half  themselves. 
It  seems  that  the  price  they  offered  was  an  average  of  the 
different  estimates  made  of  the  value  of  the  property  four- 

25 


290  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

teen  years  afterwards.  The  negotiation  was  not  done  in  a 
corner.  Allis  took  ample  time  to  consider  the  matter,  con- 
versed with  and  received  the  advice  of  his  friends  on  the 
subject,  deliberately  consummated  the  bargain,  and  for  seven 
years  continued  to  affirm  it  by  receiving  the  annual  pay- 
ments on  the  notes. 


CHAPTER    IX. 


DEMENTIA. 

§  280.  THIS  form  of  insanity  is  attended  by  a  general 
enfeeblement  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  which 
were  originally  sound  and  well-developed,  in  consequence  of 
age  or  disease,  and  is  characterized  by  forgetfulness  of  the 
past,  indifference  to  the  present  and  future,  and  a  certain 
childishness  of  disposition.  The  apparent  similarity  of  this 
state  to  that  of  imbecility  or  idiocy,  renders  it  necessary  that 
they  should  be  accurately  distinguished ;  for  nothing  could 
be  more  improper  or  unjust,  than  to  view  them  merely  as 
different  shades  of  the  same  mental  condition.  Idiocy  and 
the  higher  degrees  of  imbecility  are  congenital  or  nearly  so, 
and  consist  in  a  destitution  of  powers  that  were  never  pos- 
sessed. Little  or  nothing  is  remembered,  because  little  or 
nothing  has  left  any  impression  upon  the  mind,  and  no 
advance  is  made  in  knowledge,  because  the  faculties  neces- 
sary for  obtaining  it  have  never  existed.  The  proprieties  and 
decencies  of  life  are  unobserved,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
their  moral  relations  have  never  been  discerned,  and  their  in- 
difference to  the  most  pressing  wants  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  absence  of  the  most  common  instincts  of  our  nature. 
The  idiot  is  restless,  uneasy,  and  inattentive,  because  the 
faculties  that  direct  the  attention,  and  draw  from  its  applica- 
tion valuable  results,  have  been  utterly  denied.  In  idiocy 
and  imbecility  the  manners  and  conversation  strongly  resem- 
ble those  of  childhood ;  in  dementia  they  never  lose  the  im- 
press of  manhood,  however  disjointed  and  absurd  they  may 
be.  The  former  appear  at  an  early  age  of  life ;  the  latter 
never  takes  place  till  after  the  age  of  puberty,  except 
occasionally  as  a  sequel  of  wounds  or  diseases  of  the  head, 


292  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  generally  increases  with  time,  from  the  slightest  possible 
impairment  of  mental  energy  to  the  most  complete  fatuity. 
In  dementia  the  past  is  forgotten,  or  but  indistinctly  and  un- 
connectedly  brought  up  to  the  mind  ;  the  attention  wanders 
from  one  thing  to  another ;  the  affairs  of  the  present  possess 
no  interest;  and  the  moral  and  social  affections  are  inac- 
tive, because  the  faculties,  in  consequence  of  pathological 
changes  in  the  brain,  have  fallen  into  a  state  of  inertia  that 
prevents  their  ordinary  manifestations.  The  whole  condition 
betrays  the  existence,  not  of  physical  imperfection,  but  of 
physical  weakness,  (many  of  the  bodily  functions  also  fre- 
quently being  enfeebled,)  and  consequently  it  may  sometimes 
be  cured,  or  temporarily  relieved.  When  once  firmly  seated, 
it  is  not  incompatible  with  length  of  years ;  and  after  death, 
we  may  find,  on  examination,  lesions  of  structure,  or  diminu- 
tions of  size,  which  are  accidental,  the  result  of  diseased 
action,  and  not  original  malconformations.  The  above 
comparison  of  mental  deficiency  with  dementia  shows,  that 
they  depend  on  two  very  different  conditions  of  the  brain, 
and  consequently  must  display  very  different  moral  and  intel- 
lectual manifestations ;  from  which  we  are  warranted  in  in- 
ferring that  in  regard  to  their  medico-legal  relations,  they  can- 
not properly  be  placed  on  the  same  ground. 

§  281.  Dementia  is  distinguished  from  general  mania, 
the  only  other  affection  with  which  it  is  liable  to  be  con- 
founded, by  characters  that  cannot  mislead  the  least  practised 
observer.  The  latter  arises  from  an  exaltation  of  vital 
power,  from  a  morbid  excess  of  activity,  by  which  the  cere- 
bral functions  are  not  only  changed  from  their  healthy  con- 
dition, but  are  performed  with  unusual  force  and  rapidity. 
The  maniac  is  irrational  from  an  inability  to  discern  the 
ordinary  characters  and  relations  of  things,  amid  the  mass  of 
ideas  that  crowd  upon  his  mind  in  mingled  confusion ;  while 
in  dementia,  the  reasoning  faculty  is  impaired  by  a  loss  of  its 
original  strength,  whereby  it  not  only  mistakes  the  nature  of 
things,  but  is  unable,  from  want  of  power,  to  rise  to  the  con- 
templation of  general  truths.  The  reasoning  of  the  maniac 
does  not  so  much  fail  in  the  force  and  logic  of  its  arguments, 


DEMEXTIA.  293 

as  in  the  incorrectness  of  its  assumptions  ;  but  in  dementia 
the  attempt  to  reason  is  prevented  by  the  paucity  of  ideas, 
and  that  feebleness  of  the  perceptive  powers,  in  consequence 
of  which  they  do  not  faithfully  represent  the  impressions 
received  from  without.  In  mania,  when  the  memory  fails,  it 
is  because  new  ideas  have  crowded  into  the  mind,  and  are 
mingled  up  and  confounded  with  the  past ;  in  dementia  the 
same  effect  is  produced  by  an  obliteration  of  past  impressions 
as  soon  as  they  are  made,  from  a  want  of  sufficient  power  to 
retain  them.  In  the  former,  the  mental  operations  are  char- 
acterized by  hurry  and  confusion ;  in  the  latter,  by  extreme 
slowness  and  frequent  apparent  suspension  of  the  thinking 
process.  In  the  former,  the  habits  and  affections  undergo  a 
great  change,  the  conduct  becoming  strange  and  inconsistent 
from  the  beginning,  and  the  persons  and  things  that  once 
pleased  and  interested,  viewed  with  indifference  or  aversion. 
In  the  latter,  the  moral  habits  and  natural  feelings,  so  far  as 
they  are  manifested  at  all,  lose  none  of  their  ordinary  charac- 
ter. The  temper  may  be  more  irritable,  but  the  moral  disposi- 
tion evinces  none  of  that  perversity  which  characterizes  mania. 
§  282.  In  dementia  the  mind  is  susceptible  of  only  feeble 
and  transitory  impressions,  and  manifests  but  little  reflection 
even  upon  these.  They  come  and  go  without  leaving  any 
trace  of  their  presence  behind  them.  The  attention  is  inca- 
pable of  more  than  a  momentary  effort,  one  idea  succeeding 
another  with  but  little  connection  or  coherence.  The  mind 
has  lost  the  power  of  comparison,  and  abstract  ideas  are 
utterly  beyond  its  grasp.  The  memory  is  peculiarly  weak, 
events  the  most  recent  and  most  nearly  connected  with  the 
individual  being  rapidly  forgotten.  The  language  of  the 
demented  is  not  only  incoherent,  but  they  are  much  inclined 
to  repeat  insulated  words  and  phrases  without  the  slightest 
meaning.  "  It  seems,"  says  Esquirol,  "  as  if  they  were  lis- 
tening to  imaginary  tales  which  they  repeat  in  obedience  to 
an  involuntary  or  automatic  impulse  excited  by  their  old 
habits  or  fortuitous  associations  with  actual  impressions."  ] 

1  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  220. 

25* 


294  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

The  mind  is  often  occupied  by  hallucinations  which  con- 
tinue a  longer  or  shorter  time,  and  disappear  to  be  succeeded 
by  others.  The  useful  or  ornamental  arts  which  they  may 
have  practised  with  skill  and  followed  with  ardor,  and  the 
various  other  employments  of  life,  seem  to  be  utterly  forgot- 
ten as  if  they  had  never  been  thought  of.  Their  time  is 
spent  either  in  moving  about  with  restless  activity,  or  pass- 
ing days,  weeks,  or  months,  in  the  same  spot,  in  utter  vacuity 
of  thought  or  purpose  ;  in  pouring  forth  an  incessant  flow  of 
words  at  the  top  of  their  voice,  or  uttering  low,  muttering 
sounds,  consisting  of  scarcely  articulate  words  and  broken 
phrases ;  in  singing,  crying,  or  laughing. 

§  283.  Though  often  irascible  and  self-willed,  their  anger 
is  momentary,  and  thus  they  readily  yield  to  the  direction  of 
others.  The  moral  powers,  in  fact,  seem  to  be  possessed  of 
too  little  energy  to  maintain  resolution,  or  cherish  the  pas- 
sions. Their  feebleness  of  purpose  and  passive  obedience  to 
the  will  of  others,  strikingly  contrast  with  the  pertinacity  and 
savage  fury  often  evinced  by  the  maniac.  .  With  the  remem- 
brance of  their  friends  and  former  employments,  there  also 
disappears  all  trace  of  the  social  and  domestic  affections. 
All  interest  in  the  concerns  of  others  is  lost ;  and  family, 
friends,  and  relations  are  viewed  with  the  indifference  of  per- 
fect strangers,  and  nothing  is  able  to  awaken  an  emotion  of 
pleasure  or  pain. 

§  284.  The  derangement  of  the  intellectual  powers  is 
sometimes  indicated  by  remarkable  changes  of  the  counte- 
nance. The  skin  is  pale,  dry,  and  wrinkled  ;  the  eyes  sunken, 
dull,  and  moistened  with  tears ;  the  pupils  dilated  ;  the  look 
uncertain  and  wandering  ;  the  cheeks  hollow  and  emaciated; 
and  the  whole  face  destitute  of  expression,  and  indicative  of 
decay.  The  organic  functions  suffer  but  little ;  the  appetite 
for  food  is  so  great  that  the  patient  seems  to  be  constantly 
eating,  and  the  quantity  consumed  is  enormous.  Affections 
of  the  nervous  system,  however,  particularly  paralysis,  are 
not  unfrequent  complications  of  dementia. 

§  285.  The  above  description  is  applicable  to  dementia 
only  when  fully  developed  and  before  it  has  passed  into  the 


DEMENTIA.  295 

state  of  fatuity  in  which  it  often  terminates.  This  form  of 
insanity  appears  under  two  different  degrees  of  severity,  which 
are  designated  as  acute  and  chronic.  The  former  is  a  sequel 
of  temporary  errors  of  regimen,  of  fevers,  hemorrhages, 
metastases,  suppression  of  customary  evacuations,  and  the 
debilitating  treatment  of  mania.  It  differs  from  the  latter 
in  being  more  rapid  in  its  progress,  and  in  its  successive 
stages  not  being  so  well  distinguished  from  one  another. 
It  is  readily  cured  by  regimen,  exercise,  bathing,  tonics,  anti- 
spasmodics,  or  simply  by  removing  the  exciting  cause.  It 
sometimes  terminates  in  an  explosion  of  acute  mania,  which 
then  becomes  critical. 

§  286.  Chronic  dementia  is  a  sequel  of  mania  (of  which 
it  is  the  usual  termination)  when  life  continues  long  enough, 
of  apoplexy,  epilepsy,  masturbation,  and  drunkenness ;  or  it 
may  occur  idiopathically,  and  then  it  usually  accompanies 
old  age.  This  form  of  the  disorder,  or  senile  dementia,  is  so 
often  the  subject  of  medico-legal  inquiries,  especially  in  con- 
nection with  wills,  that  it  deserves  particular  attention.  Senile 
dementia,  it  must  be  recollected,  is  something  more  than  that 
mere  loss  of  mental  power  which  results  from  the  natural 
decay  of  the  faculties  ;  it  is  attended  with  those  pathological 
changes  also  which  are  essential  to  the  production  of  insani- 
ty. The  mind  is  not  only  feeble,  but  it  is  deranged.  Were 
it  not  so,  every  old  man  would  labor  under  a  certain  degree 
of  dementia.  The  first  symptom  which  indicates  the  ap- 
proach of  this  affection,  is  generally  an  impairment  of  the 
memory  of  recent  occurrences.  The  events  of  early  life  have 
lost  none  of  their  distinctness,  while  recent  impressions  are 
feebly  made,  and  in  a  short  time  mostly  forgotten.  While 
the  visits  of  his  friends  are  forgotten  beyond  the  day  or  week 
they  are  made,  the  patient  may  talk  of  their  former  inter- 
views, and  relate  the  most  trivial  details  concerning  them. 
From  this  weakness  of  memory  seems  to  arise,  oftentimes, 
the  first  appearance  of  mental  alienation.  The  patient  for- 
getting the  intermediate  ideas,  the  connection  between  those 
he  does  remember,  and  that  order  and  filiation  of  them 
necessary  to  sound  reasoning,  are  destroyed  ;  and  hence  those 


296  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

gaps  in  his  ideas,  and  those  inconsistencies  of  conduct  which 
convey  the  impression  of  mental  derangement.  Coincident 
with  the  failure  of  the  memory,  or  very  shortly  afterwards, 
there  is  a  diminution  of  the  ordinary  ability  of  recognizing 
external  objects,  which  arises  not  so  much  from  weakness  of 
the  organs  of  sensation,  as  of  the  organs  of  perception  within. 
That  is,  the  impressions  of  sound,  light,  touch,  etc.,  are  well 
enough  received,  but  the  qualities  of  form,  size,  weight,  color, 
etc.,  are  imperfectly  discerned.  Objects  not  very  different 
are  mistaken  for  one  another,  from  an  inability  to  perceive  at 
the  first  sight  the  qualities  that  distinguish  them,  though  the 
individual  may  recognize  his  mistake  when  it  is  pointed  out 
to  him. 

§  287.  Thus  far  there  is  nothing  that  can  properly  be 
called  mental  derangement ;  the  pathological  changes  in  the 
brain  have  only  occasioned  a  diminution  of  the  natural  power 
and  activity  of  the  mind.  The  first  symptom  indicative  of 
derangement  (and  it  is  the  next  which  is  observed),  is  a  degree 
of  incoherence  in  the  ideas,  like  that  of  dreams.  It  may  not 
appear  for  days  or  weeks  together,  or  only  on  certain  occa- 
sions. The  above  symptoms  increase  in  intensity  more  or 
less  rapidly  till  complete  dementia  is  produced,  when  all  the 
moral  and  intellectual  powers  are  involved  in  this  state  of 
decay  and  derangement.  The  memory  of  recent  impres- 
sions fades  away  as  fast  as  they  are  formed,  and  the  past  is 
beheld  with  considerable  indistinctness  and  confusion,  though 
events  and  acquaintances  of  early  life  are  not  yet  forgotten. 
The  patient  is  often  at  a  loss  to  know  where  he  is,  or  thinks 
himself  at  home  when  in  another  house,  and  wonders  why 
he  is  not  engaged  in  his  usual  occupations.  Places,  times, 
and  circumstances  are  forgotten,  or  incorrectly  remembered. 
His  friends  are  not  easily  distinguished;  morning,  noon, 
and  evening,  yesterday  and  to-morrow  are  being  constantly 
blended  together ;  and  he  will  get  up  in  the  night,  mistake 
the  light  of  candles  for  that  of  day,  and  persist  in  calling  it 
morning.  Objects  the  most  dissimilar  are  mistaken  for  one 
another,  and  consequently  his  notions  are  often  the  most 
grotesque  and  absurd.  The  intellect  gradually  becomes 


DEMENTIA.  297 

incapable  of  discerning  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and 
of  comparing  ideas  together ;  in  short,  any  thing  like  an  effort 
of  reflection  is  beyond  its  powers.  The  person  is  unable  to 
follow  the  conversation,  unless  it  be  of  the  simplest  ideas, 
and  particularly  addressed  to  him. 

§  288.  Although  such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  senile 
dementia,  it  sometimes  begins  with  a  general  nervous  excite- 
ment, accompanied  by  an  excitement  of  some  particular 
function  which  is  exerted  with  a  new  and  unaccustomed 
energy  that  deceives  the  old  man  and  imposes  on  his  friends. 
Thus,  some  are  irritated  by  the  slightest  circumstances,  and 
are  very  active  and  ready  to  undertake  any  thing.  Others 
experience  venereal  desires  that  have  been  long  since  ex- 
tinguished, exciting  them  to  conduct  directly  contrary  to  their 
ordinary  habits.  Others  who  had  previously  been  temperate 
and  sober,  manifest  an  appetite  for  high-seasoned  dishes  and 
intoxicating  drinks.  These  symptoms  of  excitement,  how- 
ever, are  soon  succeeded  by  those  of  dementia,  and  the  transi- 
tion is  sometimes  quite  sudden,  especially  when  the  patient 
is  restrained  from  gratifying  his  unreasonable  desires. 

§  289.  The  same  decay  which  the  bodily  powers  exhibit 
as  they  proceed  to  their  natural  termination  in  death,  is 
always  participated  by  the  mental ;  but  it  sometimes  happens 
that  the  latter  are  irretrievably  affected  long  before  the  former 
have  shown  any  symptoms  of  faltering  in  their  course.  The 
causes  of  this  inversion  of  the  natural  order  of  decay,  so  far 
as  they  are  external,  are  to  be  found  probably  in  the  great 
irregularity  of  exercise,  both  of  kind  and  duration,  to  which 
the  brain  is  subjected  by  the  habits  and  wants  of  a  highly 
civilized  condition,  whereby  its  healthy  elasticity  and  vigor 
are  so  impaired,  that  it  needs  only  the  first  touch  of  decay  to 
lose  forever  the  nicely  adjusted  balance  of  its  faculties.  The 
transition  from  the  greatest  mental  exertion  to  the  most  tedi- 
ous inactivity,  from  the  various  phases  of  excitement  to  the 
irksome  sameness  of  ennui,  from  the  stimulus  afforded  by 
the  performance  of  a  thousand  duties,  and  the  glow  that  is 
constantly  kindled  by  the  hopes  of  the  future,  to  the  mo- 
notony too  often  occasioned  by  the  loss  of  business,  friends, 


298  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

and  the  cares  of  long-accustomed  pursuits,  is  of  such  fre- 
quent occurrence,  that  every  thing  like  regular  and  proper 
exercise  which  is  as  indispensable  to  the  health  of  the  brain 
as  it  is  to  that  of  every  other  organ,  is  but  imperfectly  prac- 
tised by  a  large  proportion  of  men. 

§  290.  In  the  later  periods  of  life,  —  and  particularly  if 
the  constitution  be  weakened  by  sickness  or  dissipation  — 
any  exertion  of  the  mind  far  beyond  its  power  to  sustain,  is 
liable  to  be  rapidly  followed  by  a  state  of  dementia.  The 
same  effect  is  produced  when  after  many  years  of  unremit- 
ting attention  to  certain  pursuits,  the  mind  is  suddenly  de- 
prived of  the  objects  on  which  it  rested,  and  thrown  upon 
itself  to  furnish  the  means  of  excitement  in  the  declining 
years  of  life,  when  novelty  presents  no  allurements,  and  the 
circle  of  earthly  prospects  is  being  constantly  narrowed. 
Take  an  individual  from  the  stir  and  bustle  of  a  city  resi- 
dence ;  from  the  unceasing  strife  of  competition  in  the  pur- 
suit of  wealth  or  honor ;  throw  down  the  goal  on  which  for 
years  his  eye  has  rested,  though  ever  receding  from  his  grasp; 
place  him  in  the  country,  at  a  distance  from  familiar  faces 
and  scenes ;  and  unless  his  mind  be  informed  with  various 
knowledge,  or  warmed  by  an  interest  in  the  moral  concerns 
of  his  fellow  men  around  him,  it  will  sink  into  that  state  of 
inactivity  so  favorable  for  the  operation  of  the  predisposing 
causes  of  this  disease. 

§  291.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  old  age  is  subject  to 
no  other  kind  of  insanity  than  that  of  dementia,  for  mania, 
even  of  the  severest  description,  is  not  uncommon  at  this 
period,  and  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between  them, 
in  a  legal  point  of  view,  must  be  immediately  obvious. 
Not  only  may  the  mind  remain  competent  to  the  discharge 
of  some  of  the  civil  duties  of  life,  in  mania,  but  there  is 
always  a  prospect  of  its  restoration  to  health.  The  charac- 
teristic symptoms,  as  well  as  the  exciting  causes  that  we 
have  described  above,  if  carefully  observed,  will  generally 
prevent  us  from  committing  the  serious  mistake  of  confound- 
ing them  together,  as  is  too  often  done,  with  scarcely  a 
thought  o"f  the  impropriety  of  the  practice. 


CHAPTER    X. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA. 

§  292.  IN  its  last  stages,  dementia  does  not  differ,  of  course, 
in  respect  to  its  legal  relations,  from  general  intellectual 
mania.  It  is  only  while  the  mind  is  in  its  transition-state,  if 
we  may  use  the  expression,  passing  from  its  sound  and 
natural  condition  to  the  enfeeblement  and  total  extinction  of 
its  reflective  powers  —  and  the  entire  change  may  occupy 
months  and  years  in  its  progress  —  that  its  legal  capacity  is 
ever  called  in  question.  The  successive  steps  of  this  disorder 
are  so  gradual  and  oftentimes  affect  the  powers  so  unequally, 
that  it  is  not  strange  that  so  much  diversity  of  opinion 
should  arise  respecting  the  capacity  of  the  mind  which  is  the 
subject  of  it,  or  that  groundless  suspicion  of  improper  influ- 
ence should  be  so  frequently  excited.  It  must  be  considered, 
too,  as  a  circumstance  calculated  to  favor  this  effect,  that 
the  judgment  is  debarred  from  forming  an  unbiased  decision, 
by  suggestions  of  interest  or  jealousy  which  leads  it  to  see 
lapses  of  the  mind  that  would  otherwise  have  appeared  to  be 
nothing  more  than  that  natural  loss  of  energy,  suffered  by 
the  mind  as  it  "  draws  near  to  its  eternal  home."  Most 
people,  too,  are  so  little  accustomed  to  observe  and  analyze 
the  mental  phenomena,  and  so  little  acquainted  with  the 
physiological  laws  that  govern  their  manifestations,  that  cir- 
cumstances are  often  adduced  as  indications  of  unequivocal 
insanity,  which  only  evince  some  normal  peculiarities  of  the 
senile  understanding.  They  need  only  to  be  put  on  the  pro- 
per bias,  to  confound  the  natural  decay  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties with  that  derangement  that  depends  exclusively  on  patho- 
logical affections ;  so  strongly  do  they  resemble  each  other  to 


300  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

the  superficial  observer.  By  how  many  would  Bichat's 
beautiful  picture  of  the  closing  scenes  of  old  age,  be  mistaken 
to  represent  the  defaced  and  shattered  temple  that  has  been 
prostrated  by  the  touch  of  disease.  "  Seated  near  the  fire 
and  concentrated  within  himself,  a  stranger  to  every  thing 
without  him,  he  passes  his  days  there,  deprived  of  desire,  of 
passion,  and  sensation ;  speaking  little,  because  he  is  deter- 
mined by  nothing  to  break  his  silence,  yet  happy  in  feeling 
that  he  still  exists,  when  almost  every  other  sentiment  is 
gone."  1  Far  greater,  then,  must  be  the  necessity  of  caution 
in  distinguishing  between  such  degrees  of  capacity  as  exist 
in  the  early  and  those  of  the  later  stages  of  dementia,  and 
where,  too,  the  causes  of  error  are  so  much  more  numerous. 
The  deafness  that  generally  accompanies  the  early  stages, 
disables  the  individual  from  participating  in  or  listening  to 
the  conversation  of  those  around  him,  and  thus  gives  to  his 
countenance  an  expression  of  dulness  and  stupidity  that 
might  easily  mislead  one  not  particularly  acquainted  with 
him,  while  in  fact  he  needs  only  to  be  properly  addressed,  to 
display  a  mind  that  has  not  yet  ceased  to  think  with  some 
degree  of  accuracy  and  vigor.  The  latter  fact,  however,  will 
be  known  only  to  his  intimate  friends,  while  the  former  is 
conveyed  to  the  mass  of  common  observers  who  are  always 
ready  to  decide  upon  a  person's  mental  capacity,  from  an 
occasional  glimpse  of  his  manner,  or  a  few  remarks  on  the 
most  ordinary  topics. 

§  293.  A  judge  is  seldom  required  to  decide  questions  of 
more  delicacy,  —  questions  that  demand  such  nice  and  cau- 
tious balancing  of  evidence,  such  penetration  into  motives 
and  biases,  such  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  mental  mani- 
festations as  affected  by  disease,  —  than  those  of  mental 
capacity  in  old  age,  where  the  mind  is  confessedly  laboring 
under  some  kind  or  degree  of  impairment.  The  standard 
by  which  witnesses'  opinions  are  formed  in  such  cases  is  so 
different,  and  the  pertinacity  with  which  each  one  clings  to 
his  own  conclusions,  —  in  proportion  generally  to  his  igno- 

1  Sur  la  Vie  et  le  Mort,  pt.  1,  c.  x. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  301 

ranee  of  the  subject,  —  is  so  strong,  that  nothing  but  a  great 
display  of  the  above-mentioned  qualities  will  enable  the 
judge  to  perform  his  duty  with  credit  to  himself,  and  satis- 
faction to  others.  Unless  he  can  state  the  grounds  of  his 
opinions,  they  are  no  better  than  surmises,  and  "he  fails  of 
accomplishing  one  of  the  most  desirable  objects  of  the  law  — 
that  of  establishing  and  confirming  the  popular  confidence  in 
its  decisions.  Difficult  as  this  duty  is,  it  will  be  very  much 
lightened  by  attending  to  some  of  those  points  which  can 
always  be  ascertained,  and  which  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  question  at  issue. 

§  294.  Though  some  of  the  perceptive  powers  may  pre- 
serve their  wonted  activity  through  the  whole  of  the  disease ; 
yet  it  is  in  these  that  the  disorder  is  first  manifested,  and  that 
long  before  the  higher  powers  of  the  understanding  have 
materially  suffered.  The  memory  of  persons,  things,  and 
dates,  and  especially  of  recent  impressions,  is  exceedingly 
treacherous,  and  so  striking  is  this  impairment  to  those 
unaccustomed  to  look  beneath  the  surface  of  appearances, 
that  when  they  find  they  are  not  recognized,  though  once 
well  enough  known ;  that  past  events  and  the  actors  engaged 
in  them,  are  either  forgotten,  or  singularly  entangled  and  con- 
fused ;  and  that  a  certain  listlessness  and  absence  of  mind 
takes  the  place  of  former  animation  and  attentiveness ;  they 
summarily  conclude  that  for  all  business  purposes,  the  patient 
is  utterly  incapacitated.  The  impressions  produced  by  a 
single  short  interview  have  no  chance  of  being  corrected  by 
subsequent  opportunities,  or  by  more  philosophical  observa- 
tions, and  the  final  opinion  is  adopted  and  authoritatively 
propounded,  that  the  individual  in  question  did  not  possess 
legal  capacity.  If  he  take  no  part  in  the  conversation,  and 
appear  scarcely  to  know  what  is  passing  around  him,  we  are 
not  to  draw  unfavorable  conclusions  relative  to  his  mental 
condition,  until  we  ascertain,  if  possible,  that  there  are  no 
peculiar  reasons  why  he  should  remain  silent  and  alone,  and 
that  he  is  no  longer  capable  of  pursuing  a  train  of  thought 
of  some  length  and  complexity.  If  he  have  forgotten  the 
names  and  circumstances  of  those  qnce  familiar,  but  whom 

26 


302  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

he  has  not  been  in  the  habit  of  seeing  recently,  it  does  not 
follow  that  he  has  also  forgotten  those  whose  relations  to 
him  have  kept  them  within  the  sphere  of  his  daily  observa- 
tion, and  made  them  the  objects  of  his  thoughts.  An  old 
servant  or  tenant  whose  countenance  may  not  have  been 
seen  for  weeks  or  months,  is  not  to  be  compared  in  this  re- 
spect, with  the  near  relative  who  is  frequently  in  his  com- 
pany, and  always  regarded  with  feelings  of  interest  and 
affection.  However  certain  it  may  be  that  he  has  lost  all 
sense  of  the  ordinary  proprieties  of  life,  it  needs  farther  evi- 
dence to  prove  that  the  persons  and  interests,  which  have 
been  always  nearest  to  his  heart  and  connected  with  the 
great  purposes  of  his  life,  have  utterly  faded  from  his  mind. 
The  evidence  of  those,  therefore,  who  are  qualified  both  by 
their  habits  of  intimacy  with  the  person  whose  mental  capa- 
city is  in  question,  and  by  their  intelligence  and  education, 
to  appreciate  the  changes  his  mind  may  have  undergone,  is 
far  more  to  be  relied  on,  than  that  of  people  of  a  different 
description,  who  make  up  their  opinion  hastily  from  a  few 
casual  and  perhaps  trivial  circumstances.  The  great  point 
to  be  determined  is,  not  whether  he  was  apt  to  forget  the 
names  of  people  in  whom  he  felt  no  particular  interest,  nor 
the  dates  of  events  which  concerned  him  little,  but  whether 
in  conversation  about  his  affairs,  his  friends  and  relatives, 
he  evinced  sufficient  knowledge  of  both,  to  be  able  to  dis- 
pose of  the  former  with  a  sound  and  untrammeled  judgment. 
It  is  a  fact  that  many  of  those  old  men  who  appear  so  stupid, 
and  who  astonish  the  stranger  by  the  singularities  of  their 
conduct,  need  only  to  have  their  attention  fairly  fixed  on 
their  property,  their  business,  or  their  family,  to  understand 
them  perfectly  well,  and  to  display  their  sagacity  in  the  re- 
marks they  make.  In  the  case  of  Kindleside  v.  Harrison,1 
which  we  shall  briefly  notice,  in  illustration  of  these  remarks, 
the  reader  may  obtain  a  better  idea  than  can  otherwise  be 
conveyed,  of  the  kind  of  evidence  generally  produced  in  cases 
of  senile  dementia,  and  derive  instruction  and  high  intellec- 

1  2  Phillimore's  Reports,  449. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   DEMENTIA.  303 

tual  gratification  from  the  clearness  and  ability  with.which 
it  is  sifted  and  stamped  with  its  proper  value,  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl. 

§  295.  The  points  contested  in  this  case  were  four  codi- 
cils to  the  will  of  an  old  gentleman,  on  the  ground  that  at 
the  time  of  making  them,  he  was  incapable,  by  reason  of 
mental  decay,  of  understanding  their  nature  and  effect.  It 
was  testified  by  some  of  the  servants  of  his  brother,  who 
lived  at  a  little  distance  from  him,  and  by  those  of  the  lady 
with  whom  he,  the  deceased,  resided,  that  during  the  two 
or  three  years  within  which  the  codicils  were  made,  he  fre- 
quently did  not  know  people  with  whom  he  had  previously 
been  well  acquainted,  without  being  told  who  they  were ; 
that  he  would  go  about  the  house  and  garden  looking 
around,  and  appearing  not  to  know  what  he  was  about.  On 
one  occasion,  he  not  only  did  not  recognize  a  certain  person, 
but  could  not  be  made  to  understand  who  he  was,  and  it  was 
testified  by  a  very  different  kind  of  witness,  that  the  deceased 
asked  him  how  old  was  witness's  father,  (though  he  had  been 
dead  sixteen  years  and  had  been  his  partner  in  business,)  and 
soon  after,  he  inquired  of  the  witness  after  his  health,  as  if  he 
were  addressing  another  person.  Several  other  similar  lapses 
of  memory  and  various  appearances  of  childishness  in  his 
conduct,  were  also  revealed  by  the  evidence,  amply  suf- 
ficient, no  doubt,  to  induce  superficial  observers  to  believe 
that  he  was  mentally  incapacitated  from  disposing  of  prop- 
erty. It  appeared,  however,  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  giv- 
ing, in  favor  of  his  brother's  butler,  drafts  accurately  signed 
and  filled  up ;  that  at  Christmas  time,  he  gave  the  servants 
Christmas  boxes  and  the  usual  amount  of  money,  and  enter- 
ed the  sums  in  his  account  book ;  that  he  received  a  farmer's 
bills  for  corn  and  paid  them  with  drafts  on  his  banker  which 
he  wrote  himself,  going  through  the  whole  business  correctly, 
and  that  he  docketed  the  bills  and  receipts  on  the  back  with 
the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  paid,  and  the  amount  of  the 
bill,  making  corresponding  entries  also  in  his  private  account 
book ;  that  he  signed  twenty  drafts,  at  least,  one  morning  for 
payment  of  his  brother's  debts,  without  instruction  or  assist- 


304  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ance,  subscribing  his  own  name  as  executor  of  his  brother ; 
that  he  would  detect  errors  in  the  casting  up  of  other  peo- 
ple's accounts ;  that  he  discharged  his  physician's  bills  cor- 
rectly ;  and,  in  short,  that  he  managed  his  affairs,  and  that 
prudently  and  correctly,  to  the  last.  It  was  also  testified 
that  it  was  his  practice  to  read  aloud  to  the  family  the  psalms 
and  lessons  of  the  day ;  that  he  was  fond  of  a  little  fun,  and 
played  at  whist  remarkably  well.  That  a  person  might  have 
done  all  this  and  yet  been  unsound  in  mind,  is  certainly  not 
impossible ;  but  it  was  far  beyond  the  power  of  a  mind  so 
broken  up  by  old  age  and  the  invasion  of  disease  as  to  be 
incapable  of  altering  testamentary  dispositions  previously 
made.  This  consideration,  and  the  fact  that  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  furnished  abundant  reasons  for  the  altera- 
tion, induced  the  court  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  capacity  of 
the  testator. 

§  296.  In  this  country,  where  such  cases  are  decided  by 
juries  who  are  not  responsible  for  their  decisions,  we  some- 
times meet  with  extraordinary  verdicts.  The  case  of  Dennet 
and  wife  v.  Dow,  Executor,  recently  decided  in  Maine,  after 
a  protracted  litigation,  is  calculated  to  excite  serious  reflec- 
tions in  the  minds  of  all  who  are  accustomed  to  regard  the 
testamentary  act  as  too  sacred  to  be  disturbed  by  any  other 
than  the  clearest  evidence  of  incompetency.  It  appears  that 
Stephen  Neal,  who  died  in  December,  1836,  aged  seventy- 
four  years,  left  a  will,  dated  29th  of  October,  1835,  in  which 
his  nephew  John  Neal,  was  made  residuary  legatee  to  nearly 
the  whole  of  his  property.  From  the  decree  of  the  probate 
judge  approving  this  will,  an  appeal  was  entered  by  the  nat- 
ural heirs,  (the  daughter  of  the  testator  and  her  husband)  and 
tried  before  the  supreme  court  in  November,  1838  ;  and  again, 
in  consequence  of  a  successful  application  for  a  new  trial, 
in  December,  1840,  the  verdict  being,  in  each  trial,  against 
the  will,  on  the  ground  of  insanity.  Before  noticing  the  evi- 
dence relative  to  his  mental  condition,  it  will  be  better  to 
mention  some  acts  in  which  the  testator  was  a  party  con- 
cerned. April  15th,  1834,  he  was  placed  under  guardianship, 
as  being  non  compos,  but  the  application  which  was  made  by 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  305 

some  prominent  members  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  to  which 
he  also  belonged,  was  accompanied  by  a  written  request 
from  him  that  the  measure  might  be  taken,  and  no  inquiry 
was  made  into  his  mental  condition.  The  guardian  having 
taken  him  home  to  his  own  house,  and  observed  him  closely 
for  several  months,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  not 
unsound,  and  on  his  setting  forth  the  facts,  the  letters  of 
guardianship  were  revoked,  September,  1834.  In  November, 
1834,  he  conveyed  to  the  appellants  divers  stocks  and  por- 
tions of  real  estate,  amounting  to  about  one  half  of  his  whole 
property.  In  December,  1834,  he  made  a  will  which  was 
found  after  his  death  uncancelled,  in  which  he  constituted  the 
Society  of  Friends  in  Portland  residuary  legatee  of  nearly  all 
his  remaining  property.  In  July,  1835,  the  Friends,  by  their 
committee,  applied  to  have  him  placed  under  guardianship  on 
the  ground  of  his  being  non  compos  mentis.  This  application 
having  been  dismissed  in  October,  1835,  it  was  immediately 
renewed,  and  again  dismissed  December  2d,  1835.  On  the 
29th  of  October,  1835,  he  made  the  will  in  dispute,  agreeing 
essentially  with  the  other  just  mentioned,  excepting  the 
clause  respecting  the  residuary  legatee,  in  which  John  Neal 
is  substituted  for  the  Society  of  Friends.  In  February, 
1836,  his  last  illness  commenced ;  he  was  placed  under 
guardianship  upon  application  of  the  Friends,  25th  of  April, 
1836,  and  died  in  December  of  the  same  year. 

§  297.  As  the  evidence  touching  the  mental  condition  of 
the  testator,  was  unusually  multifarious,  rambling,  and  inap- 
propriate, we  must  confine  ourselves  to  those  facts  which 
have  any  real  connection  with  this  point.1  In  favor  of  his 
mental  capacity,  it  was  testified  by  the  person  who  drew  up 

1  For  these  I  am  indebted  to  the  notes  of  the  Courts  (Mr.  Justice  Shep- 
ley  on  the  first  trial,  and  Chief  Justice  Weston,  on  the  last,)  which  were 
politely  submitted  to  my  inspection  by  those  gentlemen.  As  the  evidence 
at  the  two  trials  was  essentially  the  same,  except  that  some  additional  facts 
came  out  at  the  last,  J  have  made  no  distinction  between  it,  only  using  those 
notes  in  which  it  is  most  fully  reported.  As  the  verdicts  were  alike,  there 
seems  to  be  no  impropriety  in  this  course.  I  have  given  every  fact  which 
had  any  bearing  on  the  state  of  the  testator's  mind. 

26* 


306  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  will,  that  he  did  it  from  a  draft  originally  in  testator's  hand- 
writing ;  that  they  had  considerable  conversation  about  the 
items ;  and  that  he  had  no  doubt  of  his  entire  competency. 
One  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  who  was  also  a  neighbor 
and  in  the  habit  of  doing  business  with  him,  had  no  doubt 
of  his  competency.  While  under  the  first  guardianship  and 
during  the  year  1835,  he  made  bargains  and  contracts  of 
various  kinds,  such  as  for  sale  of  land,  for  board,  for  rent 
with  his  tenants,  for  services,  etc.,  all  of  which  appeared  to  be 
shrewd  and,  well-considered.  The  woman  with  whom  he 
boarded  a  few  weeks,  immediately  after  the  first  guardian- 
ship was  discharged,  testified  that  he  used  to  purchase  for  the 
table,  he  keeping  an  account  and  she  also  ;  and  that  when 
they  settled,  she  found  him  exact  to  a  cent,  and  very  close. 
The  accounts  with  his  tenants  were  entered  in  a  little 
memorandum -book,  addition  and  subtraction  made,  credits 
given,  etc.  After  making  a  contract  for  board  in  November, 

1834,  by  which  he  was  to  provide  the  fuel,  he  struck  out  the 
word  firewood,  and  inserted    "  coal,  to  be  delivered  at  the 
wharf,"  in  order  to  save  the  charge  of   truckage.     In  July, 

1835,  when  land  speculations  were  rife,  he  refused  an  offer  of 
two  thousand  six  hundred  dollars,  and  half  profits,  for  a  lot  of 
land,  preferring  two  thousand  eight  hundred  dollars,  part  in 
cash,  and  the  balance  secured  by  mortgage.     It  appears,  too, 
that  the  purchaser,  having  soon  after  sold  the  land  for  five 
thousand  dollars,  induced  the  testator  to  change  the  papers, 
and  receive  from  the  last  purchaser  notes  amounting  to  three 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  secured  by  a  mortgage  on  the 
land.     He  showed  uncommon  watchfulness  about  security, 
insisting  upon  the  purchaser's  wife  signing  a  relinquishment 
of  dower  in  the  mortgage,   until  satisfied  by  legal  inquiry 
that  it  was  not  necessary.     He  insisted,  too,  upon  having  the 
deed  carried  down  at  night  and  recorded,  lest  possibly  an 
attachment  might  be  slipped  in,  as  he  had  known  such  a 
case.     On  being  assured  of  the  purchaser's  solvency,  he  gave 
up  the  point,  and  waited  until  the  next  morning.     Hiring  a 
man  to  dig  his  potatoes  by  the  bushel  in   October,  1834,  and 
finding  that  he  made  more  than  day's  wages,  he  insisted  on 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OP   DEMENTIA.  307 

changing  the  bargain  and  paying  him  by  the  day.  Another 
witness  who  had  known  him  for  fifty  years,  met  him  one  day 
while  under  the  first  guardianship,  and  the  testator  began  to 
converse  about  the  value  of  stocks  and  the  comparative  value 
of  bank  and  insurance  stocks,  observing  that  he  owned  both, 
and  thought  the  former  safer,  though  the  latter  might  be 
more  profitable.  Neither  then  nor  afterwards,  for  he  was  in 
the  habit  of  meeting  testator  frequently  at  his  son's  house, 
did  he  observe  any  thing  in  him  to  lead  him  to  suspect  that 
the  testator  was  unsounS  or  incompetent.  One  of  his  nieces 
often  saw  him  during  the  summers  of  1833,  '34,  and  '35.  At 
one  time  he  fenced  their  land-lots  which  were  contiguous ; 
bought  boards,  used  her  old  posts  to  save  expense,  and  kept 
the  accounts.  He  also  bought  trees,  gave  her  some,  and 
directed  her  how  to  plant  them.  An  architect  conversed  with 
him  several  times  about  some  houses  he  was  building  for  his 
nephew  in  1835,  and  showed  him  plans  with  which  he  was 
pleased,  though  he  criticised  them,  and  suggested  some  sen- 
sible alterations  in  the  manner  of  laying  the  stone.  In  the 
autumn  of  1834,  he  bargained  with  a  witness  for  some 
stones  to  be  used  in  making  a  cellar  drain ;  and  conversed 
very  sensibly  on  the  different  kinds  and  qualities  of  stone 
and  the  manner  of  splitting  them.  About  this  time  he  con- 
versed with  considerable  acuteness  respecting  a  young  child's 
memory.  The  child  knew  its  aunt,  he  said,  not  because  he 
remembered  her  countenance,  but  because  she  resembled  his 
mother  ;  and  when  it  was  objected  that  the  resemblance  was 
not  very  strong,  he  replied  that  the  child  might  perceive  it 
though  an  adult  might  not,  and  that  probably  the  resem- 
blance was  in  the  sound  of  their  voices,  rather  than  their 
features.  This  child  died  in  September,  1835,  and  for  some 
time  afterwards,  he  frequently  spoke  of  it,  and  with  feelings 
of  affection.  It  appears  that  until  his  last  sickness,  he 
always  immediately  recognized  his  friends  and  acquaint- 
ances, and  manifested  an  interest  in  their  welfare. 

§  298.  To  show  that  the  will  was  a  rational  act,  as  well 
as  rationally  done,  a  memorandum  book  was  produced,  con- 
taining, in  the  handwriting  of  the  first  guardian,  a  schedule 


308  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

of  the  property  he  had  .conveyed  to  his  children,  and  beneath 
it,  in  his  own  hand,  and  subscribed  with  his  name,  he  ex- 
pressed the  design  not  to  give  them  any  thing  more,  saying, 
"  he  had  amply  provided  them  with  the  means  of  a  comfort- 
able subsistence,  provided  that  they  exercise  proper  industry 
and  economy  ;  and  without  these  all  my  property  could  not 
suffice  them,  which,  therefore,  I  have  thought  proper  to  dis- 
pose of  in  another  manner."  He  expressed  the  same  views 
in  conversation  with  different  witnesses.  It  also  appeared 
that  he  was  not  on  good  terms  with  his  children,  from  whom 
he  had  received,  or  at  least  thought  he  had  received,  much 
unkind  treatment.  As  reasons  for  altering  his  testamentary 
dispositions,  we  have  the  two  attempts  of  the  Friends  to 
place  him  under  guardianship,  which,  of  course,  were  as 
little  calculated  to  secure  his  regard  for  them,  as  the  treat- 
ment of  his  children  was  to  increase  his  affection  for  them. 
It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  Society  had  "  dealt  with 
his  wife,"  and  turned  her  out  of  meeting,  on  the  representa- 
tions of  his  own  daughter. 

§  299.  On  the  other  hand,  in  proof  of  his  incompetency, 
it  was  testified  by  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  that  he 
"  did  not  think  him  of  sound  mind,"  though  he  could  give  no 
other  reason  for  his  opinion  than  "  the  appearance  of  the 
man."  He  could  state  no  facts  nor  conversation  evincing 
unsoundness  of  mind,  though  before  and  after  the  execution 
of  the  will,  the  testator  was  in  the  habit  of  buying  groceries 
at  his  shop.  He  also  admitted  that  the  testator  "always 
appeared  to  know  what  he  was  about."  The  remaining  sub- 
scribing witness  "  did  not  consider  him  so  sound  as  it  was 
desirable  he  should  be  in  such  an  important  transaction," 
though  he  admitted  that  "  he  was  pretty  close  in  making  a 
bargain,  and_was  a  saving,  prudent  man  in  his  calculations." 
He  told  stories  and  conversed  correctly  on  old  affairs,  but  on 
recent  transactions,  was  not  so  connected.  This  witness 
also  mentioned  some  other  facts  indicative,  in  his  opinion,  of 
mental  unsoundness,  which  will  be  presently  noticed.  In 
July,  1835,  he  offered  to  the  city  treasurer,  in  payment  of 
his  taxes,  a  scrap  of  paper,  apparently  a  bill  of  purchases, 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  309 

and  insisted  that  it  was  as  good  as  money,  and  would  be 
taken  at  the  bank.  But  it  appeared  that  he  had  received  a 
check  upon  a  bank,  but  his  sight  being  poor,  and  his  specta- 
cles missing,  he  had  mistaken  for  it  something  of  no  import- 
ance. One  evening  he  entered  a  house  next  his  own  and  sat 
down,  but  he  discovered  the  mistake  himself  the  moment  he 
heard  a  strange  voice.  Once  when  the  meeting  for  worship 
was  over,  and  the  business  meeting  had  begun,  he  asked,  in 
a  loud  whisper,  an  old  friend  of  his  who  dealt  in  wool,  what 
he  gave  for  wool  then.  On  being  answered  that  he  should 
wait  till  after  meeting  before  talking  on  such  subjects,  he 
nodded  assent  and  was  silent.  Several  times  he  went  out  of 
his  house  without  his  hat,  and  in  one  or  two  instances,  he 
inquired  the  way  to  a  house  or  street  with  which  he  had 
been  previously  well  acquainted,  and  then  started  off  in  an 
opposite  direction.  Some  of  the  entries  in  the  memorandum- 
book  were  repeated,  but  they  were  all  correct  to  a  cent. 
Once,  in  1833,  after  paying  the  balance  of  an  account,  he 
entirely  forgot  it  in  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  and  when 
reminded  of  it,  said,  I  am  forgetful ;  and  in  1835,  he  would 
ask  the  same  question  several  times  in  succession,  without 
being  aware  that  it  had  been  asked  and  answered.  Once  he 
undertook  to  write  a  deed  (a  business  he  was  accustomed  to,) 
boggled  over,  and  finally  gave  it  up.  Then  he  took  another 
blank,  got  confused,  and  the  witness  had  to  write  it  himself. 
In  1834,  when  the  witness  carried  to  him  money  to  pay  a 
note,  he  had  forgotten  the  note  entirely,  was  unable  to  find 
it,  and  requested  the  witness  to  write  a  receipt  for  him  to 
sign.  The  money  he  undertook  to  count,  but  merely  tum- 
bled it  over,  and  laid  it  down,  when  the  witness  counted  it 
over  to  him,  bill  by  bill.  On  purchasing  things  at  the  shops, 
he  would  take  his  change  without  counting  it.  It  was  testi- 
fied that  when  at  table  he  required  his  food  to  be  cut  up  for 
him  ;  that  he  would  attempt  to  spread  cheese  on  his  bread, 
mistaking  it  for  butter ;  would  pour  his  tea  into  a  cup-plate 
instead  of  a  saucer ;  and  put  his  sugar  into  the  plate.  A 
stray  cow  coming  into  the  yard,  he  said  it  was  one  he  had 
lately  bought.  Asked  a  witness  if  his  mother's  shed  was 


310  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

much  injured  in  the  storm,  alluding  to  his  aunt's  shed,  which 
had  been  blown  down.  He  spoke  of  having  some  chairs 
and  tables  in  a  town  at  some  distance,  and  wanted  the  wit- 
ness to  ask  the  stage-driver  to  bring  them  down,  as  he  might, 
a  part  at  a  time.  One  witness  testified  that  in  the  autumn 
of  1835,  after  the  execution  of  the  will,  he  rode  out  with  him 
at  a  little  distance  from  town  ;  that  he  seemed  lost  —  did  not 
know  where  he  was,  even  when  he  got  to  his  son's  tanyard  ; 
that  he  would  rave  about  his  children  and  their  ill-treatment 
of  him,  and  then  go  to  see  them  and  be  cheerful  with  them, 
make  no  complaints,  and  come  away  happy.  He  admitted, 
however,  that  they  drove  around  by  an  unusual  road,  and 
that  on  returning,  while  yet  at  a  little  distance  from  town, 
testator  asked  where  they  were,  when  he  replied,  pointing 
over  the  bridge  to  Dennet's  tanyard,  "  Don't  thee  know  that 
place  ?  That  is  Oliver's  tanyard."  He  spoke  of  certain 
property  as  his,  after  he  had  sold  it.  A  female  witness,  who 
lived  in  the  same  house  with  him  in  the  autumn  of  1835, 
said  that  he  could  not  dress  himself  unassisted  ;  that  she  had 
seen  him  try  to  put  on  his  wife's  stays ;  that  he  used  to 
bring  bits  of  paper  and  ask  her  to  sew  them  together,  calling 
it  dividing  his  property ;  that  he  talked  of  being  buried  at 
the  head  of  his  bed  ;  that  he  called  patching  windows,  tailor- 
ing ;  and  that  he  made  up  a  fire  on  the  floor  and  filled  the 
room  with  smoke.  It  appeared,  however,  that  being  large, 
clumsy,  and  wearing  a  loose  wrapper,  he  was  sometimes 
embarrassed  in  putting  on  his  pantaloons ;  that  his  wife's 
stays  were  in  fact  a  flannel  waist  much  resembling  the  flan- 
nel waistcoat  he  always  wore  ;  that  the  bits  of  paper  he  had 
sewed  together  were,  on  one  occasion  at  least,  vouchers  of 
his  guardian's  accounts,  which  he  had  stitched  through  and 
through,  in  order  to  preserve  them  ;  that  he  had  strips  of 
paper  sewed  together  and  used  for  a  measure  ;  that  the 
hearth  was  very  large,  and  one  leg  of  one  andiron  stood  off 
the  hearth  on  the  floor.  There  was  evidence  of  a  want  of 
cleanliness,  and  neglect  of  the  decencies  of  life,  indicative  of 
mental  unsoundness.  He  was  seen  in  the  street  with  the 
flap  of  his  pantaloons  wholly  or  partly  down,  and  he  some- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  311 

times  disregarded  the  calls  of  nature, "or  attended  to  them  in 
improper  places.  It  was  testified,  however,  in  explanation 
of  these  facts,  that  his  hands  being  swollen  and  clumsy,  and 
the  button-holes  of  his  pantaloons  much  worn,  he  had  some 
difficulty  in  buttoning  and  in  keeping  them  buttoned ;  that 
the  uncleanliness  was  not  habitual,  but  limited  to  occasions 
when  he  was  suffering  from  diarrho3a,  and  that  other  instances 
of  impropriety,  which  had  been  alleged,  occurred  during  his 
last  illness,  when  his  mental  unsoundness  was  admitted  by 
the  other  party.  It  also  appeared  that  he  was  somewhat  in- 
temperate in  the  use  of  spirituous  liquors. 

§  300.  No  one,  at  all  acquainted  with  the  habits  of  old 
age  and  with  the  effect  of  senile  dementia  on  the  mind,  can 
entertain  a  doubt  of  the  testator's  competency  to  make  his 
will.  True,  he  was  more  forgetful  of  the  present  than  of  the 
past ;  he  frequently  forgot  what  he  had  just  before  said  or 
done  ;  and  he  sometimes  disregarded  the  common  observances 
of  life.  All  this,  however,  may  be  said  of  multitudes  of  old 
men  whose  competency  for  any  business  is  never  questioned 
by  those  who  know  them  best.  However  weak  may  have 
been  fhe  mind  of  this  old  man,  he  still  was  acquainted  with 
the  value  of  property,  especially  of  his  own ;  he  recognized 
his  relatives  and  friends ;  was  always  aware  of  the  exact 
nature  of  their  relations  towards  him,  and  of  their  respective 
claims  on  his  bounty ;  he  still  was  capable  of  feeling  the 
sting  of  filial  ingratitude,  and  of  being  actuated  by  motives 
of  ordinary  prudence  and  discretion.  If  his  mind  were  not 
sufficiently  vigorous  to  engage  in  contracts  and  speculations 
of  large  magnitude,  it  was  none  the  less  able  to  bequeath  his 
property,  the  kind  and  amount  of  which  he  perfectly  under- 
stood, to  relatives  and  friends  whom  he  still  recognized  and 
loved.  The  will  was  a  rational  act,  rationally  done,  and 
there  was  not  a  tittle  of  evidence  to  show  that  the  testator 
was  under  improper  influences. 

§  301.  The  court,  at  each  trial,  refrained  from  any  com- 
ments on  the  evidence  relating  to  the  testator's  mental  con- 
dition, and  the  jury  were  left  to  their  own  unenlightened  and 
unassisted  deliberations.  There  were  peculiar  reasons,  per- 


312  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

haps,  for  taking  this  course,  in  the  present  case,  but  we  may 
be  allowed  to  question  its  propriety  as  a  general  rule  of  prac- 
tice. In  cases  like  these,  which  are  characterized  by  the 
abundance  and  discrepancy  of  the  evidence,  it  needs  a  cool, 
tenacious,  and  intelligent  mind  to  recapitulate  this  evidence ; 
to  sift,  to  analyze,  weigh,  and  finally  stamp  it  with  its  proper 
value.  The  jury,* it  is  true,  are  sole  judges  of  the  facts,  and 
if  the  question  here  were,  whether  certain  facts  offered  in 
evidence  were  true  or  false,  not  a  remark  might  be  required 
of  the  court.  But  since  they  have  to  do  with  a  very  different 
question,  that  is,  whether  these  facts  warrant  certain  infer- 
ences relative  to  mental  capacity,  they  are  unable  to  answer 
it  correctly,  we  apprehend,  without  the  light  that  is  derived 
from  superior  penetration  and  attainments.  The  knowledge 
necessary  for  this  purpose  is  of  a  technical  kind,  which  a  jury 
cannot  be  expected  to  possess,  and  the  very  abundance  of  the 
evidence  is  calculated  to  fill  their  minds  with  uncertainty  and 
confusion.  If  they  can  hear  the  opinions  of  experts  —  of 
persons  who  have  given  especial  attention  to  this  branch  of 
knowledge  —  respecting  the  precise  value  of  all  these  facts 
considered  in  relation  to  the  point  they  are  designed  to 
establish,  then  indeed  they  would  be  in  a  condition  to  form 
conclusions  of  their  own.  But  since  this  is  not  always 
practicable,1  are  they  to  be  left  to  float  about  on  a  sea  of 
conjecture,  without  star  or  compass  to  guide  their  course  ? 
Must  a  jury,  not  one  of  whom,  perhaps,  ever  observed  a  case 
of  insanity,  or  even  studied  the  operations  of  the  sane  mind, 
take  upon  themselves  to  say  that  certain  facts  do,  or  do  not 


1  Nothing  can  more  strongly  illustrate  the  necessity  of  some  such  measure 
as  we  have  suggested,  (§  44)  than  a  fact  that  occurred  in  this  case.  The  ap- 
pellees were  desirous  that  the  evidence  relating  to  the  testator's  mental  con- 
dition, should  be  heard  by  some  one  particularly  acquainted  with  the  subject 
of  insanity,  who  might  testify,  on  the  strength  of  such  knowledge,  whether 
the  evidence  showed  him  to  have  been  incapable  of  making  a  valid  will.  The 
attendance  of  such  a  witness  could  not  be  obtained,  for  one  of  the  gentlemen 
applied  to  —  and  they  were  the  nearest  —  resided  at  a  distance  of  120,  and 
>  another  of  250  miles.  Had  it  been  otherwise,  we  might  not  have  seen  the 
most  sacred  of  legal  acts  annulled  on  the  most  trivial  grounds. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   DEMENTIA.  313 

prove  the  presence  of  testamentary  capacity ;  in  other  words, 
to  decide  upon  professional  questions  of  acknowledged  diffi- 
culty ?  The  really  intelligent  and  conscientious  juror,  dis- 
tracted by  an  appalling  mass  of  evidence,  much  of  which  is 
irrelevant  and  contradictory,  which  he  may  try  in  vain  to 
unravel  and  arrange,  and  puzzled  by  questions  he  never  con- 
sidered before,  will  and  ought  to  look  to  the  court  for  assist- 
ance. 

§  302.  The  principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  at  the  first 
trial,  that  a  disposing  mind  means  "  so  much  mind  and  mem- 
ory as  would  enable  him  to  transact  common  business  with 
that  intelligence  which  belongs  to  the  weakest  class  of  sound 
minds,"  may  be  theoretically  correct,  but  it  seems  to  be  of 
too  abstract  a  nature  to  be  practically  applied  by  jurors.  To 
compare  one  mind  with  another  of  different  calibre,  is  a  task 
for  which  they  are  altogether  unfitted  by  their  previous  tastes, 
habits,  and  studies.  Justice  merely  requires  that  the  strength 
of  the  mind  should  be  equal  to  the  purpose  to  which  it  is 
applied.  If  this  simple  principle  be  distinctly  presented  to 
the  minds  of  the  jury,  there  are  few  so  dull  as  to  be  unable  to 
give  it  a  practical  application.  It  is  not  only  reasonable,  but 
it  has  the  merit  of  having  been  repeatedly  recognized  in 
courts  of  law,  until  it  has  now  obtained  all  the  force  of  estab- 
lished authority.  "  He  may  not  have  sufficient  strength  of 
memory  and  vigor  of  intellect,  to  make  and  to  digest  all  the 
parts  of  a  contract,  and  yet  be  competent  to  direct  the  distri- 
bution of  his  property  by  will." 1  "A  man  may  be  capable 
of  making  a  will,  and  yet  incapable  of  making  a  contract,  or 
to  manage  his  estate."2 

§  303.  We  are  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  testamen- 
tary dispositions  generally  imply  an  exercise  of  memory. 


1  Stevens  and  wife  v.  Vancleve,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  R.  262. 

2  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  R.  580.     Nowhere  has  the  subject  of 
testamentary  capacity  been  treated  with  so  much  good  sense  and  regard  to 
scientific  truth,  as  in  the  charges  of  the  court  from  which  the  above  quotations 
are  made.     With  the  progress  of  sound  views  on  this  subject,  the  correctness 
of  the  principles  there  laid  down  will  only  be  the  more  firmly  established. 

27 


314  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

The  mind  must  be  able  to  bring  up  before  it  scenes  and  per- 
sons connected  with  the  past  as  well  as  the  present,  for  with- 
out such  ability,  persons  may  be  overlooked  who  would  other- 
wise have  held  a  prominent  place  in  the  act,  and  transactions 
forgotten  which  might  naturally  be  supposed  to  have  an 
effect  upon  its  dispositions.  A  will  which  makes  no  men- 
tion of  relatives  who  had  a  natural  claim  on  the  bounty  of 
the  testator,  and  in  regard  to  whom,  he  apparently  enter- 
tained only  the  kindest  feelings,  creates  a  suspicion  that  his 
memory  was  at  fault,  and  unless  the  fact  is  satisfactorily 
explained,  a  strong  presumption  is  raised  against  the  validity 
of  the  will.  Many  old  men  who  have  begun  to  lose  their 
faculties,  have  a  passion  for  making  wills,  and  so  far  as  the 
form  is  concerned,  they  are  able  to  do  it  correctly,  but  they 
are  often  governed  by  the  whim  of  the  moment  rather  than 
any  definite  views  of  the  claims  which  others  may  have  upon 
them,  and  not  having  them  brought  to  their  notice  by  any 
one  else,  they  are  liable  to  overlook  them  unintentionally. 


CHAPTER    XI. 


FEBRILE   DELIRIUM. 

§  304.  CEREBRAL  affection,  of  some  kind  or  other,  we 
have  considered  as  essential  to  the  existence  of  insanity  —  as 
constituting  in  fact  the  whole  disease ;  but  there  is  another 
form  of  mental  derangement  of  very  common  occurrence, 
in  which  the  cerebral  affection  is  only  an  accidental  symp- 
tom of  severe  disease  in  the  brain  or  some  other  organ. 
The  functions  of  the  brain  are  disturbed  in  each,  but  they 
differ  so  widely  in  their  causes,  progress,  and  termination, 
that  the  propriety  of  distinguishing  them  from  each  other 
for  medico-legal,  as  well  as  therapeutical  purposes,  is  uni- 
versally recognized.  Few  diseases  terminate  in  death  with- 
out presenting  at  some  period  or  other  of  their  progress,  but 
more  particularly  towards  their  close,  more  or  less  disturb- 
ance of  the  mental  faculties ;  organic  diseases  of  the  brain, 
especially  acute  inflammation  of  its  membranes  and  its 
periphery,  are  generally  accompanied  with  delirium ;  and 
it  is  sometimes  a  symptom  of  acute  disease  in  other  organs, 
in  consequence  of  the  cerebral  irritation  which  they  sympa- 
thetically produce.  It  is  seldom  entirely  absent  in  fevers  of 
any  severity,  and  is  readily  determined  by  inflammations 
of  the  mucous  and  serous  membranes,  particularly  of  the  ali- 
mentary canal.  In  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  liver,  spleen, 
and  kidneys,  it  appears  only  towards  the  last  period  of  the 
disease  when  it  is  approaching  a  fatal  termination.  Surgical 
operations,  too,  that  prove  fatal,  are  ordinarily  attended  at 
last  with  delirium.  In  chronic  diseases,  such  as  cancer, 
dropsy,  consumption,  the  mind  is  seldom  impaired,  except 
that  occasionally,  during  the  final  struggle,  it  wanders  over 


316  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  mingled  and  broken  images  of  the  past.  Delirium  is  also 
produced  by  intoxicating  agents,  when  it  simulates  mania 
more  perfectly  than  when  it  arises  from  other  causes;  but 
this  form  of  the  affection  will  be  discussed  in  a  different  place. 
§  305.  Delirium  sometimes  occurs  suddenly,  but  gene- 
rally comes  on  gradually,  and  is  preceded  by  premonitory 
symptoms,  such  as  pain  or  throbbing  in  the  head,  heat  of 
the  scalp,  and  flushing  of  the  cheeks.  Its  first  appearance 
is  manifested  by  a  propensity  of  the  patient  to  talk  during 
sleep,  and  a  momentary  forgetfulness  of  his  situation  and  of 
things  about  him,  on  waking  from  it.  After  being  fully 
aroused,  however,  and  his  senses  collected,  the  mind  is  com- 
paratively clear  and  tranquil,  till  the  next  slumber,  when  the 
same  scene  is  repeated.  Gradually,  the  mental  disorder 
becomes  more  intense,  and  the  intervals  between  its  returns 
of  shorter  duration,  until  they  are  scarcely,  or  not  at  all 
perceptible.  The  patient  lies  on  his  back,  his  eyes,  if  open, 
presenting  a  dull  and  listless  look,  and  is  almost  constantly 
talking  to  himself  in  a  low,  muttering  tone.  Regardless  of 
persons  or  things  around  him,  and  scarcely  capable  of  recog- 
nizing them  when  aroused  by  his  attendants,  his  mind  retires 
within  itself  to  dwell  upon  the  scenes  and  events  of  the  past, 
which  glide  before  it  in  wild  and  disorderly  array,  while  the 
tongue  feebly  records  the  varying  impressions,  in  the  form  of 
disjointed,  incoherent  discourse,  or  of  senseless  rhapsody.  In 
the  delirium  which  occurs  towards  the  end  of  chronic  diseases, 
the  discourse  is  often  more  coherent  and  continuous,  though 
the  mind  is  no  less  absorbed  in  its  own  reveries.  As  the  dis- 
order advances,  the  voice  becomes  more  indistinct,  the  fingers 
are  constantly  picking  at  the  bed-clothes,  the  evacuations  are 
passed  insensibly,  and  the  patient  is  incapable  of  being 
aroused  to  any  farther  effort  of  attention.  In  some  cases, 
delirium  is  attended  with  a  greater  degree  of  nervous  and 
vascular  excitement  which  more  or  less  modifies  the  above- 
mentioned  symptoms.  The  eyes  are  open,  dry,  and  blood- 
shot, intently  gazing  into  vacancy,  as  if  fixed  on  some  object 
which  is  really  present  to  the  mind  of  the  patient;  the  skin 
is  hotter  and  drier;  and  he  is  more  restless  and  intractable. 


FEBRILE    DELIRIUM.  317 

He  talks  more  loudly,  occasionally  breaking  out  into  cries 
and  vociferations,  and  tosses  about  in  bed,  frequently  en- 
deavoring to  get  up,  though  without  any  particular  object  in 
view. 

§  306.  While  delirium  thus  shuts  out  all  ideas  and  images 
connected  with  the  present,  it  sometimes  revives  the  impres- 
sions of  the  past,  which  had  seemed  long  before  to  have 
been  consigned  to  utter  oblivion,  in  a  manner  unknown  in  a 
state  of  health.  A  case  once  occurred  in  St.  Thomas's  hos- 
pital, of  a  patient  who,  when  he  began  to  rally,  after  a  con- 
siderable injury  of  the  head,  spoke  a  language  that  nobody 
could  understand,  but  which  was,  at  last,  ascertained  to  be 
Welsh.  It  appeared  that  he  was  a  Welshman,  and  had 
been  from  his  native  country  about  thirty  years,  during  which 
period  he  had  entirely  forgotten  his  native  tongue,  and 
acquired  the  English  language.  But  when  he  recovered 
from  the  accident,  he  had  forgotten  the  language  he  had 
been  so  long  and  recently  in  the  habit  of  speaking,  and 
acquired  that  which  he  had  originally  learned  and  lost.1  Dr. 
Rush  mentions,  among  many  other  similar  instances,  that 
the  old  Swedes  of  Philadelphia,  when  on  their  death-beds, 
would  always  pray  in  their  native  tongue,  though  they  had 
not  spoken  it  for  fifty  or  sixty  years,  and  had  probably  for- 
gotten it  before  they  were  sick.2 

§  307.  When  delirium,  or  more  properly  speaking  the 
disease  on  which  it  depends,  proves  fatal,  it  usually  passes 
into  coma.  Occasionally,  however,  it  disappears  some  days 
or  hours  before  death,  and  leaves  the  mind  in  possession  of 
its  natural  soundness.  Though  enfeebled  by  disease,  and 
therefore  incapable  of  much  exertion  of  his  faculties,  the 
patient  is  rational  and  intelligent,  recognizes  perfectly  well 
his  relations  to  others,  and  on  familiar  subjects,  can  arrange 
his  ideas  without  dictation  or  guidance. 

§  308.  So  closely  does  delirium  resemble  mania  to  the 
casual  observer,  and  so  important  is  it  that  they  should  be 


1  Tupper's  Inquiry  into  Gall's  System,  35. 

2  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  282. 

27* 


318  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

distinguished  from  each  other,  that  it  may  be  well  to  indicate 
some  of  the  most  common  and  prominent  features  of  each. 
In  mania,  the  patient  recognizes  persons  and  things,  and  is 
perfectly  conscious  of  and  remembers  what  is  passing  around 
him.  In  delirium,  he  can  seldom  distinguish  one  person  or 
thing  from  another,  and,  as  if  fully  occupied  with  the  images 
that  crowd  upon  his  memory,  gives  no  attention  to  those 
that  are  presented  from  without.  In  delirium,  there  is  an 
entire  abolition  of  the  reasoning  power ;  there  is  no  attempt 
at  reasoning  at  all ;  the  ideas  are  all  and  equally  insane ;  no 
single  train  of  thought  escapes  the  morbid  influence,  nor 
does  a  single  operation  of  the  mind  reveal  a  glimpse  of  its 
natural  vigor  and  acuteness.  In  mania,  however  false  and 
absurd  the  ideas  may  be,  we  are  never  at  a  loss  to  discover 
patches  of  coherence,  and  some  semblance  of  logical  se- 
quence in  the  discourse.  The  patient  still  reasons,  though 
he  reasons  incorrectly.  In  mania,  the  muscular  power  is  not 
perceptibly  diminished,  and  the  individual  moves  about  with 
his  ordinary  ability.  Delirium  is  invariably  attended  with 
great  muscular  debility ;  the  patient  is  confined  to  his  bed, 
and  is  capable  of  only  a  momentary  effort  of  exertion.  In 
mania,  sensation  is  not  necessarily  impaired,  and  in  most 
instances,  the  maniac  sees,  hears,  and  feels  with  all  his 
natural  acuteness.  In  delirium,  sensation  is  greatly  im- 
paired, and  this  avenue  to  the  understanding  seems  to  be 
entirely  closed.  In  mania,  many  of  the  bodily  functions  are 
undisturbed,  and  the  appearance  of  the  patient  might  not,  at 
first  sight,  convey  the  impression  of  disease.  In  delirium, 
every  function  suffers,  and  the  whole  aspect  of  the  patient  is 
indicative  of  disease.  Mania  exists  alone  and  independent 
of  any  other  disorder,  while  delirium  is  only  an  unessential 
symptom  of  some  other  disease.  Being  a  symptom  only, 
the  latter  maintains  certain  relations  with  the  disease  on 
which  it  depends ;  it  is  relieved  when  that  is  relieved,  and  is 
aggravated  when  that  increases  in  severity.  Mania,  though 
it  undoubtedly  tends  to  shorten  life,  is  not  immediately  dan- 
gerous, whereas  the  disease  on  which  delirium  depends, 
speedily  terminates  in  death,  or  restoration  to  health.  Mania 


FEBRILE    DELIRIUM.  319 

seldom  occurs  till  after  the  age  of  puberty ;  delirium  attacks 
all  periods  alike,  from  early  childhood  to  extreme  old  age. 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  the  above  distinctive 
features  are  not  always  present.  A  form  of  mania  is  oc- 
casionally seen,  in  which  the  mental  aberrations  and  some 
of  the  physical  symptoms  are  remarkably  like  those  of 
delirium. 


CHAPTER    XII. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DELIRIUM. 

§  309.  TESTAMENTARY  dispositions  made  during  the  inter- 
vals of  febrile  delirium,  are  often  contested  on  the  ground  of 
incapacity,  especially  where  there  is  any  suspicion,  real  or 
pretended,  of  improper  influence  on  the  testator's  mind. 
These  cases  are  sometimes  very  embarrassing,  and  it  is  im- 
possible to  come  to  a  conclusion  upon  the  direct  evidence 
respecting  the  state  of  mind ;  nothing  more  can  be  attained 
than  an  approximation  to  correctness,  by  a  careful  investiga- 
tion of  the  attending  circumstances.  When  the  delirium 
accompanies  only  the  daily  exacerbations  of  the  fever,  and 
disappears  with  them,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  mind's 
being  in  a  suitable  condition,  during  the  intervals,  for  devis- 
ing property,  but  not  for  transacting  other  business  of  im- 
portance. The  existence  of  delirium  at  any  period  of  a 
disease  will  be  sufficient  to  throw  suspicion  on  any  contracts 
entered  into  during  such  disease ;  and  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  the  delirium  was  but  an  occasional  symptom  and  of  short 
duration  when  it  occurred,  and  that  the  mind  of  the  patient 
at  other  times  was  perfectly  calm  and  rational,  their  validity 
is  liable  to  be  destroyed.  When  these  two  conditions  are 
reversed,  that  of  delirium  being  the  habitual,  and  the  lucid 
intervals  the  occasional  state,  the  mind  may  have  sufficient 
capacity  to  make  a  will ;  but,  certainly,  no  other  civil  act 
which  it  might  perform  ought  to  be  held  valid,  for  the  same 
reason  that  the  acts  of  imbeciles  are  avoided.  Georget, 
however,  does  not  hesitate  to  express  his  belief,  that  under 
these  circumstances,  the  reason  is  not  so  restored  that  the 
patient  can  be  declared  capable  even  of  making  a  will,  and 
we  readily  admit  that  it  is  often  questionable  whether  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DELIRIUM.  321 

mind  is  sufficiently  steady  and  collected  to  comprehend  the 
relations  of  property,  or  appreciate  the  claims  of  kindred 
and  friends.  A  case  related  by  Dr.  Woodward,  the  superin- 
tendent of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Ayslum,  while  giving 
his  evidence  in  court  on  one  occasion,  strongly  confirms  the 
correctness  of  Georget's  views.  A  legal  gentleman,  in  the 
course  of  an  acute  pneumonic  affection,  began  to  have  slight 
delirium  on  waking  in  the  morning,  but  it  was  observed  at 
no  other  time.  About  this  time  he  remarked  to  his  physicians 
that  if  they  considered  him  in  danger,  he  wished  to  know  it, 
as  he  was  desirous  of  altering  his  will,  which  he  had  previ- 
ously made.  Though  not  considering  him  to  be  in  much 
danger,  they  approved  of  the  plan,  and  the  alteration  was 
made.  A  few  months  after  his  recovery,  he  accidentally  met 
with  the  will  among  his  papers,  but  had  no  recollection  of 
having  made  it,  and  wasv  much  surprised  and  dissatisfied  with 
its  dispositions,  for  they  did  great  injustice  to  two  of  his 
sons.  Still  we  would  not  make  the  disqualification  univer- 
sal, for  cases  not  unfrequently  happen  in  which,  after  days  of 
constant  delirium,  reason  for  a  while  resumes  her  dominion 
and  the  patient  converses  with  his  accustomed  fluency  and 
wisdom,  describing  his  feelings,  giving  directions  to  his 
family,  and  alluding  to  the  past  with  a  clearness  and  accuracy 
that  leaves  no  doubt  on  the  minds  of  those  around  him,  of 
his  perfect  sanity.  A  safer  practice  probably  would  be,  to  be 
governed  in  our  decision  of  this  point  by  the  circumstances 
that  attend  the  making  of  the  will,  the  previous  intentions 
of  the  testator,  and  the  nature  of  his  disease.1 

§  310.  The  law  requires  that  in  this  affection,  as  in  mania, 
the  occurrence  of  lucid  intervals  should  be  proved  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  but  as  delirium  is  merely  an  adventitious 
symptom,  and  not,  like  mania,  the  habitual  state  of  the 
patient,  it  will  be  satisfied  with  much  less  proof  in  the  for- 


1  It  must  be  recollected  that  the  question  is,  not  whether  the  mind  pos- 
sesses its  ordinary  soundness  and  vigor,  for  we  know  it  is  always  enfeebled, 
but  whether  it  retains  what  may  be  called  a  testamentary  capacity.  See 
ante  §§  105,  294. 


322  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

mer  than  in  the  latter  affection.  Sir  John  Nicholl  has  very 
justly  observed,  that  "  in  cases  of  permanent,  proper  insanity, 
the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty, 
and  for  this  among  other  reasons,  namely ;  that  the  patient 
so  affected  is  not  unfrequently  rational  to  all  outward  .appear- 
ance, without  any  real  abatement  of  his  malady ;  so  that  in 
truth  and  substance,  he  is  just  as  insane  in  his  apparently 
rational,  as  he  is  in  his  visible  raving  fits.  But  the  apparently 
rational  intervals  of  persons  merely  delirious,  for  the  most 
part,  are  really  such.  Delirium  is  a  fluctuating  state  of 
mind,  created  by  temporary  excitement;  in  the  absence  of 
which,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  appearance  of  the  patient, 
the  patient  is,  most  commonly,  really  sane.  Hence,  as  also 
indeed,  from  their  greater  presumed  frequency  in  most  in- 
stances in  cases  of  delirium,  the  probabilities,  a  priori,  in 
favor  of  a  lucid  interval,  are  infinitely  stronger  in  a  case  of 
delirium,  than  in  one  of  permanent  proper  insanity  ;  and  the 
difficulty  of  proving  a  lucid  interval  is  less,  in  the  same  exact 
proporti9n,  in  the  former,  than  it  is  in  the  latter  case,  and  has 
always  been  so  held  by  this  court."  1 

§  311.  ,In  the  case  from  which  the  above  passage  is 
taken,  the  testatrix,  a  widow  lady,  died  of  some  acute  dis- 
ease after  an  illness  of  about  ten  days,  during  the  two  or 
three  last  of  which  she  was  more  or  less  delirious.  Her  will 
was  made  on  the  evening  of  the  day  preceding  her  death, 
and  its  validity  was  opposed  on  the  ground  that  she  did  not 
possess  a  testamentary  capacity  at  the  time  of  its  execution. 
The  evidence  of  the  two  consulting  physicians  who  visited 
her  about  four  o'clock,  which  was  but  a  few  hours  prior  to 
the  execution  of  the  will,  was  decidedly  unfavorable  to  her 
testamentary  capacity.  One  considered  it  "  doubtful  whether 
she  was  capable  of  making  a  will  or  not ;  his  opinion  rather 


1  Judgment  in  Brogden  v.  Brown,  2  Addams's  Rep.  441.  If  the  reader  is 
desirous  of  extending  his  knowledge  of  this  subject,  he  will  be  well  rewarded 
for  a  careful  perusal  of  this  and  the  following  cases,  in  which  the  luminous 
expositions  of  Sir  John  Nicholl  cannot  fail  to  please  and  convince :  Evans  v. 
Knight,  1  Addams,  229 ;  Lemann  v.  Bonsall,  ibid.  383. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DELIRIUM.  323 

was  that  she  was  not."  He  saw  her  once  or  twice  after- 
wards, when  she  was  "  quite  delirious  and  clearly  incapable." 
The  other  physicians  who  saw  her-  at  four  o'clock,  conceived 
her  "  quite  incapable  of  any  complicated  act;  undoubtedly  of 
any  thing  that  required  fixed  attention,  or  any  exercise  of 
mental  faculty."  The  attending  physician,  however,  attribu- 
ted the  delirium  to  the  paroxysms  of  severe  pain  suffered  by 
the  deceased,  it  being  scarcely  perceptible  when  these  were 
absent,  and  believed  that  in  the  intervals  she  had  perfect 
capacity.  It  appeared,  too,  that  the  will,  which  had  been 
prepared  from  instructions  just  before  received  from  her,  was 
read  over  to  the  deceased,  placed  before  her  while  she  was 
sitting  up  in  bed,  and  subscribed  by  her  in  the  usual  form 
•with  a  dash  below.  The  validity  of  the  will  was  established. 

§  312.  In  another  case,  the  testator  who  died  on  Friday, 
the  24th  of  April,  of  an  attack  of  pneumonia,  during  the 
latter  stages  of  which  he  had  considerable  delirium,  made  his 
testamentary  dispositions  on  the  21st.  One  of  the  physicians 
deposed  that  when  he  saw  the  deceased  on  the  21st,  "  he  was 
not  in  a  state  of  sound  mind,  memory,  and  understanding,  or 
capable  of  doing  any  act  requiring  the  exercise  of  thought, 
judgment,  and  reflection."  Another,  who  saw  him  for  the 
first  and  only  time  on  the  23d,  thought  it  was  extremely 
"  improbable  that  the  deceased  should  have  been  free  from 
wandering  and  mental  affection,  on  a  day  so  shortly  before 
he  saw  him,  as  the  21st."  It  appeared,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  he  gave  instructions  for  a  will  without  any  suggestions 
whatever  from  the  solicitor  who  reduced  them  to  writing, 
and  that  after  they  were  read  to  him,  he  approved  and  sub- 
scribed them.  It  was  also  deposed  by  other  witnesses,  that 
when  the  solicitor  came,  and  while  giving  him  instructions, 
he  appeared  rational  and  conducted  with  propriety.  The 
court  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  deceased's  testamentary 
capacity.1 

§  313.  In  cases  where  the  validity  of  testamentary  dis- 
positions is  impugned  on  the  ground  of  mental  incapacity 

1  Evans  v.  Knight  and  Moore,  1  Addams,  229. 


324  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

produced  by  delirium,  or  indeed  by  any  other  disorder,  it  is 
the  practice  of  the  English  ecclesiastical  courts,  not  to  con- 
fine their  attention  exclusively  to  the  evidence  directly  relat- 
ing to  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator,  but  to  consider 
all  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  testamentary  act ; 
for  the  object  is  not  so  much  to  settle  the  question  of  sound- 
ness and  unsoundness  in  general,  as  it  is  in  reference  to  that 
particular  act.  The  principle  is  —  and  it  is  one  that  is  well- 
grounded  in  the  common  experience  of  men  —  that  a  person 
may  be  capable  of  testamentary  acts,  while  technically  and 
really  unsound,  and  incapable  of  doing  other  acts  requiring 
much  reflection  and  deliberation.  This  principle  is  particu- 
larly applicable  in  cases  of  delirium  where  the  transitions 
from  a  state  of  senseless  raving  to  that  in  which  the  mind  is 
calm,  perfectly  rational,  and  conscious  of  its  condition,  are 
very  rapid,  and  where  in  the  lucid  interval,  the  mind,  though 
weak,  is  clear  and  unclouded  by  any  of  those  peculiar  views 
or  notions  which  often  characterize  the  lucid  intervals  in 
mania.  Accordingly,  the  testamentary  capacity  is  to  be  de- 
termined, in  a  great  measure,  by  the  nature  of  the  act  itself. 
If  it  be  agreeable  to  instructions  or  declarations  previously 
expressed,  when  unquestionably  sound  in  mind ;  if  it  be  con- 
sonant to  the  general  tenor  of  his  affections ;  if  it  be  consist- 
ent and  coherent,  one  part  with  another ;  and  if  it  have  been 
obtained  by  the  exercise  of  no  improper  influence ;  it  will  be 
established,  even  though  the  medical  evidence  may  throw 
strong  doubts  on  the  capacity  of  the  testator.  On  the  con- 
trary, when  these  conditions  are  absent,  or  are  replaced  by 
others  of  an  opposite  description,  it  will  as  generally  be  an- 
nulled, however  plain  and  positive  may  be  the  evidence  in 
favor  of  his  capacity.1 


1  In  illustration  of  these  remarks  the  reader  is  referred  to  Cook  v.  Goude 
and  Bennet,  1  Haggard,  577;  King  and  Thwaits  v.  Farley,  ibid.  502; 
Waters  v.  Hewlett,  3  Haggard,  790  ;  Bird  v.  Bird,  2  Haggard,  142;  Martin 
v.  Wotton,  1  Lee's  Eccl.  Rep.  130;  Bittleston  by  her  guardian  v.  Clark,  2 
Lee,  229 ;  Marsh  v.  Tyrrel,  2  Haggard's  Eccl.  Rep.  84 ;  Hoby  v.  Hoby  1 
Haggard,  146. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DELIRIUM.  325 

§  314.  In  some  affections  of  the  head,  and  they  may  be 
primary  or  sympathetic,  the  patient  lies  in  a  comatose  state 
from  which  he  may  be  aroused,  when  he  will  recognize  per- 
sons and  answer  questions  correctly  respecting  his  feelings, 
but  drop  asleep  again  as  soon  as  they  cease  to  excite  him. 
That  the  mind  is  much  embarrassed  certainly  cannot  be 
doubted,  and  it  is  well  known  that  when  the  patient  recovers, 
he  has,  ordinarily,  very  little  idea  of  what  passed  at  those 
times ;  indeed,  he  is  generally  unconscious  of  every  thing  he 
either  said  or  did.  It  would  be  a  bold  assertion  to  say  that 
the  mind,  under  these  circumstances,  is  legally  capable  of 
making  testamentary  dispositions,  and  they  ought,  therefore, 
to  receive  no  favor  from  courts.  In  cases  of  injury  to  the 
head,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  the  patient  (after  rallying  from 
its  immediate  effects)  to  answer  questions  rationally,  to 
appear  collected  and  intelligent,  in  short  to  have  fully 
recovered  his  senses,  though  he  may  subsequently  declare/ 
that  he  is  utterly  unconscious  of  what  were  his  acts,  thought, 
or  feelings  at  that  time.  Few,  even  among  medical  men, 
who  observe  a  person  under  such  circumstances,  would  have 
any  hesitation  in  expressing  their  belief  in  his  testamentary 
capacity,  though  the  event  would  show  that  they  had  labored 
under  a  serious  error. 


28 


CHAPTER   XIII. 


DURATION   AND   CURABILITY   OF   MADNESS. 

§  315.  WITH  the  exception  of  that  kind  of  dementia  that 
occurs  at  other  periods  of  life  than  that  of  old  age,  mania  is 
the  only  form  of  insanity  that  admits  of  a  cure ;  and  though 
its  duration  is  various,  the  probability  of  this  event  is  almost 
entirely  destroyed  within  a  comparatively  short  space  of 
time.  This  is  abundantly  evident  from  the  statistics  of  mad- 
ness that  have  been  published  from  time  to  time  by  the  heads 
of  various  lunatic  establishments.  Esquirol  concludes,  on 
data  furnished  by  the  returns  of  the  principal  French  and 
English  hospitals,  that  the  absolute  number  of  recoveries 
from  madness  is  about  one  in  three ;  and  also  that  the  num- 
ber of  recoveries  varies  in  different  establishments,  from  one 
in  four,  to  one  in  two  or  two  and  a  half  of  the  whole  number 
of  persons  affected.  Prichard  regards  this  computation  of 
recoveries  as  much  below  what  really  takes  place  under 
favorable  circumstances,  and  the  reports  of  American  hospi- 
tals confirm  the  correctness  of  his  opinion.  Such,  however, 
is  the  imperfection  of  statistics  on  this  subject,  that  we  can 
speak  with  but  little  confidence  respecting  the  proportion  of 
recoveries.  We  only  know  that  in  cases  subjected  to 
judicious  treatment  soon  after  the  attack,  recovery  takes 
place  in  the  proportion  of  six  or  eight  to  ten ;  while  in  those 
which  have  continued  a  couple  of  years,  there  is  little  pros- 
pect of  recovery.  Pinel,  in  a  memoir  presented  to  the  Insti- 
tute in  1800,  was  led  to  conclude  from  a  selection  of  cases 
expressly  chosen  for  this  purpose,  that  a  greater  number  of 
recoveries  takes  place  in  the  first  month  than  in  any  succeed- 
ing one,  and  that  the  mean  time  of  the  duration  of  the  dis- 


DURATION   AND    CURABILITY   OF  MADNESS.  327 

ease  when  cured,  is  between  five  and  six  months.  Esquirol, 
however,  gives  a  table  of  recoveries  at  the  Salpetriere  during 
ten  years,  which  shows  a  little  longer  term  to  insanity.  Out 
of  two  thousand  and  five  patients,  twelve  hundred  and 
twenty-three  were  cured,  viz.,  six  hundred  and  four  during 
the  first  year ;  four  hundred  and  ninety-seven  in  the  second ; 
eighty-six  in  the  third ;  and  forty-one  in  the  seven  succeeding 
years;  from  which  it  appears  that  eleven  twelfths  of  the 
number  of  cures  is  obtained  within  the  first  two  years ;  that 
the  mean  duration  of  cases  cured  is  a  little  short  of  one  year ; 
and  that  after  the  third  year,  the  probability  of  a  cure  is 
scarcely  more  than  one  in  thirty.  M.  Desportes  states,  from 
observations  made  at  the  Bicetre  and  Salpetriere,  that  of  the 
whole  number  of  recoveries  in  1822,  1823,  and  1824,  seven 
hundred  and  forty-six  took  place  in  the  first  year,  and  one  hun- 
dred and  eighteen  only  from  the  second  to  the  seventh  year.1 
§  316.  Recovery  from  insanity  generally  takes  place 
gradually,  though  occasionally  the  disease  may  suddenly 
disappear  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  moral  or  physical 
impressions.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a  literary  gentleman 
who,  in  a  paroxysm  of  suicidal  mania  resolved  to  go  and 
jump  into  the  river.  On  arriving  at  the  bridge,  he  was  at- 
tacked by  robbers,  against  whom  he  defended  himself  vigor- 
ously, beat  them  off,  forgot  the  purpose  of  his  excursion,  and 
returned  home  cured.  Dr.  Rush  relates  that  one  of  his 
patients,  for  whom  he  had  recommended  gentle  exercise  on 
horseback,  was  suddenly  cured  in  consequence  of  the  fright 
experienced  from  her  horse  running  away  in  one  of  her  excur- 
sions. He  was  stopped  by  a  gate,  and  when  her  attendants 
came  up  they  found  her  entirely  restored  to  reason.  Several 
other  cases  of  recovery  are  related,  produced  by  a  similar 
cause.  Esquirol  speaks  of  having  cured  a  girl  at  once,  by 
the  terror  she  experienced  at  the  sight  of  the  actual  cautery 
which  he  was  about  to  apply.  He  also  mentions  the  case  of 
a  girl  who,  after  being  insane  ten  years,  suddenly  ran  to  her 
mother's  bed,  exclaiming,  as  she  embraced  her,  "  Mother, 

1  Esquirol,  Des  nial.  ment.  i.  94. 


328  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

mother,  I  am  well."  She  had  become  insane  in  consequence 
of  a  suppression  of  the  menses  which  at  last  made  their  ap- 
pearance on  the  evening  preceding  her  cure.  Prichard  states 
that  several  instances  of  sudden  cure  from  the  same  cause, 
have  occurred  in  some  of  the  English  hospitals.  Insanity 
has  been  sometimes  cured  by  an  attack  of  fever.  A  number 
of  maniacs  were  once  cured,  in  the  Pennsylvania  hospital, 
by  a  malignant  fever  which  appeared  in  that  establishment. 
Direct  appeals  to  the  reasoning  power  have  sometimes  been 
followed  by  immediate  recovery.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a 
watchmaker  who  became  deranged,  and  believed  that  he  had 
been  guillotined,  and  that  in  consequence  of  the  mixing  of 
the  heads  of  other  victims,  his  own  had  been  replaced  by 
another.  When  the  miracle  of  St.  Denis  was  mentioned, 
who  carried  his  head  under  his  arm  and  kissed  it  as  he  went, 
he  contended  for  the  possibility  of  the  fact,  by  appealing  to 
his  own  case,  when  one  of  his  companions  burst  into  a  loud 
laugh,  saying,  "  What  a  fool  you  are ;  how  could  St.  Denis 
kiss  his  own  head  ?  was  it  with  his  heel  ? "  The  absurdity 
of  the  idea  struck  his  mind,  and  he  never  after  spoke  of  the 
misplacement.  Dr.  Cox  speaks  of  a  patient  who  believed 
that  he  was  the  Holy  Ghost.  Another  asked  him,  "  Are  there 
two  Holy  Ghosts  ?  how  can  you  be  the  Holy  Ghost  and  I  be  so 
too  ?  "  He  appeared  surprised,  and  after  pausing  awhile  said, 
"  But  are  you  the  Holy  Ghost  ?  "  and  when  the  other  replied, 
"  Did  you  not  know  that  I  was  ?  "  he  answered,  "  I  did  not 
know  it  before ;  then  I  cannot  be  the  Holy  Ghost."  1  It  is 
probable  that  in  nearly  if  not  quite  all  these  cases  of  sud- 
den recovery  by  means  of  mental  impressions,  the  disease 
was  declining,  and  that  its  termination  was  hastened  only 
by  these  impressions. 

§  317.  Partial  intellectual  mania  is  said  to  be  cured  with 
much  more  difficulty  than  general  mania,  and  the  latter  is 
more  easily  cured  when  the  sequel  of  some  violent  cause, 
than  when  it  has  come  on  gradually  from  some  steadily  con- 
tinued influence.  Among  the  circumstances  favorable  to 

1  Spurzheim  on  Insanity,  294. 


DURATION   AND   CURABILITY   OF  MADNESS.  329 

recovery  may  be  mentioned  a  constitution  not  greatly  de- 
bilitated by  excesses  of  any  kind,  good  moral  and  intellectual 
education,  the  absence  of  hereditary  predisposition,  and  an 
early  medical  treatment 

§  318.  The  above  facts  and  considerations  will  furnish  the 
data,  on  which  the  physician  is  to  form  an  opinion  relative 
to  the  duration  and  curability  of  any  given  case  of  insanity. 
While  in  very  many  cases  incurability  is  almost  certain, 
and  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in  certifying  the  same,  there 
are  none  in  regard  to  which  we  can  predict  a  certain  re- 
covery. The  utmost  we  can  say  in  the  most  favorable  cases 
is,  that  the  patient  will  probably  recover,  and  the  physician 
cannot  be  too  cautious  how  he  commits  his  own  reputation 
and  the  interests  and  happiness  of  others  by  the  expression 
of  hasty  and  positive  opinions.1  Idiocy,  imbecility,  and  senile 
dementia  admit  neither  of  cure  nor  amelioration,  and  when 
mania  is  of  more  than  two  years'  standing,  and  especially 
if  other  circumstances  are  not  favorable,  it  may  be  safely 
said  there  is  but  little  hope  of  cure,  but  never  that  the  case 
is  beyond  all  hope.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  persons, 
after  years  of  insanity,  have  sometimes  recovered  their  reason 
shortly  before  death. 

§  319.  An  important  feature  of  insanity  in  a  medico- 
legal  point  of  view,  is  its  tendency  to  relapse  during  con- 
valescence, and  to  recurrence  after  being  perfectly  cured. 
The  general  rule  is,  that  a  brain  which  has  once  been  the 
seat  of  the  maniacal  action  is  far  more  liable  to  its  recur- 
rence, than  one  which  has  not.  Many  recover  the  full 
strength  and  activity  of  their  mental  faculties,  but  the  ma- 
jority, Prichard  thinks,  are  curable  only  to  a  certain  extent. 
"  They  remain,"  says  Esquirol,  "  in  such  a  state  of  suscep- 
tibility that  the  slightest  causes  give  rise  to  relapses,  and  they 
only  preserve  their  sanity  by  continuing  to  live  in  a  house 

1  If  proof  be  required  of  the  propriety  of  this  warning,  the  reader  will  find 
a  memorable  one,  in  TVraxaU's  (Posthumous  Memoirs)  lively  description  of 
the  contradictory  statements  and  dogmatic  assertions  into  which  the  medical 
attendants  of  George  HI.  were  betrayed  by  party  zeal,  and  which  resulted  in 
the  confusion  and  disgrace  of  some  respectable  physicians. 

28* 


330  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

where  no  mental  agitation  or  inquietude,  no  unfortunate  con- 
tingency is  likely  to  fall  to  their  lot,  and  throw  them  back  to 
their  former  state.  There  are  other  individuals  whose  facul- 
ties have  sustained  such  a  shock,  that  they  are  never  capable 
of  returning  to  the  sphere  which  they  had  held  in  society. 
They  are  perfectly  rational,  but  have  not  sufficient  mental 
capacity  to  become  again  military  officers,  to  conduct  com- 
mercial affairs,  or  to  fulfil  the  duties  belonging  to  their 
appointments."  *  The  proportion  of  cases  in  which  insanity 
is  recurrent,  is  estimated  by  writers  at  from  one  tenth  to  one 
sixth ;  Esquirol  estimates  it  at  one  twentieth.  In  those  cases 
where  the  mind 'on  recovery  regains  its  usual  capability,  this 
disposition  to  recurrence  is  by  no  means  so  strong,  as  when 
it  is  left  in  a  weak  and  irritable  state,  and  it  diminishes  with 
the  length  of  the  interval  after  the  recovery.  This  feature  of 
insanity  should  ever  be  borne  in  mind  by  the  physician,  when 
required  to  give  his  opinion  on  the  propriety  of  removing  the 
interdiction  of  an  insane  person,  who  is  apparently  restored 
to  health.  He  should  seriously  consider  the  risk  that  he 
runs,  by  entering  again  on  the  busy  scenes  of  life,  and  endur- 
ing the  anxiety  and  excitement  attendant  011  the  manage- 
ment of  his  affairs,  of  renewing  that  cerebral  irritation  which 
the  quiet  and  repose  of  seclusion  have  temporarily  subdued. 
In  criminal  cases,  also,  it  should  lead  to  a  thorough  and 
candid  investigation  of  the  plea  of  insanity  urged  in  defence 
of  those  who  have  previously  suffered  from  it,  and  it  should 
be  satisfactorily  settled  whether  or  not  the  circumstances 
attending  the  criminal  act  were  likely  to  reproduce  that 
pathological  condition  on  which  insanity  depends.  If  it 
should  prove  that  they  were  of  that  nature,  and  that  the 
individual  had  but  recently  recovered  from  an  attack  of 
insanity,  then  it  would  indicate  a  confidence  that  springs  from 
some  other  source  than  a  just  appreciation  of  the  phenomenon 
of  insanity  under  consideration,  to  presume,  nevertheless,  the 
continuance  of  mental  soundness  and,  consequently,  of  moral 
responsibility. 

1  Des  maladies  mentales,  i.  96. 


DURATION   AND    CURABILITY   OF   MADNESS.  331 

§  320.  We  are  also  to  bear  in  mind,  that  a  considerable 
number  recover  only  to  a  certain  point.  They  recover  so  far 
as  to  be  free  from  all  delusions,  to  maintain  unremitting  self- 
control,  and  transact  their  customary  business  correctly  and 
shrewdly,  but  never  regain  confidence  in  those  who  favored 
their  confinement  or  restraint,  though  their  part  in  it  was 
prompted  by  kindness  and  managed  discreetly  and  consider- 
ately. This  state  of  feeling  varies  from  tacit  distrust  and 
aversion,  to  a  deep  malignity  that  leads  to  violence  and 
litigation.  Having  regained  all  their  natural  shrewdness, 
they  have  no  difficulty  in  enlisting  the  sympathies  of  those 
—  and  they  constitute  the  greater  part  of  mankind  —  who 
are  ever  ready  to  yield  their  faith  to  any  statement  that  is 
uttered  with  a  certain  plausibility  of  manner.  Whether 
actuated  by  a  kind  of  pride  that  refuses  to  acknowledge  that 
they  have  been  the  subjects  of  so  humbling  an  infirmity  as 
insanity,  or  an  obscurity  in  their  recollections  of  the  past,  that 
leads  them  to  mingle  the  real  and  imaginary,  and  confound 
the  scenes  with  the  cause  of  their  suffering,  they  persist  in 
referring  the  mental  tortures  they  endured,  to  the  measures 
that  were  meant  for  their  mitigation,  and  attributing  their 
various  discomforts  to  the  cruelty  or  neglect  of  others,  rather 
than  to  the  disordered  condition  of  their  own  minds.  Even 
when  they  fail  to  convince  the  world  that  they  were  never 
insane,  —  for  of  this  fact  there  may  have  been  too  many 
witnesses,  —  they  often  leave  the  impression  that  they  have 
been  unjustly,  if  not  cruelly  dealt  with.1 

§  321.     It   has  been  already  remarked  that  in  most  in- 


1  A  memorable  case  of  this  description  —  memorable  for  the  success  which 
followed  the  representations  of  the  patient,  and  the  utter  groundlessness  of 
the  charges  which  he  brought — occurred  but  two  or  three  years  ago,  in 
Philadelphia.  A  man  named  Hinchman  who  was  placed  in  the  Friends' 
Asylum  for  the  insane  in  Frankford,  because,  as  the  evidence  showed  beyond 
a  doubt,  he  was  violently  and  dangerously  insane,  brought  an  action  of  con- 
spiracy against  every  individual  the  least  concerned  in  the  measure,  —  his 
mother,  sister,  cousins,  the  sheriff',  a  passing  traveller,  the  physicians  of  the 
Asylum  and  the  physician  who  signed  the  certificate,  and  others,  —  and  he 
succeeded  in  obtaining  heavy  damages. 


332  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

stances,  recovery  takes  place  gradually,  and  is  completed  only 
after  a  period,  more  or  less  long,  of  convalescence.  Nothing, 
therefore,  can  be  more  chimerical  than  the  idea  of  fixing  on 
any  precise  moment  when  all  disease  has  departed  and 
perfect  health  is  established ;  and  yet  this  is  what  we  are 
called  upon  to  do  when  required  to  determine,  as  we  some- 
times are  in  criminal  cases,  at  what  time  the  accused  began  to 
be  responsible.  To  contend  that  a  convalescent  maniac  may 
be  irresponsible  one  day  and  responsible  the  next,  would  be  no 
less  absurd  than  to  say  to  one  recovering  from  inflammation 
of  the  lungs,  that,  as  he  valued  his  life,  he  must  not  leave  his 
room  to-day,  though  to-morrow  he  might  safely  expose  him- 
self to  the  severest  inclemency  of  the  weather ;  and  to  believe 
that  the  former  is  perfectly  sound,  because  laboring  under 
no  hallucination  and  attacked  by  no  fits  of  fury,  would  be  as 
erroneous,  as  to  consider  the  respiratory  functions  of  the 
latter  sound  and  vigorous,  because  we  hear  no  cough  and  see 
no  difficulty  of  breathing.  The  time  that  has  elapsed  since 
the  unequivocal  insanity  of  the  accused,  is  therefore  an  im- 
portant element  in  the  determination  of  his  mental  sound- 
ness. Just  as  exposure  to  bad  weather,  a  week  after  an 
attack  of  inflammation  of  lungs  had  begun  to  subside,  would 
be  more  likely  to  reproduce  the  disease,  than  it  would  a 
month  afterwards ;  so  the  longer  the  time  since  an  attack  of 
insanity  has  been  apparently  cured,  the  less  likely  is  the  cere- 
bral irritation  to  be  renewed  by  sudden  provocations  or  other 
causes  that  tend  to  produce  it.  Ample  time  must  be  allowed 
to  cover  the  period  of  convalescence,  and  if  it  be  difficult  to 
fix  upon  the  exact  duration  of  this  state,  so  much  greater 
the  necessity  of  caution  in  determining  the  responsibility  of 
the  accused.  Here  it  is  often  a  merit  to  doubt,  and  justice 
requires  that  the  accused  should  have  the  benefit  of  our 
doubts. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 


LUCID   INTERVALS. 

§  322.  IT  is  well  known  that  many  diseases  —  especially 
of  the  class  called  nervous  —  observe  a  law  of  periodicity 
which  is  not  uncommon  in  the  actions  of  the  animal  econo- 
my. One  effect  of  this  curious  law  consists  in  an  intermis- 
sion of  the  outward  manifestations  of  the  disease,  so  com- 
plete as  to  bear  the  appearance  of  a  perfect  cure,  and  this,  in 
the  present  state  of  our  knowledge,  is  all  that  we  can,  with 
certainty,  say  of  it.  As  to  the  change  that  takes  place  in 
the  organic  condition  of  the  part  affected,  during  the  inter- 
mission, we  can  at  best  hazard  nothing  more  than  a  rude 
conjecture.  We  have  no  warrant  for  believing  that  the 
pathological  affection  itself  entirely  disappears  with  the 
symptoms  that  arise  from  it,  and  perhaps  never  shall  have, 
until  we  are  able  to  explain  why,  after  such  disappearance, 
the  tendency  of  the  disease  to  return  at  certain  intervals 
should  still  remain;  or,  in  other  words,  wherein  the  final, 
perfect  cure  differs  from  the  temporary  intermission.  But  in 
view  of  the  established  fact  that  organic  disease  often  exists 
without  producing  its  ordinary  symptoms,  or  revealing  itself 
by  any  appreciable  signs,  it  seems  the  more  probable  suppo- 
sition, that  the  pathological  condition  of  the  affected  organs 
does  not  disappear  entirely  during  the  intermission,  but 
continues  with  perhaps  a  modified  intensity. 

§  323.  The  slightest  examination  will  convince  us,  that 
in  the  most  complete  intermission  of  any  disease  that  affects 
the  whole  system  to  some  extent,  the  patient  is  far  from 
enjoying  sound  health,  or  free  from  every  indication  of 
morbid  action.  A  greater  contrast  in  the  matter  of  health, 
can  scarcely  be  presented  in  the  same  individual,  than 


334  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

that  between  the  paroxysm  and  the  intermission  of  a 
quotidian  fever;  yet  none  will  say,  after  the  former  has 
passed  off,  and  the  patient  is  no  longer  shaking  with  cold 
nor  parched  with  he5,t,  but  is  able  to  arise  and  give  some 
attention  to  his  duties,  that  he  is  entirely  well.  Better,  no 
doubt,  he  is  ;  but  his  mind  is  weak,  his  stomach  declines 
its  once  favorite  food,  a  little  exertion  overcomes  him,  a  cer- 
tain malaise  not  easily  described,  pervades  his  whole  system, 
and  which,  though  not  excessively  painful,  is  something  very 
different  from  the  buoyant  sensation  of  health.  We  are 
therefore  bound  to  believe,  that  the  disease  still  exists,  though 
its  external  aspect  has  changed.  And  here  it  may  be  as 
well  to  remark,  that  we  must  riot  be  led  by  an  abuse  of 
language  to  attribute  that  to  the  disease  —  to  the  pathologi- 
cal condition  —  which  belongs  only  to  one  of  its  symptoms. 
When  the  epileptic,  a  few  days  after  one  of  his  frightful  con- 
vulsions, appears  to  have  regained  his  customary  health,  no 
intelligent  physician  imagines  that  the  proximate  cause  of 
this  disturbance  has  vanished  with  the  fit,  leaving  the  organ 
it  affected  as  sound  as  ever.  The  fit  itself  which  is  a  mere 
symptom,  is  indeed  of  periodical  occurrence,  but  the  patho- 
logical condition  on  which  it  depends,  continues,  slowly  and 
surely  though  imperceptibly,  to  undermine  the  powers  of  the 
constitution.  The  general  expression  of  all  our  knowledge 
on  the  subject  of  the  intermission  of  diseases  is,  then,  that 
certain  pathological  conditions  give  rise,  among  other  phe- 
nomena, to  some  that  disappear  for  a  time,  only  to  recur 
after  an  interval  of  more  or  less  duration. 

§  324.  That  insanity,  or  rather  mania,  is  one  of  the  dis- 
eases that  are  subject  to  this  law  of  periodicity,  in  some 
respects,  is  universally  admitted ;  but  to  what  extent  the  law 
operates,  is  a  point  on  which  there  is  much  diversity  of 
opinion.  There  are  few  cases  in  which  we  may  not  observe 
various  periods  in  their  course,  when  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms  is  greatly  alleviated;  when  calmness  takes  the 
place  of  fury,  and  a  quiet  and  sober  demeanor  succeeds  to 
noisy  and  restless  agitation ;  when  reason,  driven  from  her 
throne,  seems  to  be  retracing  her  steps  and  struggling  for  her 


DURATION   AND    CURABILITY   OF   MADNESS.  335 

lost  dominion.  In  all  this,  however,  there  is  nothing  differ- 
ent from  what  occurs  in  many,  if  not  the  greater  proportion 
of  chronic  diseases.  In  mania,  but  in  no  other  form  of  in- 
sanity, this  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the  symptoms  may 
amount  to  a  complete  intermission,  when  the  patient  is  con- 
scious of  his  true  condition,  converses  rationally,  and  admits 
his  having  been  insane.  But  that  the  intermissions  of  mania 
are  ever  so  complete,  that  the  mind  is  restored  to  its  original 
integrity,  would  seem  scarcely  probable,  from  the  fact,  that 
the  very  seat  of  the  pathological  changes  is  the  material 
organ  on  which  the  manifestations  of  the  mental  phenomena 
depend.  For  if  the  mind  be  rendered  as  sound  as  before  the 
attack,  it  necessarily  follows  that  the  brain  is  equally  restored, 
since  in  point  of  health  they  stand  to  each  other  in  the  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect.  But  as  there  is  no  proof  that  such 
is  the  case,  and  as  the  supposition  is  not  supported  by  what 
we  do  know  of  pathological  actions,  we  have  no  right,  at 
present,  to  conclude  that  the  physical  condition  on  which 
mania  depends  is  entirely  removed  during  the  intermission. 
We  are  thus  led  to  scrutinize  a  little  more  closely  these  peri- 
odical restorations  of  the  insane  mind,  or  lucid  intervals,  as 
they  are  called,  in  order  to  ascertain  if  possible,  what  is  the 
actual  state  of  the  mind  at  these  times.  But  before  doing 
this,  it  will  be  proper  to  show  what  is  understood  in  law  by 
lucid  intervals,  as  explained  by  eminent  legal  authorities. 

§  325.  D'Aguesseau,  in  his  pleading  in  the  case  of  the 
Abb£  d' Orleans,  says,  "  It  must  not  be  a  superficial  tran- 
quillity, a  shadow  of  repose,  but  on  the  contrary  a  profound 
tranquillity,  a  real  repose ;  it  must  be,  not  a  mere  ray  of 
reason,  which  only  makes  its  absence  more  apparent  when  it 
is  gone.  —  not  a  flash  of  lightning,  which  pierces  through  the 
darkness  only  to  render  it  more  gloomy  and  dismal,  —  not 
a  glimmering,  which  joins  the  night  to  the  day ;  but  a  per- 
fect light,  a  lively  and  continued  lustre,  a  full  and  entire  day 
interposed  between  the  two  separate  nights,  of  the  fury 
which  precedes  and  follows  it ;  and,  to  use  another  image, 
it  is  not  a  deceitful  and  faithless  stillness  which  follows  or 


336  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

forebodes  a  storm,  but  a  sure  and  steadfast  tranquillity  for  a 
time,  a  real  calm,  a  perfect  serenity ;  in  fine,  without  look- 
ing for  so  many  metaphors  to  represent  our  idea,  it  must  be 
not  a  mere  diminution,  a  remission  of  the  complaint,  but  a 
kind  of  temporary  cure,  an  intermission  so  clearly  marked, 
as  in  every  respect  to  resemble  the  restoration  of  health."  l 

§  326.  Many  years  after,  Lord  Thurlow,  in  the  court  of 
chancery,  thus  stated  his  views  of  the  condition  of  mind 
necessary  to  constitute  a  lucid  interval.  "  By  a  perfect  in- 
terval, I  do  not  mean  a  cooler  moment,  an  abatement  of  pain 
or  violence,  or  of  a  higher  state  of  torture,  —  a  mind  relieved 
from  excessive  pressure ;  but  an  interval  in  which  the  mind, 
having  thrown  off  the  disease,  had  recovered  its  general 
habit." 2 

§  327.  Here,  then,  is  the  lucid  interval  as  clearly  and  mi- 
nutely described,  as  a  profusion  of  words  and  metaphors 
could  do  it,  and  as  such  it  was  believed  by  these  authorities, 
no  doubt,  to  have  a  real  existence.  In  the  early  periods  of 
the  English  law,  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals  was  univer- 
sally admitted,  and  they  seem  to  have  been  considered  not 
a  rare,  but  a  very  common  phenomenon  of  mental  derange- 
ment. Indeed,  judging  from  the  frequent  mention  made  of 
them  in  all  discussions  on  the  subject,  and  from  the  fact  that 
idiocy  and  lunacy  —  which  latter  was  considered,  as  its 
name  would  lead  us  to  suspect,  to  be  of  an  intermittent  na- 
ture—  constituted,  for  a  long  time,  the  only  division  of 
mental  diseases,  it  will  not  perhaps  be  too  strong  an  expres- 
sion to  say,  that  they  were  viewed  as  an  essential  feature  of 
mania.  This,  however,  was  in  the  infancy  of  medical 
science,  before  the  phenomena  of  mania  —  which,  until  re- 
cently, has  always  been  less  understood  than  other  diseases 
—  were  thoroughly  and  accurately  observed,  and  the  men 
whose  ideas  we  have  just  quoted  had  no  practical  acquaint- 
ance with  the  disorder  whose  phases  they  so  vividly  de- 


1  Pothier  on  Obligations,  by  Evans,  Appendix,  579. 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Parnther,  3  Brown's  Ch.  Cases,  234. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  337 

scribed.  Before  adopting  their  views,  then,  it  will  be  pro- 
per to  inquire  how  far  they  are  supported  by  the  investiga- 
tions of  modern  medical  science. 

§  328.  While  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals,  as  ex- 
plained by  the  language  above  quoted,  is  upheld  by  scarcely 
a  single  eminent  name  in  the  medical  profession,  we  find 
that  their  existence  is  either  denied  altogether,  or  they  are 
regarded  as  being  only  a  remission,  instead  of  an  intermis- 
sion of  the  disease ;  an  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms,  not  a  temporary  cure.  Mr.  Haslam  who  is  no 
mean  authority  on  any  question  connected  with  insanity, 
emphatically  declares,  that,  "  as  a  constant  observer  of  this 
disease  for  more  than  twenty-five  years,  I  cannot  affirm  that 
the  lunatics,  with  whom  I  have  had  daily  intercourse,  have 
manifested  alternations  of  insanity  and  reason.  They  may 
at  intervals  become  more  tranquil,  and  less  disposed  to 
obtrude  their  distempered  fancies  into  notice.  For  a  time 
their  minds  may  be  less  active,  and  the  succession  of  their 
thoughts  consequently  more  deliberate ;  they  may  endeavor 
to  effect  some  desirable  purpose,  and  artfully  conceal  their 
real  opinions,  but  they  have  not  abandoned,  nor  renounced 
their  distempered  notions.  It  is  as  unnecessary  to  repeat 
that  a  few  coherent  sentences  do  not  constitute  the  sanity  of 
the  intellect ;  as  that  the  sounding  of  one  or  two  notes  of  a 
keyed  instrument  could  ascertain  it  to  be  in  tune." 1 

§  329.  Strong  as  this  testimony  is,  and  true,  no  doubt, 
as  the  result  of  an  individual's  experience,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  others,  whose  opportunities  have  not  been  less  than  Mr. 
Haslam's,  have  distinctly  recognized  the  existence  of  inter- 
vals, when  the  patient  not  only  becomes  more  tranquil  and 
reserved,  but  is  conscious  of  having  been  mad,  and  perceives 
the  folly  of  the  delusions  that  have  engrossed  his  thoughts. 
But  so  far  are  they  from  attributing  to  the  mind,  during  their 
occurrence,  that  degree  of  soundness  which  is  contended  for 
in  the  passages  above  quoted,  that  they  have  taken  great  care 
to  inculcate  a  very  different  doctrine.  "  The  mania,"  says 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  224. 
29 


338  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

Foderd,  "  which  is  accompanied  by  fury,  is  very  often  periodi- 
cal ;  that  is,  as  if  granting  an  occasional  truce  to  the  patient, 
it  appears  only  at  certain  epochs,  between  which  he  enjoys 
all  his  reason,  and  seems  to  conduct  and  judge  in  all  respects 
like  other  men,  if  we  except  in  regard  to  certain  ideas  the 
thought  of  which  may  at  any  time  occasion  a  fresh  par- 
oxysm." 1 

§  330.  Georget,  while  he  speaks  of  lucid  intervals  "  as 
returns  to  reason,"  is  careful  to  add,  that,  "  in  this  state, 
patients  frequently  experience  some  degree  of  malaise,  of 
some  disturbance  of  their  ideas,  and  weakness  of  mind, 
which  prevents  them  from  fixing  their  attention,  for  any 
length  of  time,  on  a  particular  subject;  from  engaging  in 
reading,  writing,  or  attending  to  their  affairs."  2 

§  331.  "  There  are  few  cases  of  mania  or  melancholy," 
says  Dr.  Reid,  "  where  the  light  of  reason  does  not  now  and 
then  shine  out  between  the  clouds.  In  fevers  of  the  mind 
as  well  as  those  of  the  body,  there  occur  frequent  intermis- 
sions. But  the  mere  interruption  of  a  disorder  is  not  to  be 
mistaken  for  its  cure,  or  its  ultimate  conclusion.  Little 
stress  ought  to  be  laid  upon  those  occasional  and  uncertain 
disentanglements  of  intellect,  in  which  the  patient  is  for  a 
time  only,  extricated  from  the  labyrinth  of  his  morbid  hallu- 
cinations. Madmen  may  show,  at  starts,  more  sense  than 
ordinary  men."  f 

§  332.  Dr.  Combe,  in  one  of  the  most  philosophical 
treatises  on  Insanity,  which  the  present  century  has  pro- 
duced, expresses  similar  views  in  the  most  explicit  and 
forcible  language.  "  But  however  calm  and  rational  the 
patient  may  appear  to  be,  during  the  lucid  intervals,  as  they 
are  called,  and  while  enjoying  the  quietude  of  domestic 
society,  or  the  limited  range  of  a  well  regulated  asylum,  it 
must  never  be  supposed,  that  he  is  in  as  perfect  possession 
of  his  senses,  as  if  he  had  never  been  ill.  In  ordinary  cir- 


1  De  Mddecine  Le"gale,  i.  205,  §  140. 

2  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  46. 

8  Essays  on  Hypochondriacal  and  other  Nervous  affections:  21st  Essay. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  339 

• 

cumstances  and  under  ordinary  excitement,  his  perceptions 
may  be  accurate,  and  his  judgment  perfectly  sound ;  but  a 
degree  of  irritability  of  brain  remains  behind,  which  renders 
him  unable  to  withstand  any  unusual  emotion,  any  sudden 
provocation,  or  any  unexpected  and  pressing  emergency. 
Were  not  this  the  case,  it  is  manifest  that  he  would  not  be 
more  liable  to  a  fresh  paroxysm,  than  if  he  had  never  been 
attacked.  And  the  opposite  is  notoriously  the  fact;  for 
relapses  are  always  to  be  dreaded,  not  only  after  a  lucid 
interval,  but  even  after  perfect  recovery.  And  it  is  but  just 
as  well  as  proper  to  keep  this  in  mind,  as  it  has  too  often 
happened,  that  the  lunatic  has  been  visited  with  the  heaviest 
responsibility,  for  acts  committed  during  such  an  interval, 
which,  previous  to  the  first  attack  of  the  disease,  he  would 
have  shrunk  from  with  horror."  l 

§  333.  With  the  views  of  these  distinguished  observers 
before  us,  what  are  we  to  think  of  the  doctrine,  that  in  the 
lucid  intervals  the  mind  is  restored  to  its  natural  strength 
and  soundness ;  that  it  is  capable  of  as  great  intellectual 
exertions,  and  of  holding  as  tight  a  rein  over  the  passions ; 
that  it  is  as  able  to  resist  foreign  influence  and  to  act  on  its 
own  determinations,  with  its  ordinary  prudence  and  forecast ; 
that  "  having  thrown  off  the  disease,  it  has  recovered  its  gene- 
ral habit,"  or  that  it  has  undergone  a  "temporary  cure?" 
Sounder  patho.logy  was  never  written,  than  is  contained  in 
the  extract  from  Dr.  Combe,  and  no  physician,  who  has  been 
much  conversant  with  the  insane,  will  be  disposed  to  ques- 
tion its  correctness.  Foder£  goes  a  step  farther  and  hazards 
a  theory  which  is  plausible,  at  least,  to  explain  the  pathologi- 
cal causes  that  produce  this  alternation  of  paroxysms  and 
lucid  intervals.  The  former  state,  he  considers,  is  attended 
by  an  excessive  plethora  of  the  blood-vessels  of  the  brain, 
and  the  latter  by  a  relaxed,  atonic  condition  of  these  vessels, 
which  is  an  effect  of  their  previous  forcible  distension.  In 
this  condition  they  are  liable  to  be  suddenly  engorged  by 
exciting  causes,  such  as  intemperance  in  eating  or  drinking, 

1  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  241. 


340  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

• 

anger,  violent  exercise,  insolation,  etc. ;  or  in  consequence  of 
a  certain  predisposition  of  constitution.1  Indeed,  it  is  well 
known,  that  the  return  of  the  paroxysms  is  often  retarded  by 
regulated  diet,  bleeding,  quiet,  seclusion,  kind  treatment,  and 
the  absence  of  the  above-named  stimuli.  It  is  thus  shown, 
conclusively,  that  in  every  lucid  interval,  there  remains  some 
unsoundness  of  the  material  organ  of  the  mind,  which  may 
be  designated  generally  as  a  morbid  irritability,  which,  on 
the  application  of  the  slightest  exciting  cause,  may  produce 
an  outbreak  of  mania  in  all  its  original  severity. 

§  334.  The  principle  of  law,  which  holds  the  civil  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  insane  to  be  unimpaired  during  the  lucid 
interval,  we  are  willing  to  admit,  is  generally  correct.  It 
should  be  the  duty  of  courts,  however,  to  view  their  acts 
done  at  such  times  with  the  most  watchful  jealousy,  because 
their  minds,  though  left  free  from  all  delusion,  are  neverthe- 
less weak  and  irritable,  and  they  may  be  easily  induced  by 
the  arts  of  unprincipled  men,  to  enter  into  transactions, 
the  folly  of  which  would  have  been  obvious  enough  to  them 
before  they  began  to  be  insane.  Although  inclined  to  be- 
lieve that  the  restoration  of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  inter- 
val is  far  from  being  so  perfect,  as  it  is  represented  by  the 
legal  authorities  above  quoted,  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say, 
that  the  proof  of  its  occurrence  should  be  as  strong,  as  they 
require  it.  D'Aguesseau,  in  continuation  of  the  remarks 
above  quoted,  declares,  that,  "  as  it  is  impossible  to  judge  in 
a  moment  of  the  quality  of  an  interval,  it  is  requisite  that  there 
should  be  a  sufficient  length  of  time  for  giving  a  perfect  assur- 
ance of  the  temporary  reestablishment  of  reason,  which  it  is 
not  possible  to  define  in  general,  and  which  depends  upon 
the  different  kinds  of  fury,  but  it  is  certain  there  must  be  a 
time  and  a  considerable  time."  Lord  Thurlow,  also,  on  the 
same  occasion  which  elicited  his  views  of  the  nature  of  the 
lucid  interval,  says,  that  "the  evidence  in  support  of  the 
allegation  of  a  lucid  interval,  after  derangement  at  any  period 
has  been  established,  should  be  as  strong  and  demonstrative 

1  De  Medicine  Legale,  i.  208,  §  140. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  341 

of  such  fact,  as  where  the  object  of  the  proof  is  to  establish 
derangement.1  The  evidence  in  such  a  case,  applying  to 
stated  intervals,  ought  to  go  to  the  state  and  habit  of  ^he 
person,  and  not  to  the  accidental  interview  of  an  individual, 
or  to  the  degree  of  self-possession  in  any  particular  act."  It 
may  be  well  to  inquire  how  far  these  views  are  sustained  by- 
subsequent  decisions. 

§  335.  In  law  and  equity  courts  there  seems  to  have 
been  little  disposition,  in  civil  cases,  to  question  their  cor- 
rectness.2 In  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  however,  there  has 

1  It  appears  from  a  note  in  1  Beck's  Med.  Juris.  586,  that  Lord  Eldon  dis- 
sented from  this  proposition,  and  thus  stated  his  objections  to  it  to  Lord  Thur- 
low  himself.  "  I  have  seen  you  exercising  the  duties  of  lord  chancellor  with 
ample  sufficiency  of  mind  and  understanding,  and  with  the  greatest  ability. 
Now  if  Providence  should  afflict  you  with  a  fever,  which  should  have  the 
effect  of  taking  away  that  sanity  of  mind  for  a  considerable  time,  (for  it  does 
not  signify  whether  it  is  the  disease  insanity,  or  a  fever  that  makes  you  in- 
sane,) would  any  one  say,  that  it  required  such  very  strong  evidence  to  show  that 
your  mind  was  restored  to  the  power  of  performing  such  an  act  as  making  a 
will,  —  an  act,  to  the  performance  of  which  a  person  of  ordinary  intelligence 
is  competent  ?  "  We  are  not  informed  how  this  objection  struck  Lord  Thur- 
low,  but  we  trust  that  no  reader  of  the  present  work  will  be  at  a  loss  to  per- 
ceive its  weakness  for  a  moment.  It  does  signify  every  thing,  whether  it  is  the 
disease  insanity  or  a  fever  that  makes  one  insane,  for  the  delirium  of  fever  is 
but  a  casual  symptom  of  that  disease,  and,  together  with  the  pathological  con- 
dition that  gave  rise  to  it,  is  presumed  to  disappear  with  the  main  disorder  on 
which  it  depends.  This  is  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  On  the  contrary, 
mental  alienation  is  the  essential,  the  pathognomic,  and,  oftentimes,  the  only 
clearly  discernible  symptom  of  mania,  and  its  disappearance  furnishes  the 
only  intimation  perhaps  that  we  have  of  the  cure  of  this  disease.  Thus  our 
means  of  deciding  this  point  being  so  small,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  require 
stronger  evidence  of  their  certainty,  than  of  the  restoration  of  the  mind  in 
fever,  because  the  latter  is  confirmed  by  a  multitude  of  symptoms.  Recovery 
from  an  attack  of  fever  is  a  phenomenon,  that  any  one  can  see,  but  not  such 
is  recovery  from  an  attack  of  mania ;  because,  though  the  insane  delusions  or 
conduct  by  which  it  was  manifested  may  disappear,  it  remains  to  be  deter- 
mined in  every  case,  whether  they  are  not  purposely  concealed  from  observa- 
tion, or  proper  opportunity  has  been  offered  to  the  patient  to  bring  them 
forward.  Just  as  the  existence  of  mania  requires  stronger  proof  than  that 
of  the  delirium  of  fever,  so  does  recover)'  from  the  former  require  stronger 
proof  than  recovery  from  the  latter. 

8  See  Hdl  v.  Warren,  9  Vesey ;  exparte  Holyland,  11  Vesey. 

29* 


342  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

occurred  some  discrepancy  of  opinion,  both  as  to  the  exact 
nature  of  the  lucid  interval,  and  the  kind  of  proof  required  to 
establish  its  existence.     In  a  commendable  respect  for  the 
sacred  character  'of  testamentary  acts,   they  have  assumed 
considerable  latitude,  and,  no  doubt,  very  properly,  in  their 
construction  of  lucid  intervals ;  but  occasionally  they  have 
gone  farther  than  even  the  truths  of  pathology  will  warrant. 
§  336.     In  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,1  the  deceased,  a  sin- 
gle woman,  made  her  will  on   the   14th    of  August,  1775, 
which  will  was  contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of 
the   testator.     "  It  was  proved  in  general,"  says  the  court, 
"  that  her  habit  and  condition  of  body,  and  her  manner,  for 
several   months  before  the  date  of  the  will,  was  that  of  a 
person   afflicted  with  many  of  the  worst  symptoms  of  that 
dreadful   disease,    and  continued  so   certainly  after  making 
the  will."     It  appears  from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time 
previous  to  the  date  of  the  will,  she  was  very  importunate 
for  the   use   of  pen,  ink,  and  paper,  which,  however,  were 
withheld   from  her  by  the  direction   of   her   physician,   Dr. 
Battie,  who  was  eminent  for  his  knowledge  and  treatment  of 
mental  disorders.     Her  importunity  continuing,  he  at  length 
consented,  in  order  to  quiet  and  pacify  her,  that  she  might 
have  them,  observing  that  it  did  not  signify  what  she  might 
write,  as  she  was  not  fit  to  make  a  proper  use  of  pen,  ink, 
and  paper.     These  being  carried  to  her,  her  hands,  which  had 
been  constantly  tied,  were  loosed,  and  she  sat  down  to  a 
bureau   to  write.     Her  attendants,  who  were  watching  her 
outside  the  door,  saw  her  write  on  several  pieces  of  paper  in 
succession,  which  she  tore  up  and  threw  into  the  grate,  walk- 
ing up  and  down  the  room  in  a  wild  and  ferocious  manner, 
and  muttering  to  herself.     After  one  or  two  hours  spent  in 
this   manner,  she  finally  succeeded  in  writing   a  will  that 
suited  her,  though  it  occupied  but  a  few  lines.     Such  are  the 
facts  that  have  any  bearing  on  the  point  at  issue.     It  was 
decided  by  the  court,  Sir  William  Wynne,  that  she  had  a 
lucid  interval  while  making  the  will,  the  validity  of  which 

1  1  Phillimore's  Reports,  90. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  343 

was  consequently  established.  The  grounds  of  this  decision 
were,  that  the  will  made  a  natural  and  consistent  distribu- 
tion of  her  property,  and,  in  short,  that  it  was  "  a  rational  act 
rationally  done  ; "  hence  it  was  to  be  inferred,  that  her  mind 
was  visited  by  a  lucid  interval,  at  the  moment  of  making  it. 
For,  says  the  court,  "  I  think  the  strongest  and  best  proof, 
that  can  arise  as  to  a  lucid  interval,  is  that  which  arises  from 
the  act  itself;  that  I  look  upon  as  the  thing  to  be  first  ex- 
amined, and  if  it  can  be  proved  and  established,  that  it  is  a 
rational  act  rationally  done,  the  whole  case  is  proved."  It 
seems  to  have  occurred  to  the  court,  that  some  catenation 
must  be  made  out  between  such  an  act  and  a  lucid  interval ; 
and  it  being  in  evidence,  that,  at  times,  she  would  converse 
rationally,  we  have  the  following  deductions  therefrom.  "  If 
she  could  converse  rationally,  that  is  a  lucid  interval;  and 
that  she  did  so  and  had  lucid  intervals,  I  think  is  completely 
established."  The  fact  is,  that  the  court,  throughout  its 
whole  judgment,  confounded  testamentary  capacity  with  a 
lucid  interval,  without  once  seeming  to  be  aware  that  though 
the  will  might  be  a  rational  act,  and,  therefore,  perhaps  valid, 
it  by  no  means  followed,  that  a  lucid  interval  had  taken 
place.  What  it  considered  as  such  here  scarcely  amounted 
to  the  kind  of  remission  described  by  Mr.  Haslam  .(§  328,)  for 
not  a  single  fact  appears  in  the  evidence,  from  which  we  can 
infer  any  alteration  whatever  in  the  state  of  her  disease. 
True,  the  court  thought  that  her  reason  had  returned,  be- 
cause, though  released  from  the  confinement  of  a  strait- 
waistcoat,  and  trusted  with  a  candle,  she  did  no  mischief  and 
did  not  abuse  her  liberty ;  but  such  things  would  have  little 
weight  with  medical  men,  especially  at  the  present  day. 
Nothing  indeed  can  be  more  chimerical,  because  so  utterly 
contradicted  by  all  that  we  know  of  insanity,  than  this  idea 
of  a  lucid  interval  of  a  few  minutes'  duration  suddenly  inter- 
posed amid  years  of  mania,  and  as  suddenly  disappearing.1 

1  Its  consequences  seem  to  render  it  as  pernicious  as  it  is  absurd.  In  the 
trial  of  Hadfield  for  shooting  at  the  king,  Lord  Kenyon,  after  admitting  that 
he  was  insane  both  before  and  after  the  act,  and  that  it  was  improbable  he 
had  recovered  his  senses  in  the  interim,  declared,  that  "  were  they  to  run 


344  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

The  point  particularly  insisted  upon  by  the  judge  is,  that  she 
would  sometimes  converse  rationally,  as  indeed  most  insane 
people  do.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  she  had  particular  subjects  or 
topics  in  her  mind,  and  at  such  times  would  converse  ra- 
tionally upon  them,  and  when  those  topics  were  out  of  her 
mind  would  fly  into  outrages  of  frenzy  and  extravagance, 
does  that  all  show  that  at  the  former  time  she  was  deprived 
of  rational  capacity?"  He  does  not  seem  to  be  aware,  that 
madmen  are  every  day  doing  rational  acts,  and  that  it  would 
not  be  surprising  if  wills  should  sometimes  be  found  among 
the  number.1 

§  337.  We  have  no  fault  to  find  with  the  principle  of  law 
which  makes  these  wills  valid,  but  we  would  have  the  ground 
on  which  such  validity  is  established,  distinctly  understood 
to  be  the  character  of  the  act,  not  the  condition  of  the  tes- 
tator's mind ;  and  if,  in  the  above  case,  the  court  had  been 
contented  with  proving  the  will  to  be  a  rational  act,  and 
thence  inferring  testamentary  capacity,  there  would  have 
been  nothing  to  complain  of.  It  is  important  that  on  sub- 
jects like  medical  jurisprudence,  language  should  be  used 
with  strict  adherence  to  its  original  and  proper  signification ; 
and  therefore  when  a  lucid  interval  is  defined  by  competent 
authority  to  be  a  "  temporary  cure "  of  the  disease,  a  re- 
covery of  the  mind's  general  habit,  the  occurrence  of  which 
must  be  proved  by  the  "  state  and  habit,"  of  th,e  person, 
observed  during  a  sufficient  length  of  time,  we  have  to  com- 
plain, that  the  term  is  applied  by  others  to  a  mere  remission 
in  the  violence  of  the  symptoms,  which  lasts  but  a  few  min- 
utes, and  is  proved  by  a  single  coherent  act. 

§  338.  The  construction  here  put  upon  the  lucid  interval, 
not  only  conflicts  with  the  opinions  of  the  eminent  authori- 
ties we  have  quoted,  but  has  not  been  countenanced  by  sub- 
sequent decisions  even  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts.  In  a 

into  nicety,  proof  might  be  demanded  of  his  insanity,  at  the  precise  moment 
when  the  act  was  committed  ! "  as  if  such  proof  were  not  utterly  beyond  the 
reach  of  human  means. 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  the  views  of  the  court  in  this  case,  are  fully  in 
accordance  with  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Swinburne.  See  §  12. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  345 

recent  case,  where  the  testamentary  acts  of  an  insane  per- 
son were  propounded  by  the  executors  who  endeavored 
to  prove  the  occurrence  of  a  lucid  interval  at  the  time  of 
their  execution,  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl,  decided  that 
the  proof  was  not  sufficient,  though  it  was  unquestionably 
stronger  than  in  the  case  of  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright. 
The  surgeon  of  the  testator  who  saw  him  once  within 
the  period  —  a  little  more  than  ten  months  —  that  included 
the  two  wills  in  question,  and  commenced  a  frequent  at- 
tendance on  him  between  two  and  three  months  afterwards, 
deposed,  that  on  none  of  these  occasions  did  he  exhibit 
any  symptoms  of  insanity,  but  "  conducted  himself,  and 
talked  and  discoursed  in  a  rational  manner,  and  was  in 
the  full  possession  of  his  mental  faculties."  The  solicitor 
who  took  the  instructions  for  the  last  will,  considered  him  of 
sound  mind,  and  deposed  that  neither  of  the  witnesses 
treated  him  as  a  person  of  deranged  intellect  or  of  unsound 
mind.  In  the  testamentary  dispositions  themselves,  there 
was  nothing  to  negative  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  sound- 
ness of  mind.  In  view  of  the  fact,  however,  that  the  testa- 
tor was  so  deranged  that  he  was  attended  by  a  keeper  from 
a  lunatic  asylum,  till  within  a  few  months  of  the  date  of  the 
first  will,  and  frequently  manifested  absurd  delusions  during 
the  period  including  both  wills,  the  above  proof  was  not  con- 
sidered as  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  reasoning  upon  the 
general  principles  of  insanity.  "  It  is  clear,"  said  the  court, 
"  that  persons  essentially  insane  may  be  calm,  may  do  acts, 
hold  conversations,  and  even  pass  in  general  society  as  per- 
fectly sane.  It  often  requires  close  examination  by  persons 
skilled  in  the  disorder,  to  discover  and  ascertain  whether  or 
not  the  mental  derangement  is  removed,  and  the  mind  again 
become  perfectly  sound.  When  there  is  calmness,  when 
there  is  rationality  on  ordinary  subjects,  those  who  see  the 

party  usually  conclude  that  his  recovery  is  perfect 

Where  there  is  not  actual  recovery,  and  a  return  to  the 
management  of  himself  and  his  concerns  by  the  unfortunate 
individual,  the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  extremely  diffi- 


346  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

cult."  l  Whatever  confidence  the  civil  law  may  repose  in  the 
evidence  furnished  by  the  character  of  the  testamentary  act 
touching  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator,  it  is  distinctly 
enough  inculcated  in  the  above  quotations,  that  such  evi- 
dence is  not  necessarily  to  prevail  over  that  which  is  drawn 
from  his  daily  walk  and  conversation.  When,  however, 
sanity  is  confessedly  doubtful  merely,  then  "  the  agent  is  to 
be  inferred  rational,  from  the  character  broadly  taken  of  his 
act." 1 

§  339.  It  has  been  admitted,  that,  with  certain  reserva- 
tions, the  civil  responsibilities  of  the  insane  are  unimpaired 
during  the  lucid  interval,  because  the  mind  is  sufficiently 
restored  to  enable  the  individual  to  act  with  tolerable  discre- 
tion in  his  civil  relations.  In  respect  to  crime,  however,  the 
matter  is  altogether  different,  for  reasons  that  will  not  be 
without  their  force,  we  trust,  to  those  who  have  attentively 
considered  the  proceeding  remarks.  These  reasons  are,  that 
the  crimes  which  are  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  a 
lucid  interval,  are  generally  the  result  of  the  momentary 
excitement  produced  by  sudden  provocations;  that  these 
provocations  put  an  end  to  the  temporary  cure,  by  immedi- 
ately reproducing  that  pathological  condition  of  the  brain 
called  irritation,  and  that  this  irritation  is  the  essential  cause 
of  mental  derangement  which  absolves-  from  all  the  legal 
consequences  of  crime.  The  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that 
we  ought  never  perhaps  to  convict  for  a  crime  committed  dur- 
ing the  lucid  interval,  because  there  is  every  probability,  that 
the  individual  was  under  the  influence  of  that  cerebral  irrita- 
tion which  makes  a  man  insane.  The  difference  between  a 
person  in  the  lucid  interval  and  one  who  has  never  been 
insane,  on  which  we  particularly  insist,  is,  that  while  in  the 


1  Groom  and  Thomas  v.  Thomas  and  Thomas,  2  Ilagg.  Eccl.  Hep.  433  : 
In  White  v.  Driver,  1  Phillimore,  84,  however,  a  lucid  interval  was  held  to 
be  established,  on  much  less  proof  than  was  offered  in  the  above  case,  though 
far  more  certainly  than  was  admitted  in  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright. 

1  Scruby  and  Finch  v.  Fordham,  1  Addams,  Ecc.  11.  74. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  347 

latter  provocations  stimulate  the  passion  to  the  highest  degree 
of  which  they  are  capable  in  a  state  of  health,  though  still 
more  or  less  under  his  control,  they  produce  in  the  former  a 
pathological  change  which  deprives  him  of  every  thing  like 
moral  liberty.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  do  more  than 
barely  state  these  views,  since  their  correctness  seems  to  have 
been  universally  recognized  in  practice,  not  a  single  case  hav- 
ing occurred,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  where  a  person 
has  been  convicted  of  crime  committed  during  a  lucid 
interval.  Burdened  as  the  criminal  law  is  with  false  princi- 
ples on  the  subject  of  insanity,  the  time  has  gone  by  when 
juries  will  return  a  verdict  of  guilty  against  one  who  is 
admitted  to  have  been  insane,  within  a  short  period  of  time 
before  the  criminal  act  with  which  he  is  charged.1 

§  340.  We  shall  be  careful  not  to  confound  the  period 
intervening  between  the  perfect  cure  of  one  attack  of  insanity 
and  the  occurrence  of  another  attack,  with  a  lucid  interval. 
The  renewal  of  the  disease  does  not  prove  that  it  never  has 
been  cured,  for  in  this  respect,  insanity  follows  the  same 
pathological  laws,  as  gout,  rheumatism,  colic,  or  any  other 
disease.  True,  persons  who  have  experienced  repeated  attacks 
of  insanity,  generally  labor  under  a  certain  irritability  of  the 
nervous  system,  which  should  lead  us  to  be  cautious  in  form- 
ing opinions  relative  to  their  moral  liberty  under  particular 
circumstances.  Whether  the  absence  of  the  disease  arise 

1  We  have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  the  severity  that  characterizes  the 
spirit  of  the  English  criminal  law,  that  we  look  with  no  little  jealousy  on  any 
attempt  to  circumscribe  the  range  of  its  operation.  In  Germany,  however, 
where  no  such  influence  is  felt,  more  humane  and  scientific  views  on  the 
subject  of  responsibility  during  the  lucid  interval  have  found  distinguished 
supporters.  "  The  state  of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  interval  is  such,"  says 
Dr.  Friedreich,  "  that  a  circumstance  which  would  have  passed  unnoticed  at 
any  other  time,  here  excites  the  individual  to  violent,  illegal  acts."  "  Who 
can  positively  decide  whether  the  criminal  act  really  happened  during  a  lucid 
interval,  or  was  the  result  of  a  paroxysm  prematurely  provoked  by  some 
internal  or  external  cause  of  excitement,  (for  during  the  lucid  interval,  the 
susceptibility  to  excitement  is  greatly  increased,)  and  which  paroxysm  might 
not  have  occurred  at  all  without  such  provocation." —  Ueber  Zurechnung  im 
lucido  intervallo,  Neues  Archiv  des  Criminalrechts,  xiv.  268. 


348  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

from  a  lucid  interval,  or  a  complete  cure,  the  occurrence  of 
certain  exciting  causes  equally  exposes  the  patient  to  a 
renewed  attack  of  the  disease  in  all  its  original  severity. 
Whenever,  therefore,  the  criminal  acts  of  one  subject  to 
repeated  attacks  of  insanity,  are  called  in  question,  and  it 
appears  that  the  accused  was  under  the  influence  of  violent 
or  harassing  moral  emotions,  such  as  anger,-  grief,  or  sense 
of  responsibility ;  or  of  certain  physiological  conditions,  such 
as  menstruation,  lactation,  or  the  repulsion  of  other  diseases  ; 
or  exposed  to  the  noxious  influence  of  certain  physical 
agents,  such  as  insolation,  deprivation  of  sleep,  or  blows  on 
the  head,  we  are  justified  in  considering  him  as  not  having 
been  morally  free  at  the  time  when  the  act  was  committed. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  appear  to  have  been  no  causes  of 
this  kind  in  operation,,  and  the  usual  signs  of  insanity  were 
not  present,  and  especially  if  the  act  obviously  serves  some 
interest  of  the  accused,  we  can  hardly  avoid  the  conclusion, 
that  he  is  responsible  for  his  criminal  acts. 


CHAPTER    XV. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY. 

§  341.  THE  supposed  insurmountable  difficulty  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  feigned  and  real  insanity  has  conduced, 
probably  more  than  all  other  causes  together,  to  bind  the 
legal  profession  to  the  most  rigid  construction  and  applica- 
tion of  the  common  law  relative  to  this  disease,  and  is  always 
put  forward  in  objection  to  the  more  humane  doctrines  that 
have  been  inculcated  in  the  present  work.  That  some  diffi- 
culty has  been  experienced,  and  given  rise  to  much  per- 
plexity and  mistake,  cannot  be  denied;  but  it  is  to  be 
considered,  whether  it  has  not  arisen,  less  from  the  obscurity 
of  the  subject,  than  from  the  imperfect  means  that  have  been 
generally  applied  to  its  elucidation.  The  opinions  of  phy- 
sicians, which  are  ordinarily  taken  in  doubtful  cases,  have 
been  received  with  a  deference  that  was  warranted  more  by 
general  professional  reputation,  than  by  superior  knowledge 
of  this  particular  disease.  The  treatment  of  insanity  is  now 
so  much  confined  to  the  heads  of  extensive  establishments 
in  which  its  subjects  are  congregated,  that  opportunities  for 
studying  it  are  comparatively  limited  in  ordinary  practice,  so 
that  a  physician  may  be  justly  celebrated  in  the  knowledge 
and  treatment  of  other  diseases,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
poorly  qualified  to  decide  upon  questions  relative  to  insanity, 
especially  when  every  effort  is  made  to  perplex  and  mys- 
tify-his  mind.  This  truth  cannot  be  disguised,  and  though 
physicians  are  frequently  unwilling  to  believe  it,  and  are  dis- 
posed to  act  on  the  popular  notion  that  all  medical  subjects 
are  equally  familiar  to  them,  this  is  no  reason  why  courts  and 
juries  should  ever  forget  it.  Nothing,  indeed,  requires  a 

30 


350  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

severer  exercise  of  a  physician's  knowledge  and  tact,  than  a 
case  of  simulated  insanity ;  but  the  same  might  be  said  with 
quite  as  much  truth,  of  other  diseases  that  men  have  been 
led  to  feign,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are  every  day  investi- 
gated and  understood. 

§  342.  The  workings  of  an  insane  mind  —  such  as  attract 
the  popular  notice  —  are  apparently  so  confused  and  dis- 
cordant, so  wild  and  unnatural,  as  to  have  given  rise  to  the 
notion  as  prevalent  as  it  is  unfounded,  that  insanity  may  be 
easily  imitated.  The  method  that  is  in  madness,  the  con- 
stant and  consistent  reference  to  the  predominant  idea,  which 
the  practised  observer  detects  amid  the  greatest  irregularity 
of  conduct  and  language,  is  one  of  those  essential  features  in 
certain  forms  of  the  disease,  which  is  generally  overlooked, 
or  at  least  very  unsuccessfully  imitated.  Those  who  have 
been  longest  acquainted  with  the  manners  of  the  insane, 
and  whose  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease  furnishes 
the  most  satisfactory  guaranty  of  the  correctness  of  their 
opinions,  assure  us  that  insanity  is  not  easily  feigned,  and 
consequently  that  no  attempt  at  imposition  can  long  escape 
the  efforts  of  one  properly  qualified  to  expose  it.  Georget 
does  not  believe,  "that  a  person  who  has  not  made  the 
insane  a  subject  of  study,  can  simulate  madness  so  as  to 
deceive  a  physician  well  acquainted  with  the  disease." x  Mr. 
Haslam  declares,  that,  "  to  sustain  the  character  of  a  parox- 
ysm of  active  insanity,  would  require  a  continuity  of  exertion 
beyond  the  power  of  a  sane  person." 2  Dr.  Conolly  affirms, 
"  that  he  can  hardly  imagine  a  case  which  would  be  proof 
against  an  efficient  system  of  observation."8  Another 
writer,  while  admitting  that  attempts  to  deceive  are  some- 
times successful,  on  account  of  the  imperfect  knowledge  of 
the  operations  of  the  mind  in  health  and  disease  possessed 
by  medical  men  in  general,  observes,  however,  that  when 
we  consider  the  "  very  peculiar  complex  phenomena  which 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  60. 

2  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  322. 
8  Inquiry  concerning  the  indications  of  Insanity,  467. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  351 

characterize  true  madness,  and  reflect  on  the  general  igno- 
rance of  those  who  attempt  to  imitate  them,  we  have  no 
right  to  expect  such  a  finished  picture  as  could  impose  on 
persons  well  acquainted  with  the  real  disease."1  With  such 
authority  before  us,  to  urge  as  an  objection  against  the  free 
admission  of  insanity  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  detecting  attempts  to  feign  it,  can  no  longer  be  any 
thing  more  than  the  plea  of  ignorance  or  indolence.  The 
only  effect  such  difficulty  should  have  on  the  minds  of  those 
who  are  to  form  their  opinions  by  the  evidence  they  hear, 
should  be  to  impress  them  with  a  stronger  sense  of  the 
necessity  of  an  intimate,  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity 
on  the  part  of  the  medical  witness,  and  convince  them  that 
without  this  qualification,  the  testimony  of  the  physician  is 
but  little  better  than  that  of  any  one  else.  We  shall  now 
notice  those  features  of  insanity  the  knowledge  of  which, 
either  from  their  not  being  generally  obvious,  or  not  easily 
simulated,  will  enable  us  to  distinguish  the  reality  from  the 
imitation  ;  and  as  general  mania  is  oftener  chosen  than  any 
other  form  of  mental  derangement,  for  the  purpose  of  decep- 
tion, we  shall  begin  with  that. 

§  343.  The  grand  fault  committed  by  impostors  is,  that 
in  their  anxiety  to  produce  an  imitation  that  shall  deceive, 
they  overdo  the  character  they  assume,  and  present  nothing 
but  a  clumsy  caricature.  The  representations  of  mania 
put  forth  in  the  works  of  novelists  and  poets,  with  a  few 
such  admirable  exceptions  as  the  Lear  and  Hamlet  of 
Shakspeare,  are,  of  all  their  attempts  to  copy  nature,  the 
least  like  their  model.  If,  then,  men  of  education,  who  may 
have  had  some  opportunities  for  observing  the  disease,  have 
after  all  so  imperfect  a  picture  of  its  phenomena  in  their 
mind,  what  success  could  be  expected  from  the  attempts 
of  persons  who,  for  the  most  part,  assume  their  task  upon 
the  spur  of  the  occasion  with  little  preparation,  and  who 
have  derived  all  then*  ideas  of  madness  from  a  casual  visit 
to  an  insane  hospital,  or  from  observing  the  manoeuvres  of 

1  Cyclopaedia  of  Practical  Medicine:  Article,  Feigned  Diseases,  146. 


352  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

some  roving  maniac  ?  With  such,  insanity  is  but  another 
name  for  wildness,  fury,  and  unlimited  irregularity,  and 
consequently  under  the  thin  disguise  they  assume,  there 
can  readily  be  detected  a  constant  effort  to  impress  on  the 
beholder  the  conviction  they  are  anxious  to  produce  by  the 
mere  force  of  noise  and  disorder.  The  really  mad,  except 
in  the  acute  stage  of  the  disease,  are,  generally  speaking, 
not  readily  recognized  as  such  by  a  stranger,  and  they  retain 
so  much  of  the  rational  as  to  require  an  effort  to  detect  the 
impairment  of  their  faculties.  In  feigned  cases,  all  this  is 
very  different ;  the  person  is  determined  that  his  derangement 
shall  not  be  overlooked  for  want  of  numerous  and  obvious 
manifestations  of  its  existence.  Under  this  impression,  the 
impostor  is  constantly  guilty  of  some  word  or  act  grossly  in- 
consistent with  real  insanity,  and  affording  an  easy  clew  to 
the  truth  of  the  case. 

§  344.  Generally  speaking,  after  the  acute  stage  has 
passed  off,  a  maniac  has  no  difficulty  in  remembering  his 
friends  and  acquaintances,  the  places  he  has  been  accus- 
tomed to  frequent,  names,  dates,  and  events,  and  the  occur- 
rences of  his  life.  The  ordinary  relations  of  things  are,  with 
some  exceptions,  as  easily  and  clearly  perceived  as  ever,  and 
his  discrimination  of  character  seems  to  be  marked  by  his 
usual  shrewdness.  His  replies  to  questions,  though  they 
may  sometimes  indicate  delusion  or  extravagant  notions, 
generally  have  some  relation  to  the  subject,  and  show  that 
it  has  occupied  his  attention.  Now  a  person  simulating 
mania  will  frequently  deny  all  knowledge  of  men  or  things, 
with  whom  he  has  always  been  familiar,  especially  when- 
ever he  imagines  that  such  ignorance,  if  believed,  may  be 
considered  as  a  proof  of  his  innocence.  The  very  names, 
dates,  and  transactions,  with  which  he  has  been  most  lately 
and  intimately  conversant,  he  will,  for  the  same  reason, 
refuse  to  remember,  while  the  real  madman  will  seldom,  if 
ever,  forget  them,  in  whatever  shapes  they  may  appear  to  his 
mind,  or  with  whatever  delusions  they  may  be  connected. 
His  distorted  perceptions  may  transform  his  humble  dwelling 
into  a  princely  castle,  and  the  people  about  him  into  generals 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  353 

and  courtiers  ready  to  execute  his  slightest  orders ;  but  he 
will  never  deny  that  he  has  an  abode,  nor  forget  the  existence 
or  names  of  those  whose  station  and  duties  he  has  so  entire- 
ly mistaken.  Grant  his  premises,  and  oftentimes  nothing 
can  be  urged  against  the  conclusions  df  the  madman's  rea- 
soning ;  but  in  simulated  madness,  the  common  error  is  to 
imagine  that  nothing  must  be  remembered  correctly,  and  that 
the  more  inconsistent  and  absurd  the  discourse,  the  better  is 
the  attempt  at  deception  sustained.  In  simulated  madness 
there  is  also  a  certain  hesitation  and  appearance  of  premedi- 
tation in  the  succession  of  ideas,  however  incoherent,  very 
different  from  the  abruptness  and  rapidity,  with  which  in 
real  madness  the  train  of  thought  is  changed.  This,  of  itself, 
is  sufficient,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  to  reveal  the  deception 
to  the  practised  observer  of  insanity.  In  simulated  mania, 
the  impostor,  when  requested  to  repeat  his  disordered  ideas, 
will  generally  do  it  correctly,  as  if  anxious  that  none  of  his 
ravings  should  escape  attention,  or  be  forgotten ;  while  the 
genuine  patient  will  be  apt  to  wander  from  the  track,  or  intro- 
duce ideas  that  had  not  presented  themselves  before.  The 
following  case,  which  we  find  in  one  of  Georget's  works,  will 
furnish  an  appropriate  illustration  of  the  foregoing  remarks, 
and  give  an  insight  into  the  devices  of  imposture,  to  be 
obtained  only  from  examples. 

§  345.  "  Jean-Pierre,  aged  forty -three  years,  formerly  a 
notary,  was  brought  before  the  court  of  assizes  of  Paris,  on 
the  21st  February,  1824,  accused  of  crimes  and  misconduct, 
in  which  cunning  and  bad  faith  had  been  prominently  con- 
spicuous. He  had  already  been  condemned  for  forgery  ;  and 
was  now  accused  of  forgery,  swindling,  and  incendiarism. 
When  examined  after  his  arrest,  he  answered  with  precision 
every  question  that  was  put  to  him.  But  about  a  month 
after,  he  would  no  longer  explain  himself,  talked  incoherently, 
and  finally  gave  way  to  acts  of  fury,  breaking  and  destroying 
every  thing  that  came  in  his  way,  and  throwing  the  furniture 
out  of  the  window.  At  the  suggestion  of  the  medical  men 
who  were  called  to  examine  him,  Jean-Pierre  was  sent  to 

30* 


•354  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  Bicetre,  to  be  more  closely  observed.  There  he  became 
acquainted  with  another  pretended  lunatic,  accused  also  of 
forgery  and  swindling,  and  retained  in  that  house  for  the 
same  purpose,  —  that  of  being  observed  by  the  physicians. 
One  night  a  violent  fire  broke  out  at  the  Bicetre,  in  three 
different  places  at  once,  in  one  of  the  buildings  occupied  by 
the  insane,  which  circumstance  led  to  the  suspicion  that  the 
fire  was  the  effect  of  malice.  The  next  day  it  was  discovered 
that  the  two  supposed  madmen  had  disappeared.  Jean- 
Pierre  hid  himself  in  Paris  in  a  house  where  his  wife  was 
employed,  and  where  he  was  again  arrested.  Immediately 
on  his  escape  from  the  Bicetre,  he  wrote  a  very  sensible 
letter  to  one  of  his  friends ;  but  scarcely  had  he  been  taken 
when  he  again  assumed  the  character  of  a  madman.  From 
the  indictment,  it  appears  that  the  person  who  ran  away  at 
the  same  time  with  Jean-Pierre,  confessed  that  they  had 
formed  the  plan  of  escaping  in  company,  and  that  they  had 
profited  by  the  occurrence  of  the  fire  to  put  it  into  execution. 
He  also  said  that  Jean-Pierre  had  made  him  swear  to  reveal 
nothing ;  and  he  seems  to  have  told  as  a  secret  to  one  of  the 
officers  of  La  Force,  that  the  fire  was  the  work  of  Jean- 
Pierre. 

"  All  the  witnesses,  who  had  had  any  transactions  with,  or 
known  any  thing  of  the  accused  before  his  arrest,  deposed 
that  he  always  seemed  to  them  rational  enough,  and  even 
very  intelligent  in  business.  One  of  the  prisoners  in  La 
Force,  who  occasionally  met  and  talked  with  Jean-Pierre, 
declared  that  his  conversation  was  often  veny  incoherent, 
and  that  in  some  of  the  phases  of  the  moon,  his  mind  was 
much  excited.  But  these  observations  were  made  after  the 
arrest  of  the  accused.  It  was  his  conduct  at  the  trial,  how- 
ever, which,  more  than  any  thing  else,  proved  that  the  mad- 
ness of  Jean-Pierre  was  only  assumed ;  for  there  is,  perhaps, 
not  one  of  his  answers  that  would  have  been  given  by  a 
madman.  The  following  are  a  few  of  them. 

"  Q.  How  old  are  you?  —  A.  Twenty-six  years  [he  was 
forty-three]. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  355 

"  Q.  Have  you  ever  had  any  business  with  Messrs.  Pel- 
lene  and  Desgranges  [two  of  his  dupes]  ?  —  A.  I  do  n't  know 
them. 

"  Q.  Do  you  acknowledge  the  pretended  notarial  deed 
which  you  gave  this  witness  ?  —  A.  I  do  not  understand  this. 

"  Q.  You  have  acknowledged  this  deed  before  the  com- 
missary of  police  ?  —  A.  It  is  possible. 

"  Q.  Why,  the  day  of  your  arrest,  did  you  tear  up  the  bill 
for  three  thousand  eight  hundred  francs?  —  A.  I  don't  re- 
collect. 

"  Q.  You  stated  in  your  previous  examinations,  that  it 
was  because  the  bill  had  been  paid.  —  A.  It  is  possible. 

"  As  to  many  other  of  his  own  depositions  the  accused 
answered,  in  like  manner,  that  he  did  not  recollect  any  thing 
about  them. 

"  Q.  Do  you  know  this  witness  [the  portress  of  the  house 
he  lived  in]  ?  —  A.  I  do  n't  know  that  woman. 

"  Q.  Can  you  point  out  any  person  who  was  confined  in 
La  Force  with  you,  and  who  can  give  any  account  of  your 
then  state  of  mind  ?  —  A.  I  do  n't  understand  this. 

"  Q.  You  made  your  escape  from  the  Bicetre  ?  —  A.  Was 
you  there  ? 

"  Q.  At  what  hour  did  you  escape  ?  —  A.  At  one  o'clock 

—  three  o'clock. 

/ 

"  Q.  What  road  did  you  take  ?  —  A.  That  of  Meaux  en 
Brie.  [He  took  that  of  Normandy.] 

"  Q.  Can  you  tell  us  who  set  the  Bicetre  on  fire  ?  —  A.  I 
do  not  know  what  you  mean. 

"  Q.  You  wrote  a  letter  to  Captain  Froyoff  the  day  after 
your  escape  from  the  Bicetre  ?  —  A.  I  did  not  write  that 
letter.  [It  was  his  own  handwriting.] 

"  When  charged  with  setting  fire  to  the  Bicetre,  Jean- 
Pierre  uttered  the  most  horrid  imprecations,  and  incessantly 
interrupted  his  counsel  and  the  advocate-general  in  their 
pleadings,  with  contradictions,  ridiculous  remarks,  and 
curses." l 

1  Archives  general  de  Med.  viii.  182. 


356  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  346.  In  commenting  on  this  case,  Georget  observes, 
that  "  among  those  madmen  who  have  not  entirely  lost  their 
senses,  —  and  Jean-Pierre  is  not  one  of  this  kind,  —  probably 
not  one  will  be  found  who  would  mistake  the  persons  with 
whom  he  has  been  connected,  who  would  not  understand 
what  a  notarial  act  is,  who  would  have  forgotten  his  actions, 
who  would  not  know  what  was  meant  when  a  memorable 
event  was  recalled  to  him,  and  who  would  make  such  sin- 
gular answers  as  those  we  have  quoted.  The  latter  appear 
as  so  many  contradictions  to  those  who  are  accustomed  to 
observe  the  insane.  When  people  have  completely  lost  their 
reason,  they  either  do  not  reply  to  questions  at  all,  or  branch 
off  to  subjects  that  have  no  relation  to  the  questions  address- 
ed to  them.  I  have  seen  patients  whose  understanding  was 
reduced  to  a  few  isolated  sensations,  and  who  recognized 
their  parents  and  friends,  and  called  them  by  name.  Some,  it 
is  true,  can  recognize  nobody,  but  they  certainly  would  not 
have  returned  all  the  answers  above-mentioned,  and  their 
mental  disorder  would  have  been  otherwise  characterized." 3 

§  347.  The  change  that  takes  place  in  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  the  insane,  in  their  affections  and  desires,  furnishes  an 
excellent  test  of  the  genuineness  of  any  particular  case,  inas- 
much as  this  fact  hardly  enters  into  the  popular  notions  of 
this  disease.  Perhaps  no  character  of  mania,  general  or 
partial,  is  more  common  than  that  inversion  of  feeling,  which 
is  manifested  in  reference  to  every  person  or  thing  that 
comes  within  the  circle  of  the  domestic  and  friendly  relations. 
The  feelings  of  the  parent,  child,  and  spouse,  seem  to  be 
completely  eradicated,  while  family  loses  its  ties,  home  its 
endearments,  and  friends  their  kind  and  soothing  influence. 
Suspicion  takes  the  place  of  confiding  trust;  jealousy,  of 
love ;  and  fierce  and  hostile  demeanor,  of  grace  and  suavity 
of  manner.  As  the  severity  of  the  disease  abates,  the  cur- 
rent of  the  affections  begins  to  resume  its  ordinary  direction, 
and  no  indication  of  improvement  is  more  to  be  relied  on, 
than  manifestations  of  regard  for  those  to  whom  they  are 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  61. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  357 

bound  by  ties  of  intimacy  or  relationship.  The  impostor  is 
seldom  aware  of  these  facts,  and  generally  evinces  no  settled 
diminution  of  his  attachment  to  his  family  or  friends.  He 
does  not  scruple  to  show  his  ordinary  fondness  for  his  chil- 
dren or  parents,  or  if  he  happen  to  be  aware  of  the  trait  of 
insanity  here  described,  and  has  suppressed  all  such  displays, 
the  first  menace  of  injury  to  these  objects  of  his  regard,  is 
sufficient  to  tear  away  his  disguise,  and  disclose  the  rational 
and  affectionate  man.  In  the  conspiracies  and  hostile  plans 
that  constantly  perplex  the  madman's  brain,  his  intimate 
friends  bear  the  most  prominent  part,  while  the  impostor 
always  pitches  upon  those  as  the  disturbers  of  his  peace, 
with  whom  he  has  had  some  previous  disagreement,  or  at 
least,  no  particular  intimacy. 

§  348.  In  real,  general  mania  there  is  usually  more  or  less 
insensibility  to  the  ordinary  proprieties  and  decencies  of  life, 
insomuch  that  sometimes  those  who  "were  formerly  noted  for 
the  purity  of  their  manners,  freely  indulge  in  obscene  lan- 
guage and  filthy  practices.  Indeed,  it  seldom  happens  that 
in  general  mania  the  patient  preserves  the  natural  propriety 
of  his  conversation  and  manners ;  and  this  departure  from 
the  ordinary  character  will  go  far  to  distinguish  the  real  from 
the  simulated  disease. 

§  349.  If,  as  we  have  endeavored  to  prove  elsewhere, 
mania  arises  from  cerebral  disorder,  we  might  reasonably 
expect  to  find  it  giving  rise  to  physical  disturbances  of  more 
or  less  moment,  and,  accordingly,  in  most  cases,  it  actually  is 
manifested  by  various  pathological  symptoms  which  no 
device  of  imposture  can  ever  imitate.  To  say  nothing  of 
the  wildness  of  the  eye,  and  a  certain  strangeness  of  expres- 
sion, as  easily  recognized  when  once  impressed  on  the  mind, 
as  it  is  difficult  to  describe,  there  is  some  degree  of  febrile 
action  which  it  requires  no  very  labored  examination  to 
discover.  The  pulse  will  generally  be  found  more  frequent 
than  in  health,  and  when  this  increased  frequency  is  observed 
in  doubtful  cases,  it  will  furnish  a  strong  collateral  proof  of  the 
genuineness  of  the  mental  disorder.  In  the  case  of  a  crimi- 
nal condemned  to  be  executed  who  was  suspected  of  feign- 


358         MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

ing  madness,  the  opinion  of  the  late  Dr.  Rush  was  requested, 
and  when  that  critical  observer  of  disease  found  the  pulse 
twenty  beats  more  frequent  than  in  the  natural  state,  he 
decided,  chiefly  on  the  strength  of  this  fact,  that  the  prisoner 
was  really  mad,1  and  such  he  finally  proved  to  be  beyond  a 
doubt.  Of  course,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  whenever 
the  pulse  remains  at  the  natural  standard,  the  plea  of  mad- 
ness is  fictitious,  nor  vice  versa ;  it  is  mentioned  merely  as  a 
valuable  means  in  connection  with  others,  of  arriving  at 
correct  conclusions  in  doubtful  cases. 

§  350.  Sleeplessness,  which  is  so  common  in  mania,  is 
another  of  those  symptoms,  the  presence  of  which  may 
furnish  conclusive  proof  of  real  insanity,  and  though  its 
absence  would  hardly  warrant  the  contrary  conclusion,  it 
would  certainly  produce  strong  suspicions,  and  thus  give 
additional  weight  to  less  prominent  symptoms.  In  real 
mania,  the  patient  will  be  days  and  even  a  week  without 
sleep,  while  the  simulator,  if  aware  of  this  feature  of  the 
disease,  will  be  observed,  when  faithfully  watched,  not  to 
protract  his  sleeplessness  to  any  thing  like  the  period  which  it 
commonly  remains  in  the  real  disease.  In  fact,  in  spite  of 
all  his  efforts,  sound  sleep  will  invariably  overtake  him  before 
the  second  or  third  day.  Impostors  almost  always  attempt  to 
imitate  the  nocturnal  restlessness  and  disorder  of  maniacs, 
but  the  imitation  is  as  different  from  the  reality,  as  the 
occasional  disturbance  by  sound  slumbers  can  make  it,  —  a 
difference  which  it  would  require  but  little  watching  to 
establish. 

§  351.  Perhaps  there  is  nothing  which  of  itself  furnishes 
a  better  test  in  doubtful  cases,  than  the  manner  of  their  inva- 
sion. Well-marked,  real  mania  seldom  occurs  suddenly,  but 
is  preceded,  as  has  been  elsewhere  noticed,  by  a  course  of 
preliminary  symptoms  which  occupy  a  period  of  more  or 
less  duration,  and  which,  though  they  do  not  always  suggest 
to  the  beholder  the  suspicion  of  derangement,  will,  when  the 
disease  has  become  indubitably  established,  be  recollected  as 

1  Introductory  Lectures,  369. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  359 

having  appeared  strange  and  unaccountable.  In  simulated 
insanity,  on  the  contrary,  the  invasion  is  as  sudden  as  is  most 
frequently  the  occasion  that  leads  to  it.  The  simulator  being 
unaware  of  the  progressive  nature  of  the  invasion,  suddenly, 
in  the  midst  of  health,  startles  his  attendants  by  an  outbreak 
of  the  most  extravagantly  wild  and  furious  conduct,  while  the 
minutest  inquiries  will  fail  to  establish  the  previous  existence 
of  any  precursory  symptoms.  No  instance  of  strange,  or 
eccentric  conduct  or  language,  not  the  slightest  departure 
from  the  individual's  natural  thoughts  and  affections,  or 
manner  of  manifesting  them,  nor  any  indications  of  bodily 
derangement,  will  have  been  observed  by  those  who  were 
about  his  person.  When,  therefore,  the  disease  has  come  on 
in  this  manner,  it  may  be  safely  concluded,  if  there  be  any 
other  the  least  ground  of  suspicion,  that  the  case  is  one  of 
simulation. 

§  352.  When  other  tests  fail,  the  habits  and  constitutional 
peculiarities  of  the  individual  may  sometimes  furnish  us  with 
valuable  information.  If,  for  instance,  the  person  have  in- 
dulged in  intemperate  drinking,  the  occurrence  of  mental 
derangement  would  be  no  unnatural  sequel  to  the  sudden 
abstinence  from  intoxicating  drinks  to  which  prisoners  are 
generally  subjected.  If  insanity  have  been  a  disease  of  his 
family,  more  especially  if  it  have  been  manifested  in  former 
periods  of  his  life,  when  there  existed  no  motive  for  decep- 
tion, there  must  be  additional  evidence  strong  enough  to 
counterbalance  the  presumption  drawn  from  this  fact,  to 
induce  the  belief  that  the  case  is  one  of  simulation.  When, 
too,  the  person  is  well  known  to  possess  an  irritable,  nervous 
temperament,  inordinately  excited  by  moral  or  physical 
causes,  this  fact  will  very  justly  raise  a  bias  in  his  favor,  and 
lead  us  to  require  so  much  additional  weight  in  the  proofs  of 
deception  ;  and  its  force  will  be  strengthened  by  the  consider- 
ation, that  the  circumstances  in  which  he  has  been  recently 
placed,  are  of  the  very  kind  most  calculated  to  produce  the 
effect  to  which  he  is  thus  predisposed. 

§  353.  In  real  mania  there  is  always  an  extreme  irrita- 
bility of  temper  which  makes  the  person  impatient  of  the 


360  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

least  contradiction,  and  is  constantly  breaking  out  into 
furious  gusts  of  passion,  as  sudden  as  the  apparent  causes 
are  inadequate  to  account  for  them.  This  feature  of  mania 
is  not  easily  imitated,  and  nothing  less  than  long  personal 
observation  of  the  insane,  joined  with  no  inconsiderable 
powers  of  mimicry,  would  enable  the  simulator  to  arrive  at 
even  an  approximation  to  the  reality.  When,  therefore,  the 
pretended  madman  maintains  his  temper  under  various  little 
aftmoyances  and  contradictions,  or  only  displays  a  clumsily- 
enacted  passion,  it  may  be  pretty  safely  concluded  that  he  is 
feigning  the  disease. 

§  354.  Generally,  persons  feigning  mania,  lack  the  bold, 
unflinching  look  of  real  maniacs ;  they  never  look  the  physi- 
cian steadily  in  the  face,  nor  allow  him  to  fix  their  eye ;  and 
on  being  accused,  their  change  of  countenance  plainly  betrays 
that  they  are  conscious  of  the  nature  of  the  charge.  Dr. 
Hennen  speaks  of  an  instance  where  a  person  feigning  mad- 
ness, confessed  that  he  could  not  support  the  inquiring  glance 
of  the  physician  who  examined  him.1 

§  355.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  in  real  madness,  the 
system  becomes  singularly  insensible  to  the  power  of  certain 
medicines — particularly  emetics,  drastic  purgatives,  and  opi- 
um. A  dose  of  the  last  article,  which  would  not  procure  a 
moment's  sleep  to  a  real  maniac,  would  completely  over- 
power the  simulator,  and  in  doubtful  cases  the  result  of  this 
experiment  should  be  entitled  to  considerable  weight.  The 
same  may  also  be  said  of  experiments  on  the  effect  of  other 
narcotics. 

§  356.  Partial  insanity,  in  consequence  of  the  superior 
difficulty  of  the  attempt,  is  much  less  frequently  simulated, 
and  with  a  much  smaller  degree  of  success,  than  the  general 
form  of  the  disease.  Those  who  undertake  it  "  are  deficient," 
says  Haslam,  "  in  the  presiding  principle,  the  ruling  delusion, 
the  unfounded  aversions,  and  causeless  attachments  which 
characterize  insanity,  —  they  are  unable  to  mimic  the  solemn 
dignity  of  characteristic  madness,  nor  recur  to  those  asso- 

1  Principles  of  Military  Surgery,  364. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  361 

ciations  which  mark  this  disorder ;  and  they  will  want  the 
peculiarity  of  look  which  so  strongly  impresses  an  experienced 
observer."  i  The  mental  and  physical  peculiarities  of  partial 
mania  are  of  a  kind  that  do  not  obtrude  themselves  on  the 
observation,  and  instead  of  loudly  proclaiming  the  presence 
of  a  crazed  condition,  and  soliciting  the  attention  of  the 
beholder,  some  investigation  is  required  before  they  are  dis- 
covered. All  this  is  contrary  to  the  purposes  of  the  simula- 
tor, which  require  that  an  immediate  and  powerful  impres- 
sion should  be  made  on  those  in  whose  charge  he  is  placed. 
If,  however,  in  consequence  of  ignorance  or  presumption, 
these  difficulties  are  unknown  or  under-estimated,  and  the 
task  of  simulating  partial  madness  is  assumed,  we  have  only 
to  bear  in  mind  the  characteristic  features  of  the  affection,  to 
detect  the  counterfeit  almost  at  a  glance.  In  real  mono- 
mania the  patient  seldom  troubles  himself  to  make  the  sub- 
ject of  his  delusion  square  with  other  notions  with  which  it 
has  more  or  less  relation,  and  the  spectator  wonders  that  he 
can  possibly  help  observing  the  inconsistency  of  his  ideas, 
and  that  when  pointed  out  to  him,  he  should  seem  to  be  indif- 
ferent to  or  unaware  of  this  fact.  In  the  simulator,  on  the 
contrary,  the  experienced  physician  will  detect  an  unceasing 
endeavor  to  soften  down  the  palpable  absurdity  of  his  delu- 
sions, or  reconcile  them  with  correct  and  rational  notions. 
This  too  obvious  anxiety  to  produce  an  impression,  strongly 
contrasts  with  the  reserve  and  indifference  of  the  real  dis- 
order, and  will,  of  itself,  furnish  almost  conclusive  proof  of  sim- 
ulation. In  partial  mania,  the  subject  of  the  delusion,  though 
it  may  frequently  change,  completely  occupies  the  mind  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  period,  and  the  patient's  discourse,  when 
he  wanders,  will  always  have  some  relation  to  it.  When 
this  form  of  the  disease  is  simulated,  the  delusions  are  not 
only  frequently  changing,  but  when  questioned  concerning 
them,  the  person  is  more  likely  than  not  to  shape  his  answer 
without  any  reference  to  the  subject,  and  embrace  the  oppor- 
tunity to  introduce  a  new  insane  idea.  Nothing  irritates  a 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  323. 

31 


362  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

monomaniac  more  than  to  be  called  insane.  He  stoutly 
repels  the  idea,  and  maintains  the  reality  and  correctness  of 
his  delusions.  The  simulator,  on  the  contrary,  will  be  but 
little  inclined  to  discourage  a  belief  which  it  is  his  great 
object  to  produce.  "  A  real  monomaniac,"  says  Marc,  "is 
strongly  prejudiced  -in  favor  of  his  opinions,  the  slightest 
contradiction  excites  his  temper,  while  the  simulator  readily 
overlooks  this  essential  point  in  his  part,  if  the  contradiction 
be  skilfully  managed.  The  taciturnity  peculiar  to  the  real 
subject  of  monomania,  frequently  leaves  simulators  at  fault, 
since  the  complaints  of  the  latter,  when  sure  of  being  seen 
or  heard,  and  their  repugnance  at  dwelling  in  solitude,  are 
not  met  with,  or  at  least,  not  in  the  same  degree,  in  the 
others."1  In  addition  to  these  characteristics  of  this  form 
of  mental  derangement,  it  may  be  remarked  that  many  of 
the  peculiarities  diagnostic  of  general  mania,  are  often  so  of 
partial  mania,  such  as  sleeplessness,  insensibility  to  opium, 
and  irritability  of  temper.  According  to  Marc,  monomania 
that  is  not  characterized  by  sad,  or  at  least  serious  ideas,  has 
seldom,  if  ever,  led  to  criminal  acts. 

§  357.  Idiocy  and  imbecility  are  sometimes  simulated, 
and  the  imitation  would  be  very  likely  to  deceive  those  not 
practically  acquainted  with  these  mental  affections;  but  the 
history  of  the  individual  and  his  physical  constitution  furnish 
such  conclusive  proof  of  the  imposture,  that  the  attempt  is 
less  successful  than  when  the  other  forms  of  insanity  are 
selected  for  simulation.  In  genuine  cases,  if  the  affection 
be  congenital,  the  history  of  the  patient  or  form  of  the  head 
will  establish  this  fact.  If  it  have  occurred  at  an  after  period 
of  life,  the  circumstances  that  have  occasioned  it  may  be 
learned  from  the  acquaintances  of  the  patient.  If  the  form 
of  the  head  present  nothing  abnormal,  it  is  to  be  supposed 
that  the  mental  deficiency,  if  there  be  any  in  reality,  is  of 
the  acquired  kind,  so  that  if  the  person  pretends  to  have  been 
from  birth  in  his  present  condition,  this  of  itself  would  be 
presumptive  proof  of  imposition.  If,  however,  he  is  capable 

1  Diet.  Med.  Sci.  Article,  Alienes. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  363 

of  referring  his  mental  deficiency  to  the  influence  of  any  par- 
ticular adventitious  causes,  the  practitioner  can  determine  for 
himself,  in  a  certain  measure,  how  far  these  alleged  causes 
could  have  contributed  to  produce  the  condition  in  question. 
If  they  appear  to  be  plainly  and  palpably  inadequate,  he  has 
a  right  to  conclude  that  the  person  is  acting  the  part  of  an 
impostor.  It  sometimes  happens  that  the  simulator  has  had 
frequent  opportunities  of  observing  the  manners  of  an  idiot 
or  imbecile,  and  possessing  some  powers  of  mimicry,  is  able 
to  give  a  pretty  faithful  copy  of  the  example  he  has  studied. 
But  there  is  a  stupid,  vacant  cast  of  countenance  in  these 
affections,  which  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  imitate 
well  enough  to  deceive  one  much  conversant  with  this  class 
of  beings.  Full  as  difficult  is  it  to  imitate  the  unfixed,  un- 
certain, expressionless  look,  and  the  frequently  and  abruptly 
fluctuating  train  of  their  ideas.  Zacchias  offers  as  a  test  of 
idiocy,  the  pusillanimous  and  submissive  character  of  its 
subjects,  but  it  is  now  well  known  that  most  idiots  are  liable, 
on  provocation,  to  gusts  of  furious,  brutal  passion,  as 
transient  as  they  are  sudden.  Imbecility  presents  such  a 
diversity  of  mental  deficiency  both  in  kind  and  degree,  that 
the  simulation  of  it  will  baffle  the  scrutiny  of  the  observer, 
who  is  not  prepared  for  his  task  by  a  considerable  acquaint- 
ance with  the  phenomena  of  the  imbecile  mind.  In  the  first 
degree  of  real  imbecility  there  is  a  singular  mixture  of  stupid- 
ity and  shrewdness,  in  the  fraudulent  imitation  of  which,  the 
vigilant  observer  may  discover  proofs  of  simulation.  He 
will  find  that  on  points  directly  involving  the  interest  of  the 
simulator,  the  latter  will  display  the  full  endowment  of  the 
shrewdness  compatible  with  this  condition,  while  he  reserves 
his  stupidity  for  occasions  where  his  own  interests  are  not 
particularly  concerned.  In  replying  to  the  questions  put  to 
him,  he  will  be  careful,  amid  all  his  display  of  imbecility,  to 
say  nothing  likely  to  favor  a  belief  of  his  guilt  in  the  matter 
which  has  led  him  to  assume  the  part  of  an  impostor.  What 
he  says  is  intended  to  leave  an  impression  favorable  to  his 
innocence,  and  this  effect  he  will  endeavor  to  produce  as  far 
as  he  dares.  When,  therefore,  the  person  replies  to  inquiries 


364  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

in  such  a  manner  as  to  criminate  himself,  it  may  be  pretty 
safely  concluded  that  the  imbecility  is  genuine ;  and  though 
the  converse  of  this  rule  may  not  be  equally  true,  yet  if  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  replies  has  an  exculpatory  turn,  strong 
ground  of  suspicion  at  least  is  afforded,  that  all  is  not  right. 
Imbecility  in  the  first  degree  will  seldom  be  counterfeited, 
however,  from  the  simple  fact,  that  the  real  affection  seldom 
annuls  the  criminal  responsibilities  of  those  who  are  ac- 
knowledged to  be  its  subjects. 

§  358.  Senile  dementia  may  be  simulated  by  aged  per- 
sons, but  it  is  so  imperfectly  known  as  a  distinct  form  of 
insanity,  that  its  peculiar  features  would  probably  be  mingled 
with  those  of  general  and  partial  mania,  and  thus  lead  to  an 
easy  detection.  If  the  physician  will  steadily  bear  in  mind 
that  senile  dementia  is  essentially  characterized  by  deficiency 
of  mental  excitement,  he  will  not  be  long  in  arriving  at  the 
truth  in  doubtful  cases,  for  the  simulator  will  inevitably 
indulge  in  hallucinations,  and  perform  physical  movements 
indicative  of  excessive  mental  excitement.  The  principal 
points  that  distinguish  this  affection  from  mania  may  be 
briefly  recapitulated.  In  senile  dementia,  the  delusions  are 
based  on  some  previous  event  of  life,  and  though  irrational, 
are  not  always  absurd.  The  memory  decays,  first,  relative 
to  recent  events,  and  finally,  to  every  thing  it  had  previously 
stored  up.  The  senses  lose  their  acuteness ;  the  power  of 
recognizing  persons,  places,  and  things,  fails  at  last,  and  has 
gone  forever ;  and  one  looks  in  vain  for  the  least  exertion  of 
thought.  The  whole  conduct  and  language  are  indicative  of 
complete  childishness;  and  in  this  second  childhood,  the 
necessity  of  vigilance  to  prevent  the  miserable  patient  from 
injuring  himself  or  others,  is  no  less  imperative  than  in  the 
first.  In  mania,  the  delusions  are  generally  absurd  as  well 
as  irrational ;  the  memory  manifests  no  decay,  except  perhaps 
on  subjects  that  relate  to  the  predominant  idea ;  the  strength 
and  accuracy  of  the  senses  are  unimpaired;  persons  and 
things  are  as  readily  recognized  as  ever;  and  occasionally 
the  mind  flashes  forth  with  more  than  its  usual  power  and 
vividness.  At  times  the  character  assumes  its  natural  manli- 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  ^365 

ness  and  dignity,  and  the  individual  conducts  with  a  pro- 
priety and  discretion  scarcely  to  be  distinguished  from  those 
of  perfect  soundness  of  mind.  Bearing  in  mind  these  char- 
acteristic differences  which  are  so  little  known  to  any  but 
medical  men,  we  cannot  be  easily  deceived  by  the  best-man- 
aged attempt  at  simulating  senile  dementia. 

§  359.  It  has  been  already  stated,  (§  286,)  that  the  other 
forms  of  dementia  are  usually  the  sequel  of  mania,  or  other 
disorders  of  the  nervous  system.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  the  previous  disorder  is  sometimes  so  mild,  so  obscure, 
and  so  short  in  its  duration,  as  to  be  entirely  overlooked. 
AYlien  this  is  the  case,  the  dementia  that  supervenes  is 
viewed  with  suspicion,  and,  unless  sufficient  time  is  allowed 
for  its  development,  it  may  frequently  be  mistaken  for  the 
effect  of"  simulation.  The  following  case  looks  like  one  of 
this  kind,  though  nothing  but  farther  observation  and  per- 
haps more  information  respecting  his  previous  history,  could 
place  its  true  nature  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt.  "  I  was, 
a  few  years  ago,  requested  to  see  a  man  confined  in  gaol 
for  the  crime  of  cutting  off  his  wife's  head.  This  man  had 
made  no  attempt  to  deny  the  deed,  or  to  escape  the  conse- 
quences. For  some  time  after  he  was  taken  to  prison,  his 
conduct  was  quiet,  and  on  common  subjects  he  would  talk 
in  a  common  way  with  his  fellow-prisoners.  When  he  was 
asked  about  the  murder,  and  reminded  that  he  would  cer- 
tainly be  hanged  for  it,  he  always  said  he  did  not  know  that 
he  had  done  any  harm.  After  being  confined  five  or  six 
weeks,  he  occasionally  showed  a  disposition  to  be  violent; 
and,  on  one  occasion,  put  a  handkerchief  round  his  neck  as 
if  he  intended  to  hang  himself.  Subsequently  he  became 
taciturn,  and  his  demeanor  changed  to  that  of  an  imbecile 
person,  which  it  was  at  the  time  of  my  seeing  him.  He 
wore  a  woollen  cap,  which  he  had  taken  from  one  of  the 
other  prisoners,  and  carried  a  piece  of  wood  about  with  him, 
which  he  represented,  by  signs,  to  be  his  sword;  for  he 
would  not  speak,  nor  answer  any  questions ;  only  breaking 
silence  now  and  then  by  repeating  the  word  '  cabbage,'  with- 
out any  kind  of  meaning.  He  had  buttons  and  other  com- 

31* 


366  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mon  trinkets  tied  round  his  wrist ;  and  he  had  made  a  great 
many  attempts  to  walk  out  of  the  hospital  of  the  prison,  in 
which  he  was  lodged.  When  a  watch  or  any  shining  sub- 
stance was  shown  to  him,  he  would  assume  an  idiotic  smile, 
and  begin  to  dance." 1 

§  360.  The  narrator  of  this  case  suspected  that  the  man 
"  was  playing  a  part,"  though  he  admits  that  u  the  nature 
of  his  crime,  and  his  conduct  after  committing  it,  went  far 
to  support  the  idea  of  his  insanity,  and  that  his  insanity 
might  have  been  coming  on  some  time  before  the  murder." 
He  remarks,  as  one  ground  of  his  suspicions,  that  "  the 
mixed  character  of  his  mental  disorder,  and  the  rapid  super- 
vention of  idiocy  [dementia]  on  a  quiet  form  of  insanity,  in 
a  man  of  thirty-five,  seemed  to  be  unusual  circumstances." 
Such  circumstances  are  certainly  not  very  common,  but 
nevertheless,  they  have  been  observed.  Esquirol  recognizes 
a  form  of  dementia  which  is  complicated  more  or  less 
with  monomania,  and  distinctly  alternating  with  it.  He 
remarks  of  a  patient  whose  case  he  relates,  that  "  though 
apparently  insensible  to  whatever  was  passing  around 
him,  he  still  was  not  entirely  deprived  of  intelligence,  and 
he  had  great  strength  of  will."2  The  case  of  Pechot,  adjudi- 
cated in  France  within  three  or  four  years,  was  a  striking 
instance  of  the  rapid  supervention  of  dementia  on  a  quiet 
form  of  insanity,  though  the  patient  was  older,  it  is  true, 
than  Dr.  Conolly's.  Between  the  time  of  the  commission 
of  the  murder  in  April,  for  which  he  was  indicted,  and  that 
of  his  trial  in  the  following  November,  he  was  frequently 
observed  and  examined  by  a  medical  commission  appointed 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  exact  condition  of  his 
mind.  During  the  early  part  of  this  period,  he  merely  ap- 
peared to  be  deeply  dejected,  and  the  commission  reported 
that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  say  that  his  understanding 
was  nowise  impaired.  At  the  time  of  the  trial,  however, 
dementia  was  plainly  visible,  and  then  one  of  the  commission 

1  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  455. 

2  Des  Maladies  Men.  ii.  228. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  367 

stated,  that  during  the  first  examination,  Pechot  was  un- 
doubtedly in  a  state  of  profound  melancholy,  of  which  the 
present  dementia  was  the  natural  sequel.  It  also  appeared 
from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time  previous  to  the  mur- 
der, his  mind  was  considerably  disordered.1  The  other  cir- 
cumstances which  raised  the  suspicion  of  simulation  in  the 
above  case,  were,  that  though  he  would  not  answer  ques- 
tions, he  heard  and  understood  them,  —  that  "  although  he 
never  looked  directly  at  any  one,  he  was,  in  reality,  very  watch- 
ful of  their  movements,  even  when  distant  from  him," —  and 
that  "  he  always  made  a  sudden  run  toward  the  door  when 
anybody  opened  it  to  go  out."  In  regard  to  the  last  circum- 
stance, we  can  only  say,  that  it  is  often  seen  in  every  form  of 
insanity ;  and  as  it  regards  the  others,  it  may  be  sufficient  to 
observe,  that  the  committee,  in  speaking  of  Pechot's  condi- 
tion a  few  days  after  the  murder,  stated  that  he  was  very  re- 
luctant to  answer  questions,  and  that  "  his  eye  was  constantly 
on  the  watch,  the  slightest  noise,  the  least  gesture  instantly 
attracting  his  attention." 

§  361.  Homicidal  insanity,  when  the  fact  of  its  existence 
shall  be  generally  recognized,  will,  undoubtedly,  be  often 
falsely  pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  and  the  task  imposed  on 
the  physician  in  such  cases,  will  be  sometimes  a  difficult  and 
a  delicate  one.  The  characteristic  and  distinctive  features  of 
this  affection  have  been  elsewhere  stated  (§  217,)  and  it  is  to 
a  knowledge  of  them  we  are  to  look  for  the  means  of  detect- 
ing its  counterfeits ;  and  though  our  investigation  may  oc- 
casionally result  only  in  doubt  and  uncertainty,  yet,  generally 
speaking,  when  rightly  conducted,  it  will  lead  us  to  the  truth. 

§  362.  Insanity,  characterized  by  hysteric  symptoms,  was 
simulated  not  long  since  in  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massa- 
chusetts, and,  considering  the  youth  of  the  subject,  the  appar- 
ent want  of  motive,  and  the  severity  of  the  symptoms,  it  was 
somewhat  curious.  The  lad,  thirteen  years  old,  had  fallen  on 
his  head  about  two  years  and  a  half  previous  to  admission, 

1  Annales  D'Hygiene  Publique,  No.  35.  The  article  is  condensed  in  22 
American  Jurist,  27. 


368  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  ever  since  that  period,  had  exhibited  some  anomalous 
symptoms  of  disease,  which  had  been  referred  by  his  phy- 
sicians to  derangement  of  the  digestive  organs.  For  the  few 
last  months  the  symptoms  were  more  severe  and  decided. 
He  refused  food  for  long  periods,  had  spasms,  laid  with  his 
eyes,  fixed  and  legs  drawn  up,  would  hold  his  breath  and 
strike.  On  admission  to  the  asylum,  he  presented  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  sickly,  emaciated  boy  under  puberty,  unable  to 
stand,  exhausted  by  suffering,  breathing  quick,  and  pass- 
ing his  evacuations  in  bed.  Every  few  minutes  he  had  a 
frightful  spasm,  commencing  with  a  convulsive  shaking  of 
the  head,  pawing  of  the  hands,  and  turned-up  eyes.  Soon 
his  hands  would  vibrate  against  his  sides  and  chest;  his 
countenance  would  be  dreadfully  distorted,  and  then  would 
commence  a  horrid  scream  that  might  be  heard  over  the 
whole  premises.  In  this  condition,  with  occasional  remis- 
sions, and  the  addition,  at  one  time,  of  diarrhosa,  he  remained 
for  about  a  month,  when  the  imposture  which  had  been  sus- 
pected, was  detected.  Being  watched  through  a  hole  in  a 
blanket  hung  before  his  window,  he  was  observed  to  jump 
up  and  stride  about  his  room  as  actively  as  anybody,  but  at 
the  slightest  noise,  resuming  his  old  position,  screaming  and 
groaning.  Dr.  Bell,  finally  burst  in  upon  him  before  he 
could  regain  his  bed,  chided  him  for  his  deceit,  and  bade  him 
walk  into  the  hall.  "  The  spell  is  broken,"  says  the  record, 
"  the  feeble  knees  are  made  strong,  the  convulsed  and  dis- 
torted visage  is  calm  and  smooth,  and  the  young  deceiver 
goes  forth  erect,  clothed,  and  in  his  right  mind." 

§  363.  Besides  a  knowledge  of  the  symptoms  of  insan- 
ity, which  will  enable  the  physician  to  detect  its  simulation, 
his  own  ingenuity  may  often  contrive  some  plan  for  outwit- 
ting the  pretender,  and  entrapping  him  in  his  own  toils.  To 
perform  the  part  of  an  insane  person,  carrying  through  its 
numerous  and  complicated  phases,  requires  an  endowment 
of  the  imitative  powers,  seldom  bestowed  on  any,  least  of  all, 
on  those  who  would  have  occasion  to  use  it  for  such  pur- 
poses, so  that  the  measure  of  ingenuity  by  which  it  is  main- 
tained, is  scarcely  ever  a  match  for  the  devices  which  a 


SIMULATED  INSANITY.  369 

shrewd  and  vigilant  physician  has  always  at  hand.  In  the 
case  of  a  girl  feigning  mania,  Foder£  informed  the  keeper,  in 
her  presence,  that  if  she  were  not  better  the  next  day,  he 
should  apply  a  hot  iron  between  her  shoulders.  This  im- 
mediately produced  a  decided  amendment.  There  is  related 
the  case  of  a  sailor,  whose  simulated  madness  was  mani- 
fested by  a  vehement  desire  to  throw  himself  overboard, 
which,  after  being  prevented  for  some  time,  he  was  at  last 
permitted  to  do ;  immediately  on  reaching  the  water,  how- 
ever, he  swam  vigorously  and  called  loudly  for  a  boat.1  A 
device  frequently  resorted  to,  is  to  mention  in  the  hearing  of 
the  person  some  symptom  of  madness  which  is  easily  imi- 
tated, as  not  being  present ;  at  a  subsequent  examination,  if 
the  disease  is  feigned,  this  symptom  will  certainly  be  observ- 
ed, whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  symptom  of  madness.  In  some 
cases,  it  would  be  perfectly  proper  to  adopt  the  suggestion  of 
Marc,  to  intoxicate  him  slightly,  when,  if  he  be  playing  a 
part,  he  will  be  likely  to  forget  it,  and  appear  in  his  real 
colors.  In  the  English  naval  and  military  service,  where  the 
medical  officer  is  often  called  on  to  deal  with  feigned  insan- 
ity, punishment  is  much  resorted  to,2  on  the  principle,  prob- 
ably, that  if  the  affection  be  counterfeited,  it  will  be  more 
efficacious  than  any  thing  else  in  restoring  the  impostor  to  his 
right  mind ;  and  if  real,  it  will  do  good  by  acting  as  a  power- 
ful derivative.  If  the  latter  part  of  the  alternative  were  true, 
nothing  certainly  could  be  more  proper  than  sound  flagella- 
tion ;  but  if  any  thing,  more  surely  than  another,  will  push  a 
case  of  mental  derangement  beyond  the  reach  of  curative 
means,  it  is  corporal  punishment.  The  misery  thus  produced 
is  poorly  compensated  by  the  detection  of  a  few  cases  of  im- 
posture. In  the  following  case,  however,  where  something 
like  this  kind  of  treatment  was  used,  it  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  very  proper  had  the  disorder  actually  existed ;  and 
as  it  may  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  practitioner  in  similar  in- 
stances, a  brief  notice  of  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  in  this 
connection. 

i  Cyclop.  Pract.  Med.  Article,  Feigned  Diseases.          a  Idem. 


370  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  364.  Jean  Gerard,  a  bold  villain,  murdered  a  woman 
at  Lyons  in  1829.  Immediately  after  being  arrested,  he 
ceased  to  speak  altogether,  and  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of 
fatuity.  He  laid  nearly  motionless  in  his  bed,  and  when 
food  was  brought,  his  attendants  raised  him  up,  and  it  was 
given  to  him  in  that  position.  His  hearing  also  seemed  to 
be 'affected.  The  physicians  who  were  directed  to  examine 
him,  concluded  that  if  this  were' actually  what  it  appeared 
to  be,  a  paralysis  of  the  nerves  of  the  tongue  and  ear,  the 
actual  cautery  applied  to  the  soles  of  the  feet,  would  be  a 
proper  remedy.  It  being  used,  however,  for  several  days, 
without  any  success,  it  was  agreed  to  apply  it  to  the  neck. 
For  two  days  no  effect  was  produced;  but  on  the  third, 
while  preparations  were  making  for  its  application,  Gerard 
evinced  some  signs  of  repugnance  to  it,  and  after  some  urg- 
ing, he  spoke,  declaring  his  innocence  of  the  crime  of  which 
he  was  charged.  His  simulation  was  thus  exposed.1 

§  365.  When  required  to  examine  and  report  upon  cases 
of  suspected  simulation,  the  medical  man  cannot  be  too  cau- 
tious in  arriving  at  his  final  decision.  The  judgment  is  not 
to  be  determined  by  any  single  symptom,  however  striking, 
but  every  pathological  indication,  every  possible  motive  to 
action,  in  short,  the  whole  moral,  intellectual,  and  physical 
history  of  the  individual  should  be  faithfully  studied,  before 
we  venture  to  make  up  our  final  opinion.  Especially 
should  we  try  to  ascertain  from  the  acquaintances  of  the 
individual,  whether  he  has  evinced  mimic  powers  to  any 
extent,  and  has  ever  had  an  opportunity  to  observe  the  man- 
ners and  discourse  of  the  insane.  The  mimic  power  neces- 
sary to  produce  a  clever  imitation  of  insanity  of  any  kind, 
can  hardly  be  supposed  to  have  laid  all  his  life  unexercised 
and  unknown,  and  still  less  could  it  be  supposed  that  this 
power  might  be  so  great  as  to  render  any  personal  observa- 
tion of  the  disease  unnecessary.  Ample  time  for  the  investi- 
gation should  be  demanded,  and  unless  it  be  granted,  the 
physician  would  be  justified  in  declining  altogether  the  duty 

1  Annales  D'Hygiene  Publique,  ii.  392. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  371 

assigned  him.  Opportunities  must  be  provided  of  observing 
the  simulator,  when,  thinking  himself  not  watched,  he  throws 
off  the  guise  he  has  assumed,  (which  he  will  do  at  such 
times,)  and  returns  to  his  own  proper  character.  The  phy- 
sician should  never  forget,  however,  the  extreme  perseverance 
and  vigilance  with  which  these  people  manage  thei/  imposi- 
tions, and  not  be  too  easily  induced  to  regard  them  favorably 
in  consequence  of  the  results  which  such  opportunities  may 
sometimes  furnish ;  for  they  will"  often  suppose  they  are 
watched  at  times  when  they  have  no  means  of  knowing 
whether  they  are  so  or  not.  Foder£  speaks  of  a  girl,  un- 
doubtedly a  simulator,  who  committed  every  kind  of  inde- 
cency in  her  cell ;  and  another  case  is  related  of  some 
French  prisoners  of  war,  who  carried  "  their  simulation  to  so 
exquisite  a  height,  as  to  eat  their  own  excrement,  even  when 
shut  up  in  their  cells,  suspecting  that  they  might  be  over- 
looked."1 In  suspected  cases,  therefore,  the  persons  should 
be  strictly,  and  as  far  as  possible,  secretly  watched,  in  order" 
that  in  their  moments  of  forgetfulness  or  a  sense  of  security, 
they  may  be  seen  laying  aside  their  false  colors,  and  sudden- 
ly assuming  their  natural  manners.  That  this  will  happen 
sooner  or  later  in  every  case,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt,  for  the 
mind  will  instinctively  seek  relief  from  the  painful  exertion 
and  sense  of  restraint,  rendered  necessary  by  an  elaborate 
attempt  at  deception,  by  throwing  off  the  disguise  that  has 
been  adopted,  and  again  returning  to  its  natural  condition. 
Again  we  caution  the  practitioner  not  to  be  in  haste  to  form 
his  opinion,  but  to  wait  long  and  patiently,  for  opportunities 
that  may  shed  new  light  on  the  difficulties  before  him. 

§  366.  The  importance  of  the  last  suggestion  is  strongly 
exemplified  in  the  following  case,  related  by  Professor  Mon- 
teggia,  and  translated  from  the  Italian  by  Marc.  We  have 
taken  the  liberty  to  abridge  somewhat  the  original  narrative. 
In  1792,  a  criminal  who  was  confined  in  the  prison  of  St. 
Ange,  in  the  province  of  Lodi,  became  insane  soon  after 
hearing  that  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his  accomplices.  The 

1  Cyclop.  Pract  Med.  Article,  Feigned  Diseases. 


372  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

physicians  of  the  place  who  were  required  to  examine  him, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  feigning  madness,  though 
they  did  not  express  strong  confidence  in  their  opinion. 
From  their  report,  his  disorder  seems  to  have  been  of  rather 
a  quiet  form.  To  any  question  whatever,  he  merely  uttered 
the  words,  book,  priest,  crown,  crucifix.  Sometimes  he 
seemed,  by  the  motions  of  his  mouth  and  tongue,,  desirous  of 
replying  to  questions,  but  finally  repeated,  with  a  smile,  the 
usual  words.  Their  reasons  for  considering  him  to  be  feign- 
ing, were,  that  the  disease  appeared  suddenly,  without  any 
premonition,  and  was  accompanied  by  irregular  symptoms, 
sometimes  appearing  to  be  a  melancholy,  attended  by  wan- 
dering, sometimes  a  cheerful  mania,  and  sometimes  a  com- 
plete dementia.  It  appears  that  he  was  noisy  at  night  and 
quiet  by  day;  that  he  scattered  his  food  about;  that  he 
never  sighed ;  and  that  he  never  fixed  his  eye  on  any  partic- 
ular object.  The  physicians,  in  speaking  to  one  another  in 
his  hearing,  of  these  four  circumstances,  observed,  for  the 
purpose  of  entrapping  him,  that  if  just  the  contrary  had  hap- 
pened, they  must  necessarily  have  concluded  that  he  was 
insane.  It  was  soon  after  observed  that  he  was  quiet  at 
night,  no  longer  scattered  his  food,  and  did  sigh.  He  seemed 
reluctant  to  have  his  pulse  felt,  for  whenever  this  was  done, 
he  would  keep  his  arm  and  fingers  constantly  in  motion, 
though  before  perfectly  at  rest.  The  physicians  also  said  in 
his  presence,  that  his  disorder  would  certainly  be  improved 
by  a  blister  to  the  neck.  At  this  time  he  was  mute,  but 
shortly  after  the  application,  he  began  to  repeat  the  old  words 
book,  croum,  etc. 

In  July,  1793,  he  was  ordered  by  the  court  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  prison  at  Milan,  and  Prof.  M.  was  requested  to 
examine  him  and  ascertain  his  mental  condition.  At  this 
time  he  appeared  to  be  in  a  demented,  imbecile  state,  and 
there  was  a  kind  of  oddity  and  apparent  affectation  in  his 
manners,  which  at  first  strongly  favored  the  suspicion  of 
simulation.  Though  attentive  to  what  was  passing  around 
him,  he  seemed  to  shrink  from  observation,  and  averted  his 
eye  the  moment  it  met  that  of  another.  When  called,  he 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  373 

certainly  heard  the  voice,  and  would  start  to  go  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  sound,  but  instead  of  advancing  directly,  he 
would  wander  about  the  room.  He  never  spoke ;  the  only 
sound  he  uttered  was  a  kind  of  whistle,  like  that  made  by 
the  wind  blowing  through  a  keyhole.  He  was  singularly 
fond  of  bright  and  beautiful  objects,  viewing  and  touching 
them  with  an  air  of  great  interest.  He  collected  various 
trifles  of  which  he  was  quite  fond.  He  never  was  com- 
pletely quiet,  but  was  constantly  in  motion,  or  making  some 
gesture.  He  was  never  observed  to  sleep ;  while  in  bed  he 
was  continually  moving  his  legs,  or  some  other  part  of  his 
body,  or  playing  with  a  rag  which  he  would  put  upon  his 
eyes  or  mouth,  or  twine  around  his  fingers.  He  loved  to  put 
it  over  the  eyes  or  mouth  of  others,  and  then  retiring  a  few 
steps,  would  look  at  them  with  a  smiling  air,  and  utter  a 
sound  expressive  of  gratification.  He  would  frequently 
caress  those  about  him,  and  pinch  their  cheeks  in  a  friendly 
manner.  He  could  neither  dress  nor  undress  himself  alone ; 
being  used  to  eat  out  of  crockery  plates,  he  would  refuse 
food  brought  to  him  in  any  other  kind  of  ware.  He  would 
sometimes  hide  his  bread  in  his  bed,  and  think  no  more  of  it. 
He  never  seemed  to  desire,  nor  to  seek  for  food,  though  he  ate 
with  avidity  when  he  was  hungry.  Sometimes,  instead  of 
eating  his  soup  out  of  the  plate,  he  would  turn  it  out  on  the 
floor,  and  then  take  it  up  with  a  spoon.  He  was  much  an- 
noyed if  made  to  remain  long  in  any  one  place.  When 
they  brought  towards  him  a  mirror,  he  would  spit  at  it, 
refuse  to  look  at  it,  and*be  made  quite  angry  if  they  persist- 
ed in  putting  it  under  his  eyes.  When  teased  in  this  man- 
ner, he  exerted  extraordinary  strength.  When  pinched,  he 
appeared  not  to  feel  it,  and  he  was  seen  to  take  up  live  coals 
in  his  hands,  without  showing  any  sign  of  pain.  When  his 
attention  was  directed  to  figures  on  the  wall,  made  by  candle- 
light, he  would  run  as  if  to  catch  them  in  his  hands,  and 
express  his  disappointment  by  beating  his  head  with  his  fist. 
He  would  never  drink  wine,  but  the  moment  he  tasted  it,  he 
would  spit  it  out  with  a  strong  expression  of  displeasure. 
Though  inclined  to  believe,  from  the  examination  so  far, 
32 


374  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

that  the  disorder  was  real  and  not  feigned,  yet  considering 
the  suspicions  of  the  physicians  of  St.  Ange,  some  decisive 
test  seemed  to  be  required  that  would  unmask  the  simula- 
tion, if  it  existed,  beyond  all  doubt.  Wine  being  out  of  the 
question,  six  grains  of  opium  was  given  him  in  his  soup,  but 
it  produced  no  effect  whatever.  A  few  days  afterwards  he 
again  took  six  grains  of  opium,  in  the  morning,  and  this  pro- 
ducing no  effect  at  the  end  of  six  hours,  six  more  grains,  from 
a  different  parcel,  was  given  him.  In  the  evening  he  appear- 
ed as  usual.  A  cracker  was  fired  near  him  while  his  eye 
was  turned  in  another  direction,  to  see  if  the  unexpected  ex- 
plosion would  surprise  him  at  all ;  but  it  did  not,  nor  did 
another  that  was  exploded  under  his  shirt.  He  passed  the 
night  as  usual,  without  sleep.  No  change  was  observed  in 
him  the  next  morning,  but  in  the  evening,  he  appeared  a 
little  uneasy  and  looked  towards  the  windows,  as  if  frightened. 
He  went  to  bed,  and  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he 
raised  himself  up,  heaved  some  deep  sighs,  and  at  last  cried 
out,  "  My  God,  I  am  dying."  The  physician  who  was  im- 
mediately summoned,  found  him  quiet  and  talking  rationally, 
without  any  sign  of  madness.  He  said,  upon  inquiry,  that 
he  had  no  idea  of  what  had  taken  place;  he  believed,  or 
seemed  to  believe,  that  he  was  still  in  the  prison  of  St.  Ange ; 
and  demanded  a  confessor  and  an  officer  of  justice,  that  he 
might  be  judicially  interrogated.  He  added,  that  there  had 
seemed  to  be  persons  at  the  windows,  who  told  him  that 
they  had  given  him  poisoned  soup  in  order  to  kill  him.  He 
complained  of  nausea,  though  his  pufse  was  natural,  and  his 
countenance  calm  and  unaltered.  The  next  day  he  ate  well, 
and  continued  to  conduct  well  and  appear  perfectly  rational 
as  long  as  he  remained  in  the  prison,  after  which  he  was  lost 
sight  of.  The  narrator  of  the  case  concludes  that  the  crimi- 
nal was  really  insane,  and  that  he  was  suddenly  cured  by 
the  opium ;  because  if  he  had  been  feigning,  and  were 
finally  induced  to  throw  off  the  mask  from  the  fear  of  actu- 
ally dying  from  the  effects  of  opium,  it  is  not  very  clear  why 
the  first  dose  had  no  effect. 

§  367.     Marc,  in  commenting  on  the  above  case,  observes, 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  375 

"  that  the  reasons  which  induced  the  physicians  of  St.  Ange 
to  suspect  simulation,  may  be  easily  disposed  of.  Their 
opinion  is  founded,  first,  on  the  irregularity  of  the  signs  of 
madness ;  but  this  fact  appears  to  me  by  no  means  to  have 
been  established.  I  see  in  this  patient,  so  far  as  the  imper- 
fect description  enables  me  to  judge,  a  maniac  laboring  under 
a  cheerful  form  of  mania,  characterized  by  restlessness  and 
nocturnal  noise,  followed  by  a  remission  with  depression  and 
true  dementia.  Such  a  complication,  however,  is  frequently 
observed  in  maniacs.  The  circumstance  of  the  patient's 
being  noisy  at  night,  and  quiet  by  day,  is  rather  in  favor  of 
the  reality  of  the  derangement,  than  otherwise.  Is  it  proba- 
ble, indeed,  that  a  simulator  would  choose  the  time  when  the 
imperious  want  of  sleep  is  most  strongly  felt,  to  feign  an 
attack  of  mania  which  he  could  just  as  well  feign  during  the 
day,  and  sleep,  at  least,  a  portion  of  the  night  ?  Besides, 
those  who  lived  with  the  prisoner,  and  even  the  keepers  of 
the  prison  of  Milan,  declared  that  he  had  never  been  seen  to 
sleep,  and  during  the  day,  was  so  restless  as  to  be  constantly 
changing  his  position.  It  seems  to  me  impossible  for  a 
simulator  to  persist  in  this  manner,  and,  therefore,  I  believe 
that  such  a  complete  and  long-continued  absence  of  sleep  is 
alone  sufficient  to  prove  the  reality  of  the  mental  perturba- 
tion." The  sudden  invasion  of  the  insanity,  he  does  not 
regard  as  a  proof  of  simulation,  because  this  fact,  though 
rare,  is  not  without  examples.  The  oddities  of  demeanor 
also,  are  characteristic  of  dementia,  and  could  not  be  coun- 
terfeited for  any  length  of  time.  But  the  effect  of  opium 
was  enough  to  destroy  any  remaining  suspicion  of  simula- 
tion. If  he  had  been  simulating,  there  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  a  sufficient  reason  for  ceasing  when  he  did.  The 
return  of  reason  was  preceded  by  a  hallucination  of  the 
sense  of  hearing ;  but  it  is  not  probable,  says  Marc,  that  an 
Italian  bandit  could  have  been  so  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  mental  disease,  as  to  have  thought  of  using  such  a 
stratagem. 

§  368.    A  remarkably  embarrassing  case  has  been  published 
by  Dr.  Parchappe,  physician  of  the  asylum  at  Rouen,  who 


376  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

was  directed  by  the  court  to  investigate  the  mental  condition 
of  the  prisoner,  and  who,  for  that  purpose,  was  allowed,  as 
is  the  custom  in  France,  to  examine  the  evidence  given  at 
the  preliminary  trial.  From  this  it  appears,  that  on  the  8th 
of  April,  1845,  a  man  named  Lambert  was  bitten  in  the 
hand  by  a  dog  that  was  generally  considered  to  be  mad. 
The  same  day  the  wound  was  cauterized  with  the  actual 
cautery.  The  next  day  he  started  for  Nibas  to  find  some  one 
who  could  cure  him,  but  stopped  at  Eu  and  consulted  a 
lawyer  from  whom  he  got  a  secret  remedy  for  hydrophobia. 
On  the  llth  he  returned  home,  having  been,  during  all  this 
period,  very  anxious  and  abstracted,  saying  that  he  was  lost. 
About  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  13th,  he 
was  heard  howling'  in  his  room.  The  persons  who  went  to 
him  found  him  calm.  He  told  them  that  he  had  perspired 
and  trembled ;  that  this  was  the  first  paroxysm  of  hydro- 
phobia ;  that  he  must  go  directly  to  Nibas  to  get  cured,  as 
he  might  be  then,  but  that  after  the  third  paroxysm,  there 
could  be  no  help  for  him.  That  day  he  went  again  to  Eu, 
but  the  lawyer  declined  giving  him  a  remedy,  and  told  him 
he  was  more  likely  to  be  crazy  than  hydrophobic.  The 
following  night  he  did  not  go  to  bed,  because,  as  he  said,  if 
he  should  lie  down,  a  paroxysm  would  come  on.  On  the 
14th,  about  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  came  into  the 
house  [he  slepi^  over  the  stables]  for  the  purpose  of  getting  a 
purse  of  money,  to  carry  into  the  fields.  He  sought  for 
money  in  every  direction,  and  then  displayed  it  on  the 
kitchen  table,  singing,  laughing,  and  dancing.  He  committed 
these  extravagances  till  noontime,  when  his  mistress  ordered 
him  to  go  to  work,  which  he  refused  to  do.  She  then  told 
him  that,  since  he  would  not  work,  he  might  quit  her  service. 
He  replied  that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  be  quiet  that 
afternoon.  He  did  not  dine,  but  for  two  or  three  hours  kept 
repeating  that  he  had  money,  but  it  was  a  great  misfortune, 
because  he  had  stolen  it  from  Dorothy,  an  old  servant  of  the 
family,  and  would  have  his  throat  cut  for  it.  In  the  morning 
he  had  had  an  altercation  with  his  mistress  because  she  had 
refused  him  the  use  of  a  horse,  and  called  her  an  old  tiger. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  377 

About  half-past  two  he  had  collected  some  money,  and  by 
way  of  preventing  him  from  carrying  it  away,  his  mistress 
struck  him  with  a  little  walking-stick.  Lambert  wrested  the 
stick  from  her,  threw  her  upon  the  floor,  and  then  went  to 
the  kitchen,  saying :  "  This  is  not  the  thing ;  I  want  the 
hatchet ;  I  must  kill  her."  With  this  weapon  he  returned  to 
her  room,  and,  having  frightened  away  her  maid,  killed  her 
by  repeated  blows  on  the  head.  In  about  ten  minutes  he 
went  into  the  street,  with  the  hatchet  on  his  shoulder,  pursu- 
ing every  one  who  came  in  sight,  and  crying  out,  "  long  live 
the  king,  my  fortune  is  made."  He  overtook  a  woman,  and 
killed  her  with  two  strokes  of  the  hatchet.  On  approaching 
another  person,  he  said,  "fear  not,  I  do  not  mean  to  kill 
you ;  "  but  he  raised  the  hatchet  as  if  to  strike  him.  Pres- 
ently, he  was  shot  down  and  secured,  but  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  after,  he  begged  to  be  released,  because  he  had  eight 
more  to  kill.  A  witness  told  him  he  deserved  to  be  shot, 
when  he  replied,  "  shoot."  He  appeared  calm,  and  spoke  in 
his  ordinary  tone.  On  his  way  to  prison,  he  uttered  cries, 
and  tried  to  get  away.  He  said  to  a  witness,  "that  if 
he  died  without  killing  him,  he  should  not  die  content." 
"  Why,"  he  said,  "  should  he  regret  having  killed  his  mistress ; 
if  he  had  taken  her  money,  it  was  only  to  give  it  away  in 
charity,  which  she  never  would  do  herself.  Here,  too,  he 
cried,  "  long  live  the  king ;  Jesus,  my  God ;  rny  fortune  is 
made."  At  nine  o'clock  he  arrived  at  the  prison,  where  he 
tried  to  kick  one  of  the  witnesses.  Here  he  soon  became 
taciturn  and  abstracted,  and  refused  food.  Shortly  after,  he 
slept.  On  the  15th  he  was  abstracted  and  dull,  and  seemed 
to  be  surprised  when  told  of  the  cause  of  his  arrest  and  of 
his  wounds.  He  cursed  any  one  who  would  harm  so  good  a 
mistress  as  his.  When  examined  by  the  magistrate,  he  pro- 
fessed not  to  know  that  he  had  been  wounded,  nor  where  he 
was,  and  denied  having  killed  his  mistress.  "  When  was  it?  " 
said  he ;  "  I  have  not  killed  her.  If  I  did,  I  was  mad?  Why 
should  I  have  killed  her?  People  do  not  kill  without  a 
motive."  He  denied  having  killed  the  other  woman.  "  If  I 
did,"  said  he,  "  I  do  not  remember  it."  On  the  18th,  he 

32* 


378  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

recognized  the  hatchet,  but  denied  all  knowledge  of  the  mur- 
ders. He  recollected  nothing  since  Sunday.  From  the  14th 
of  April  to  the  6th  of  June,  the  physician  who  visited  him 
every  day,  was  unable  to  discover  a  single  symptom  of 
mental  disorder,  or  of  hydrophobia.  The  prisoner  constantly 
declared  that  he  had  no  recollection  of  the  murders  imputed 
to  him.  On  the  6th  of  August,  he  was  visited  by  Dr.  Par- 
chappe  who  found  him  with  every  appearance  of  good 
health,  except  that  he  walked  with  a  little  difficulty  and  had 
a  sad  expression  of  countenance.  He  denied  all  knowledge 
of  the  murders,  and  of  other  events  subsequent  to  Sunday, 
as  before  stated.  He  was  conscious  of  his  situation,  and 
shed  tears.  On  the  12th  of  August,  visited  again,  with  the 
same  result. 

In  regard  to  Lambert's  mental  condition,  it  is  obvious  that 
he  was  either  insane  or  feigning  insanity ;  and  if  insane,  he 
must'  have  been  laboring  under  hydrophobia,  or  ordinary 
mania.  The  motiveless  character  of  the  acts,  the  circum- 
stances of  atrocity  by  which  they  were  marked,  and  the 
previous  good  reputation  of  the  prisoner,  are  at  variance 
with  the  supposition  of  intentional  crime,  in  which  fact 
alone  could  be  found  any  motive  for  his  feigning  insanity. 
We  are,  therefore,  led  to  the  conclusion  that  he  must  have 
been  laboring  under  some  form  of  mental  disorder,  —  either 
hydrophobia  or  mania.  Although,  from  the  time  he  was 
bitten,  until  the  murder,  he  was  evidently  suffering  with 
strong  apprehensions  of  hydrophobia,  yet,  as  Dr.  Parchappe 
well  observes,  he  exhibited  at  no  time,  a  single  diagnostic 
symptom  of  that  disease.  His  mental  disorder  must  have 
been  a  form  of  acute  mania  of  which  his  excessive  appre- 
hensions of  the  consequences  of  the  bite,  were  a  powerfully 
exciting  cause.  To  this  idea  which  obtained  complete  pos- 
session of  his  mind,  may  be  attributed  the  howling  on  Sun- 
day,—  the  fact  which  furnishes  the  strongest  suspicion  of 
simulafton.  It  is  more  likely  to  have  arisen  in  this  manner, 
than  to  have  been  put  forth  as  the  only  symptom  of  an  affec- 
tion which  is  marked  by  so  many  and  such  well  known 
traits.  By  some,  the  very  brief  duration  of  the  attack  may 


SIMULATED  INSANITY.  379 

be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  objection  to  this  hypothesis.  This 
is  certainly  an  unusual  feature  of  mania,  yet  its  occurrence 
has  been  too  often  witnessed  to  be  considered  as  problem- 
atical, (§  120).  Dr.  Parchappe  is  most  embarrassed  by  the 
complete  unconsciousness  of  Lambert  for  a  period  of  forty- 
eight  hours,  a  fact  which  he  conceives  to  be  entirely  unsup- 
ported by  our  knowledge  of  the  disease.  "  In  mania  and  the 
kindred  forms  of  mental  disorder  unaccompanied  by  fever," 
he  says,  "  the  memory  is  preserved  during  the  disease.  .  .  . 
After  the  return  of  reason,  the  insane,  remember  all  they 
have  said  and  done  and  thought."  He  concludes,  therefore, 
that,  although  the  prisoner  had  actually  suffered  an  attack  of 
mania,  he  simulated  this  unconsciousness  when  he  came  to 
himself,  in  order  the  better  to  escape  responsibility  for  his 
acts.  Without  disputing  this  hypothesis  which  may  possi- 
bly be  correct,  we  are  not  quite  satisfied  of  the  necessity  of 
resorting  to  it  at  all,  for  our  own  observations  do  not  lead  us 
to  agree  with  Dr.  Parchappe,  as  to  the  matter  of  fact.  We 
think  we  have  occasionally  met  with  a  case  not  marked  by 
any  febrile  movement,  in  which,  after  recovery,  a  certain 
period  was  a  complete  blank  in  the  mind.1 

a"  Annales  med.  psyco.  viii.  228. 


CHAPTER   X  VI. 


CONCEALED   INSANITY. 

§  369.  IT  sometimes  happens,  that  when  maniacs  have 
learned  what  notions  of  theirs  are  accounted  insane  by  oth- 
ers, and  have  understanding  enough  left  to  appreciate  the 
legal  consequences  of  their  mental  condition,  they  endea- 
vor to  conceal  it,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  those  conse- 
quences. If  the  address  and  ingenuity  which  they  then  mani- 
fest have  occasionally  succeeded  in  baffling  the  scrutiny  of 
the  most  practised  experts,  it  is  not  strange  that  common 
observers  should  have  been  frequently  deceived,  and  that 
some  of  the  medical  profession  even,  with  a  knowledge  of 
this  fact  before  their  eyes,  should  have  been  outwitted  by 
their  manoeuvres.  When  it  is  considered  that  the  insanity 
of  many  consists  in  a  few  insane  notions  which  do  not,  to 
appearance,  affect  their  general  conduct  and  conversation, 
the  difficulty  of  concealing  it,  by  professing  to  have  renoun- 
ced their  belief  in  these  notions,  is  perhaps  not  greater  than 
that  which  attends  the  accomplishment  of  most  of  their 
designs.  Their  task,  too,  is  materially  lessened,  it  is  to  be 
recollected,  by  the  prevalent  error,  that  madness  is  insepa- 
rable from  boisterous  behavior  and  complete  disorder  of  the 
ideas.  At  the  commencement  of  the  French  Revolution, 
when  the  mob  broke  into  the  lunatic  hospitals,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  liberating  those  among  their  inmates  whom  they  sup- 
posed to  be  unjustly  confined,  one  man  recounted  his  wrongs 
so  clearly  and  connectedly,  that  he  was  deemed  at  once  to 
be  a  victim  of  oppression,  and  ordered  to  be  released.  The 
use  he  made  of  his  liberty  soon  convinced  these  enlightened 
champions  of  their  race,  that  those  who  put  him  in  confine- 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  381 

ment,  had,  what  they  themselves  had  not,  some  reason  for 
their  measures.1  Lord  Eldon  once  related,  that  after  repeated 
conferences  and  much  conversation  with  a  lunatic,  he  was 
persuaded  of  the  soundness  of  his  understanding,  and  pre- 
vailed on  Lord  Thurlow  to  supersede  the  commission.  The 
lunatic,  calling  immediately  afterwards  on  his  counsel  to 
thank  him  for  his  exertions,  convinced  him  in  five  minutes, 
that  the  worst  thing  he  could  have  done  for  his  client,  was  to 
get  rid  of  the  commission.2  In  another  place  (§  21)  will  be 
found  a  case  which  well  illustrates  the  adroitness  and  per- 
severance, with  which  maniacs  will  sometimes  conceal  their 
mental  derangement. 

§  370.  In  England  and  in  this  country,  the  choice  of  the 
means  for  proving  the  existence  of  insanity  when  concealed, 
is  left  to  individual  sagacity.  This,  no  doubt  is  sufficient, 
where  great  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity  readily  sug- 
gests the  course  best  adapted  to  each  particular  case ;  but 
the  great  majority  of  medical  men  will  feel  the  need  of  some 
system  or  order  of  proceeding,  that  will  simplify  their  in- 
quiries, and  render  them  more  efficient.  The  French  arrange 
their  means  into  three  general  divisions  or  classes,  which  are 
made  use  of,  each  in  succession,  when  the  preceding  class 
has  failed  of  its  object.  They  are  called  the  interrogatory, 
the  continued  observation,  and  the  inquest,  and  as  no  better 
arrangement  has  ever  been  offered,  it  may  be  well  to  describe 
it ;  and  it  may  be  added  in  passing,  that  it  would  materially 
conduce  to  our  success  in  inquiries  of  this  kind,  if  they  were 
always  pursued  in  the  course  here  indicated. 

§  371.  Interrogatory.  —  The  interrogatory  embraces  only 
those  means  of  information,  which  are  applicable  in  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  the  patient.  After  learning  generally 
his  moral  and  intellectual  character,  his  education  and  habits 
of  living,  the  duration  and  nature  of  his  mental  delusion,  (if 
they  can  be  ascertained  from  his  acquaintances,)  and  the  state 
of  his  relations  to  others,  and  after  observing  the  expression 


1  Pinel,  Sur  Alienation  mentale,  159.      • 

2  Ex  parte  Holyland,  11  Yesey's  Reports,  11. 


382  MEDICAL   JUBISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  his  countenance,  his  demeanor  and  general  appearance, 
we  may  proceed  to  a  direct  examination  of  his  case.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  necessary  to  lull  his  suspicions  and  remove 
his  distrust,  as  far  as  possible,  by  a  free  and  courteous  deport- 
ment, and  an  air  of  kindness  and  unaffected  interest  in  his 
welfare.  He  should  then  be  engaged  in  conversation,  which 
should  lead  him  by  easy  and  imperceptible  transitions  to  the 
particular  subject  on  which  it  is  alleged  his  mind  is  deranged ; 
and  the  manner  in  which  he  treats  it  should  be  carefully  ob- 
served, for  if  he  be  really  insane  on  that  point,  he  will  pro- 
bably avow  it ;  while  if  he  is  not  so,  he  will  take  the  oppor- 
tunity to  declare  his  disbelief  in  the  notions  imputed  to  him, 
and  bring  forward  various  considerations  to  support  the  truth 
of  his  assertions.  He  should  be  led  to  speak  of  his  relatives 
and  friends,  especially  if  they  have  taken  any  part  in  provok- 
ing his  interdiction,  or  otherwise  interfered  in  his  affairs,  and 
here  he  will  need  all  his  self-control  to  restrain  himself  from 
the  angry  and  revengeful  feelings  which  he  entertains  to- 
wards them.  When  confined  in  hospitals  or  other  lunatic 
establishments,  we  should  not  fail  to  ask  how  they  like  their 
situation,  and  what  they  think  of  their  companions ;  for 
Georget  observes,  that  many,  even  of  those  the  least  derang- 
ed, are  such  poor  observers,  or  have  so  little  penetration,  that 
they  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  their  abode,  and  the  char- 
acter of  those  around  them.  When  the  mental  disorder  is 
that  of  imbecility  or  dementia,  we  must  not  confine  our  ques- 
tions to  the  simple  topics  of  their  present  condition  or  feel- 
ings, for  they  may  be  able  to  answer  them  clearly  and  ration- 
ally, though  subjects  requiring  a  little  more  reflection  or  ex- 
ertion of  memory,  may  be  far  beyond  their  comprehension. 
It  not  unfrequently  happens  that  the  mental  deficiency 
affects  the  faculties  of  the  mind  unequally,  degrading  some  to 
the  scale  of  idiocy,  and  leaving  others  in  a  state  of  tolerable 
strength  and  development.  When,  therefore,  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  is  in  question,  whether  for  interdiction  or  any  other 
purpose,  we  must  not  fail  to  test  the  soundness  of  all  the  fac- 
ulties, by  inquiries  relative  to  the  objects  with  which  they  are 
respectively  concerned,  since,  if  satisfied  with  a  partial  ex- 


CONCEALED   INSANITY.  383 

animation,  we  may  grossly  deceive  ourselves  and  injure  the 
interests  of  others.  True,  this  requires  a  knowledge  of  the 
mental  constitution  not  possessed  by  every  one  charged  with 
this  kind  of  investigation  ;  but  the  deficiency,  common  as  it 
is,  proves  nothing  against  the  importance  of  this  knowledge. 

§  372.      The    importance    of   the   above    suggestions    is 

strikingly  shown  by  the  case  of  a   young  man,  B , 

noticed  by  Dr.  Abercombie,1  and  Dr.  Combe,2  which  occa- 
sioned much  trouble  and  litigation  to  the  parties  concerned. 
This  person  was  educated  for  the  church,  and  had  made 
such  proficiency  in  the  study  of  Latin  and  Greek,  that,  for 
several  years,  he  acted  as  a  tutor  in  these  languages.  He 
also  displayed  great  keenness  and  adroitness  in  driving  a 
bargain.  When,  however,  his  mind  was  directed  to  those 
studies  and  topics  which  require  the  exercise  of  the  higher 
powers  of  the  intellect,  he  was  found  so  deficient  that  he 
utterly  failed  in  his  second  examination  before  the  presby- 
tery, in  which  his  reasoning  powers  were  tasked,  though 
the  first,  which  was  in  the  languages,  he  passed  successfully 
and  creditably.  It  was  found,  too,  that  he  was  incapable  of 
comprehending  the  relations  of  business,  or  even  performing 
the  ordinary  duties  of  life.  Accordingly,  it  appeared  in  the 
course  of  the  law-proceedings,  that  those  witnesses  who  knew 
him  only  as  a  linguist  or  a  purchaser,  did  not  hesitate  to 
pronounce  him  a  capable,  clever  man ;  while  those  who  had 
business  transactions  with  him  that  called  his  reflective 
powers  into  action,  had  no  doubt  whatever  of  his  imbecility. 

§  373.  There  are  few  points  in  regard  to  which  the  medi- 
cal jurist  will  find  it  more  important  to  possess  correct 
notions,  than  the  value  of  the  interrogatory  as  a  means  of 
establishing  the  existence  of  insanity.  In  the  English  courts 
of  chancery,  it  has  been  common,  especially  of  late  years,  to 
appoint  a  committee  of  physicians  to  examine  the  party 
whose  mental  condition  is  supposed  to  require  the  interference 
of  the  court,  and  thus  their  report,  deciding  as  it  virtually 
does,  questions  of  liberty  and  property,  becomes  an  instru- 

1  On  the  Intellectual  Powers,  276.        2  On  Mental  Derangement,  244. 


384  MEDICAL. JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ment  of  much  good  or  much  harm.  It  is  a  curious  and  a  mor- 
tifying fact,  that,  not  unfrequently,  different  committees  have 
thus  examined  the  same  individual,  and  arrived  at  opposite 
results.  If  they  had  been  composed  of  persons  selected 
rather  on  account  of  professional  eminence  generally,  than 
for  their  knowledge  of  insanity,  unanimity  of  opinion  could 
hardly  have  been  expected ;  but  in  fact  we  always  observe 
among  them  the  names  of  men  whose  lives  have  been  devot- 
ed to  this  special  department  of  the  profession.1  Of  course, 
an  honest  difference  of  opinion  occasionally,  is  no  mat- 
ter of  surprise  ;  but  when  it  becomes  so  common  as  it  has 
of  late  years,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a 
prevalent  mistake  touching  the  precise  value  of  the  method 
employed  for  obtaining  the  requisite  object. 

§  374.  There  are  cases,  unquestionably,  where  the  insan- 
ity of  the  party  would  be  clearly  exposed  by  means  of  the 
interrogatory;  but  the  converse  of  the  proposition  is  not 
equally  true.  In  a  large  proportion  of  the  cases  which  re- 
quire such  investigation,  the  interrogatory  must  prove  utterly 
incompetent  for  this  purpose.  If  the  patient  entertain  delu- 
sions, he  may  have  learned  enough  of  the  consequences  of 
avowing  them,  to  keep  them  to  himself  in  the  presence  of 
those  who,  he  well  knows,  have  approached  him  for  the  very 
purpose  of  drawing  them  out  and  turning  them  to  his  detri- 
ment. If,  too,  the  examiners  possess  no  clew  to  his  delu- 
sions, they  have  no  means  of  provoking  him  to  utter  them, 

1  In  the  celebrated  case  of  Dyce  Sombre  (London  Morning  Post,  Feb.  26, 
1849  and  seq.)  which  was  in  the  court  of  chancery  from  1842  to  1849,  a  com- 
mittee of  French  physicians,  not  entirely  unknown  to  fame,  reported  that  the 
party  was  of  sound  mind.  Shortly  after,  a  committee  of  two  English  phy- 
sicians reported  that  he  was  unsound,  and  incapable  of  managing  his  estate. 
Two  or  three  years  after,  the  same  committee,  with  the  addition  of  two 
others,  examined  him  again  and  found  no  change  in  his  mental  condition. 
Two  months  after,  another  English  committee  of  six  physicians,  examined 
him,  and  reported  in  the  strongest  terms  that  he  was  of  sound  mind,  and  ca- 
pable of  managing  his  property.  In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Gumming  (Times,  Jan. 
8,  1852  and  seq.)  there  was  the  same  lamentable  difference  between  the 
conclusions  to  which  two  medical  committees  arrived,  —  both  bearing  the 
names  of  men  eminent  for  their  knowledge  of  insanity. 


CONCEALED   INSANITY.  385 

and  hence  he  passes  for  being  sound  simply  because  the 
chord  which  is  out  of  tune,  has  not  been  touched.  Another 
and  a  more  common  reason  why  the  interrogatory  should 
fail,  is,  that  the  patient's  unsoundness  may  not  manifest  itself 
in  delusions,  but  in  gross  improprieties  of  behavior,  in  fool- 
ish and  absurd  transactions,  and  the  extravagance  of  all  his 
anticipations.  Conversation  furnishes  no  occasion  for  the 
display  of  his  mental  disorder ;  but  let  him  go  into  the  world, 
the  master  of  his  own  movements,  heeding  no  will  but  his 
own,  and  every  day  would  furnish  additional  evidence  of  his  in- 
capacity to  manage  himself  or  his  affairs.  Any  one  who  visits 
a  hospital  for  the  insane,  may  find,  at  every  turn,  a  patient  who 
converses  intelligently  and  discreetly,  and  neither  in  discourse 
nor  behavior,  displays  a  single  trace  of  insanity.  Whoever 
has  not  met  with  such  cases,  can  have  had  but  little  practical 
acquaintance  with  the  insane.  A  woman  once  came  under 
our  care  who  was  reported  to  have  had  several  previous  at- 
tacks, but  beyond  this  the  history  of  the  case  happened  to  be 
exceedingly  imperfect.  For  three  months  her  whole  dis- 
course and  demeanor  were  without  fault  or  blemish.  She 
was  calm  and  quiet  in  her  ways,  affable  and  intelligent,  and 
exerted  a  healthy  influence  upon  those  around  her.  In  regard 
to  her  own  case,  she  complained  that  she  should  be  banished 
from  society,  and  especially  from  that  of  a  young  and  beloved 
daughter  who  was  thus  cast  upon  the  mercy  of  strangers,  and 
for  no  other  reason,  as  she  said,  but  the  superior  force  of  a 
tyrannical  husband.  She  then  would  launch  into  long  and 
circumstantial  accounts  of  the  sufferings  she  had  experi- 
enced, by  poverty,  sickness,  and  every  species  of  privation,  in 
consequence  of  his  habitual  intemperance.  He  finally 
crowned  his  iniquities  two  or  three  years  before,  by  shutting 
her  up  in  a  hospital  for  the  insane.  Now  all  this  might  or 
might  not  have  been  true.  We  had  no  means  of  deciding. 
But  when  she  added  as  a  great  secret,  not  to  be  told  to  all, 
that  he  employed  a  man  to  go  to  the  hospital,  every  day,  and 
beat  her  soundly  with  a  stick,  there  was  certainly  strong  rea- 
son to  suspect  a  delusion.  Towards  the  end  of  the  above- 
named  period,  she  became  agitated  and  irritable,  and  finally 

33 


386  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

raved.  In  this  condition  she  continued  about  six  months, 
when  she  began  to  improve  quite  rapidly,  and  in  the  course 
of  a  month  or  two,  went  home,  entirely  restored,  with  her 
husband  whose  conduct,  she  then  admitted,  had  always 
been  most  exemplary.  Had  this  woman  been  submitted  to 
the  examination  of  a  committee  of  physicians,  they  would 
unquestionably  have  reported  her  as  being  of  sound  mind 
and  an  unsuitable  subject  for  confinement. 

§  375.  When  delusions  or  other  indications  of  insanity, 
of  equivalent  value,  have  been  detected  by  competent  ob- 
servers, we  cannot  understand  why  their  existence  should  be 
denied  by  other  observers,  merely  because  they  have  failed 
to  detect  them.  To  prove  a  negative  under  any  circum- 
stances, is  no  easy  matter,  but  to  prove  it  in  the  face  of  an 
affirmative,  requires  a  course  of  protracted  and  varied  observa- 
tion, aided  by  strong  professional  sagacity,  very  different 
from  the  hasty  examinations  we  usually  witness.  Especial- 
ly should  we  be  cautious  in  cases  of  moral  insanity,  where 
the  very  incidents  which,  viewed  precisely  as  they  occurred, 
furnish  indubitable  proofs  of  disease,  may  be  so  easily  repre- 
sented by  a  little  false  coloring,  in  a  totally  different  light. 
Had  this  caution  been  duly  observed,  the  world  would  prob- 
ably have  been  spared  some  of  those  disagreements  which  are 
little  calculated  to  advance  its  confidence  in  medical  opinions. 

§  376.  Continued  observation.  —  A  systematic  course  of 
observations  continued  for  some  time,  may  establish  the 
fact  of  insanity  in  doubtful  cases,  after  several  personal  in- 
terviews have  completely  failed.  Opportunities,  therefore, 
should  be  demanded  for  visiting  the  patient  freely  and  fre- 
quently ;  for  watching  him  at  times  when  he  supposes  himself 
unobserved;  and  for  exercising  a  general  surveiUance  over 
his  conduct  and  conversation.  Those  about  him  should  be 
enjoined  to  watch  his  movements,  and  he  should  often,  but 
cautiously,  be  led  to  speak  of  the  motives  of  those  who  are 
anxious  to  prove  his  insanity.  It  often  happens,  too,  that  those 
who  are  most  successful  in  concealing  every  indication  of 
disordered  mind,  in  their  conversation,  will  betray  themselves 
the  moment  they  commit  their  thoughts  to  paper.  They 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  387 

should  be  induced,  therefore,  to  write  letters  to  their  friends, 
describing  their  present  situation,  and  to  prepare  statements 
of  their  wrongs  and  grievances,  and  thus  we  may  be  readily 
furnished  with  instances  of  incoherence  and  folly,  which  the 
patient  had  self-command  enough  to  withhold,  when  put  on 
his  guard  by  questions  which  he  knows  well  enough  are 
designed  to  entrap  him.  "  The  rapid  transitions  and  odd 
unions  of  discordant  subjects,  the  relations  of  things  which 
have  not  happened,  and  could  not  have  happened,  are  in 
many  cases  very  remarkable ;  and  a  forgetfulness  of  common 
modes  of  spelling,  or  of  the  arrangement  of  the  letters  of  words 
well  known,  will  be  evinced  by  maniacs  who  have  been  well 
educated,  and  who  would  commit  no  such  mistakes  but  for 
their  malady."  1 

§  377.  Inquest.  —  When  the  above  means  fail,  our  inqui- 
ries must  take  a  wider  range  and  be  directed  to  the  previous 
history  of  the.  patient,  as  made  known  to  us  by  the  testimony 
of  friends  and  relatives,  and  those  who  have  been  connected 
with  him  in  business,  or  had  any  other  good  opportunity  of 
becoming  acquainted  with  his  mental  condition.  "  The  In- 
quest" says  Georget,  "  consists  in  collecting  information 
respecting  the  patient's  condition  before  and  after  the  pre- 
sumed disease,  and  the  causes  suspected  to  have  impaired 
his  mind.  For  this  purpose  we  consult  his  writings,  and 
recur  to  the  testimony  of  those  who  have  been  about  him 
and  conversed  with  him ;  who  have  been  able  to  observe 
him  closely  and  to  witness  his  insane  actions  and  irrational 
discourse.  We  should  be  particularly  careful,  however,  to 
require  of  witnesses  facts  rather  than  opinions.2  We  should 
ascertain  if  madness  be  a  disease  of  the  family ;  if  he  have 
already  evinced  a  degree  of  singularity  in  his  moral  and 
intellectual  character,  or  exaltation  of  any  kind ;  if  he  have 
been  exposed  to  the  influence  of  powerful  causes,  such  as 
chagrins,  severe  and  repeated  crosses,  reverses  of  fortune, 
etc. ;  if,  without  any  real  motive,  he  has  manifested  any 

1  Connolly:  Inquiry  concerning  the  Indications  of  Insanity,  469. 

2  See  Hathorne  u.  King,  8  Mass.  Reports,  371. 


388  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

change  of  his  habits,  tastes,  or  affections ;  in  short,  we  should 
inquire  into  all  those  circumstances  which  so  frequently  pre- 
cede the  development  of  the  disease."  *  We  are  to  look  into 
his  business  transactions,  his  management  of  family  affairs, 
his  conduct  in  the  domestic  and  social  relations,  and  the  part 
he  has  taken  in  public  scenes  and  duties.  His  letters  and 
written  communications  should  be  closely  scrutinized,  espe- 
cially those  that  have  any  reference  to  the  state  of  his  health, 
or  to  the  legal  measures  that  have  been  taken  against  him,  for 
here  we  may  meet  with  incoherent  and  foolish  ideas,  that  we 
have  found  nowhere  else.  In  short,  no  source  of  information 
likely  to  enlighten  us  on  the  subject  of  the  patient's  mental 
condition,  should  be  suffered  to  go  unexplored.  If  the  means 
thus  indicated  are  faithfully  used  —  if  the  whole  life  of  the 
individual  have  passed  in  review  before  us,  and  after  all,  we 
are  unable  to  prove  the  patient's  insanity  beyond  a  doubt, 
we  are  bound  to  conclude  that  his  mind  is  sound,  or  at  least, 
that  he  is  not  a  proper  subject  for  legal  interference.  This 
conclusion  will  be  no  less  proper,  even  though  we  still  enter- 
tain some  doubt  of  his  mental  soundness,  for  if  he  have  suf- 
ficient self-control  and  penetration  to  enable  him  to  conceal 
his  mental  impairments  and  conduct  himself  rationally,  but 
little  harm  will  probably  arise  from  leaving  him  at  present  to 
his  own  discretion. 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  57. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 


EPILEPSY  AND  ITS   LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES. 

§  378.  EPILEPSY  is  a  nervous  disease  characterized  by 
paroxysms  of  insensibility,  unconsciousness,  and  convulsions. 
These  vary  in  severity,  from  that  of  a  simple  vertigo,  continu- 
ing for  a  few  seconds  and  scarcely  discernible  by  others,  to 
that  of  a  most  distressful  convulsive  fit  enduring  from  five  to 
fifteen  minutes.  They  may  recur  twice  or  thrice  a  day  for 
several  days  together,  or  once  a  week,  month,  or  year.  They 
sometimes  occur  without  warning,  but  as  often  perhaps  they 
are  preceded  by  symptoms  indicative  of  disturbance  of  the 
nervous  functions ;  such  as,  giddiness,  pain  of  the  head, 
drowsiness,  frightful  dreams,  hallucinations  of  sight  or  of 
hearing,  vigilance,  irritability  of  temper.  So  distressing  is 
the  condition  of  many  epileptics,  says  Esquirol,  previous  to 
the  paroxysm,  that  they  endeavor  to  hasten  its  access,  and 
for  this  purpose  resort  to  spirituous  drinks.  The  cessation  of 
the  paroxysm  is  followed  by  somnolence,  pain  in  the  head, 
and  a  sense  of  weakness.  The  recurrence  of  the  fits  is 
determined  by  whatever  disturbs  the  general  health,  more 
especially  by  derangements  of  those  organs  in  which  the 
series  of  morbid  phenomena  takes  its  origin.  Anger,  fright, 
or  any  strong  moral  emotion  is  very  liable  to  produce  a 
paroxysm.  A  soldier,  in  mounting  a  breach,  was  frightened 
into  a  fit  of  epilepsy  by  the  bursting  of  a  bomb-shell  near 
him.  He  was  soon  cured,  but  at  sight  of  the  place,  twenty 
years  afterwards,  he  was  thrown  into  a  fit.1 

§  379.  Epilepsy  seldom  continues  for  any  length  of  time 
without  destroying  the  natural  soundness  of  the  mind,  ren- 
dering the  patient  listless  and  forgetful,  indisposed  and  un- 

1  Esquirol,  Des  Malad.  Ment  i.  297. 
33* 


390  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

able  to  think  for  himself,  yielding  without  any  will  of  his 
own  to  every  outward  influence,  and  finally  sinking  into 
hopeless  fatuity,  or  becoming  incurably  maniacal.  Esquirol 
states  that  of  three  hundred  and  thirty-nine  epileptics  in  the 
SalpetriSre,  twelve  were  monomaniacs ;  sixty-four  were  mani- 
acal, of  whom  thirty-four  were  furious ;  one  hundred  and 
forty-five  were  imbecile  or  demented,  of  whom  one  hundred 
and  twenty-nine  were  so  only  immediately  after  the  fit ;  eight 
were  idiots ;  fifty  were  habitually  rational,  but  with  loss  of 
memory,  exaltation  of  the  ideas,  sometimes  a  temporary 
delirium  and  a  tendency  to  dementia ;  sixty  had  no  derange- 
ment of  intellect,  but  were  very  irritable,  irascible,  obstinate, 
capricious,  and  eccentric.1 

§  380.  From  this  statement  it  appears,  that  of  the  one 
hundred  and  forty-five  imbecile  or  demented  epileptics,  all 
but  sixteen  were  so  only  immediately  after  the  fit,  and  that 
this  was  also  the  case  with  three  of  the  thirty-four  who  were 
furious.  This  is  a  fact  of  no  little  importance  in  a  medico- 
legal  point  of  view,  and  should  never  be  lost  sight  of  in 
judicial  investigations  of  the  mental  condition  of  epileptics. 
The  maniacal  fury  of  these  patients  is  of  the  wildest  and 
blindest  kind  which  nothing  can  tame,  the  individual  acting 
automatically  as  it  were,  and  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness. 
It  may  continue  for  minutes,  hours,  or  days.  The  dementia 
which  is  the  form  of  mental  derangement  to  which  epileptics 
are  most  liable  after  the  fit,  is  characterized  by  intellectual 
stupor  and  moral  depression,  in  which,  however,  they  have 
sufficient  energy,  under  some  circumstances,  to  commit  acts 
of  violence,  of  which  they  retain  only  an  imperfect  recollec- 
tion when  they  recover.  Another  direct,  though  temporary 
effect  of  the  epileptic  fit,  is  to  leave  the  mind  in  a  morbidly 
irritable  condition,  in  which  the  slightest  provocation  will 
derange  it  entirely.  Sometimes  this  irritability  is  accom- 
panied by  a  sense  of  anxiety,  distrust,  jealousy,  and  un- 
founded fear,  and  sometimes  by  great  activity  of  the  lower 
propensities. 

1  Ibid,  i.  284. 


EPILEPSY   AND  ITS  LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  391 

§  381.  To  determine  exactly  the  mental  condition  of  an 
epileptic  at  the  moment  of  his  committing  a  criminal  act,  is 
often  a  difficult  task.  It  may  have  taken  place  in  the 
absence  of  any  observer,  in  a  fit  of  fury  that  rapidly  passed 
away,  and  which,  perhaps,  may  not  have  followed  any  previ- 
ous paroxysm  ;  or  the  accused,  though  subject  to  the  disease, 
may  not  have  recently  suffered  an  attack,  and  may  have 
appeared  perfectly  rational  to  those  around  him.  The  sus- 
picion that  the  accused  was  deprived  of  his  moral  liberty 
when  committirfg  the  criminal  act,  would  be  strengthened,  if 
the  paroxysms  had  been  recently  frequent  and  severe ;  if  one 
had  shortly  preceded  or  succeeded  the  act ;  if  he  had  been 
habitually  subject  to  mental  irritability,  or  other  symptoms  of 
nervous  disorder;  and  by  those  circumstances  generally 
which  would  lead  to  the  same  conclusion,  were  the  supposed 
disease  a  form  of  moral  mania,  instead  of  epilepsy.  (§  217.) 
Cases  of  this  kind  should  be  closely  scrutinized,  and  where 
the  accused  has  been  undeniably  subject  to  epilepsy,  he 
should  have  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable  doubt  that  may 
arise  respecting  his  sanity.  Less  than  this  common  human- 
ity could  not  ask ;  more  even  has  sometimes  been  granted 
under  the  operation  of  milder  codes  than  the  English  com- 
mon law. 

§  382.  In  the  following  case,  the  criminal  act  was  the' 
result  of  that  morbid  irritability  which  sometimes  succeeds 
the  paroxysms,  Joachim  Hoewe,  twenty-nine  years  old,  had 
been  an  epileptic  since  his  sixth  year.  Since  the  age  of 
puberty,  the  disease  had  become  aggravated,  and  latterly  had 
attacked  him  once  in  three  weeks.  He  was  long  in  recover- 
ing from  the  effects  of  the  fits,  being  troubled  with  pain  in 
the  head  and  vertigo,  and  manifesting  strong  aversion  to 
food,  though  never  furious  or  insane.  In  July,  1826,  after  an 
hour's  walk,  he  experienced  a  fit,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
three  next  days,  he  had  several,  appearing  all  the  while  to  be 
quite  unconscious,  and  refusing  nourishment.  On  the  third 
day  he  arose  from  his  bed,  and  went  down  into  the  yard, 
where  he  met  with  a  son  of  his  brother  ten  years  old,  and  a 
daughter  of  a  relative  to  whom  he  was  attached,  eleven 


392  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

years  old.  The  boy  asked  him  if  he  did  not  wish  to  eat. 
The  patient  made  no  reply,  but  struck  at  him,  when  the 
children  ran  off.  He  followed  them,  overtook  the  girl,  knocked 
her  down,  and  catching  up  a  hatchet  from  the  ground,  frac- 
tured her  skull  in  several  places,  when  the  neighbors  rushed 
in,  and,  after  considerable  resistance,  overpowered  him.  He 
now  remained  quiet,  till  they  proceeded  to  carry  him  to  the 
magistrate,  when  he  broke  out  into  violent  expressions  of" 
hatred  against  his  fellow-townsmen.  In  prison  he  layed  two 
days  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness,  took  no  nourishment,  and 
had  a  fit.  On  the  third  day  his  reason  returned ;  he  ex- 
pressed some  interest  in  his  friends,  complained  bitterly  of 
his  sufferings,  but  had  no  recollection  of  what  had  occurred. 
The  question  having  been  put  to  the  medical  expert,  (by 
whom  the  case  was  reported,)  whether  the  accused  was  in  a 
responsible  condition  of  mind  when  he  committed  the  mur- 
der, it  was  answered  in  the  negative,  for  the  following 
reasons.  Unlike  real  criminals,  he  had  no  definite  purpose 
in  view,  and  did  not  fly,  after  having  committed  the  act. 
The  mental  condition  of  epileptics  just  before  and  after  the 
fit,  is  usually  very  peculiar,  and  for  many  years,  medical 
jurists  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of  considering  an  epileptic 
as  deserving  of  punishment  for  any  offence  he  might  commit 
within  three  days  before  or  after  a  fit.  Among  the  exciting 
causes  of  his  fits  at  the  time  in  question,  and  of  the  criminal 
act,  the  reporter  mentioned  the  exercise  and  heat  of  the 
weather  to  which  the  accused  had  been  exposed,  and  the 
inquiry  of  the  child  whether  he  would  eat,  which,  on  account 
of  his  morbid  aversion  to  food,  excited  him,  in  his  uncon- 
scious and  irritable  condition,  to  expend  his  fury  on  the 
nearest  object.  Two  months  after,  he  died  in  a  fit.1 

§  383.  Epilepsy  is  often  accompanied  by  imbecility,  con- 
genital or  acquired,  and  by  disordered  appetites  and  propen- 
sities. Although  its  immediate  effect  on  the  mind,  in  these 
cases,  may  not  be  so  definite  and  prominent  as  in  others,  yet 
it  is  no  less  effectual  in  weakening  and  perverting  its  facul- 

1  Jahn  in  Henke's  Zeitschrift.    1827,  iv.  282. 


EPILEPSY  AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  393 

ties.  The  medical  jurist  should  preserve  himself  from  the 
common  error  of  viewing  these  bad  propensities  as  indicative 
of  a  depraved  and  sin-loving  character,  instead  of  being  the 
result  of  an  abnormal  condition  of  the  nervous  system.  The 
following  case  from  an  old  writer,  will  illustrate  this  form  of 
the  disorder.  C.  F.  Oppel,  sixteen  years  old,  twice  set  fire 
to  the  royal  stable  in  Saxony,  once  in  April,  and  again  in 
May,  1725.  The  fire  was  discovered  before  much  damage 
was  done,  and  the  second  time,  he  extinguished  it  himself. 
It  appeared  in  evidence  that  he  had  always  manifested  a 
good  and  peaceable  disposition ;  that  from  childhood,  he  had 
always  been  troubled,  especially  in  the  summer  time,  with 
bleeding  from  the  nose  ;  that  when  ten  years  old,  he  hacl  an 
attack  of  scarlet  fever ;  and  that  about  a  year  before  the  in- 
cendiary attempts,  he  began  to  suffer  from  epilepsy,  the  par- 
oxysms of  which  were  light  at  first,  but  gradually  increased 
in  severity.  Four  weeks  before  the  fire  he  had  a  fit,  and  two 
days  after  he  had  another,  and  they  continued  for  some  time 
to  be  very  frequent  and  severe.  The  reasons  which  he  him- 
self gave  for  the  act  were,  that  when  he  had  been  drinking, 
he  felt  strongly  impelled  to  commit  incendiary  acts,  and  that 
on  this  occasion,  he  also  hoped  to  save  something  from  the 
fire,  with  which  he  might  buy  drink,  instead  of  being  obliged 
to  ask  his  mother  for  money.  It  appeared  that  his  father 
was  an  epileptic,  and  addicted  to  drinking.  The  physician 
who  was  directed  to  inquire  whether  the  accused  was  in  per- 
fect possession  of  his  reason  when  he  committed  the  offence, 
reported  that  he  was  not,  and  had  been  of  unsound  mind 
from  childhood.  The  reasons  offered  in  support  of  his  opinion 
though  remarkably  correct  for  the  time,  will  not  all  bear  a 
critical  examination  now,  and  therefore  it  will  not  be  worth 
our  while  to  state  them  at  length.  The  fact  that  he  might 
have  inherited  a  depraved  constitution  which  was  still  more 
weakened  by  the  accession  of  a  severe  nervous  disease,  is 
sufficient  to  warrant  the  suspicion  that  his  mind  may  have 
been  a  prey  to  morbid  impulses  which,  when  under  the  influ- 
ence of  drink,  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  resist.  The  fact 
that,  shortly  before  and  after  the  offence,  he  had  suffered 


394  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

from  epilepsy,  furnishes  a  presumption  that,  however  ra- 
tional he  may  have  appeared,  his  mind  was  far  from  being 
in  a  sound  and  healthy  condition.  True,  he  alleged  as  his 
motive,  the  gratification  of  an  appetite,  but  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  appetite  existed  till  after  the  invasion  of  the 
epilepsy.1 

1  Troppaneger,  decis.  med.  forens.  1735,  quoted  in  Henke's  Abhandlung, 
iv.  25,  2te  Aufl. 


CHAPTER   XVIII. 


SUICIDE. 

§  384.  AT  the  present  day,  the  subject  of  suicide  is 
deprived  of  much  of  the  medico-legal  importance  which  it 
once  possessed.  Still,  however,  as  questions  occasionally 
come  up  in  which  dispositions  of  property  are  made  to  de- 
pend on  the  judicial  views  that  are  formed  respecting  its 
relations  to  mental  derangement,  it  is  highly  proper  that 
mistakes  should  not  be  committed  from  a  want  of  correct 
notions  of  its  nature.  With  all  the  light  on  the  subject 
which  the  researches  of  modern  inquirers  have  elicited,  many 
probably  are  yet  unable  to  answer  understandingly  the  ques- 
tion so  often  started,  whether  suicide  is  always  or  ever  the 
result  of  insanity.  It  may  be  proper,  therefore,  to  lay  before 
the  reader  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  on  this  subject, 
in  order  that  he  may  have  the  materials  for  forming  correct 
and  well-grounded  opinions  respecting  it. 

§  385.  To  the  healthy  and  well-balanced  mind,  suicide 
appears  so  strange  and  unaccountable  a  phenomenon,  that 
many  distinguished  writers  have  inconsiderately  regarded  it 
as,  in  all  cases,  the  effect  of  mental  derangement ;  while,  by 
many  others,  it  has,  with  still  less  reason,  been  viewed  as 
always  the  act  of  a  sound,  rational  mind.  Neither  of  these 
views  can  be  supported  by  an  impartial  consideration  of  all 
the  facts,  and  the  truth  probably  lies  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes. Suicides  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  founded 
upon  the  different  causes  or  circumstances  by  which  they 
are  actuated.  The  first  includes  those  who  have  deliberately 
committed  the  act  from  the  force  of  moral  motives  alone; 
the  second,  those  who  have  been  affected  with  some  patho- 


396  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

logical  condition  of  the  brain,  excited  or  not  by  moral  mo- 
tives. 

§  386.  If  it  be  considered,  that  life  is  not  the  only  nor  per- 
haps the  best  gift  we  have  received  from  the  author  of  our  be- 
ing, it  ought  not  to  appear  strange  that  men  should  sometimes 
be  willing  to  relinquish  it  for  the  sake  of  securing  a  good,  or 
avoiding  an  evil.  We  know  well  enough  that  life  is  not  so 
dear  that  it  will  not  be  readily  sacrificed,  when  all  that  makes 
it  worth  retaining  is  taken  away.  The  intrepid  Roman 
chose  rather  to  fall  on  his  own  sword,  than  survive  the  liber- 
ties of  his  country  or  live  an  ignominious  life ;  and  reverses 
of  fortune,  which  hurl  men  from  the  pinnacles  of  wealth  or 
power,  or  the  certain  prospect  of  infamy  and  the  world's 
scorn,  are  no  very  inadequate  motives  for  terminating  one's 
existence.  In  these  cases,  the  person,  no  doubt,  may  act 
from  error  of  judgment,  and  thus  be  guilty  of  foolish  and 
stupid  conduct,  but  we  have  no  right  to  confound  such  error 
with  unsoundness  of  mind.  Inasmuch  as  the  prospect  before 
him  may  be  such  that  it  will  appear  to  his  mind  more  painful 
to  live  than  to  die,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  if,  for  want  of 
courage  to  bear  up  against  the  ills  that  threaten  to  over- 
whelm him,  and  battle  it  to  the  last,  he  should  prefer  the 
latter ;  for,  after  all,  the  choice  might  indicate  less  folly  than 
that  which  often  characterizes  the  conduct  of  men.  True, 
the  motive  may  seem  sometimes  totally  inadequate  to  lead 
to  such  a  determination,  when  in  reality  it  may  be  the  only 
and  sufficient  motive ;  and  this,  probably,  must  always  con- 
tinue to  be  one  of  the  mysterious  facts  in  our  constitution, 
that  the  termination  of  our  existence,  from  which  we  instinct- 
ively shrink  with  feelings  of  horror,  should  so  often  be  volun- 
tarily hastened  from  the  most  trivial  and  insignificant  motives. 
No  doubt  the  mental  disturbance  is  always  great,  but  the 
same  may  be  affirmed  of  all  cases  where  crime  is  committed 
under  the  excitement  of  strong  passions,  and,  therefore,  is  in 
itself  no  proof  of  insanity.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however, 
that  the  cases  are  comparatively  few  in  regard  to  which  it 
would  be  safe  to  affirm,  that  the  excitement  of  the  organic 
action  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system,  which  accompanies 


SUICIDE.  397 

this  perturbation  of  mind,  had  not  transcended  the  limits  of 
health  and  passed  into  real  pathological  irritation.  Among 
these  few  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in  placing  the  case  of 
the  pair  of  youths,  noticed  by  Mrs.  Trollope,  who,  after 
dining  sumptuously  at  a  fashionable  restaurant  at  the  ex- 
pense of  their  entertainer,  went  to  their  lodgings,  and  suffoca- 
ted themselves  together  in  the  same  bed ; *  or  that  of  suicidal 
clubs,  the  members  of  which  bind  themselves  to  die  by  their 
own  hands  within  an  appointed  time.  Men  who,  with  cul- 
tivated intellects  and  refined  passions,  entertain  only  the 
meanest  conceptions  of  the  great  moral  purposes  of  life,  may 
be  ready  to  terminate  their  existence  the  moment  it  ceases  to 
impart  its  usual  zest  to  sensual  gratification.  Here,  self-de- 
struction is  obviously  not  the  effect  of  physical  disease,  but  of 
moral  depravity.  But  how  are  we  to  account  for  those  in- 
stances of  juvenile  suicide  so  often  recorded,  where  the 
dreadful  propensity  is  excited  by  the  most  trivial  causes  ? 
Burrows  speaks  of  a  girl,  but  little  over  ten  years  of  age, 
who,  on  being  reproved  for  some  trifling  indiscretion,  cried 
and  sobbed  bitterly,  went  up  stairs  and  hung  herself  in  a 
pair  of  cotton  braces ;  and  of  another,  eleven  years  old,  who 
drowned  herself  for  fear  of  simple  correction.2  A  French 
journal  has  lately  reported  the  case  of  a  boy  twelve  years  old, 
who  hung  himself  by  fastening  his  handkerchief  to  a  nail  in 
the  wall,  and  passing  a  loop  of  it  around  his  neck,  for  no 
other  reason,  than  because  he  had  been  shut  up  in  his  room 
and  allowed  only  dry  bread,  as  a  punishment  for  breaking 
his  father's  watch.  Another  case  is  related  of  a  boy  eleven 
years  old,  who  killed  himself  because  reproved  by  his  father ; 
and  several  more  of  a  similar  description  are  also  recorded.8 
In  these  cases,  the  moral  causes  seem  altogether  inadequate 
to  excite  the  suicidal  propensity,  without  first  producing 
some  serious  physical  disturbance,  for  here  are  none  of  those 


1  Paris  and  the  Parisians. 

2  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  440. 

8  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  N.  S.  xxvii.  21. 
34 


398  MEDICAL  JDKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

motives  for  self-destruction  which  have  just  been  mentioned 
as  influencing  the  adult  mind. 

§  387.  That  suicide  is  often  committed  under  the  im- 
pulse of  mental  derangement,  even  when  mental  derange- 
ment would  not  otherwise  have  been  suspected,  is  a  doc- 
trine that  was  long  since  taught  by  some  medical  writers, 
and  has  been  confirmed  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  by 
the  researches  of  recent  inquirers.  The  propensity  to  suicide 
connected  with  an  obviously  melancholy  disposition,  is  now 
universally  recognized  as  a  form  of  monomania,  for  its  symp- 
toms are  plainly  indicative  of  cerebral  derangement.  These 
patients  labor  under  a  constant  melancholy,  conjuring  up  the 
darkest  prospects,  and  presaging  nothing  but  evil  fortune. 
They  have  been  guilty  of  some  sin,  real  or  imaginary,  which 
they  believe  to  be  of  the  most  heinous  nature,  and  thence- 
forth there  is  no  more  happiness  nor  comfort  in  the  world  for 
them.  They  imagine  their  friends  are  constantly  watching 
their  movements  and  engaged  in  machinations  against  them, 
or  silently  neglecting  and  despising  them;  at  one  time, 
morose  and  taciturn ;  at  another,  uttering  the  most  bitter 
complaints,  weeping  and  traversing  the  room,  as  if  in  ex- 
treme mental  anguish.  If  their  thoughts  take  a  religious 
turn,  they  imagine  they  have  committed  the  unpardonable 
sin,  that  their  prayers  are  rejected,  that  the  Saviour  turns 
away  his  face  from  their  sight,  and  that  the  miseries  of  the 
damned  are  to  be  their  everlasting  portion.  This  unquiet 
and  melancholy  mood  will  occasionally  give  way  to  short 
periods  of  comparative  cheerfulness,  when  the  clouds  seem 
to  be  breaking  away,  and  the  individual  approximating  to 
his  natural  character.  Their  nervous  system  is  weak  and 
irritable,  the  circulation  is  quickened,  the  digestion  more  or 
less  impaired,  the  secretions,  especially  the  biliary,  more  or 
less  deficient,  or  vitiated,  and  the  mind  is  incapable  of  con- 
tinued exertion.  After  this  state  has  continued  for  some 
time,  the  mental  derangement  becomes  more  prominent,  and 
the  wretched  victim  begins  to  see  visions  and  hear  strange 
voices,  and  believes  that  he  has  communications  from  supe- 


SUICIDE.  399 

rior  beings.  All  this  time  the  idea  of  self-destruction  is  fre- 
quently if  not  constantly  before  the  mind,  and  unless  the 
patient  be  narrowly  watched,  he  will  finally  succeed,  after 
various  attempts,  in  accomplishing  his  purpose. 

§  388.  The  suicidal  propensity  here  described,  is  univer- 
sally attributed  to  pathological  causes ;  but  there  is,  besides, 
a  large  class  of  cases,  in  which  no  insanity  of  mind  or  body 
has  been  observed  or  suspected,  though  we  have  good  rea- 
son to  believe  its  existence.  That  one  may  be  so  harassed 
with  the  ills  of  life,  as  to  deem  it  best  to  rid  himself  at  once 
of  both,  is  not  perhaps  very  strange ;  but  when  a  person, 
apparently  in  good  health,  and  surrounded  with  every  thing 
that  can  make  life  dear  to  him,  deliberately  destroys  himself 
without  any  visible  cause,  no  balancing  of  motives  nor  scru- 
tiny of  private  circumstances  can  satisfactorily  explain  it, 
and  we  are  obliged  to  consider  it  as  a  form  of  partial  moral 
mania.  Within  a  few  years  past,  the  attention  of  the  medi- 
cal profession  has  been  directed  to  this  subject,  and  their 
researches  have  abundantly  established  the  fact,  that  the 
efficient  cause  is  some  pathological  change,  or  physical  pecu- 
liarity, not  in  every  case  easily  defined  or  understood,  but 
none  the  less  certain  on  that  account. 

§  389.  Sometimes  this  monomania  is  attended  appa- 
rently by  no  physical  or  moral  disorder,  the  individual  being 
driven  by  mere  impulse  to  self-destruction,  without  being  able 
to  assign  any  reason  therefor,  real  or  imaginary.  He  feels 
that  he  is  urged  on  by  an  impulse  he  can  neither  account  for 
nor  resist,  deplores  his  sad  condition,  and  beseecrles  his 
friends  to  protect  him  from  himself.  In  another  class  of 
cases,  some  powerful  physical  or  moral  impression  only  is 
needed,  to  call  the  suicidal  propensity  into  fatal  activity. 
The  wonderful  effect  of  mental  influences  on  diseases  of  the 
bodily  organs,  is  so  common  a  fact,  that  we  have  no  rational 
ground  for  disbelieving  a  similar  kind  of  agency  in  the  pro- 
duction of  this  phenomenon.  The  distinguished  accoucheur 
who  attended  the  princess  Charlotte  in  her  fatal  confinement, 
observed  a  pair  of  pistols  in  the  room  to  which  he  had  retired 
for  repose,  the  sight  of  which  was  sufficient,  to  a  mind 


400  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

harassed  by  long  and  anxious  attendance,  and  overwhelmed, 
as  it  were,  by  the  responsibilities  of  his  situation,  to  provoke 
a  desire  —  which  he  may  never  have  felt  before  —  to  die  by 
his  own  hands.  The  case  of  Sir  Samuel  Romilly  who  com- 
mitted suicide  immediately  after  sustaining  a  severe  domes- 
tic bereavement,  strongly  shows  how  far  the  propensity  to 
commit  this  act  is  beyond  the  control  of  moral  principle  or 
Christian  virtue,  even  when,  as  it  was  with  him,  previously 
contemplated  and  conditionally  determined  upon. 

§  390.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that  in  many  cases  of 
attempted  suicide,  the  individual,  after  recovery,  has  no  re- 
collection, or  at  most,  but  a  faint  and  shadowy  one,  of  the 
fact  itself,  and  believes  it  upon  the  testimony  of  others. 
And  yet  he  may  have  evinced  considerable  forethought  and 
ingenuity  in  preparing  the  means,  and  when  detected  in  the 
attempt,  have  conversed  about  it  calmly  and  pertinently.  It 
seems  to  be  analogous  to  that  loss  of  recollection  in  regard 
to  homicide,  or  other  violent  acts  committed  in  acute  mania, 
often  evinced  by  patients  after  recovery.  The  fact  strongly 
shows  us  what  deep  and  serious  disorder  may  pervade  the 
mind,  while  outwardly  all  is  calm  and  regular. 

§  391.  Among  the  features  which  ally  the  propensity  to 
suicide  with  ordinary  mania,  is  that  of  its  hereditary  dispo- 
sition. Dr.  Gall  knew  several  families  in  which  the  suicidal 
propensity  prevailed  through  several  generations.  Among 
the  cases  he  mentions,  is  the  following  very  remarkable 
one.  "  The  Sieur  Ganthier,  the  owner  of  various  houses 
built  without  the  barriers  of  Paris,  to  be  used  as  entrepots 
of  goods,  left  seven  children,  and  a  fortune  of  about  two 
millions  of  francs,  to  be  divided  among  them.  All  re- 
mained at  Paris  or  in  the  neighborhood,  and  preserved  their 
patrimony ;  some  even  increased  it  by  commercial  specu- 
lations. None  of  them  met  with  any  real  misfortunes,  but 
all  enjoyed  good  health,  a  competency,  and  general  esteem. 
All,  however,  were  possessed  with  a  rage  for  suicide,  and 
all  seven  succumbed  to  it  within  the  space  of  thirty  or  forty 
years.  Some  hanged,  some  drowned  themselves,  and  others 
blew  out  their  brains.  One  of  the  first  two  had  invited  six- 


SUICIDE.  401 

teen  persons  to  dine  with  him  one  Sunday.  The  company 
collected,  the  dinner  was  served,  and  the  guests  were  at  the 
table.  The  master  of  the  house  was  called,  but  did  not 
answer,  —  he  was  found  hanging  in  the  garret.  Scarcely  an 
hour  before,  he  was  quietly  giving  orders  to  the  servants,  and 
chatting  with  his  friends.  The  last,  the  owner  of  a  house  in 
the  rue  de  Richelieu,  having  raised  his  house  two  stories,  be- 
came frightened  at  the  expense,  imagined  himself  ruined,  and 
was  anxious  to  kill  himself.  Thrice  they  prevented  him,  but 
soon  after,  he  was  found  dead,  shot  by  a  pistol.  The  estate, 
after  all  the  debts  were  paid,  amounted  to  three  hundred 
thousand  francs,  and  he  might  have  been  forty-five  years  old 
at  the  time  of  his  death. 

"  In  the  family  of  M.  N.  *  *  *,  the  great-grandfather,  the 
grandfather,  and  the  father  committed  suicide."  1 

§  392.  Falret,  whose  researches  have  thrown  much  light 
on  this  affection,  believes  that  it  is  more  disposed  to  be  heredi- 
tary than  any  other  kind  of  insanity.  He  saw  a  mother  and 
her  daughter  attacked  with  suicidal  melancholy,  and  the 
grandmother  of  the  latter  was  at  Charenton  for  the  same 
cause.  An  individual,  he  says,  committed  suicide  in  Paris ; 
his  brother  who  came  to  attend  the  funeral,  cried  out  on 
seeing  the  body  —  "  What  fatality !  My  father  and  uncle  both 
destroyed  themselves ;  my  brother  has  imitated  their  exam- 
ple ;  and  twenty  times  during  my  journey  hither,  I  thought 
of  throwing  myself  into  the  Seine."  2 

§  393.  Gall  also  relates  the  case  of  a  dyer  of  a  very 
taciturn  humor,  who  had  five  sons  and  a  daughter.  The 
eldest  son,  after  being  settled  in  a  prosperous  business,  with 
a  family  around  him,  succeeded,  after  many  attempts,  in 
killing  himself  by  jumping  from  the  third  story  of  his  house. 
The  second  son  who  was  rather  taciturn,  had  some  domestic 
troubles,  lost  part  of  his  fortune  at  play,  and  strangled  him- 
self at  the  age  of  thirty-five.  The  third  threw  himself  from 
the  window  into  his  garden,  but  did  not  hurt  himself ;  he 
pretended  he  was  trying  to  fly.  The  fourth  tried  one  day 

1  Sur  les  fonctions,  iv.  345.  2  Sur  la  Hypochondria  et  Suicide. 

34* 


402  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

to  fire  a  pistol  down  his  throat,  but  was  prevented.  The 
fifth  was  of  a  bilious,  melancholy  temperament,  quiet,  and  de- 
voted to  business  ;  he  and  his  sister  showed  no  signs  of  being 
affected  with  their  brother's  malady.  One  of  their  cousins 
committed  suicide.1 

§  394.  Like  other  kinds  of  mental  derangement,  the 
suicidal  propensity  undergoes  occasional  exacerbations,  from 
the  influence  of  the  seasons,  periodical  congestions,  etc. 
The  patient,  perhaps,  may  have  thrown  off  some  of  the 
gloom  which  overshadowed  his  mind,  resumed  a  portion  of 
his  ordinary  cheerfulness  and  interest  in  his  affairs,  courted 
the  company  of  his  friends,  and  thus  excited  strong  expecta- 
tions of  a  perfect  cure,  when  suddenly  his  malady  breaks 
out  afresh ;  the  sentiments  are  again  perverted,  the  judgment 
disturbed,  his  breast  torn  with  anguish  and  despair,  and  the 
utmost  watchfulness  is  necessary  to  prevent  him  from  accom- 
plishing his  fatal  designs. 

§  395.  Another  trait  which  the  suicidal  propensity  pos- 
sesses in  common  with  some  nervous  diseases,  though  not 
insanity,  is  its  disposition  to  prevail  epidemically,  as  it  were, 
in  consequence  of  that  law  of  our  constitution,  not  well  un- 
derstood, called  sympathy.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  obser- 
vation, that  the  occurrence  of  one  case  of  suicide  is  followed, 
oftener  than  not,  by  one  or  more  in  the  same  community. 
In  a  sitting  of  the  Academy  of  Medicine  at  Paris  a  few  years 
since,  it  was  mentioned  by  M.  Costel  that  a  soldier  at  the 
Hotel  des  Invalids  having  hanged  himself  on  a  post,  his 
example  was  followed  in  a  short  time  by  twelve  other  in- 
valids, and  that  by  removing  this  fatal  post,  the  suicidal 
epidemic  was  arrested.  It  is  related  that  thirteen  hundred 
people  destroyed  themselves  in  Versailles  in  1793  ;  and  that 
in,  one  year,  1506,  sixty  perished  by  their  own  hands  in 
Rouen.2 

§  396.  The  analogies,  thus  presented  between  the  suici- 
dal propensity  and  insanity  or  other  nervous  diseases  in  its 
symptoms,  are  also  strengthened  by  the  pathological  changes 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  350.  2  Burrows's  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  438. 


SUICIDE.  403 

observed  after  death.  In  the  larger  proportion  of  instances 
where  examination  is  made,  the  brain  or  abdominal  viscera 
are  found  to  have  suffered  organic  lesions,  more  or  less  ex- 
tensive, which,  when  confined  to  the  latter,  have  affected 
the  mind  by  sympathetic  irritation.  Even  in  those  cases 
where  the  fatal  act  was  preceded  by  no  indications  of  dis- 
ease or  other  symptoms  that  excited  suspicions  that  the 
individual  was  tired  of  life,  dissection  has  often  revealed  the 
most  serious  disease,  which  must  have  existed  for  some  time 
previous  to  death.  True,  the  most  careful  dissection  will 
sometimes  fail  of  revealing  the  slightest  deviation  from  the 
healthy  structure,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  support  of 
the  above  views  of  the  nature  of  this  affection,  that  it  always 
should.  For  here,  as  in  mania,  sometimes  the  pathological 
change  may  not  have  gone  beyond  its  primary  stage,  that 
of  simple  irritation,  which  is  not  appreciable  to  the  senses, 
but  the  existence  of  which  we  are  bound  to  believe  on  the 
strength  of  the  symptoms. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SUICIDE. 

§  397.  BY  the  common  law  of  England,  a  felo  de  se 
forfeited  all  chattels,  real  or  personal,  which  he  had  in  his 
own  right,  and  various  other  property,  and  his  will  became 
void  as  to  personal  property.1  Such  severity  has  been  gen- 
erally avoided  by  the  almost  universal  practice  of  coroners' 
juries  to  return  an  inquest  of  insanity.  At  present,  the  fact 
of  suicide  has  no  other  importance,  than  what  it  derives 
from  its  connection  with  the  mental  derangement  which  may 
be  supposed  to  have  given  rise  to  it.  Courts  would  very 
justly  refuse  to  consider  it  as  sufficient  proof  of  insanity,  in 
the  absence  of  other  proofs,  because  it  might  have  been  the 
act  of  a  rational  mind,  and  because,  too,  if  it  really  had  sprung 
from  insanity,  the  delusion  might  have  been  so  circumscribed, 
as  not  to  have  perverted  the  judgment  in  regard  to  testa- 
mentary dispositions  and  other  civil  acts.  The  principle 
adopted  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  is,  that  in  cases  of  doubt- 
ful sanity,  —  among  which  those  of  suicide  must  always  be 
ranged,  —  the  validity  of  the  individual's  testament  must  be 
determined  solely  by  the  character  of  that  instrument  itself. 
Here  is  an  inherent  difficulty  that  courts  will  never  be  very 
anxious  to  encounter,  and  that  is,  to  determine  the  exact  con- 
nection of  suicide  with  insanity  —  supposing  the  latter  to  be 
admitted  —  in  point  of  time.  When  this  act  is  the  only 
proof  we  have  of  mental  derangement,  we  are  left  without 
the  means  of  ascertaining  when  this  condition  began  to  exist 
or  to  disappear,  and  consequently  nothing  can  be  more 

1  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  iv.  190. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SUICIDE.  405 

difficult  than  to  decide  within  what  time,  either  before  or 
after  the  suicidal  attempt,  the  individual  can  be  pronounced 
insane.  It  not  uncommonly  happens,  that  a  person  kills 
himself,  or  makes  the  attempt,  shortly  after  making  his  will, 
when  the  question  requires  a  judicial  decision,  whether  or  not 
the  insanity  which  led  to  the  fatal  act  existed  at  the  time  of 
making  the  will.  The  practice  has  usually  been,  if  there 
were  no  other  evidence  of  unsound  mind,  either  in  his  con- 
duct or  conversation,  or  in  the  testamentary  dispositions  them- 
selves, not  to  impeach  the  testator's  sanity.  In  a  certain  case 
it  was  held  by  Sir  John  Nicholl,  that  where  there  was  no 
evidence  of  insanity  at  the  time  of  giving  instructions  for  a 
will,  the  commission  of  suicide  three  days  afterwards  did 
not  invalidate  the  will,  by  raising  an  inference  of  previous 
derangement.1  Chief  Justice  Parker,  of  Massachusetts,  also 
held  that  suicide  committed  fifteen  days  after  the  date  of  the 
person's  will,  was  not  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of  other  evi- 
dence, to  prove  him  insane  and  thus  invalidate  the  will,  on 
account  of  the  difficulty  we  have  just  mentioned.2 

§  398.  Even  where  the  suicidal  act  is  unquestionably  the 
effect  of  insanity,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  a  will 
prepared  within  a  short  time  of  it,  is  invalid ;  for  it  may  be 
that  the  insanity  was  of  a  limited  kind  not  involving  ideas 
of  property  or  relations.  A  gentleman  made  his  will  a  few 
hours  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  on  his  life,  and  intrusted 
it  to  the  charge  of  a  person  with  the  injunction  that  he  should 
produce  it  after  his  death.  After  some  months'  treatment  he 
got  better,  and  promised  never  again  to  attempt  to  shorten 
his  life.  For  three  years  he  kept  his  promise,  and  showed  no 
signs  of  mental  derangement,  but  it  does  not  appear  of  what 


1  Burrows  v.  Burrows,  1  Haggard's  Eccl.  Reports,  109. 

2  His  language  was,  that,  "  even  if  the  act  itself,  [suicide,]  should  be  con- 
sidered as  proof  demonstrative  that  the  reasoning  faculty  was  disturbed  at 
the  time  of  its  commission,  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  with  precision  the 
very  inception  of  derangement,  weakens  its  force  in  relation  to  any  ante- 
cedent act."     Brooks  and  others  v.  Barret  and  others,  7  Pickering's  Re- 
ports, 94. 


406  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

disease  he  died.1  The  dispositions  of  the  will  were  reason- 
able ;  but  since  it  was  undoubtedly  made  during  the  insanity 
of  the  testator,  it  could  not  be  deemed  valid  on  the  principles 
of  the  common  law.  When  we  consider,  however,  that  it 
was  a  rational  act,  and  that  the  testator  suffered  it  to  remain 
unaltered  during  the  three  years  that  he  was  free  from  disease, 
we  are  bound  to  believe  that  it  expressed  his  true,  deliberate 
intentions ;  and  being  such,  we  ought  to  be  cautious  how  we 
adopt  a  principle  that  would  have  defeated  them. 

§  399.  Generally,  then,  if  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
will  itself  raises  a  suspicion  of  the  testator's  sanity,  the  act  of 
suicide  within  a  short  time  will  always  be  strongly  confirma- 
tory of  it,  and,  in  connection  with  attending  circumstances, 
may,  in  some  instances,  turn  suspicion  into  conviction. 
There  will  be  little  danger  of  going  wrong  in  any  cases  of 
this  kind,  if  we  are  willing  to  be  governed  in  our  decisions  by 
the  principles  of  equity  and  common  sense,  rather  than  by 
technical  distinctions  and  antiquated  maxims.  If  the  will 
be  a  rational  act  rationally  done,  a  suicidal  act  or  attempt 
ought  not  to  invalidate  it,  because  the  presumption  is,  either, 
that  the  will  was  made  before  the  mind  became  impaired,  or 
that  the  derangement  was  of  a  kind  that  did  not  prevent  the 
judgment  from  using  its  ordinary  discretion  in  the  final  dis- 
position of  property.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  be  an  unreason- 
able act,  and  especially  if  it  be  contrary  to  the  previously 
expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  then  the  act  of  suicide 
will  be  in  itself  strong  proof,  that  the  mind  was  impaired  at 
the  time  of  making  the  will. 

§  400.  It  sometimes  happens  that  two  persons  desirous 
of  dying,  agree  to  kill  each  other,  while  the  plan  succeeds  but 
in  part,  and  one  survives.  In  this  case,  how  is  the  survivor  to 
be  treated  ?  We  do  not  know  that  any  trial  for  this  offence  has 
ever  taken  place  in  this  country  or  England,  but  in  all  prob- 
ability it  would  be  viewed  by  the  light  of  the  common  law, 
as  nothing  short  of  manslaughter.  In  the  milder  spirit  of 
German  jurisprudence,  Professor  Mittermaier  thinks  that  the 

1  Georget,  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  114. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OP   SUICIDE.  407 

survivor  would  not  be  a  fit  object  of  punishment ;  but 
whether  because  he  considers  his  responsibility  as  annulled, 
or  that  the  act  is  not  criminal,  he  does  not  state.1  However, 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  an  agreement  to  commit  mutual 
homicide,  ought  to  be  regarded  as  but  questionable  evidence 
of  insanity,  and  therefore  should  receive  no  favor  on  that 
ground  alone. 

1  De  principio  imputationis  alienationum  mentis  in  jure  criminali  recte 
constituendo.   p.  26.     Heidi.  1838. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  401.  WHETHER  this  condition  is  really  any  thing  more 
than  a  cooperation  of  the  voluntary  muscles  with  the  thoughts 
which  occupy  the  mind  during  sleep,  is  a  point  very  far  from 
being  settled  among  physiologists.  While  to  some,  the  exer- 
cise of  the  natural  faculties  alone  seems  to  be  sufficient  to 
explain  its  phenomena,  others  have  deemed  it  necessary  to 
suppose,  that  some  new  and  extraordinary  powers  of  sensa- 
tion are  concerned  in  its  production,  though  unable  to  convey 
a  very  clear  idea  of  their  nature  or  mode  of  operation.  With- 
out discussing  this  question  here,  our  purpose  will  be  an- 
swered, by  inquiring  how  far  the  natural  faculties  are  exer- 
cised during  its  continuance,  and  thus  ascertaining,  as  well 
as  may  be,  in  what  respect  it  differs  from  the  sleeping  and 
the  waking  states. 

§  402.  Not  only  is  the  power  of  locomotion  enjoyed,  as 
the  etymology  of  the  term  signifies,  but  the  voluntary  mus- 
cles are  capable  of  executing  motions  of  the  most  delicate 
kind.  Thus,  the  somnambulist  will  walk  securely  on  the 
edge  of  a  precipice,  saddle  his  horse  and  ride  off  at  a  gallop, 
walk  on  stilts  over  a  swollen  torrent,  practise  airs  on  a  musi- 
cal instrument ;  in  short,  he  may  read,  write,  run,  leap,  climb, 
and  swim,  as  well  as,  and  sometimes  even  better,  than  when 
fully  awake. 

§  403.  The  extent,  to  which  vision  is  exercised,  differs  in 
different  cases.  In  one  class  of  cases,  it  is  very  certain  that 
the  somnambulist  does  not  use  his  eyes  in  the  various  opera- 
tions which  he  performs.  Negretti,  an  Italian  servant,  whose 
celebrated  history  is  related  by  two  different  physicians, 
would  rise  in  his  sleep,  go  into  the  dining-room,  spread  a 


SOMNAMBULISM.  409 

table  for  dinner,  and  place  himself  behind  a  chair  with  a  plate 
in  his  hand,  as  if  waiting  on  his  master.  When  in  a  place 
with  which  he  was  not  perfectly  acquainted,  he  was  embarras- 
sed in  his  proceedings,  and  felt  about  him  with  his  hands ;  and 
sometimes  he  struck  himself  against  the  wall,  and  was 
severely  injured.  He  sometimes  carried  about  with  him  a 
candle  as  if  to  give  him  light,  but  when  it  was  taken  away 
and  a  bottle  put  in  its  place,  he  failed  to  perceive  the  differ- 
ence.1 Galen  says  of  himself,  that  he  once  walked  about  a 
whole  night  in  his  sleep,  till  awakened  by  stumbling  against  a 
stone  which  laid  in  his  way.  Here,  it  appears  that  the  long 
continued  habit  of  performing  certain  operations  enabled  the 
individual,  with  the  aid  of  feeling  alone,  to  repeat  them  in 
his  sleep. 

§  404.  At  other  times,  objects  are  clearly  discerned,  but 
the  imagination  transforms  them  into  those  with  which  the 
mind  happens,  at  the  moment,  to  be  engaged.  Thus,  a  som- 
nambulist described  by  Hoffman,  who  dreamed  he  was  about 
going  on  a  journey,  strided  across  the  sill  of  an  open  win- 
dow, kicking  with  his  heels,  and  exerting  his  voice,  as  if  he 
supposed  himself  riding  on  his  horse. 

§  405.  In  other  instances  again,  things  are  done,  in  which 
vision,  or  an  analogous  power,  is  unquestionably  exercised. 
Castelli,  whose  case  which  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable,  is 
related  by  Francesco  Soave,2  was,  one  night,  found  translat- 
ing Italian  into  French,  and  observed  to  look  for  the  words 
in  a  dictionary.  His  light  having  gone  out,  he  found  himself 
in  the  dark,  groped  about  for  a  candle,  and  went  into  the 
kitchen  to  light  it.  He  would  also  get  up,  and  go  into  his 
master's  shop,  and  weigh  out  medicines  for  supposed  cus- 
tomers. When  some  one  had  altered  the  marks  which  he 
had  placed  in  a  book  he  was  reading,  he  noticed  the  change 
and  was  puzzled,  saying,  "  Bel  piacere  di  sempre  togliermi  i 
segni."  Another  somnambulist,  a  priest,  whose  case  was  pub- 
lished in  the  French  Encyclopedic,  would  arise  from  his  bed 

1  Muratori :  della  forza  della  Fantazia  Umana. 

2  Biflessioni  sopra  il  Somnambolismo. 

35 


410  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  compose  sermons,  reading  over  every  page  when  finished, 
and  erasing  and  correcting  with  the  utmost  accuracy.  On 
one  occasion,  after  writing  "  ce  divine  enfant,"  he  erased  the 
word  "  divine,"  and  wrote  "  adorable  "  over  it.  Perceiving 
that  ce  could  not  stand  before  the  last  word,  he  altered  it  to 
cetj  by  inserting  after  it  a  t.  He  would  also  write  music  with 
the  greatest  accuracy. 

§  406.  In  another  class  of  cases,  there  seems  to  be  no 
reasonable  ground  for  doubting,  that  the  power  of  vision  is 
manifested  to  an  almost  incredible  extent.  Jane  Rider, 
whose  curious  history  was  published  a  few  years  since,  was 
able,  in  a  dark  room,  to  make  out  the  date  of  coins,  the 
figures  of  which  were  nearly  obliterated,  and  to  read  the 
motto  of  a  seal  which  others  had  been  unable  to  decipher  by 
the  light  of  a  lamp.  With  her  eyes  covered  by  several  folds 
of  handkerchief,  she  could  still  read  and  write  as  if  nothing 
intervened,  and  play  at  backgammon  understandingly. 

§  407.  It  appears  that  the  eyes  of  somnambulists  are 
sometimes  closed  while  walking  about,  and  perhaps  always 
so  when  they  first  get  up,  though  by  one  writer  they  are 
described  as  being  sometimes  half  open.  In  some  of  the 
cases  which  have  been  alluded  to,  the  eyes  were  observed  to 
be  open  and  staring. 

§  408.  The  senses  of  hearing  and  of  taste  present  as 
many  different  modifications  as  that  of  sight.  The  sound 
of  persons'  voices  talking  loud  in  his  presence  may  be  un- 
perceived  by  the  somnambulist,  and  that  of  a  trumpet  no 
better  heard,  unless  put  close  to  his  ears  ;  in  other  cases,  very 
faint  sounds  may  be  heard  at  considerable  distances.  Negretti 
did  not  distinguish  between  strongly  seasoned  cabbage,  and 
some  salad  he  had  prepared.  He  drank  water  instead  of 
wine  which  he  had  asked  for,  and  snuffed  ground  coffee 
instead  of  snuff.  By  other  somnambulists,  however,  such 
deceptions  have  been  instantly  detected.  Generally,  som- 
nambulists take  but  little  notice  of  what  is  passing  around 
them,  unless  it  is  naturally  connected  with  the  subject  of 
their  thoughts,  or  specially  obtruded  on  their  attention  ;  and 
then  the  perceptions  will  be  associated  more  or  less  cohe- 


SOMNAMBULISM.  411 

rently  with  their  thoughts.  Jane  Rider  would  take  part  in 
the  conversation,  and  never  mistake  the  nature  of  outward 
objects ;  while  others  have  been  no  less  accurate  and  acute 
in  some  of  their  remarks,  though  unconscious  of  the  presence 
of  other  persons.  These  facts  show  a  strong  analogy  between 
somnambulism  and  dreaming.  It  is  well  known  that  a  per- 
son, who  will  hear  and  reply  to  questions  addressed  to  him 
relative  to  the  subject  he  is  dreaming  about,  may  not  notice 
nor  be  aware  of  loud  sounds  made  near  him.  The  differ- 
ence in  the  sensorial  powers  of  different  somnambulists, 
probably  indicates  merely  a  difference  in  the  degree  to  which 
this  peculiar  condition  is  carried.  Where  it  is  but  little 
removed  from  that  of  ordinary  dreaming,  the  sense  of  feeling 
alone,  in  a  limited  measure,  is  added  to  the  locomotive 
power ;  when  still  farther  removed,  the  senses  of  sight  and 
hearing  come  into  play,  though  but  partially  exercised ;  and 
when  displayed  to  its  utmost  extent,  they  enjoy  a  range  and 
nicety  of  perception,  not  witnessed  in  the  ordinary  state,  and 
hardly  explicable  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge. 

§  409.  There  is  another  form  of  this  affection,  called 
ecstasis  or  cataleptic  somnambulism,  from  its  being  conjoined 
with  a  kind  of  catalepsy,  in  which  the  walking  and  other 
active  employments  are  replaced  by  what  appears  to  be  a 
deep,  quiet  sleep,  while  the  patient  converses  with  fluency 
and  spirit,  and  exercises  the  mental  faculties  with  activity 
and  acuteness.  Both  in  this  and  the  former  kind,  the  person 
generally  loses  all  recollection  of  whatever  transpires  during 
the  paroxysms,  though  it  may  be  revived  in  a  subsequent 
paroxysm.  In  some  cases  that  have  been  related,  the  mem- 
ory during  the  paroxysms  embraced  only  the  thoughts  and 
occurrences  of  those  periods ;  those  of  the  lucid  intervals 
being  as  entirely  forgotten,  as  those  of  the  paroxysms  were, 
after  they  had  subsided. 

§  410.  It  now  scarcely  admits  of  a  doubt,  that  somnam- 
bulism results  from  some  morbid  condition  in  the  system, 
involving,  primarily  or  secondarily,  the  cerebral  organism. 
We  see  that  its  lighter  forms  are  but  a  slight  modification  of 
dreaming,  which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  very  much 


412  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

influenced  by  the  state  of  the  corporeal  functions,  and  which 
in  certain  disorders,  is  produced  in  a  very  troublesome 
degree.  The  analogy  of  ecstasis  to  hysteria  and  epilepsy 
with  which  it  is  often  conjoined,  is  too  strong  to  escape  the 
most  cursory  observation,  not  merely  in  its  phenomena,  but 
in  its  curability  by  the  use  of  remedial  means.  Indeed, 
these  affections  are  known  to  pass  into  each  other  by  fre- 
quent and  rapid  transitions,  and  to  possess  a  strong  common 
relation  to  insanity.  The  attacks  of  cataleptic  somnambu- 
lism are  invariably  preceded  by  derangements  of  the  general 
health,  —  in  females,  of  the  uterine  functions  especially, 
and  their  recurrence  is  prevented  by  the  methods  of  treat- 
ment, which  are  found  most  successful  in  those  affections 
with  which  it  is  pathologically  related.  The  more  active 
forms  of  sleep-walking,  seldom,  if  ever  exist,  except  in  con- 
nection with  those  habits  or  conditions  that  deteriorate  the 
general  health.  Intemperate  drinking  is  said  to  be  among 
the  causes  that  produce  it;  and  an  observer  of  Negretti's 
case  attributed  the  disorder  to  his  immoderate  fondness  of 
wine.  A  plethoric  condition  of  the  vessels  of  the  head  is 
also  a  strong  predisposing  cause  of  it ;  and  in  proof  of  this, 
Muratori  relates  that  he  was  assured  by  a  physician,  that 
nothing  but  having  his  hair  cut  off  once  in  a  couple  of 
months,  saved  him  from  being  a  somnambulist.  Its  heredi- 
tary character,  which,  like  the  same  trait  in  insanity,  we  may 
fairly  conclude  depends  on  morbid  conditions,  also  indicates 
its  physical  origin ;  and  the  same  inference  may  be  drawn 
from  the  influence  of  age  and  sex  in  its  production.  The 
cataleptic  form  of  the  disorder  appears  chiefly  in  females 
before  the  last  critical  period ;  while  the  other  is  as  much  con- 
fined to  males,  in  whom  it  mostly  appears  in  childhood  and 
the  early  periods  of  manhood,  —  seldom  in  old  age. 

§  411.  In  the  somnambulist,  either  the  perceptive  organs 
are  inordinately  excited,  and  thus  he  is  led  to  mistake  in- 
ward for  outward  sensations ;  or  the  perceptions,  if  correct, 
are  misapprehended  by  some  obliquity  of  the  reflective 
powers ;  in  some  instances  probably,  both  these  events  take 
place.  He  talks,  moves,  and  acts,  unconscious  of  his  real 


SOMNAMBULISM.  413 

condition,  and  of  nearly  all  his  external  relations.  The 
ideal  images  that  are  brought  before  the  mind  are  mingled 
and  confounded  with  the  real  objects  of  sense,  and  the  con- 
duct is  regulated  accordingly.  Psychologically  considered, 
then,  somnambulism  appears  to  be  not  very  remote  from 
mania,  the  difference  consisting  in  some  circumstances  con- 
nected with  the  causes  that  give  rise  to  the  derangement  of 
the  faculties.  In  the  latter,  the  pathological  affection  of  the 
brain  is  continuous ;  in  the  former,  it  appears  only  during 
sleep,  by  which  its  effects  are  greatly  modified.  When  the 
maniac  finds  himself  restored  to  health,  he  looks  on  the 
period  of  his  derangement  as  on  a  dream  crowded  with  gro- 
tesque images,  heterogeneous  associations,  and  ever-changing 
scenes.  So  the  somnambulist,  on  awaking,  is  conscious  only 
of  having  been  in  a  dream,  the  events  of  which  have  left  a 
more  or  less  vivid  impression  on  his  memory. 

§  412.  In  somnambulism,  as  well  as  in  mania,  intellect- 
ual powers  are  sometimes  evinced,  that  are  altogether  un- 
known in  the  waking  state.  Jane  Rider  would  sing  cor- 
rectly, though  she  had  never  learned  to  sing,  nor  been  known 
to  sing  when  awake,  and  would  play  at  backgammon  with 
considerable  skill,  though  she  had  never  learned  the  game  in 
the  waking  state.  She  also  exhibited  a  power  of  imitating 
the  manners  and  language  of  people,  while  she  had  never 
evinced  the  slightest  trace  of  this  power  when  awake. 

§  413.  Like  the  maniac,  too,  the  sleep-walker's  senti- 
ments and  propensities  are  often  included  in  the  same  circle 
of  morbid  action,  in  which  the  operations  of  the  under- 
standing are  involved.  The  case  of  a  Carthusian  monk  is 
related,  who,  while  awake,  was  remarkable  for  his  sim- 
plicity, candor,  and  probity ;  but  unfortunately,  almost  every 
night  walkecj  in  his  sleep,  and  like  the  fabled  Penelope, 
undid  all  the  good  actions  for  which  he  was  so  celebrated  by 
day.  On  such  occasions,  he  was  a  thief,  a  robber,  and  a 
plunderer  of  the  dead.  A  case  of  a  pious  clergyman  is 
somewhere  described,  who  in  his  fits  of  somnambulism 
would  steal  and  secrete  whatever  he  could  lay  his  hands 
upon,  and  on  one  occasion,  he  even  plundered  his  own 

35* 


414  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

church.  In  a  case  of  somnambulism  which  occurred  a  few 
years  since  in  Maine,  there  was  a  strong  disposition  to  com- 
mit suicide.  The  paroxysms  appeared  every  night,  and 
watchers  were  required,  as  if  the  somnambulist  had  been 
laboring  under  an  acute  disease.  He  always  attempted  to 
escape  from  his  keepers,  and  having  succeeded  one  night,  an 
outcry  was  heard  from  a  neighboring  pasture,  and  he  was 
found  suspended  by  a  rope  from  the  limb  of  a  high  tree. 
Fortunately,  he  had  attached  the  rope  to  his  feet  instead  of 
his  neck,  and  consequently  was  but  little  injured. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  414.  SOMNAMBULISM  may  sometimes  incapacitate  a 
person  from  the  proper  performance  of  the  duties  and  en- 
gagements of  his  situation,  and  then  unquestionably  it  may 
impair  the  validity  of  contracts  and  other  civil  acts  to  which 
he  is  a  party.  By  rendering  him  troublesome,  mischievous, 
and  even  dangerous,  it  furnishes  good  ground  for  annulling 
contracts  of  service,  whether  it  existed  previously  and  was 
concealed,  or  had  made  its  appearance  at  a  later  date. 
Whether  it  should  be  considered  a  sufficient  defence  of 
breach  of  promise  of  marriage,  or  a  valid  reason  for  divorce 
when  concealed  from  one  of  the  parties  previous  to  the 
marriage,  are  questions  which  do  not  properly  admit  of  a 
general  answer.  Since  its  evils  may  be  in  some,  of  the 
lightest,  in  others,  of  the  most  serious  description,  each  par- 
ticular case  ought,  in  justice,  to  be  decided  solely  on  its  own 
merits,  reference  being  had  to  the  amount  of  injury  as  com- 
pared with  the  magnitude  of  the  obligation  sought  to  be 
avoided.  If  studiously  concealed  or  denied,  when  its  avowal 
would  have  undoubtedly  prevented  the  other  party  from 
entering  into  a  contract,  the  latter  ought  to  be  enabled  to  set 
aside  his  own  obligations  on  the  ground  of  fraud. 

§  415.  As  the  somnambulist  does  not  enjoy  the  free  and 
rational  exercise  of  his  understanding,  and  is  more  or  less 
unconscious  of  his  outward  relations,  none  of  his  acts  dur- 
ing the  paroxysms,  can  rightfully  be  imputed  to  him  as 
crimes.  HofFbauer  places  him  on  the  same  footing  with 
one  who  labors  under  hallucinations,  except  that  the  former 
is  not  fully  excused,  if,  knowing  his  infirmity,  he  has  not 


416  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

taken  every  possible  means  to  prevent  injurious  consequences 
to  others.  Both  law  and  equity,  too,  would  undoubtedly 
hold  him  liable,  as  they  would  the  maniac,  for  injury  com- 
mitted to  the  property  of  others,  though  as  to  what  extent 
this  power  would  be  exercised,  we  have  no  means  of  form- 
ing an  opinion.  Hoffbauer  suggests  as  a  reason  for  not  re- 
garding the  criminal  actions  of  the  somnambulist  with  too 
much  indulgence,  that  they  have  probably  originated,  if  not 
in  premeditation,  at  least  in  the  deep  and  deliberate  attention 
which  the  mind  has  given  to  the  subject  when  awake.  This 
is,  no  doubt,  the  case  in  many  instances,  p,nd  if  men  were 
to  be  punished  for  their  meditations,  the  suggestion  would 
be  not  without  its  weight ;  but  as  such  is  not  the  law,  it  is 
not  very  obvious  how  this  fact  can  affect  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  somnambulism.  Fodere*,  too,  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  acts  of  a/  somnambulist,  instead  of  resulting 
from  mental  delusion,  are  more  independent  than  any  others, 
because  they  are  the  free  and  unconstrained  expression  of 
his  waking  thoughts  and  designs,  and  therefore  that  they  are 
not  altogether  excusable.  He  seems  to  have  forgotten  that 
by  no  human  law  are  men  responsible  for  their  secret 
thoughts,  but  only  for  their  words  and  acts.  To  these  only 
does  it  look,  and  if  they  are  found  to  have  proceeded  from 
a  mind  not  in  the  full  possession  of  its  powers,  they  must  be 
excused  without  the  slightest  reference  to  the  former.  And 
as  it  cannot  be  denied  that  they  are  sometimes  excited  by 
unfounded  delusions  that  have  no  affinity  with  the  natural 
character  and  purposes  of  the  individual,  every  sentiment  of 
justice  cries  out  against  ever  regarding  them  in  a  criminal 
light.  Georget  quotes  from  an  anonymous  work  a  curious 
instance  of  somnambulism  in  a  monk,  which  was  related  to 
the  author  by  the  prior  of  the  convent  who  witnessed  it  him- 
self. Late  one  evening,  this  somnambulist  entered  the  room 
of  the  prior,  his  eyes  open  but  fixed,  his  features  contracted 
into  a  frown,  and  with  a  knife  in  his  hand.  He  walked 
straight  up  to  the  bed,  as  if  to  ascertain  if  the  prior  were 
there,  and  then  gave  three  stabs  which  penetrated  the  bed- 
clothes and  a  mat  which  served  the  purpose  of  a  mattress. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SOMNAMBULISM.  417 

He  then  returned,  his  features  relaxed,  and  an  air  of  satis- 
faction on  his  countenance.  The  next  day,  the  prior  asked 
him  what  he  had  dreamed  about  the  preceding  night.  The* 
monk  confessed,  that  having  dreamed  that  his  mother  had 
been  murdered  by  the  prior,  and  that  her  spirit  had  appeared 
to  him  and  cried  for  vengeance,  he  was  transported  with 
fury  at  the  sight,  and  ran  directly  to  stab  her  assassin. 
Shortly  after,  he  awoke,  covered  with  perspiration,  and  re- 
joiced to  find  that  it  was  only  a  dream.1  A  similar  case  is 
also  related  of  two  individuals  who,  finding  themselves  out 
over  night  in  a  place  infested  with  robbers,  one  engaged  to 
watch  while  the  other  slept,  but  the  former,  falling  asleep 
and  dreaming  of  being  pursued,  shot  his  friend  through  the 
heart. 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  127. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


SIMULATED   SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  416.  THIS  disorder  may  be  simulated,  first,  by  those 
who  have,  at  other  times,  really  experienced  its  attacks; 
secondly,  by  those  who  have  not  at  any  time.  The  motive 
may  be,  either  to  do  something  which  the  individual  would 
not  otherwise  dare  to  attempt,  or  to  avoid  the  punishment  of 
an  action  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  one 
of  its  paroxysms.  The  difference,  however,  in  the  difficulty 
of  proof,  is  not  so  great,  as  at  first  sight  might  be  appre- 
hended ;  for,  since  the  mind  is  generally  unconscious  of  what 
passes  during  the  paroxysm,  the  somnambulist  possesses  but 
little  advantage  over  others,  from  his  experience,  in  feigning 
this  affection.  He  will  be  no  less  at  fault  in  respect  to  those 
little  traits  which  mark  the  difference  between  the  real  and 
feigned  attacks,  as  well  as  the  more  important  phenomena. 
When,  however,  it  is  admitted  that  the  person  has  been  sub- 
ject to  its  attacks,  this  fact  certainly  furnishes  a  presumption 
of  its  reality  in  doubtful  cases,  which  diminishes  the  strength 
of  the  evidence  which  the  alleged  case  requires. 

§  417.  When  the  feigned  paroxysm  is  witnessed  by  others 
who  are  capable  of  describing  minutely  what  they  saw,  a 
comparison  of  his  conversation  and  acts  with  those  observed 
in  real  paroxysms,  may  furnish  us  with  a  clew  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  act  imputed  to  him ;  for  it  is  scarcely  possible 
that,  if  feigning,  he  will  not  be  caught  tripping  in  some  of 
his  manoeuvres.  A  curious  case  is  quoted  by  Hoffbauer 
from  an  old  writer,  where  nothing  was  wanting  but  a  tole- 
rable knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  mental  faculties  in  som- 
nambulism, to  expose  the  deception.  An  old  ropemaker 


SIMULATED    SOMNAMBULISM  419 

frequently  fell  into  a  profound  sleep  in  the  midst  of  his  oc- 
cupation, whether  sitting  or  standing,  or  walking  in  the  street, 
when  he  would  begin  to  repeat,  by  means  of  words  and. 
gestures,  every  thing  he  had  been  doing  during  the  day,  from 
his  prayer  in  the  morning  till  the  very  moment  of  his  falling 
asleep.  If  taken  while  walking  abroad,  he  would  pursue  his 
course  just  as  if  he  had  been  awake,  avoiding  persons  and 
things  which  might  harm  him.  The  story  was  related  as  one 
of.  genuine  somnambulism,  though  there  were  two  circum- 
stances in  it  sufficient  to  have  exposed  the  deception.  In  the 
first  place,  to  repeat  the  transactions  of  the  day  in  this  man- 
ner, is  contrary  to  what  we  know  of  somnambulists  who  do 
only  what  they  have  premeditated,  or  what  has  strongly 
engaged  their  attention.  Secondly,  this  man  acted  a  double, 
and  consequently  a  deceptive  part.  He  first  repeated  what 
he  had  done  during  the  day,  and  then  went  on  with  what  he 
was  in  the  act  of  doing  when  the  paroxysm  took  him.  The 
ruse  was  finally  discovered.  The  man  professed  himself 
cured,  as  soon  as  a  physician  charged  with  examining  his 
case  proposed  to  bandage  his  eyes,  to  see  if  he  would  then 
be  able  to  perform  those  actions  which  had  excited  so  much 
surprise.  No  doubt  can  remain  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
attack,  if  the  person  perform  feats  which  he  would  not  dare 
to  do  when  awake,  unless  —  which  would  hardly  be  possible 
—  he  has  systematically  concealed  his  skill  and  abilities ;  the 
converse  of  the  proposition,  however,  cannot  be  equally  true. 
It  will  also  be  a  strong  confirmation  of  the  evidence  in  favor 
of  its  reality,  if  the  physical  symptoms  we  have  mentioned, 
as  sometimes  attending  the  somnambulic  disposition,  are 
shown  to  have  been  present.  But  it  generally  happens  that 
the  somnambulist  walks  unwitnessed,  and  must  rest  the  proof 
of  his  mental  condition  on  his  own  testimony  and  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case.  The  full  burden  of  proof  mani- 
festly devolves  on  him,  and  if  he  fail  of  establishing  it  satis- 
factorily, he  must  suffer  the  consequence.  There  can  be  no 
other  rule ;  for  once  acquit  a  criminal  on  the  score  of  som- 
nambulism which  is  imperfectly  or  at  best  but  plausibly  proved, 
and  it  will  soon  become  a  favorite  excuse  for  crime,  whenever 


420  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  offender  possesses  the  requisite  address  for  maintaining 
the  deception.  Among  the  proofs,  however,  necessary  to 
establish  this  defence,  a  prominent  place  should  be  claimed 
for  those  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  criminal  act  itself. 
If  this  be  manifestly  contrary  to  the  known  character  and 
disposition  of  the  accused,  and  especially  if  it  can  be  shown 
that  he  could  have  entertained  no  motive  for  injuring  the 
other  party,  but  little  else  beyond  a  straight  story  and  an  open 
air  of  sincerity  ought  to  be  required  to  establish  the  truth  of 
his  own  assertions. 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 


EFFECT   OF  INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE. 

§  418.  THE  insane  are  disqualified  by  law1  from  appear- 
ing as  witnesses  in  courts  of  justice,  their  incompetence 
being  inferred  from  their  mental  unsoundness.  The  fact  of 
incompetence  to  testify,  however,  is  not  necessarily  connected 
with  that  of  insanity,  and  it  would  be  far  more  correct  to 
consider  the  former  an  independent  fact  to  be  established  by 
a  distinct  order  of  proofs.  The  truth  is,  an  analogy,  in  a 
medico-legal  sense,  has  been  too  hastily  assumed,  between 
the  act  of  testifying,  and  that  of  performing  business  con- 
tracts or  other  civil  acts,  and,  in  consequence,  it  has  shared 
with  them  in  the  same  sentence  of  disqualification,  without 
an  attempt  to  ascertain  the  kind  and  degree  of  intellectual 
power  which  they  respectively  require.  The  practice  of 
including  them  in  the  same  category,  is  certainly  not  favored 
by  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  insanity,  nor  does 
it  approve  itself  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  To  see 
what  foundation  in  nature  this  rule  of  law  really  has,  we 
shall  proceed  to  inquire  how  far  the  competency  of  a  witness 
is  actually  impaired  by  the  different  forms  of  insanity. 

§  419.  According  to  Hoffbauer,  before  a  witness  can  be 
deemed  competent,  it  is  necessary  that  his  senses  should  be 
sufficiently  sound  to  take  cognizance  of  the  facts  to  which  he 
testifies ;  that  their  impressions  should  have  been  really  what 
he  believes  they  were ;  that  his  testimony  should  coincide 
with  his  belief;  and  lastly,  that  he  should  be  able  to  convey 
to  others  his  own  ideas,  without  fear  of  being  misinterpreted. 

i  Thomas's  Coke's  Littleton,  489;  Livingston  v.  Keirsted,  10  Johnson's 
Reports,  362. 

36 


422  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

These  conditions,  it  may  be  added,  constitute  the  capacity 
of  a  witness,  and  wherever  they  are  present,  his  evidence 
should  be  received,  without  agitating  the  question  of  his 
mental  unsoundness  which  is  not  absolutely  incompatible 
with  their  existence.1  « 

§  420.  The  higher  degrees  of  imbecility  must  of  course 
disqualify  a  witness,  but  its  less  aggravated  forms  may  not, 
under  all  circumstances,  have  this  effect.  His  senses  may-be 
acute  enough  to  see  and  to  hear  what  he  deposes  to ;  no 
illusions  may  obtrude  and  mingle  with  their  impressions ; 
and  his  memory  may  be  retentive  enough,  provided  too  long 
a  space  of  time  do  not  intervene  between  the  occurrence  of 
the  facts  and  his  deposition  concerning  them,  to  bear  them 
in  mind  till  revealed  by  judicial  investigation.  The  facts  to 
which  he  testifies  must  be  of  the  simplest  kind,  requiring 
the  smallest  perceptive  effort  to  seize  and  appreciate,  and  so 
intelligible  to  the  meanest  understanding,  that  the  memory 
can  easily  retain  them.  If  the  details  are  too  numerous  and 
complicated,  and  especially  if  they  include  words  or  actions 
not  familiar  with  or  analogous  to  his  own  ordinary  experi- 
ence ;  or  if  they  happened  at  too  remote  a  period,  they  become 
confused  and  entangled  in  his  mind,  and  many  of  them  fade 
from  it  altogether,  while  some  important  members  of  the 
series  may  not  have  been  attended  to  at  all.  Hence,  the 
evidence  of  imbeciles  may  present  many  a  contradiction  and 
hiatus  of  which  they  may  be  perfectly  unconscious  them- 
selves, and  which  it  would  be  wrong  to  attribute  to  inten- 
tional omissions,  or  a  wish  to  deceive.  If  we  bear  in  mind, 
too,  that  these  persons  are  easily  embarrassed,  it  might 
naturally  be  expected  that  the  presence  of  spectators,  the 
perplexing  questions  of  counsel,  and  the  formalities  of  a 
trial,  would  so  disorder  their  ideas,  as  to  make  their  testi- 

1  The  third  condition  above-mentioned,  may  not  at  first  sight  appear  to  be 
connected  with  capacity ;  but  if  the  reader  will  refer  to  the  observations 
(§  165)  on  a  class  of  people,  who,  in  consequence  of  some  natural  defect  or 
organic  disease,  are  incapable  of  telling  the  truth,  even  when  most  conducive 
to  their  own  interests,,  he  will  be  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  placing  it  in 
this  connection. 


.   EFFECT   OF  INSANITY  ON  EVIDENCE.  423 

mony  appear  to  those  unacquainted  with  their  mental  defi- 
ciency, like  the  most  impudent  trifling  or  downright  men- 
dacity. The  more,  however,  the  witness  is  permitted  to  tell 
his  story  in  his  own  way,  and  finds  encouragement  in  the 
looks  of  those  around  him,  the  less  of  this  will  be  observed. 
The  class  described  in  (§  62,)  are  competent  to  testify  in 
matters  of  a  more  complicated  kind,  requiring  a  larger  grasp 
of  the  reflective  faculties  to  embrace,  and  more  tenacity  ot 
memory  to  retain  them,  but,  like  the  others,  they  are  very  liable 
to  be  disconcerted  by  the  questions  of  strangers,  and,  in  con- 
sequence, betrayed  into  numerous  contradictions  of  their 
own  testimony.  Since,  then,  the  competency  of  these  imbe- 
ciles is  well  established,  nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  pro- 
priety of  admitting  their  evidence,  and  leaving  it  for  the  jury 
to  decide  upon  its  credibility. 

§  421.  In  partial  intellectual  mania  the  capacity  of  testify- 
ing under  certain  circumstances  and  with  certain  reservations, 
is  still  preserved,  though  considerable  knowledge  of  the  case, 
and  extreme  caution  are  requisite  to  measure  the  witness's 
credibility.  In  regard  to  the  greater  proportion  of  cases,  the 
only  doubt  is  respecting  the  second  and  third  conditions  of 
capacity  (§  419,)  no  question  being  raised  as  to  the  presence 
of  the  others ;  that  is,  whether  the  witness  has  really  seen, 
heard,  etc.,  what  he  believes  he  saw  and  heard,  and  whether 
his  testimony  coincides  with  his  belief.  That  he  may  offer 
in  evidence  the  offspring  of  a  disordered  imagination,  sin- 
cerely believing  it  to  have  come  under  the  cognizance  of  his 
own  senses,  is  undoubtedly  true ;  but  no  less  so,  however, 
that  he  may  testify  only  to  what  has  come  under  his  own 
observation.  Which  of  these  events  does  actually  take 
place,  is  a  question  to  be  settled  by  reference  to  the  nature 
of  the  evidence  and  the  character  of  the  witness's  insanity. 
When  the  matter  on  which  he  testifies,  is  remote  from  the 
insane  delusion  which  he  entertains,  and  cannot  very  obvi- 
ously come  within  the  circle  of  its  influence,  it  would  be 
wrong  to  reject  his  testimony  on  the  score  of  incompetency. 
When  we  see  these  monomaniacs  rational  on  every  topic  but 
that  which  constitutes  their  derangement,  shrewd  and  me- 


424  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

thodical  in  the  transaction  of  business,  quick  to  perceive  and 
able  to  profit  by  whatever  appears  conducive  to  their  interests, 
trusted  and  respected  by  their  neighbors,  it  seems  more 
difficult  to  disprove  than  to  prove  then-  competency.  The 
power  of  remembering  and  telling  correctly  what  they  have 
seen  or  heard,  requires  no  more  strength  or  soundness  of 
mind,  than  numberless  other  duties  that  nobody  doubts  their 
ability  to  perform.  Even  on  topics  connected  with  their 
insane  belief,  their  capacity  is  not  necessarily  destroyed,  and 
in  doubtful  cases  it  would  seem  better  to  receive  their  evi- 
dence, and  leave  it  for  the  court  or  counsel  to  disprove  its 
credibility.  At  the  very  least,  the  burden  of  proof  should  lie 
on  the  party  that  allege  the  incompetence.  Even  while  the 
predominant  idea  is  highly  false  and  absurd,  they  may,  and 
very  often  do,  reason  upon  it  with  force  and  correctness,  their 
deductions  being  sound  and  their  reflections  appropriate. 
Indeed,  this  mixture  of  the  rational  and  the  irrational,  this 
inability  to  discern  the  relations  of  congruity  between  the 
true  and  the  false,  constitutes  one  of  the  most  characteristic 
features  of  madness.  Hence,  it  would  not  be  unnatural  for 
them  to  see  things  in  some  way  connected  with  the  delusion, 
in  most  of  their  relations,  in  their  true  light ;  and  of  this  fact 
we  should  certainly  avail  ourselves  in  deciding  on  the  admis- 
sion of  their  evidence.  The  man  who  believes  that  he  is 
charged  by  government  with  the  regulation  of  the  weather, 
may,  notwithstanding,  observe  meteorological  changes,  and 
testify  accurately  concerning  the  state  of  the  weather  at  a 
particular  time  —  perhaps  no  one  more  so ;  and  he  who 
believes  that  he  has  made  an  immense  fortune  by  a  com- 
mercial speculation,  may  talk  sensibly  on  mercantile  interests 
and  be  perfect  master  of  the  price-current,  and  thus  be  com- 
petent to  testify  on  any  matter  connected  with  the  same,  that 
has  come  under  his  observation.  The  credibility  of  such 
witnesses,  however,  depends  very  much  on  the  importance  of 
the  subject  on  which  they  testify,  and  on  the  relations  of 
their  evidence  to  that  of  other  witnesses.  When  they  cor- 
roborate the  statements  of  other  witnesses,  they  may  justly 
challenge  our  belief,  while  we  should  very  properly  hesitate 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  425 

to  decide  upon  any  great  interests  of  person  or  property, 
solely  upon  the  ground  of  their  testimony. 

§  422.  The  reported  cases  where  the  competence  of 
witnesses  was  destroyed  by  reason  of  insanity,  are  too  few  to 
render  it  very  apparent  how  far  the  following  represents  the 
ordinary  practice  of  American  courts.  It  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  effect  of  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  common-law 
maxim,  that  the  insane  are  incapable  of  testifying,  and, 
therefore,  may  be  properly  introduced  in  this  place.  In  May, 
1833,  Jacob  Schwartz  was  tried,  at  a  term  of  the  supreme 
court  for  the  county  of  Lincoln,  in  Maine,  on  an  indictment 
for  assaulting,  with  intent  to  kill,  Jonathan  Jones.  Jones 
himself  was  the  principal  witness,  and  he  stated  that  he  went 
into  Schwartz's  house  for  the  purpose  of  conversing  on  re- 
ligious subjects  with  his  wife  who  was  also  Jones's  sister ; 
that  Schwartz  who  had  often  forbidden  him  to  do  so,  follow- 
ed him  into  the  house,  drove  him  out,  seized  his  gun,  and 
threatened  to  shoot  him ;  that  he  then  ran  several  rods, 
occasionally  looking  back  at  Schwartz  who  stood  in  his 
door-way  presenting  his  gun,  as  if  in  the  act  of  firing; 
that  Schwartz  finally  fired  and  hit  him,  several  shot  lodging 
in  his  hat  and  coat,  and  a  few  penetrating  into  the  skin  of 
his  back,  from  which  they  were  taken  out  by  some  persons 
in  a  house  to  which  he  immediately  ran.  The  transaction 
was  witnessed  by  no  one  besides  Jones.  By  other  witnesses 
it  was  testified,  that  Jones  ran  into  the  house  where  they 
were,  exclaiming  that  Schwartz  had  shot  him,  and  that  they 
assisted  in  taking  the  shot  out  of  the  skin.  Thus  far  his 
testimony  was  rational  and  consistent,  and  his  manner  calm 
and  composed.  On  being  cross-examined  by  the  defend- 
ant's counsel  who  had  some  knowledge  of  his  case,  he  tes- 
tified, that  he  used  to  work  on  a  piece  of  land  which  he 
owned,  but  that  feeling  himself  called  to  exhort  sinners  to 
repentance,  he  went  about,  in  imitation  of  Christ  and  the 
apostles,  preaching  the  gospel  and  exhorting  sinners  to  for- 
sake their  evil  ways.  He  declared  himself  to  be  an  apostle, 
and  inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost;  also,  that  he  was  one  of 
the  saints  who  are  to  judge  the  world,  and  that  he  should 

36* 


426  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

bear  a  part  in  the  judgment  of  the  great  day.  On  this  sub- 
ject he  dilated  largely  and  incoherently,  his  countenance 
being  animated,  and  his  language  and  manner  ardent  and 
impassioned.  Other  witnesses  having  testified  that  in  his 
domiciliary  visits  he  had  sometimes  represented  himself  to 
be  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  he  was  examined  on  this  point. 
Here  he  was  not  very  explicit,  and  did  not  seem  disposed  to 
make  a  full  disclosure,  as,  he  said,  he  could  not  perceive  its 
connection  with  the  question  at  issue.  He  did  not  expressly 
deny,  however,  that  he  so  considered  himself,  but  seemed 
disposed  to  leave  it  to  be  inferred  from  particular  things  in 
which  he  resembled  Jesus  Christ,  as  in  his  poverty,  in  his 
going  about  to  do  good,  and  in  the  persecution  he  suffered. 
The  jury,  not  thinking  it  safe  to  convict  the  defendant  on 
Jones's  testimony,  acquitted  him,  and  the  court  signified  its 
approval  of  the  verdict. 

§  423.  If  the  testimony  of  Jones  had  stood  alone,  un- 
supported by  confirmatory  circumstances,  no  fault  could 
be  reasonably  found  with  this  verdict.  It  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  the  jury  to  know  that  he  was  laboring  under 
extensive  delusions,  with  which  the  alleged  criminal  act  was 
not  very  remotely  connected  in  his  mind,  to  be  justified 
in  shrinking  from  the  responsibility  of  depriving  another,  on 
his  testimony,  of  his  good  name,  and  subjecting  him  to  legal 
punishment.  Of  the  two  evils,  that  of  convicting  on  insuf- 
ficient evidence,  and  that  of  suffering  a  guilty  person  to  escape 
a  few  years'  imprisonment,  they  would  not  have  been  liable 
to  blame,  for  choosing  to  incur  the  risk  of  that  which  they 
considered  the  least.  The  circumstances  of  this  case,  how- 
ever, being  very  different  from  what  is  here  supposed,  might 
we  riot  have  reasonably  expected  a  different  verdict  ?  That 
Jones  was  assaulted  at,  or  very  near  the  time  alleged,  could 
not  be  doubted  for  a  moment,  and  his  exclamation,  as  he 
entered  the  house  with  the  appearance  of  sudden  fright,  that 
Schwartz  had  shot  him,  and  his  coming  in  the  direction  from 
Schwartz's  house,  strongly  authenticated  his  statement,  that 
the  assault  was  committed  by  Schwartz,  —  so  strongly  in- 
deed, that  in  the  absence  of  any  conflicting  evidence  on  the 


EFFECT  OF   INSANITY   ON  EVIDENCE.  427 

part  of  the  defendant,  it  was  entitled  to  implicit  belief.  Such 
a  scene  might,  no  doubt,  hav6  been  got  up  by  a  sane  person, 
for  the  purpose  of  gratifying  some  malignant  feelings ;  but 
men,  affected  with  the  kind  of  insanity  under  which  Jones 
was  laboring,  rarely,  if  ever,  contrive  such  schemes.  It  was 
a  circumstance,  too,  which  should  have  had  its  weight,  that 
in  relating  the  facts  of  the  assault,  he  was  calm  and  consist- 
ent, and  that  it  was  only  when  touching  on  the  subject  of  his 
delusions,  that  he  was  excited  and  incoherent.  His  insanity 
was  not  of  the  kind  which  would  deprive  him  of  the  second 
condition  of  capacity  to  testify  (§  419,)  and  it  is  the  third 
only,  in  regard  to  which  there  could  have  existed  any  reason- 
able doubts ;  and  these  were  obviated  more  or  less  satisfac- 
torily, by  the  above-mentioned  circumstances.1 

§  424.  In  a  case  which  lately  came  before  the  court  of 
sessions  in  New  York,  the  principle  we  have  contended  for 
was  adopted  by  the  court.  A  gentleman  by  the  name  of 
Gracie  labored  under  the  delusion  that  various  persons  to 
him  unknown,  were  entertaining  designs  against  his  life, 
and  he  had  spent  much  money  in  attempting  to  discover  the 
conspirators.  Taking  advantage  of  this  delusion,  a  couple 
of  rogues  obtained  money  of  him  at  different  times,  under 
pretence  of  aiding  him  in  his  researches,  for  which  practices 
they  were  finally  indicted.  On  trial,  their  counsel  resisted 
the  admission  of  Mr.  Grade's  testimony,  on  the  ground  of 
monomania;  but  the  court  decided  that  this  objection 
applied  only  to  his  credibility,  not  to  his  competency.2 

§  425.  The  view  here  taken  of.  the  competence  of  some 
monomaniacs,  as  witnesses,  is  not  without  some  support  in 
the  legal  profession.  "  Of  an  insane  person,"  says  Mr. 
Evans,  "  it  might,  for  defect  of  other  evidence,  merit  to  be 
considered,  whether,  in  civil  cases  at  least,  the  testimony  of 
such  might  not  be  admissible  upon  points  where  his  under- 
standing did  nof  appear  to  be  subject  to  disturbance ;  it  be- 

1  For  the  facts  of  the  above  case,  the  author  is  Indebted  to  the  kindness  of 
J.  G.  Reed,  Esq.,  of  Waldoborough,  Me.,  who  was  the  defendant's  counsel. 
2 'Boston  Semi- weekly  Advertiser,  July  15,  1843. 


428  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ing  well  known  that  in  many  of  these  melancholy  instances, 
especially  when  the  result  of  some  violent  passion,  the  party 
affected  is  entirely  cool,  clear,  and  collected  in  his  ideas,  and 
as  free  as  other  persons  from  the  delusions  of  a  perverted 
imagination,  in  every  thing  not  connected  with  the  cause  of 
his  insanity ;  with  regard  to  persons  who  have  only  tem- 
porary fits  of  madness,  (those  usually  termed  lunacy,)  and  at 
other  times  are  in  all  respects  sound  of  reason,  these  are  then 
considered  as.  capable  of  testimony  as  of  any  other  legal 
act."1 

§  426.  If  the  evidence  of  the  monomaniacs  in  question, 
be  rejected,  it  must  be  from  a  fear  of  deception ;  and  proba- 
bly, most  of  the  distrust  manifested  towards  such  witnesses 
arises  from  a  lurking  suspicion,  that  their  mental  impair- 
ment is  necessarily  accompanied  with  impaired  veracity. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  some  ground  for  this  sus- 
picion, and  though  it  should  not  have  the  effect  of  totally 
invalidating  their  testimony,  it  is  proper  to  bear  it  in  mind 
whenever  their  credibility  is  in  question.  It  is  well  known 
how  prone  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are  to  complain 
of  the  servants,  the  overseers,  and  one  another,  and  prefer 
against  them  special  charges  that  are  without  any  founda- 
tion whatever ;  whether  from  an  involuntary  propensity  to 
lying  and  mischief,  or  from  a  morbidly  exalted  imagination, 
which  distorts  and  discolors  its  perceptions,  it  is  not  easy 
to  decide.  Some,  however,  will  relate  very  accurately  what 
they  see  and  hear,  and  their  statements  are  received  with 
implicit  credit.  On  the  whole,  we  may  conclude  with 
Georget,  "  that  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  patient,  the 
character  of  his  madness,  his  customary  relations  to  sur- 
rounding objects,  before  we  can  know  what  degree  of  confi- 
dence to  place  in  his  assertions."  It  should  not  be  forgotten, 
also,  that  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases  of  mental  de- 
rangement, there  is  a  weakness  of  memor/  that  prevents  it 
from  retaining  impressions  so  long  and  so  faithfully,  as  when 
in  its  sound  condition ;  and,  therefore,  the  facts  to  which  a 

1  Pothier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  259. 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON  EVIDENCE.  429 

monomaniac  testifies,  should  always  be  of  recent  occurrence, 
to  render  his  testimony  at  all  credible. 

§  427.  Since  the  second  edition  of  this  work  was  pub- 
lished, a  case  (Regina  v.  Hill)  has  been  decided  in  England, 
sustaining  the  above  views,  by  implication,  at  least,  in  all 
their  length  and  breadth,  and  a  little  more.  The  considera- 
tions which  induced  the  court  thus  to  reverse  what  seemed 
to  be  a  well-settled  principle,  had  reference,  less  to  the  nature 
and  degree  of  the  witness's  mental  impairment,  than  certain 
technicalities  of  legal  procedure.  As  the  case  is  destined,  no 
doubt,  to  be  a  leading  one  on  this  point,  it  will  be  proper  to 
notice  it  here.  Hill,  it  seems,  was  an  attendant  in  a  private 
asylum,  and  was  committed  on  a  charge  of  manslaughter, 
for  causing  the  death  of  one  of  the  patients,  by  violent  ill- 
treatment.  At  the  trial  before  the  central  criminal  court, 
London,  the  principal  witness  relied  upon  by  the  govern- 
ment, was  Donelly,  also  a  patient  in  the  asylum.  In  reply 
to  the  inquiries  of  the  prisoner's  counsel,  before  being  sworn, 
he  stated  that  he  had  within  him  twenty  thousand  spirits, 
but  they  were  not  all  his ;  that  his  ascended  from  his  stomach 
to  his  head  and  ears ;  that  they  spoke  to  him  incessantly  and 
were  speaking  to  him  at  that  moment ;  that  they  were  im- 
mortal and  would  live  after  he  was  in  his  grave ;  that  they 
came  from  various  directions  and  from  various  persons, — 
some  from  the  Queen  who  frequently  visited  him.  He 
believed  that  after  death,  his  spirit  would  ascend  to  heaven 
or  remain  in  purgatory.  He  said  he  understood  the  meaning 
of  an  oath,  having  learned  from  his  catechism,  in  infancy, 
that  it  was  lawful  to  swear  for  God's  honor  and  his  neigh- 
bor's good.  He  considered  an  oath  as  an  obligation  im- 
posed upon  men  for  the  good  of  the  law,  and  that  if  he  took 
a  false  oath,  he  would  go  to  hell  to  all  eternity.  He  was 
then  sworn,  and  gave  a  perfectly  connected  and  rational 
account  of  the  abuse  inflicted  by  the  prisoner  on  the  deceased, 
and  which  was  supposed  to  have  led  to  the  death  of  the 
latter.  He  thought  it  occurred  on  a  Monday,  but  the  spirits 
told  him  that  it  was  on  Tuesday.  The  incidents  of  the 
transaction  were  not  told  him  by  the  spirits,  but  witnessed 


430  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

by  himself.  The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty,  but  the 
case  was  reserved,  in  order  that  the  opinions  of  the  full  bench 
might  be  taken,  on  the  competence  of  Donelly.  On  the  3d 
of  May,  1851,  the  chief  justice,  Lord  Campbell,  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  unanimously  sustaining  the  decision 
of  the  judge  at  the  trial.  He  declared  "  the  proper  rule  to  be, 
for  the  judge,  at  the  time  the  party  is  produced  as  a  witness, 
to  examine  him  "whether  he  understands  the  nature  of  an 
oath,  and  say  whether  he  considers  him  a  competent  witness, 
and  then  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  estimate  the  value  of  his 
testimony.  He  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  the  state  of  his 
mind,  and  witnesses  may  be  called  to  prove  that  his  mind 
was  so  diseased  that  no  reliance  can  be  placed  upon  his 
statements ;  but  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  discredit  his 
testimony,  it  would  be  competent  for  the  jury  to  hear  what 
he  said,  and  to  act  upon  it." 

§  428.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  question  made  by  the 
court  in  this  case,  was,  whether  the  witness  was  capable, 
notwithstanding  his  disease,  of  comprehending  the  nature  of 
an  oath ;  not  whether  his  disease  necessarily  incapacitated 
him  from  giving  testimony.  The  latter  consideration  was 
regarded  as  affecting  his  credibility  alone  ;  and  how  far  it  had 
this  effect,  was  a  point  for  the  jury  to  decide.  Instead  of 
the  four  conditions  of  competency  indicated  by  Hoff  bauer 
(§419,)  all  having  direct  reference  to  the  object  in  view,  the 
court  here  insists  upon  only  one,  and  that  very  remotely  con- 
nected with  this  object.  This,  certainly,  is  to  disregard  old 
maxims  and  enlarge  the  competency  of  the  insane  to  testify, 
to  an  extent  hardly  warranted  by  our  knowledge  of  insanity. 
Many  an  insane  person  who  could  perfectly  understand  the 
nature  of  an  oath,  as  well  as  any  other  abstract  question  in 
morals  or  religion,  would  be  utterly  unreliable  as  a  witness 
of  things  which  had  come  under  his  own  observation.  None 
but  those  who  are  practically  conversant  with  the  insane,  can 
have  an  adequate  conception  of  their  liability,  both  to  receive 
erroneous  impressions  from  what  passes  around  them,  and  to 
falsify  what  they  really  and  correctly  perceive.  After  habits 
of  the  closest  intimacy  with  the  insane,  continued  through 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  431 

many  years,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  those  who  con- 
verse so  correctly  and  shrewdly  with  the  transient  visitor,  and 
never  forget  the  common  observances  of  life,  are  scarcely 
more  capable  of  reporting  what  they  see  and  hear,  than  those 
who  cannot  utter  a  single  coherent  sentence.  The  most  cir- 
cumscribed delusions,  after  having  existed  for  a  considerable 
time,  are  generally  accompanied  by  a  mental  condition  in 
which  the  most  ordinary  impressions  are  very  imperfectly 
perceived.  It  would  be  difficult  to  characterize  precisely 
the  deficiency  in  question,  because  it  differs,  probably,  in 
different  individuals.  It  would  seem  as  if  in  some,  the  im- 
pression were  mingled  with  and  distorted  by  the  delusion, 
while  in  others,  it  does  not  receive  the  degree  of  attention 
necessary  for  fixing  it  firmly  and  clearly  in  the  mind.  Thus, 
without  the  least  disposition  to  deceive,  their  statements  are 
apt  to  be  wide  of  the  truth.  In  that  other  class  of  the  insane, 
also,  whose  disorder  is  characterized  by  mental  excitement 
and  impropriety  of  conduct,  while  they  entertain  no  delu- 
sions whatever,  the  competence  to  testify  is  completely 
annulled  by  an  irresistible  propensity  to  exaggerate  and  color, 
and  frequently  to  lie  without  limitation  or  scruple.  Now  it 
is  hardly  a  satisfactory  answer  to  these  objections,  to  say 
that  these  traits  of  the  insane  would  be  duly  considered  by 
the  jury  when  brought  to  their  notice,  and  that  the  only 
difference  between  us,  is,  that  in  one  case  it  is  the  judge,  and 
the  other  the  jury,  that  decides  the  question  of  competency. 
The  evidence,  if  coherently  and  plausibly  given,  will  leave 
an  impression  upon  the  jury,  though  experts  may  testify  that 
the  witness  is  not  reliable,  and  the  instructions,  of  the  court 
may  imply  the  same  opinion.  It  does  not  appear  that  the 
credibility  of  the  witness  in  the  present  case,  was  impeached 
in  the  slightest  degree,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  physician 
and  some  other  witnesses  thought  him  capable  of  giving  a 
correct  account  of  any  transaction  he  may  have  observed. 
All  this  may  have  been  quite  correct,  and  the  punishment  of 
the  offender  well  merited,  but  unless  the  physician  were 
familiarly  acquainted  with  the  witness,  his  opinion  ought  not 


432  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

to  have  affected  the  general  presumption  against  the  evidence 
of  this  class  of  patients. 

§  429.  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  notice  one  of  the 
reasons  offered  by  the  court  for  admitting  the  testimony  of 
Donelly,  viz.,  that  under  a  different  rule,  patients  in  asylums 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  their  attendants.  It  is  quite  as 
obvious  that  under  the  rule  of  the  court,  the  attendants  would 
be  at  the  mercy  of  the  patients ;  and  if  this  were  clearly  un- 
derstood, the  most  respectable  and  trust-worthy  attendants 
in  our  asylums,  would  seek  some  other  calling  immediately. 

§  430.  Another  consideration  upon  which  the  court  relied, 
ought  not  to  be  passed  over  in  silence,  because  it  evinces  a 
mistake  not  unfrequent  among  persons  who  have  no  profes- 
sional knowledge  of  the  subject.  A  rule  which  would  ex- 
clude this  witness,  said  the  court,  merely  because  he  thought 
he  had  twenty  thousand  spirits,  would  equally  have  excluded 
Socrates  who  believed  that  a  spirit  always  haunted  him.  If 
there  were  to  be  no  distinction  between  a  gross  delusion 
admitted  to  be  the  offspring  of  disease,  and  a  notion  which, 
however  opposed  to  the  general  belief  of  mankind,  is  the 
deliberate  deduction  of  an  acute  and  healthy  mind,  then,  cer- 
tainly, the  reductio  ad  absurdum  would  be  fairly  made  out. 
But  where  is  the  warrant  for  disregarding  a  distinction  which 
the  world  has  always  made  ?  In  one  instance,  the  witness  is 
deemed  to  be  incompetent,  because  laboring  under  a  mental 
disease  which  is  indicated  by  strong  delusions  as  well  as  by 
other  traits  of  character ;  in  the  other,  the  witness  is  admit- 
ted because  of  the  unquestioned  soundness  of  his  mind,  as 
evinced  by  its  ordinary  manifestations,  though  accompanied 
by  a  notion  which  may  be  extravagant  but  not  absurd.  In 
short,  the  two  cases  are  separated  by  all  the  difference  between 
health  and  disease,  which,  however  difficult  to  be  discerned 
sometimes,  is  obvious  enough  between  Socrates  and  Donelly.1 

§  431.  In  the  subjects  of  general  mania,  all  competence 
to  testify  is  lost,  except  during  what  is  called  the  lucid  inter- 

1  15  Jurist,  470.  Law  Reporter,  N.  S.  iv.  141.  American  Journal  of  In- 
sanity, vii.  386. 


EFFECT   OF  INSANITY   ON  EVIDENCE.  433 

val,  when  they  may  testify  in  regard  to  transactions  that  oc- 
curred during  a  lucid  interval,  or  at  a  time  previous  to  their 
illness.  Their  evidence  should  be  implicitly  received,  only 
when  it  relates  to  simple  facts  easily  perceived,  for  their  in- 
tellect may  be  hardly  strong  enough  to  bring  to  mind  and 
expose  in  order,  a  complicated  mass  of  details. 

§  432.  In  partial  moral  mania,  there  is  nothing  to  inca- 
pacitate one  from  testifying,  unless  we  except  that  kind  of 
it  where  the  individual  labors  under  an  uncontrollable  pro- 
pensity for  lying.  Of  all  the  forms  of  mania,  this  really 
diminishes  competence  more  than  any  other,  but  it  will  be 
long,  probably,  before  it  will  be  considered  in  this  light,  in 
courts  of  justice. 

§  433.  In  general  moral  mania,  it  has  been  seen  that  the 
intellectual  powers  are  not  perceptibly  impaired,  and  that 
the  patient  loses  none  of  his  interest  in  what  passes  around 
him,  nor  of  his  power  to  observe  and  remember  them  with 
ordinary  distinctness.  Under  such  circumstances,  there 
would  be  little  reason  for  rejecting  his  evidence  on  the  score 
of  incapacity.  Considering,  however,  the  great  derangement 
of  the  affective  powers  under  which  he  labors,  and  the  un- 
founded likes  and  dislikes  which  it  produces,  his  veracity 
may  be  justly  suspected,  and  his  evidence  should  be  entitled 
to  little  weight,  except  when  limited  to  facts  in  regard  to 
which  it  can  be  shown  that  his  feelings  are  not  interested. 

§  434.  The  competence  of  old  men  in  the  early  stages  of 
dementia  to  testify,  is  a  point  frequently  discussed  in  courts 
of  justice,  and  the  want  is  severely  felt,  of  some  fixed  princi- 
ples that  shall  serve  as  a  guide  to  correct  decisions.  In 
every  stage  of  this  affection,  the  impairment  of  the  memory 
is  more  perceptible  in  regard  to  recent  than  remote  impres- 
sions, and  it  often  happens  that  a  person  may  have  a  distinct 
recollection  of  things  that  occurred  in  his  youth,  while  those 
of  a  month's  or  a  year's  date,  are  but  imperfectly  remembered, 
if  at  all.  To  test  the  strength  of  his  memory  respecting  cer- 
tain things,  it  is  only  necessary  to  ascertain  if  he  remembers 
various  other  transactions  of  about  the  same  date,  in  which 
he  is  known  to  have  been  engaged.  If  he  can  do  this,  it  is 

37 


434  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  his  competency ;  if  not,  it 
is  incumbent  on  the  party  offering  his  testimony  to  show 
why  his  memory  should  have  been  more  faithful  in  the  one 
case  than  in  the  other.  This  is  rendered  still  more  necessary 
by  the  fact,  that  the  weakness  of  mind  incident  to  this  con- 
dition makes  its  subjects  more  easily  swayed  by  the  sug- 
gestions of  others,  and  leads  them  to  believe  that  they  re- 
member what  they  are  told  they  ought  to  remember,  or  what 
they  are  assured  they  actually  did  remember  till  within  a 
recent  period.  The  slightest  examination  will  show  how 
much  dependence  can  be  placed  on  their  recollections  of 
recent  events. 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 


DRUNKENNESS. 

§  435.  BEFORE  we  can  properly  appreciate  the  legal 
consequences  of  drunkenness,  it  is  necessary  to  understand 
its  immediate  and  remote  effects  on  the  mind,  and  the 
organism  with  which  it  is  connected.  Correct  information  of 
this  kind  will  enable  us  to  avoid  many  of  the  prevalent 
errors  that  have  arisen  from  vague  and  imperfect  notions 
respecting  the  nature  of  drunkenness.  We  shall  first  con- 
sider the  symptoms,  or  immediate  effects,  of  free  indulgence 
in  intoxicating  drinks ;  for  the  following  account  of  which 
we  are  chiefly  indebted  to  Hoffbauer  and  Macnish.1 

§  436.  The  first  effect  of  alcoholic  liquors  is  to  exalt  the 
general  sentiment  of  self-satisfaction,  and  diffuse  an  unusual 
serenity  over  the  mind.  The  intellectual  as  well  as  physical 
powers  act  with  increased  vigor  and  activity,  the  thoughts 
flow  with  more  facility  and  accuracy,  and  the  individual 
becomes  perfectly  well  pleased  with  himself  and  others.  He 
feels  an  exhilaration  of  spirits,  a  sense  of  warmth  and  gaiety, 
and  his  imagination  is  crowded  with  delightful  images.  The 
sight  and  hearing  are  very  slightly  affected ;  a  low,  humming 
sound  is  heard  in  the  pauses  of  the  conversation ;  and  objects 
are  enveloped  in  a  slight  mist  which  prevents  them  from 
being  seen  distinctly.  Thus  far  there  is  no  appearance  of 
drunkenness.  Soon  the  torrent  of  his  ideas  becomes  more 
rapid  and  violent,  and  he  can  scarcely  repress  them.  This  is 
the  moment  of  his  happiest  sallies,  and  he  pours  forth  his 
thoughts  with  a  force  of  expression  and  a  richness  of  concep- 

1  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness. 


436  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tion  unknown  in  his  sober  hours,  and  now  he  feels  the  ecstatic 
pleasures  of  getting  drunk.  As  yet  the  brain  is  in  tolerable 
order,  though  a  great  effort  is  necessary  to  relate  a  story  or 
transaction  at  ah"  complicated  in  its  details,  for  the  thoughts 
succeed  one  another  too  rapidly,  to  allow  sufficient  time  to 
arrange  them  in  the  order  that  the  recital  requires.  This  is 
the  first  well-marked  symptom  of  intoxication.  Now  his 
ideas  succeed  one  another  with  constantly  increasing  force 
and  rapidity ;  his  sensations  lose  their  ordinary  delicacy ; 
and  his  imagination  gains  as  fast  as  they  lose.  His  language 
is,  in  some  respects,  more  oratorical  and  poetical,  and  though 
he  now  feels  an  irresistible  propensity  to  talk  nonsense,  he  is 
perfectly  conscious,  all  the  while,  that  it  is  nonsense.  His 
voice  is  louder,  because  he  hears  less  acutely,  and  judges  of 
the  hearing  of  others  by  his  own.  Now  the  organic  activity 
of  the  brain  is  at  its  height.  His  imagination  is  filled  with 
strange  and  queer  images,  and  he  is  conscious,  if  so  it  may 
be  called,  of  a  sense  of  oppression  and  giddiness  in  his  head. 
His  perceptions  of  color,  form,  distance,  and  number  become 
utterly  confused ;  he  confounds  one  person  with  another ; 
the  candles  burn  all  colors  in  succession,  and  are  multiplied 
fourfold ;  and  in  stretching  forth  his  glass  to  set  it  on  the 
table,  he  lets  it  go  before  reaching  its  edge.  He  is  apt  to 
imagine,  either  that  he  has  offended  some  one,  and  shows 
a  ludicrous  anxiety  to  apologize,  or  that  he  has  been  offended, 
and  fixes  upon  some  one  as  the  object  of  his  maledictions,  per- 
haps his  blows.  Judging  from  his  discourse,  his  ideas  begin 
to  want  connection,  notwithstanding  their  vivacity,  but  this 
vivacity  and  rapidity  of  his  ideas  give  to  his  passions  an  insur- 
mountable power,  against  which  reason  has  nothing  to  oppose, 
and  unless  some  accident  divert  him  from  their  object,  he  is 
hurried  on  wherever  they  impel  him.  Soon  his  tongue 
stammers  and  his  voice  gets  thick ;  his  legs  falter ;  he  falls 
from  his  seat ;  and  is  plunged  into  a  profound  sleep,  in  which 
the  manifestation  of  his  physical  and  intellectual  powers  is 
completely  extinguished.  In  this  condition,  he  is  said  to  be 
dead  drunk.  Such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  a  fit  of  drunk- 
enness, but  it  sometimes  varies,  more  or  less,  with  the  tern- 


DRUNKENNESS.  437 

perament  or  habits  of  the  individual,  and  the  attending  cir-   \ 
cumstances. 

§  437.     Such  is  the  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness  on 
the  mind ;  we  have  now  to  show  how  the  long-continued 
and  excessive  use  of  alcoholic  liquors  affects  the  moral  and 
intellectual  powers.     Except  in  some  happily-organized  na- 
tures, the  original  delicacy  and  acuteness  of  the  moral  percep- 
tions   are    invariably   blunted ;    the    relations   of    neighbor, 
citizen,  father,  spouse,  have  lost  their  accustomed  place  in 
his  thoughts ;  great  moral  interests  no  longer  obtain  a  strong 
hold  on  his  attention  ;  the  voice  of  distress  is  apt  to  fall  on 
his  ear  like  an  unmeaning  sound  ;  and  the  finer  emotions  of 
the  soul,  which  will  occasionally  be  felt  by  the  least  culti- 
vated minds,  have  entirely  deserted  his  nature.     The  injury 
sustained  by   the   intellect   is   more  obvious,   if    not  more 
deplorable.     The  course  of  the  ideas  is  sluggish,  and  they 
want  their  former  force  and  brilliancy  ;  the  mind  has  lost  its 
comprehensiveness  of  grasp,  and  experiences  a  difficulty  in 
seizing  the  relations  of  one  idea  to  another ;  it  is  incapable 
of  the  long-continued  efforts  which  were  once  easy,  and  of    i 
concentrating  the  whole  force  of  its  faculties  on  the  subjects 
submitted  to  its  examination.     In  consequence,  too,  of  the    . 
brain  having  been  so  much  accustomed  to  artificial  stimulus, 
according  to  a  well-known  law  of   the  animal  economy,  it    \  ' 
becomes  incapable  of  an  effort  without  the  aid  of  this  stim- 
ulus, which  is  necessary  to  the  performance  of  even  its  most  » 
ordinary  exercise.     Drinking  is  thus  made  an  indispensable 
habit,  and  by  this  means,  it  sometimes  happens  that  the  tame,   > 
cold,  and  lifeless  being,  as  if  touched  by  a  spark  of  Prome-   j 
thean   fire,   is  converted  into   the    animated,    sociable,   and   ! 
efficient  man  of  his  better  days.     Sheridan  never  spoke  in 
the  House  of  Commons  without  the  inspiration  of  half  a  pint 
of  brandy ;  and  numberless  are  the  heroes  of  the  buskin  and 
the  sock,  who  require  to  be  wound  up,  as  it  were,  to  a  certain 
pitch,  by  artificial  stimulus,  before  they  venture  to  undertake 
the  labors  of  the  night.  / 

§  438.     This  account  of  the  pathological  effects  of  drunk-  j£ 
enness  would  be  incomplete,  without  some  mention  of  that  j« ) 

37*  £ 


438  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

curious  disease  to  which  it  often  leads,  called  delirium,  tre- 
mens,  or  mania  a  potu.  It  may  be  the  immediate  effect  of  an 
excess,  or  series  of  excesses,  in  those  who  are  not  habitually 
intemperate,  as  well  as  in  those  who  are ;  but  it  most  com- 
monly occurs  in  habitual  drinkers,  after  a  few  days  of  total 
abstinence  from  spirituous  liquors.  It  is  also  very  liable  to 
occur  in  this  latter  class  when  laboring  under  other  diseases, 
or  severe  external  injuries,  that  give  rise  to  any  degree  of 
constitutional  disturbance.  The  approach  of  the  disease  is 
generally  indicated  by  a  slight  tremor  and  faltering" of  the 
hands  and  lower  extremities,  a  tremulousness  of  the  voice,  a 
certain  restlessness  and  sense  of  anxiety  which  the  patient 
knows  not  how  to  describe  or  account  for,  disturbed  sleep, 
and  impaired  appetite.  These  symptoms  having  continued 
two  or  three  days,  at  the  end  of  which  time  they  have  obvi- 
ously increased  in  severity,  the  patient  ceases  to  sleep  alto- 
gether, and  soon  becomes  delirious.  At  first,  the  delirium  is 
not  constant,  the  mind  wandering  during  the  night,  but,  dur- 
ing the  day,  when  its  attention  is  fixed,  capable  of  rational 
discourse.  It  is  not  long,  however,  before  it  becomes  con- 
stant, and  constitutes  the  most  prominent  feature  of  the  dis- 

V  ease.      Occasionally,  the  delirium  occurs  at  an  earlier  period 
I  of  the  disease,  and  may  even  be  the  first  symptom  of  any 

/    disorder.     This  state  of  watchfulness  and  delirium  continues 

l  /three  or  four  days,  when,  if  the  patient  recover,  it  is  suc- 
(  ceeded  by  sleep  which,  at  first,  appears  in  uneasy  and 
irregular  naps,  and,  lastly,  in  long,  sound,  and  refreshing 
slumbers.  When  sleep  does  not  supervene  about  this  period, 
the  disease  is  fatal ;  and  whether  subjected  to  medical  treat- 
ment, or  left  to  itself,  neither  its  symptoms  nor  duration  are 
materially  modified. 

§  439.     The  character  of  the  delirium  in  this  disease  is 

peculiar,  bearing  a  stronger  resemblance  than  any  other  form 

of  mental  derangement,  to  dreaming.      It  would   seem   as 

1  if  the  dreams  which  disturb  and  harass  the  mind  during  the 

i/  imperfect  sleep  that  precedes  the  explosion  of  the  disease, 
I   continue  to  occupy  it  when  awake,  being  then  viewed  as 

unrealities,  instead  of  dreams.     The  patient  imagines  himself, 


DRUNKENNESS.  439 

I 

for  instance,  to  be  in  some  peculiar  situation,  or  engaged 
in  certain  occupations,  according  to  each  individual's  habits( 
and  profession,  and  his  discourse  and  conduct  are  con- 
formed to  this  delusion,  with  this  striking  peculiarity,  how- 
ever, that  he  is  thwarted  at  every  step,  and  is  constantly 
meeting  with  obstacles  that  defy  his  utmost  efforts  to  re- 
move. Almost  invariably,  the  patient  manifests,  more  or 
less,  feelings  of  suspicion  and  fear,  laboring  under  continual 
apprehension  of  being  made  the  victim  of  sinister  designs 
and  practices.  He  imagines  that  certain  people  have  con- 
spired to  rob  or  murder  him,  and  insists  that  he  can  hear 
them  in  an  adjoining  apartment,  arranging  their  plans  and 
preparing  to  rush  into  his  room ;  or  that  he  is  in  a  strange 
place,  where  he  is  forcibly  detained  and  prevented  from  go- 
ing to  his  own  home.  One  of  the  most  common  hallucina- 
tions is,  to  be  constantly  seeing  devils,  snakes,  vermin,  and 
all  manner  of  unclean  things  around  him  and  about  him, 
and  filling  every  nook  and  corner  of  his  apartment.  The 
extreme  terror  which  these  delusions  often  inspire,  produces 
in  the  conntenance  an  unutterable  expression  of  anguish, 
and,  in  the  hope  of  escaping  from  his  fancied  tormentors, 
the  wretched  patient  endeavors  to  cut  his  throat,  or  jump 
from  the  window.  Under  the  influence  of  these  terrible 
apprehensions,  he  sometimes  murders  his  wife  or  attendant 
whom  his  disordered  imagination  identifies  with  his  ene- 
mies, though  he  is  generally  tractable  and  not  inclined  to  be 
mischievous.  After  perpetrating  an  act  of  this  kind,  he  gene- 
rally gives  some  illusive  reason  for  his  conduct,  rejoices  in 
his  success,  and  expresses  his  regret  at  not  having  done  it 
before.  So  complete  and  obvious  is  the  mental  derangement 
in  this  disease,  so  entirely  are  the  thoughts  and  actions  gov- 
erned by  the  most  unfounded  and  absurd  delusions,  that  if 
any  form  of  insanity  should  absolve  from  criminal  respon- 
sibility, this  certainly  should  have  that  effect. 

§  440.  Before  being  able  to  decide  the  question  under- 
standingly,  of  the  relation  of  drunkenness  to  moral  agency, 
it  is  necessary  to  proceed  one  step  farther  in  this  investiga- 
tion, and  inquire  into  the  pathological,  or,  as  it  is  technically 


440  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

called,  the  proximate  cause  of  drunkenness.  No  impres- 
sions, whether  from  within  or  without,  can  affect  the  mind, 
but  through  the  brain.  In  drunkenness,  therefore,  it  is  this 
organ  which  is  principally  affected,  and  that  portion  of  it 
more  particularly  which  is  connected  with  the  manifestation 
of  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers.  The  vital  actions  of 
which  it  is  the  seat,  receive  an  increased  share  of  activity, 
so  that  every  process  that  goes  on,  is  conducted  with  fresh 
energy  and  speed.  Drunkenness,  however,  depends  on  some- 
thing more  than  mere  increase  of  cerebral  action,  because  it 
varies,  in  some  degree,  with  the  nature  of  the  intoxicating 
agent,  but  what  this  specific  action  is  exactly,  it  is  impossi- 
sible  for  us  to  know.  As  the  fit  proceeds,  this  increase  of 
action  continues,  until  it  arrives  at  such  a  pitch,  that  the  organ 
is  unable  to  perform  its  functions  properly ;  hence,  the  disor- 
der and  tumult  of  mind  that  attend  the  last  stages  of  the  fit. 
The  torpor  and  exhaustion  that  follow,  are  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  previous  excessive  stimulation,  and  the  one 
is  generally  proportioned  to  the  other.  This  increased  action 
that  takes  place  in  drunkenness,  degenerates,  after  frequent 
repetition,  into  a  permanent  state  of  irritation  which,  at  last, 
becomes  real  inflammation.  The  coats  of  the  vessels  are 
thickened  and  less  transparent  than  usual,  and,  in  some  places, 
they  assume  a  varicose  appearance.  The  cerebral  texture  is 
less  delicate  and  elastic,  becoming  either  unnaturally  hard, 
or  soft.  Slight  effusions  of  water  are  not  uncommon.  These 
appearances,  to  a  more  or  less  extent,  are  found  in  the  brains 
of  nearly  all  confirmed  drunkards,  and  it  may  be  now  con- 
sidered a  well-established  fact,  that  the  habitual  drunkard  has 
always  more  or  less  of  cerebral  disease. 

§  441.  Obviously  as  these  pathological  changes  are  the 
effect  of  a  long-continued  voluntary  habit,  there  is  strong 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  idea  that  they,  in  turn,  become 
efficient  causes,  and  act  powerfully  in  maintaining  this  habit, 
even  in  spite  of  the  resistance  of  the  will.  So  deplorably 
common  has  drunkenness  been  in  this  country,  that  there 
are  few  who  have  not  seen  the  melancholy  spectacle  of  the 
most  powerful  motives,  the  most  solemn  promises  and  reso- 


DRUNKENNESS.  441 

lutions,  a  constant  sense  of  shame  and  danger,  bodily  pain 
and  chastisements,  the  prayers  and  supplications  of  friend- 
ship, of  as  little  avail  in  reforming  the  drunkard,  as  they 
would  be  in  averting  an  attack  of  fever  or  consumption. 
With  a  full  knowledge  of  the  dreadful  consequences  to  for- 
tune, character,  and  family,  he  plunges  on  in  his  mad  career, 
deploring,  it  may  be,  with  unutterable  agony  of  spirit,  the 
resistless  impulse  by  which  he  is  mastered.  Macnish  re- 
lates the  case  of  a  young  man  of  fortune,  twenty-six  years 
old,  which  presents  an  impressive  illustration  of  this  truth. 
"  Every  morning  before  breakfast,"  he  says,  "  he  drank  a 
bottle  of  brandy;  another  he  consumed  between  breakfast 
and  dinner,  and  a  third,  shortly  before  going  to  bed.  Inde- 
pendently of  this,  he  indulged  in  wine  and  whatever  liquor 
came  within  his  reach.  Even  during  the  hours  usually  ap- 
propriated to  sleep,  the  same  system  was  pursued  —  brandy 
being  placed  at  the  bed-side  for  his  use  in  the  night  time. 
To  this  destructive  vice  he  had  been  addicted  since  his  six- 
teenth year ;  and  it  had  gone  on  increasing  from  day  to  day 
till  it  had  acquired  its  then  alarming  and  incredible  mag- 
nitude. In  vain  did  he  try  to  resist  the  insidious  poison. 
With  the  perfect  consciousness  that  he  was  destroying  him- 
self, and  with  every  desire  to  struggle  against  the  insatiable 
cravings  of  his  diseased  appetite,  he  found  it  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  offer  the  slightest  opposition  to  them." *  Another, 
whose  case  he  quotes,  replied  to  the  remonstrances  of  his 
friend,  who  painted  the  distresses  of  his  family,  the  loss  of 
his  business  and  character,  and  the  ruin  of  his  health,  "  my 
good  friend,  your  remarks  are  just ;  they  are  indeed  too  true  ; 
but  I  can  no  longer  resist  temptation.  If  a  bottle  of  brandy 
stood  at  one  hand,  and  the  pit  of  hell  yawned  at  the  other, 
and  I  were  convinced  that  I  would  be  pushed  in  as  sure  as 
I  took  one  glass,  I  could  not  refrain.  You  are  very  kind  ;  I 
ought  to  be  grateful  for  so  many  kind,  good  friends,  but  you 
may  spare  yourselves  the  trouble  of  trying  to  reform  me ;  the 
thing  is  out  of  the  question." 2 

1  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness,  163.  *  Idem,  162. 


442  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE  OF   INSANITY. 

§  442.  These  phenomena  strongly  remind  us  of  some  of 
the  manifestations  of  moral  mania,  and  if  farther  evidence  is 
necessary  to  convince  us  that  they  are  both  connected  with 
similar  pathological  conditions,  it  is  abundantly  furnished  in 
some  other  phenomena  of  drunkenness.  It  is  now  well 
understood  that  this  vice  sometimes  assumes  a  periodical 
character,  persons  indulging  in  the  greatest  excesses  peri- 
odically, who  are  perfectly  sober  during  the  intervals  which 
may  continue  from  a  month  to  a  year.  From  a  state 
of  complete  sobriety,  they  suddenly  lapse  into  the  most  un- 
bounded indulgence  in  stimulating  drinks,  and  nothing  but 
absolute  confinement  can  restrain  them.  Macnish  who  saw 
several  cases,  says  that  they  "  seemed  to  be  quite  aware  of 
the  uncontrollable  nature  of  their  passion,  and  proceeded  sys- 
tematically, confining  themselves  to  their  room,  and  procur- 
ing a  large  quantity  of  ardent  spirits.  As  soon  as  this  was 
done,  they  commenced  and  drank  to  excess  till  vomiting  en- 
sued, and  the  stomach  absolutely  refused  to  receive  another 
drop  of  liquor.  This  state  may  last  a  few  days  or  &.  few 
weeks,  according  to  constitutional  strength,  or  the  rapidity 
with  which  the  libations  are  poured  down.  So  soon  as  the 
stomach  rejects  every  thing  that  is  swallowed,  and  severe 
sickness  comes  on,  the  fit  ceases.  From  that  moment  re- 
covery takes  place,  and  his  former  fondness  for  liquor  is  suc- 
ceeded by  aversion  or  disgust.  This  gains  such  an  ascen- 
dency over  him,  that  he  abstains  religiously  from  it  for  weeks, 
or  months,  or  even  for  a  year,  as  the  case  may  be.  During 
this  interval  he  leads  a  life  of  the  most  exemplary  temperance, 
drinking  nothing  but  cold  water,  and  probably  shunning 
every  society  where  he  is  likely  to  be  exposed  to  indulgence."  * 

§  443.  Esquirol  has  distinctly  recognized  this  disorder,2 
both  in  its  continued  and  periodical  form,  under  the  name  of 
dipsomania;  and  attributing  it  to  the  influence  of  patho- 
logical changes,  considers  its  unhappy  victims  as  not  morally 
responsible.  This  distinguished  observer  of  mental  affections 

1  Op.  cit.  36. 

2  Note  in  Hoffbauer,  §  195,  and  Maladies  men  tales,  ii.  80. 


DRUNKENNESS.  443 

affirms,  that  "  sometimes  the  abuse  of  intoxicating  drinks 
and  drunkenness  are  the  first  symptoms,  or  rather  the  most 
prominent  symptoms,  of  the  first  stages  of  madness;"  that/ 
"the  stomach  being  in  that  peculiar  condition  which  pro- 
duces an  extremely  painful,  moral,  and  physical  depression, 
craves  strong  drink ; "  that  "  this  craving  is  imperious  and 
irresistible ;  "  that  "  it  continues  as  long  as  the  paroxysm,  after 
which  the  patient  becomes  sober  and  assumes  all  the  habits 
of  a  temperate  life."  He  also  says,  that  these  people  "  obey/7 
an  impulse  which  they  have  not  the  power  of  resisting ;  that 
they  are  "  true  monomaniacs  ;  "  and  that  if  carefully  observed, 
we  shah1  find  in  them  "  all  the  characterictic  features  of  par- 
tial madness."  In  illustration  of  his  views  he  relates  the  fol-/ 
lowing  case.  "  M.  N.,  a  merchant,  aged  about  forty,  of  a 
robust  but  nervous  constitution,  became,  six  years  before, 
towards  the  beginning  of  autumn,  gloomy  and  disquieted,  in 
consequence,  apparently,  of  some  reverses  in  his  affairs. 
After  a  few  weeks,  he  neglected  his  business,  and  became 
irritable  and  ill-tempered  in  his  family.  His  taste  and  habits 
changed ;  he  took  to  drinking,  and  seriously  endangered  the 
safety  of  his  fortune  and  his  family.  The  prayers  and  tears 
of  his  wife  and  children,  the  authority  of  his  father,  and  the 
inroads  upon  his  property,  were  equally  unavailing  in  check- 
ing his  career.  Thus  passed  the  winter ;  at  the  approach  of 
spring,  the  craving  for  drink  ceased.  M.  N.  resumed  his 
regular  and  sober  habits,  and  by  his  application  to  business 
and  increased  tenderness  towards  his  family,  he  endeavored 
to  forget  the  occurrences  of  the  past  winter.  In  the  follow- 
ing autumn  there  appeared  the  same  phenomenon,  the  same 
disorders,  and  the  same  spontaneous  cure  in  the  spring.  It 
was  the  same  for  the  two  following  years,  except  that  the 
symptoms  were  so  aggravated,  that  his  property  suffered 
severely,  and  his  wife's  life  was  sometimes  endangered.  At 
the  end  of  his  fourth  paroxysm,  in  1817,  M.  N.  came  to  Paris 
to  consult  me  and  submit  to  my  directions,  conjuring  me  to 
deliver  him  from  a  disease  that  rendered  him  the  most  mise- 
rable of  men."  Esquirol  subjected  him  to  a  course  of  medi- 
cal treatment,  and  in  August  sent  him  off  on  a  journey  into 


444  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

Italy.  That  year  he  escaped,  except  that  in  December  he 
manifested  a  slight  desire  to  drink,  but  found  himself  able  to 
resist,  and  never  afterwards  had  a  return  of  his  complaint. 
He  also  relates  the  case  of  a  lady  who,  after  being  melan- 
choly for  six  weeks,  with  weakness  of  the  stomach,  and  indis- 
position to  take  the  least  exercise,  was  suddenly  seized  with 
the  strongest  craving  for  spirituous  drinks,  together  with 
sleeplessness,  agitation,  disturbance  of  mind,  and  perversion 
of  the  aifections.  For  six  years,  these  symptoms  made  their 
appearance  annually,  and  continued  two  months. 

§  444.  A  case  is  related  of  a  Parisian  bookbinder,  sixty 
years  old,  who  for  fifteen  years  was  afflicted  with  periodical 
drunkenness,  having  previously  been  a  model  of  sobriety  and 
virtue.  The  paroxysm  lasted  two  or  three  months  with  an 
interval  of  equal  duration.  M.  Pierquin,  the  narrator  of  the 
case,  observed  him  closely  for  the  space  of  two  years,  and 
found  that  his  daily  habit  was,  to  rise  at  five  or  six  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  take  some  money  out  of  the  till,  and  hasten  to 
the  nearest  cabaret,  where  he  would  drink  incessantly,  until 
ten  or  eleven  o'clock.  He  would  then  stagger  home,  go 
down  into  his  cellar,  bring  up  some  large  bottles  of  wine, 
and  drink  night  and  day,  seldom  sleeping,  and  very  rarely 
eating.  During  the  early  period  of  the  attack,  he  would  go 
to  the  cabaret,  forenoon  and  afternoon ;  but  during  the  last 
eighteen  or  twenty  days,  he  never  went  from  home.  Then 
he  became  reserved,  passionate,  avoiding  the  light,  and  seek- 
ing the  darkest  corner  of  the  kitchen.  He  was  never  observed 
to  be  delirious,  nor  deranged  in  mind,  but  would  answer 
questions  correctly,  and  follow  the  train  of  conversation. 
The  paroxysm  ended  in  a  profound  sleep,  from  which  he 
would  awake  in  his  sober  senses,  and  resume  his  avocations 
as  if  he  had  just  quitted  them  the  preceding  evening,  being 
unconscious,  or  pretending  to  be  so,  of  any  thing  that  had 
occurred.1 

§  445.  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  the  above  cases 
originated  in  pathological  changes  ;  and  there  is  also  another 

1  Journal  des  Progress,  etc.  xi. 


DRUNKENNESS.  44f 

class  of  cases  which  strongly  point  to  the  same  origin,  and 
present  a  close  affinity,  both  in  this  respect,  and  in  that  of 
their  symptoms.  In  the  cases  referred  to,  the  persons,  who 
are  habitually  sober,  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  indulge  in 
the  reckless,  unlimited  use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  whenever 
agitated  by  strong  moral  emotions.  The  author  was  once 
acquainted  with  a  very  amiable,  intelligent,  and  virtuous 
young  seaman,  who,  by  means  of  strict  attention  to  his 
duties,  his  staid  deportment,  and  his  knowledge  of  navigation, 
rose  to  the  command  of  a  ship,  at  a  very  early  age.  During 
his  second  voyage  as  captain,  while  in  a  foreign  port,  in  a 
hot  climate,  some  circumstances  occurred,  which  subjected 
him  to  considerable  fatigue  and  exposure  and  great  anxiety 
of  mind,  and  seriously  affected  his  health.  By  this  and  some 
other  things  which  took  place  ori  the  passage  home,  his  mind 
was  so  disturbed,  that  this  young  man  who  hardly  knew  the 
taste  of  ardent  spirits,  suddenly  abandoned  himself  to  the 
wildest  excesses.  The  fit  continued  till  within  a  few  days  of 
their  arrival  at  port,  during  which  time  he  was  totally  uncon- 
scious of  what  was  going  on,  and  the  first  officer  took  charge 
of  the  vessel.  The  same  ^cenes  again  occurred  the  next 
voyage,  and  he  lost  his  employment ;  but  with  these  two 
exceptions,  no  man  living  practised  more  rigid  abstinence 
from  every  kind  of  intoxicating  drink.  Nothing  could  tempt 
him  to  the  slightest  indulgence,  and  he  evinced  the  strongest 
repugnance  to  all  spirituous  liquors  of  whatever  kind.  The 
author  also  knew  another  young  man  of  similar  character, 
who  rose  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  command  of  a  ship ;  but 
no  sooner  did  he  reach  this  reward  of  his  merits,  than  he 
began  to  drink  with  all  the  recklessness  of  an  old  toper.  As 
soon  as  he  was  degraded  to  an  inferior  station,  no  man  could 
be  more  temperate,  and  this  appearance  of  reform  each  time 
encouraging  his  friends  with  the  hope,  that  he  had  aban- 
doned his  bad  habits  altogether,  they  would  restore  him  to 
the  station  he  had  lost,  to  be  again  and  again  forfeited  by 
his  mad  propensity.  In  these  cases,  it  seems  as  if  the  anx- 
iety arising  from  a  sense  of  heavy  responsibility,  and  from 
adverse  circumstances,  produced  an  irritation,  if  not  inflam- 

38 


446  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

mation  of  some  portion  of  the  brain,  —  of  that  which,  if 
phrenology  be  true,  is  connected  with  the  appetite  of  hun- 
ger and  thirst. 

§  446.  Esquirol  mentions  the  case  of  a  servant  girl  in  the 
Salpe"triere,  who,  upon  the  slightest  cross  or  contradiction, 
began  and  continued  to  drink  until  prevented  by  strict  seclu- 
sion. If  not  prevented  in  time,  she  got  drunk,  became  furi- 
ous, and  attempted  suicide.1 

§  447.  Marc  observes  that  dipsomania  sometimes  occurs 
in  women  at  the  turn  of  life,  as  it  is  called,  as  a  result  of  the 
important  physiological  changes  which,  at  that  period,  take 
place  in  the  female  constitution.  He  has  met  with  many 
examples  of  it  in  women  who  previously  had  exhibited  all 
the  virtues  of  their  sex,  and  especially  temperance.2 

1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  73.  2  De  la  folie,  etc.  ii.  605. 


CHAPTER   XXV. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS. 

§  448.  BEFORE  we  undertake  to  estimate  the  legal  re- 
sponsibilities of  drunkards,  it  will  be  necessary  to  retrace 
our  steps  for  a  moment,  in  order  to  ascertain  what  is  the 
exact  state  of  the  mind  while  under  the  immediate  influence 
of  intoxicating  drinks ;  and  for  this  purpose  we  shall  dis- 
tinguish, with  Hoffbauer,  three  degrees  or  periods  of  drunk- 
enness. In  the  first  degree,  to  use  in  some  measure  the 
language  of  this  writer,  the  ideas  are  only  uncommonly 
vivacious ;  consequently  the  empire  of  the  understanding 
over  the  actions  is  so  little  weakened,  that  the  individual 
perfectly  retains  the  consciousness  of  his  external  condition, 
and  in  fact  may  be  said  to  be  in  complete  possession  of  his 
senses.  Still  this  rapid  flow  of  ideas  is  unfavorable  to  reflec- 
tion, and  there  also  accompany  it  great  irritability,  and  ac- 
tivity of  the  moral  emotions.  It  must  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  anger  is  more  rare  in  this  degree  of  drunkenness, 
in  consequence  of  the  self-satisfaction  which  the  person 
enjoys,  and  which  renders  him  more  patient ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  some  previous  circumstances  that  may  have 
increased  his  susceptibility,  even  the  sallies  of  a  wild  gaiety, 
or  a  simple  dispute  of  words,  though  conducted  with  cour- 
tesy, strongly  dispose  him  to  transports  of  passion.  Still,  as 
long  as  drunkenness  does  not  exceed  the  first  degree,  the 
passions  can  be  repressed.  In  the  second  degree  of  drunk- 
enness a  man  has  still  the  use  of  his  senses,  though  they  are 
remarkably  enfeebled;  but  he  is  entirely  beside  himself, 
memory  and  judgment  having  abandoned  him.  He  acts  as  if 
he  lived  only  for  the  present,  with  no  idea  of  the  consequences 


448  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  his  actions,  nor  their  relations  to  one  another.  The 
past  has  gone  from  his  mind,  and  he  cannot  be  influenced  by 
considerations  which  he  no  longer  remembers.  He  conducts 
himself  as  if  no  control  over  his  actions  were  necessary.  The 
slightest  provocation  is  sufficient  to  awaken  the  most  un- 
bounded rage.  He  is,  therefore,  not  unlike  the  maniac,  and 
can  be  responsible  for  his  actions  only  so  far  as  he  is  for  his 
drunkenness.  In  the  last  degree,  he  not  only  loses  the  pos- 
session of  his  reason,  but  his  senses  are  so  enfeebled,  that 
he  is  no  longer  conscious  of  his  external  relations.  In  this 
condition  he  is  more  dangerous  to  himself  than  to  others. 

§  449.  In  the  first  stage  of  drunkenness,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  legal  relations  of  the  individual  cannot  be  affected, 
inasmuch  as  he  has  lost  none  of  the  ordinary  soundness  of 
his  judgment.  In  the  second  and  third  stages,  so  much  is 
the  soundness  of  his  understanding  and  clearness  of  his  per- 
ceptions impaired,  and  his  passions  excited,  that  he  acts 
more  or  less  unconsciously  and  without  deliberation.  But 
since  drunkenness  is  itself  a  sin,  it  becomes  a  question,  how 
far  a  person's  liability  for  the  consequences  of  his  acts  in 
that  state,  can  be  affected  by  a  condition  which  is  itself 
utterly  inexcusable. 

§  450.  The  common  law  of  England  has  shown  but  little 
disposition  to  afford  relief  from  any  of  the  immediate  con- 
sequences of  drunkenness,  either  in  civil  or  criminal  cases. 
It  has  never  considered  mere  drunkenness  alone  a  sufficient 
reason  for  invalidating  a  deed  or  agreement,  except  when 
carried  to  that  excessive  degree  which  deprives  the  party  of 
all  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing.  Courts  of  equity, 
also,  have  strenuously  refused  their  relief  in  moderate  drunk- 
enness, unless  it  were  procured  by  the  contrivance  of  the 
other  party,  or  were  made  the  means  of  obtaining  some 
unfair  advantge.1  The  general  doctrine  to  be  derived  from 
modern  English  decisions  is,  first,  that  moderate  drunken- 
ness does  not  necessarily  deprive  the  mind  of  the  power  of 
rational  consent,  is  not  always  apparent  to  others,  and  ought 

1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,  1,  §  232. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  449 

not,  of  itself,  to  avoid  any  deed  or  contract ;  secondly,  that 
inasmuch  as  excessive  drunkenness  deprives  a  person,  more 
or  less,  of  the  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing,  and  is 
perfectly  obvious  to  every  one,  all  acts  executed  while  in 
this  condition  may  be  avoided  at  law  on  the  ground  of  in- 
competency,  and  in  equity,  on  that  of  fraud.  Nothing,  cer- 
tainly, can  be  fairer  than  this,  since  it  equally  guards  the 
interests  of  the  drunken  party,  and  of  those  who  deal  with 
him.  In  this  country,  the  English  practice  has  been  fol- 
lowed,1 and  in  France  the  courts  have  been  governed  by 
similar  views.2  Writers  on  natural  and  public  law  have 
regarded  drunkenness  under  any  circumstances,  as  a  sufficient 
cause  for  avoiding  any  acts  that  may  have  been  executed 
under  its  influence,  upon  the  principle  that  the  free  and 
deliberate  consent  of  the  understanding  is  essential  to  the 
validity  of  such  acts.8 

§  451.  It  is  the  legal  relations  of  drunkenness  in  regard 
to  criminal  aqts,  however,  which  more  particularly  require 
our  attention.  A  remarkable  diversity  of  views  has  pre- 
vailed on  this  point  at  different  times  and  among  different 
nations,  and  it  would  certainly  be  a  curious,  if  not  useful 
inquiry,  to  investigate  the  peculiar  circumstances  that  have 
given  rise  to  it.  Respecting  the  principles  and  practice  of 
the  ancient  Greeks  on  this  subject,  we  know  but  little  more 
than  that  Solon  condemned  to  death  a  drunken  Archon  ;  and 
that  by  a  law  of  Pittacus,  he  who  committed  a  crime  when 
drunk,  was  to  receive  a  double  punishment,  —  one  for  the 
crime  itself,  another  for  the  drunkenness  in  consequence  of 
which  it  was  committed.4  The  Roman  law  contains  no 
general  provision  on  the  subject,  but  in  practice  it  had  the 
effect  of  depriving  a  criminal  act  of  the  quality  of  malicious 
intention,  and  thus  lessening  the  amount  of  punishment.5 

1  Amer.  Jurist,  xxL  6. 

2  Pothier,  Traite  des  Oblig.  by  Evans,  26. 

3  Puffendorf,  Law  of  Nat.  and  Nat.  ch.  4,  §  8. 

*  Bruning's  Compend.  antiquatat.  graecar.  C.  2,  p.  20. 
5  Mittermaier,  Effect  of  Drunkenness  upon  criminal  responsibility.     Amer. 
Jurist,  xxiii.    For  the  following  notices  of  the  law  of  Germany  on  this  sub- 

38* 


450  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

In  the  canon,  imperial,  and  common  criminal  law  of  Ger- 
many, drunkenness  was  viewed  as  a  ground  of  extenuation, 
and  in  the  sixteenth  century,  writers  began-  to  distinguish  its 
various  kinds,  and  discriminate  between  their  legal  conse- 
quences. Excessive  drunkenness  was  regarded  as  exempting 
from  the  punishment  of  dolus,  intentional  injury,  though  not 
from  that  of  culpa,  fault ;  unless  it  were  intentional,  or  pre- 
ceded by  a  consciousness  that  it  might  lead  to  crime,  in 
which  case  it  was  to  have  no  exculpatory  effect.  When  not 
so  severe  as  to  deprive  the  subject  of  the  use  of  reason,  it 
was  to  receive  no  consideration.  These  views,  which  gradu- 
ally determined  the  German  practice,  prevailed  also  in  the 
practice  of  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  Holland,  and  the  Nether- 
lands. 

§  452.  Modern  legislation,  in  Germany,  remains  true  to 
the  old  practice  on  the  subject  of  drunkenness.  In  the  Aus- 
trian code  of  1803,  §  2,  lit.  c,  it  is  made  a  ground  of  exculpa- 
tion from  responsibility,  when  not  produced  with  a  view  of 
committing  the  crime.  In  the  Prussian  Landrecht,  p.  ii.  tit. 
20,  §  22,  it  is  intimated,  that  a  criminal  act,  committed  in  a 
state  of  drunkenness  which  originates  in  fault,  is  punishable 
for  the  fault  only  ;  and  a  case  has  been  mentioned,  where  a 
man  who  killed  his  child  in  a  drunken  fit,  was  punished  by 
only  one  year's  imprisonment.  In  the  Bavarian  code,  art. 
121,  "inculpable  disorder  of  the  senses,  or  of  the  under- 
standing," which  includes  drunkenness,  is  mentioned  as  one 
of  the  grounds  that  exempt  from  responsibility.  But  if  it  be 
intentional,  and  for  the  purpose  of  committing  the  crime,  the 
code  expressly  declares,  art.  40,  that  it  shall  be  no  ground  of 
exculpation.  In  the  revised  project  of  the  Bavarian  code  of 
1827,  art.  67,  the  above-quoted  language  is  retained,  with  the 
exception  of  the  word  "  inculpable."  The  Hanover  project, 
art.  99,  contains  the  words  of  the  code,  with  the  following 
additional  clause,  —  "  namely,  in  cases  of  the  highest  degree 


ject,  we  are  also  indebted  to  this  article,  in  which  the  subject  of  drunkenness 
in  connection  with  crime,  is  amply  and  ably  discussed  in  the  spirit  of  a 
learned  and  enlightened  jurisprudence. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  451 

of  inculpable  drunkenness."  Drunkenness  is  also  mentioned 
generally  as  a  ground  of  extenuation,  art.  109.  The  Zurich 
project  of  1829,  art.  159,  declares  that  one  who  commits  a 
crime,  in  a  state  of  inculpable  drunkenness  of  the  highest 
degree,  is  punishable  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  under 
legal  age. 

§  453.  Very  different  from  this  has  been  the  legislation 
of  France,"  England,  and  Scotland,  into  which  these  milder 
views  of  the  legal  consequences  of  drunkenness  have  never 
been  suffered  to  enter.  In  France,  an  ordinance  of  Francis  I. 
declares  that  it  shall  not  in  any  case  absolve  from  the  ordi- 
nary punishment  of  crime.  In  the  present  penal  code  of 
that  country,  drunkenness  is  not  mentioned,  expressly  or  by 
implication,  as  a  ground  of  exculpation.  Accordingly  in 
1837,  the  court  of  cassation,  which  is  the  highest  in  the  king- 
dom and  receives  appeals  from  all  other  courts,  formally 
decided  that  drunkenness  being  a  voluntary  and  reprehensi- 
ble state,  could  never  constitute  a  legal  or  moral  excuse. 
Many  eminent  French  jurists,  however,  have  lamented  the 
deficiencies  of  the  code  on  this  subject,  and  contended  for 
the  introduction  of  milder  principles.  It  has  even  been  con- 
tended that  the  penal  code,  art.  64,  which  declares  insanity, 
without  distinction  of  any  kind,  to  be  a  ground  of  entire  ex- 
culpation, would  justify  the  admission  of  drunkenness  which 
produces  a  temporary  insanity,  among  the  grounds  of  exten- 
uation. Within  a  few  years,  juries  have  availed  themselves 
of  the  suggestion,  although  in  affording  relief  in  the  only 
way  they  could,  that  is,  acquitting  the  accused  altogether, 
they  have  certainly  gone  too  far.  In  the  case  of  J.  M.  Erion, 
mentioned  by  Georget,1  who  was  tried  for  an  assault  on  his 
mother,  he  being  intoxicated  at  the  time,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury  was,  that  he  was  guilty,  but  acted  involuntarily.  Con- 
sequently, he  was  discharged  in  virtue  of  the  364th  art.  of  the 
code  of  criminal  instruction,  viz. :  "  The  court  will  discharge 
the  accused  if  the  act  for  which  he  is  indicted  is  not  pro- 

1  Discussion  medicolegale,  23. 


452  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

hibited  by  any  penal  law." 1  In  another  case,  the  jury 
returned  that  the  accused  "was  guilty,  but  acted  without 
discernment  and  without  will."2 

§  454.  In  England  drunkenness  has  never  been  admitted 
as  a  ground  of  extenuation  for  any  offences  committed  under 
its  influence.  "  A  drunkard  who  is  voluntarius  demo,  hath 
no  privilege  thereby,"  said  a  learned^  expounder  of  the  com- 
mon law;  "whatever  ill  or  hurt  he  doth,  his  drunkenness 
doth  aggravate  it."  8  It  is  not  strictly  true,  however,  that 
drunkenness  is  an  aggravating  circumstance  when  attending 
the  commission  of  real  offences.  It  may  be  said  more  cor- 
rectly, that  it  has  no  legal  effect  whatever,  on  any  offence 
which  it  accompanies ;  it  neither  modifies  its  nature,  nor 
increases  its  penalties.  Nothing  can  be  farther  from  the 
spirit  of  English  jurisprudence  than  the  idea  that  drunken- 
ness, unless  produced  by  force  or  fraud,  should  afford  any 
relief  from  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime.  Owing  to 
the  exclusive  influence  of  this  spirit,  few  are  able  to  contem- 
plate the  milder  views  that  have  prevailed  in  some  parts  of 
Europe,  with  any  other  than  feelings  of  deep  distrust  and 
aversion.  The  inevitable  consequence  thereof,  it  is  alleged, 
is  to  increase  the  temptations  to  crime,  and  to  obliterate 
some  of  the  most  important  distinctions  of  morality.  To 
one  who  comes  to  the  examination  of  this  subject  with  an 
unbiased  and  inquiring  mind,  it  certainly  is  not  very  obvio.us 

1  The  apparent  want  of  connection  between  the  discharge  of  the  accused 
and  the  provisions  of  this  article,  is  to  be  explained  by  a  difference  of  pro- 
cedure in  French  and  English  courts.     The  former,  unlike  the  latter,  permit 
the  jury  in  criminal  as  well  as  civil  cases,  to  render  a  special  verdict,  and 
accordingly  they  found  Erion  guilty  of  the  assault,  but  that  having  "  acted 
involuntarily,  he  was  guilty  of  no  crime"  and  was  entitled  to  a  discharge  from 
the  court,  as  much  as  if  he  had  been  found  by  the  same  verdict,  guilty 
of  the  assault,  but  deranged,  and  not  acting  voluntarily.     The  law  makes  no 
man  responsible  for'  an  involuntary  act,  and  drunkenness  is  not  recognized 
as  a  circumstance  that  deprives  acts  of  this  quality,  which  are  committed 
under  its  influence. 

2  Gazette  des  Tribunaux,  1828,  nr.  839. 

3  Thomas's  Coke's  Littleton,  46. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES   OP  DRUNKENNESS.  453 

how  the  views  in  question  lead  only  to  mischief.  The  ap- 
prehension that  men  would  intentionally  make  themselves 
drunk  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a  crime  with  impunity, 
has  hardly  the  shadow  of  a  foundation.  In  the  first  place, 
the  existence  of  the  previous  intention  is  liable  to  be  de- 
tected ;  and  again,  if  the  accused  be  successful  in  concealing 
it,  and  his  plea  is  admitted,  still,  at  the  very  least,  the  pen- 
alty would  probably  be  severe,  for  the  drunkenness  is  merely 
a  ground  of  exculpation.  We  do  not  apprehend,  therefore, 
that  men  would  abandon  the  ordinary  method  of  committing 
crime,  in  secrecy  and  silence,  for  one  that  is  sure  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  severe  punishment  —  perhaps  the  very  punishment 
they  would  avoid. 

455.  While  we  are  far  from  believing  that  these  milder 
views  manifest  too  much  indulgence  to  drunkenness,  we  have 
no  hesitation  in  saying  that  English  jurisprudence  has  erred 
most  widely  in  the  other  direction.  The  whole  theory  of  the 
English  law  in  regard  to  drunkenness,  is  founded  on  the  fallacy, 
that  because  the  act  of  drinking  is  voluntary,  the  person  is 
responsible  for  whatever  actions  it  may  lead  him  to  commit. 
An  act  that  unintentionally  leads  to  the  commission  of 
crime,  is  thus  confounded  with  such  as  are  deliberately 
designed  to  have  this  effect,  —  the  distinction  being  utterly 
overlooked  between  what  the  law  calls  culpa  and  dolus,  fault 
and  intentional  injury  or  crime.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive 
why  such  a  confusion  of  moral  and  legal  distinctions  should 
be  —  not  overlooked  —  but  actually  acknowledged  and  de- 
fended, even  at  the  present  day.  An  essential  element  of 
crime  is  the  previous  intention,  and  unless  the  criminal  act 
be  accompanied  by  wrong  intention,  the  author  thereof  is 
regarded  by  the  laws  of  all  civilized  people,  and  even  by  the 
English  law,  except  in  a  few  instances,  as  guilty  of  culpa,  not 
of  dolus.  We  are  not  satisfied  that  there  should  be  an  ex- 
ception to  this  principle,  in  the  case  of  drunkenness.  If  a 
person  who  enters  a  stable  with  a  lighted  candle  not  proper- 
ly protected,  and  carelessly  drops  it  into  a  hay-mow,  where- 
by the  building  is  destroyed,  is  not  deemed  guilty  of  arson, 


454  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

no  more  should  one  who,  in  a  fit  of  drunkenness,  kills  a  fel- 
low being  without  any  previous  intention  so  to  do,  be  deem- 
ed guilty  of  murder.  True,  the  fault  of  drunkenness  is  far 
greater  than  that  of  carelessness,  and  consequently  should  be 
punished  with  proportionate  severity ;  but  the  difference  is 
one  merely  of  degree.  The  doctrine  of  the  common  law 
would  have  a  shadow  of  support,  if  drunkenness  were  really 
a  crime  of  some  magnitude ;  but  it  is  not  so  regarded  by  the 
laws  of  England,  and  in  most  parts  of  this  country  it  is  no 
crime  at  all.  The  free,  unembarrassed  use  of  the  reasoning 
powers  is  essential  to  responsibility ;  but  while  the  contrary 
condition  of  these  powers  in  insanity  absolves  its  subjects 
from  the  legal  consequences  of  crime,  it  is  not  permitted  to 
have  the  same  effect  when  produced  and  accompanied  by 
drunkenness.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  a  sufficient  reason  for 
this  distinction,  that  in  the  latter  case,  the  loss  of  moral  lib- 
erty is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  party,  while  in  the  former  it 
is  the  effect  of  disease.  In  the  first  place,  the  only  object 
which  the  drunkard  has  in  view,  is  animal  enjoyment ;  for 
the  loss  of  his  reason,  though  a  certain  result,  is  not  the  mo- 
tive for  his  indulgence  ;  and,  secondly,  the  very  insanity  which 
is  admitted  in  excuse  for  crime,  may  be,  as  in  a  very  large 
proportion  of  cases  it  really  is,  the  result  of  habits  of  drunk- 
enness in  which  the  party  has  voluntarily  persisted.  Where 
the  moral  guilt  is  very  nearly,  if  not  precisely  equal,  it  seems 
unjust  that  the  legal  consequences  should  differ  so  widely,  as 
they  do  in  regard  to  criminal  acts  according  as  they  are  com- 
mitted under  the  influence  of  drunkenness,  or  of  that  insanity 
which  may  be  one  of  its  direct  results. 

§  456.  Drunkenness,  in  reference  to  its  moral  and  legal 
character,  may  be  divided  into  three  kinds,  dolous  or  crimi- 
nal, culpable  and  inculpable.  Bearing  these  distinctions  in 
mind,  we  shall  be  able  to  arrive  at  more  accurate  notions  in 
regard  to  the  effect  which  this  condition  should  produce  on 
criminal  responsibility.  Dolous  drunkenness  is  that  which 
is  deliberately  produced  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a 
crime  while  under  its  influence,  and  is  generally  regarded 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF    DRUNKENNESS.  455 

as  affording  no  relief  from  the  ordinary  punishment  of  that 
crime.  Drunkenness  is  culpable  when,  though  knowingly 
produced,  it  is  accompanied  by  no  previous  criminal  inten- 
tion. Of  course  there  must  be  various  degrees  of  culpability, 
and  the  amount  of  punishment  they  severally  require,  must 
be  determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  The 
English  law,  however,  as  has  been  already  observed,  does 
not  admit  this  kind  of  drunkenness  as  a  ground  of  extenua- 
tion, though  it  would  seem  to  be  incompatible  with  one 
crime  at  least  with  which  drunkards  are  often  charged,  that 
of  murder,  as  denned  by  legal  authorities.  If,  previous  to 
the  drunken  fit,  there  were  no  design  nor  malice,  which  is 
essential  to  murder,  we  are  obliged  to  suppose  that  they 
arose  in  the  mind  after  it  had  been  brought  under  the  influ- 
ence of  drunkenness.  But  a  mind  which  has  lost  the  perfect 
use  of  its  reasoning  powers,  cannot,  without  an  unwarranted 
abuse  of  language,  be  deemed  guilty  of  originating  the  feel- 
ing of  malice.  Lawyers  have  occasionally  suspected  that  it 
is  going  too  far  to  attribute  malice  to  a  mind  under  the  influ- 
ence of  drunkenness,  but  their  doubts  have  never  been  suffer- 
ed to  affect  their  practice.  In  a  case  where  the  defendant 
was  tried  for  murder  committe4  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  and 
where  the  circumstances  precluded  the  idea  of  previous  in- 
tention, it  was  suggested  by  the  court,  as  worthy  the  con- 
sideration of  the  jury,  that,  "  as  drunkenness  clouds  the 
understanding  and  excites  passion,  it  may  be  evidence  of 
passion  only,  and  of  want  of  malice  and  design." :  It 
scarcely  needs  to  be  added  that  the  accused  was  convicted 
of  murder ;  or  that  an  eminent  jurist  in  commenting  on  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  should  characterize  it  as  "  rather  refined 
and  hazardous  speculation."  2  Juries,  however,  both  in  this 
country  and  England,  are  beginning  to  think  otherwise. 
Thomas,  lately  tried  in  New  Hampshire,  for  the  same  offence 
committed  while  drunk,  was  found  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
second  degree.3  In  some  recent  trials  in  England,  the  court 


1  Pennsylvania  v.  McFall,  Addison's  Rep.  257. 

2  American  Jurist,  xxi.  7.  *  3  Zion's  Herald,  April  14,  1841. 


456  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

held  that  the  fact  of  drunkenness  had  an  important  bearing 
on  the  question  of  intention.1 

§  457.  Inculpable  drunkenness  is  that  which  occurs 
without  any  fault  in  the  party,  and  consequently  renders 
him  irresponsible  for  whatever  acts  he  may  commit,  while 
under  its  influence.  The  common  law  recognizes  but  two 
ways  in  which  it  can  be  produced,  viz.,  by  "  the  unskilful- 
ness  of  the  physician,  or  the  contrivance  of  enemies."  2  It 
appears  to  us,  that  it  may  also  be  produced  in  at  least  two 
other  ways ;  by  the  party's  having  drank  no  more  liquor 
than  he  had  habitually  taken  without  being  intoxicated,  but 
which,  from  some  cause  unknown  to  him  at  the  time,  was 
much  stronger  than  usual;  or  which,  without  any  change 
in  its  quantity  or  quality,  exerts  an  unusually  potent  effect  on 
the  brain,  in  consequence  of  certain  pathological  conditions. 
This  latter  kind  of  inculpable  drunkenness,  is  not  an  uncom- 
mon occasion  of  crime,  but  in  English  and  American  courts, 
it  has  never,  that  I  am  aware  of,  been  admitted  in  exten- 
uation of  punishment.  The  following  passage  contains  in 
a  few  words,  the  spirit  of  the  law  on  this  subject.  "  There 
are  many  men,  soldiers,  who  have  been  severely  wounded, 
in  the  head  especially,  who  well  know  that  excess  makes 
them  mad ;  but  if  such  persons  wilfully  deprive  themselves 
of  reason,  they  ought  not  to  be  excused  one  crime  by  the 
voluntary  perpetration  of  another."  8  It  is  not  very  obvious 
how  that  can  be  properly  called  a  crime,  which  may  not  be 
once  mentioned  in  the  statute-book ;  nor,  if  it  be  a  crime, 
why  in  the  absence  of  any  legislative  enactment  on  the  sub- 
ject, it  should  be  visited  with  capital  punishment,  as  it  virtu- 
ally is  when  it  leads  to  a  capital  crime.  In  the  following 
cases,  we  have  instances  of  this  kind  of  drunkenness,  and  a 
practical  illustration  of  the  spirit  in  which  they  are  regarded. 

§  458.     William  M'Donough  was  tried  and  convicted,  on 

1  Reg.  v.  Cruse,  8  Carrington  and  Payne,  546.   Law  Times,  Sept.  27, 1845. 
p.  542. 

2  Russell  on  Crimes,  8. 

8  Paris  and  Fonblanque,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  iii. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  457 

an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts,  in  November,  1817.  It  appeared  in 
evidence,  that,  many  years  previous,  the  defendant  had  re- 
ceived a  severe  injury  of  the  head,  in  consequence  of  which, 
he  had  suffered  occasional  paroxysms  of  insanity,  though  the 
general  habit  of  his  mind  was  sound  and  clear.  It  appeared 
that  they  were  often  produced  by  intoxication,  and  there  was 
some  evidence  to  prove  that  they  sometimes  occurred,  uncon- 
nected with  any  apparent  exciting  cause.  In  one  of  these 
fits  of  insanity  induced  by  drinking,  and  while  actually  under 
the  influence  of  liquor,  he  murdered  his  wife.  The  court,  in 
its  charge  to  the  jury,  observed,  that  "  if  they  believed  the 
prisoner  was  in  a  fit  of  lunacy  when  he  committed  the 
act,  he  should  be  acquitted;  but  if  they  believed  he  was 
of  sound  mind,  or  if  his  reason  was  impaired,  and  that  it 
was  caused  by  intoxication  only,  the  fact  being  proved 
and  no  palliating  circumstances  existing,  he  must  be  con- 
victed." 1  If,  in  using  this  language,  the  court  had  in  view 
any  circumstance  that  might  be  deemed  to  be  of  a  palliating 
character,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  it  was,  unless  it  were  the 
pathological  condition  resulting  from  the  injury  of  the  head, 
which  rendered  him  peculiarly  susceptible  to  the  effects  of  ar- 
dent spirits.  If  the  court  actually  did  consider  this  a  palliat- 
ing circumstance,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  its  language  was 
not  more  explicit  on  this  point.  It  is  very  probable,  that  in 
this  case  also,  the  jury  were  considerably  influenced  by  the 
character  of  the  exciting  cause  of  M'Donough's  insanity.  If 
it  had  been  testified,  that,  instead  of  getting  drunk,  he  was 
in  the  habit  of  attending  religious  meetings,  where  warm  and 
pungent  appeals  were  addressed  to  his  feelings ;  that  the  ex- 
citement thus  produced  occasionally  degenerated  into  a  fit 
of  madness,  in  one  of  which  he  killed  his  wife,  the  jury 
would  have  acquitted  him  without  leaving  their  seats.  Yet 
the  essential  condition  of  guilt  would  have  been  the  same 
as  in  the  case  that  actually  happened.  "  The  voluntary  use 
of  a  stimulus,"  as  it  is  expressed  by  Dr.  Beck,  "which  he 

1  Trial  of  William  M'Donough  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  65. 
39 


458  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

was  well  aware  would  disorder  his  mind,  fully  placed  him 
under  the  purview  of  the  law."  *  It  is  not  a  satisfactory  reply 
to  this  objection,  that,  in  the  one  case,  the  exciting  cause  is,  in 
itself,  of  a  commendable  character,  while  in  the  other,  it  is  in 
the  highest  degree  sinful  and  pernicious.  Drunkenness  in  it- 
self, is  not  by  law  a  crime ;  and  though  the  moral  sense  of 
the  community  at  the  present  day  condemns  even  the 
moderate  use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  it  must  be  recollected 
that  twenty  years  ago,  and  especially  in  the  class  to  which 
M'Donough  belonged,  such  use  was  generally  considered, 
not  only  harmless,  but  absolutely  necessary  to  the  bodily 
health.  Had  he  not  labored  under  this  peculiar  irritability 
of  the  brain,  it  is  not  supposed  that  the  bloody  act  would 
have  been  committed  or  even  thought  of,  so  that  M'Donough 
was  virtually  convicted  for  the  consequences  of  a  bodily  in- 
firmity. 

459.  The  following  case,  related  by  Georget,  presents  us 
with  another  striking  illustration  of  mental  disorder  excited 
by  the  use  of  spirituous  liquors.  Vatelot,  a  gendarme,  while 
passing  the  Place  Louis  Quinze,  suddenly  struck  the  Sieur 
Chardon  with  his  sabre.  The  latter  turned  round,  and  see- 
ing a  stranger  brandishing  a  sabre  over  his  head,  asked  if  he 
knew  him,  and  what  he  meant.  "  I  know  you,"  replied 
Vatelot,  "  you  are  mine  enemy,  and  I  will  give  it  to  you." 
At  the  same  moment  he  aimed  at  him  another  blow,  and 
after  pursuing  him  awhile  with  his  drawn  sword,  left  him. 
He  soon  met  the  Sieur  Bellon  whom  he  struck  on  the  head, 
and  aimed  two  blows  at  Sieur  Avenel  who  accompanied 
Bellon.  The  Sieur  Beaupied  who  ran  to  their  assistance, 
and  another  person  who  never  injured  him,  he  also  threaten- 
ed ;  and  finally,  observing  a  young  lady  standing  at  her  door, 
he  struck  her  over  the  head  with  his  sabre,  and  then  fled. 
On  trial  before  the  court  of  assizes  at  Paris,  he  denied  the 
facts,  and  admitted  that  he  had  been  drinking,  but  was  not 

1  1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  811.  In  this  the  last  edition  of  his  work,  how- 
ever, the  Doctor  observes,  that  in  using  the  language  above  quoted,  he  has 
"  probably  expressed  himself  too  strongly,  in  a  medical  point  of  view,"  and 
seems  inclined  to  retract  his  approval  of  the  verdict  of  the  jury. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  459 

drunk.  He  was  convicted  of  homicide  committed  volun- 
tarily but  without  premeditation,  and  condemned  to  hard 
labor  for  life.1 

§  460.  The  homicidal  acts  of  Vatelot  obviously  have  all 
the  characteristics  that  distinguish  those  committed  by  furi- 
ous maniacs.  "  He  attacked  indiscriminately  all  whom  he 
met,"  said  the  court,  "  and  made  four  successive  attempts  at 
homicide,  without  being  moved  by  any  of  the  passions 
characteristic  of  crime,  but  in  consequence  of  a  fatal  phrensy 
which  impelled  him  to  the  shedding  of  blood  whenever  an 
opportunity  offered."  One  of  the  elements  of  guilt  in 
M'Donough's  case  is  wanting  in  this ;  for  it  does  not  appear 
that  strong  drink  had  ever  produced  a  fit  of  insanity  before, 
and  thus  it  could  not  be  urged  that  Vatelot  sinned  against 
the  light  of  his  own  experience.  If  he  had  not  drank  enough 
to  intoxicate  him  under  ordinary  circumstances,  he  had  done 
nothing  which  the  law  or  public  opinion  recognized  to  be 
wrong,  and  there  was  not  a  shadow  of  justice  in  rejecting 
his  plea  of  insanity.  Even  if  he  had,  are  we  to  make  no 
distinction,  as  Georget  forcibly  inquires,  between  a  drunken 
person  who  commits  a  crime  from  motives  of  interest,  such 
as  theft,  or  to  gratify  a  criminal  passion  existing  before  the 
intoxication,  and  one,  who  like  Vatelot,  becomes  a  murderer, 
without  interest,  without  motive,  without  any  rational  cause 
for  his  conduct  ? 

§  461.  We  shall  close  our  observations  on  this  form  of 
inculpable  drunkenness,  with  a  couple  of  passages  from  re- 
cent writers.  "  If  either  the  insanity  has  supervened  from 
drinking,"  says  Mr.  Alison,  "without  the  panel's  having 
been  aware  that  such  an  indulgence  in  his  case  leads  to  such 
a  consequence ;  or  if  it  has  arisen  from  the  combination  of 
drinking  with  a  half  crazy  or  infirm  state  of  mind,  or  a  previ- 
ous wound  or  illness  which  rendered  spirits  fatal  to  his  intel- 
lect, to  a  degree  unusual  in  other  men,  or  which  could  not 
have  been  anticipated,  it  seems  inhuman  to  visit  him  with 
the  extreme  punishment  which  was  suitable  in  the  other  case. 

1  Discussion  Medico-Legale,  159. 


460  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

In  such  a  case,  the  proper  course  is  to  convict ;  but  in  con- 
sideration of  the  degree  of  infirmity  proved,  recommend  to 
the  royal  mercy."  l 

"  There  is  a  class  of  cases  in  which  persons  have  sustained 
injuries  to  the  head,  as  often  happens  with  soldiers  and  sail- 
ors, where  drunkenness,  even  when  existing  to  a  slight 
degree,  produces  sometimes  temporary  insanity,  and  leaves 
the  mind  in  possession  of  its  habitual  sanity  when  the 

drunken  fit  is  over Such  persons  certainly  ought  not 

to  undergo  the  same  punishment  as  sane  criminals,  unless 
the  crime  be  accompanied  by  many  circumstances  of  aggra- 
vation, and  the  plea  rest  rather  upon  suspicion  than  proof."  2 

§  462.  In  regard  to  the  effect  of  delirium  tremens  on  re- 
sponsibility, we  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  the  principles 
and  practice  of  English  courts.  Those  of  our  own  courts 
will  be  best  exhibited  by  presenting  a  few  of  the  cases  that 
have  been  tried. 

§  463.  At  the  May  term,  in  1828,  of  the  Circuit  Court  of 
the  United  States,  Alexander  Drew,  commander  of  the 
whaling  ship  John  Jay,  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
second  mate,  Charles  F.  Clark.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  previously  to  the  voyage  during  which  this  fatal  act 
occurred,  Drew  had  sustained  a  fair  character,  and  was  a 
man  of  humane  and  benevolent  disposition,  though  addicted 
to  the  excessive  use  of  ardent  spirits.  After  recovering  from 
a  drunken  debauch,  in  the  latter  part  of  August,  1827,  he 
resolved  to  drink  no  more,  and  all  the  liquor  on  board  of  the 
ship  was  thrown  overboard.  In  two  or  three  days  after,  he 
lost  his  appetite,  was  unable  to  sleep,  and  manifested  various 
hallucinations.  He  thought  the  crew  had  conspired  to  kill 
him,  and  expressed  great  fear  of  an  Indian  belonging  to  the 
ship,  calling  him  by  name  when  not  present,  and  promising 
that  he  would  drink  no  more  rum,  if  he  would  not  kill  him. 
Sometimes  he  would  sing  obscene  songs,  and  sometimes 
hymns,  and  would  pray  and  swear  alternately.  In  the  night 

1  Principles  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  654. 

2  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  x.  161. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  461 

of  the  31st  August,  he  went  on  deck,  and  attempted  to  throw 
himself  overboard,  but  was  restrained  by  the  witness.  At 
seven  o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  September  1st,  while  the  wit- 
ness, Drew,  and  Clark,  were  at  breakfast,  Drew  suddenly  left 
the  table,  and  appeared  to  conceal  something  under  his  jacket 
which  was  on  the  transom  in  another  part  of  the  cabin.  He 
immediately  turned  round  to  Clark,  and  requested  him  to  go 
upon  deck.  The  latter  replied  that  he  would  when  he  should 
have  finished  his  breakfast.  Drew  then  exclaimed, "  go  upon 
deck,  or  I  will  help  you ; "  and  immediately  took  a  knife  that 
had  been  covered  over  by  his  jacket,  and  before  another  word 
was  spoken  by  either,  he  plunged  it  into  the  right  side  of 
Clark's  breast.  Clark  fell  instantly,  but  soon  afterwards  rose 
and  went  upon  deck.  As  the  witness  left  the  cabin,  Drew 
cocked  his  pistol,  pointed  it  at  him  and  snapped  it,  but  it 
missed  fire.  Drew  followed  them  upon  deck,  and,  address- 
ing the  mate,  said,  "  Mr.  Coffin,  in  twenty-four  hours  the  ship 
shall  go  ashore."  He  was  then  seized  and  confined.  His 
whole  demeanor,  for  some  weeks  after,  was  that  of  an  insane 
person.  When  he  first  appeared  to  be  in  his  right  mind  he 
was  informed  of  Clark's  death  and  its  cause ;  he  replied  that 
he  knew  nothing  about  it ;  that,  when  he  awoke  he  found 
himself  handcuffed,  and  that  it  appeared  to  him  like  a  dream. 
It  also  appeared  that  there  had  not  been  for  months  any 
quarrel  between  Clark  and  Drew. 

§  464.  After  hearing  the  witness  who  testified  the  above 
facts,  the  court  interposed,  and  through  Mr.  Justice  Story, 
delivered  its  opinion,  that  on  these  admitted  facts  the  indict- 
ment could  not  be  maintained,  because  the  prisoner  was  un- 
questionably insane  at  the  time  of  committing  the  offence. 
"  The  question  made  at  the  bar,"  continued  the  court,  "  is 
whether  insanity,  whose  remote  cause  is  habitual  drunken- 
ness, is,  or  is  not  an  excuse  in  a  court  of  law,  for  a  homicide 
committed  by  the  party  while  so  insane,  but  not  at  the  time 
intoxicated  or  under  the  influence  of  liquor.  We  are  clearly 
of  opinion  that  insanity  is  a  competent  excuse  in  such  a 
case.  In  general,  insanity  is  an  excuse  for  any  crime,  be- 
cause the  party  has  not  the  possession  of  his  reason,  which 

39* 


462  MEDICAL  JUEISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

includes  responsibility.  An  exception  is,  when  the  crime  is 
committed  while  the  party  is  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  and 
while  it  lasts ;  and  not,  as  in  this  case,  a  remote  consequence, 
superinduced  by  the  antecedent  exhaustion  of  the  party  aris- 
ing from  gross  and  habitual  drunkenness.  However  criminal, 
in  a  moral  point  of  view,  such  an  indulgence  is,  and  however 
justly  a  party  may  be  responsible  for  his  acts  arising  from  it 
to  Almighty  God,  human  tribunals  are  generally  restricted 
from  punishing  them,  since  they  are  not  the  acts  of  a  reason- 
able being.  Had  the  crime  been  committed  when  Drew  was 
in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  he  would  have  been  liable  to  be  con- 
victed of  murder.  As  he  was  not  then  intoxicated  but 
merely  insane  from  an  abstinence  from  liquor,  he  cannot  be 
pronounced  guilty  of  the  offence.  The  law  looks  to  the  im- 
mediate, and  not  to  the  remote  cause,  to  the  actual  state  of 
the  party,  and  not  to  the  cause  which  remotely  produced  it. 
Many  species  of  insanity  arise  remotely  from  what  in  a  moral 
point  of  view,  is  a  criminal  neglect  or  fault  of  the  party  ;  as 
from  religious  melancholy,  undue  exposure,  extravagant 
pride,  ambition,  etc. ;  yet  such  insanity  has  always  been 
deemed  a  sufficient  excuse  for  any  crime  done  under  its 
influence."  The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  not  guilty.1 

§  465.  At  a  term  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  York  county, 
Me.,  April,  1836,  Theodore  Wilson  was  tried  for  the  murder 
of  his  wife  in  June,  1835,  at  Kittery.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, that  for  several  years  Wilson  had  been  addicted  to  in- 
temperate drinking ;  that  on  the  Saturday  previous  to  the  mur- 
der, he  had  brought  some  rum  from  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  and 
that  on  the  next  day  he  had  drank  it  all.  It  did  not  appear 
that  he  drank  any  more  after  this,  and  circumstances  render 
it  probable  that  he  did  not.  There  was  nothing  strange  or 
unusual  in  his  conduct  till  Wednesday  morning,  when  he 
arose  early  and  went  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor  to  get  some 
barley  and  procure  a  person  to  sow  it  for  him.  He  returned 
home  about  six  o'clock,  and  then  complained  of  being  sick. 
His  wife  assisted  him  to  undress,  and  he  lay  down,  saying 

1  3  American  Jurist,  7-9 ;  5  Mason's  Reports,  28. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  463 

that  he  was  dying.  In  the  mean  time  he  complained  that 
his  wife  would  do  nothing  for  him ;  that  she  had  often  set 
traps  for  him,  and  once  put  fire  and  wood  into  the  oven  to 
burn  him  up.  He  ate  some  porridge  only  for  his  breakfast, 
was  constantly  talking,  and  among  other  things  spoke  of  his 
having  been  fishing  when  he  was  four  years  old.  While  the 
family  were  at  dinner,  he  rose  from  bed  and  walked  about  in 
great  agitation,  striking  the  walls  with  his  fists,  and  beating 
in  the  door  with  the  tongs.  As  he  became  >more  furious,  a 
woman  who  resided  with  him  at  this  time,  left  the  house, 
he  and  his  wife  then  being  the  only  persons  in  it.  A  short 
time  after,  he  was  seen  coming  out  the  house  stark  naked  ; 
and  in-  this  condition  he  walked  rapidly  down  the  road, 
throwing  up  his  arms,  and  making  a  wild  howling  noise,  and 
finally  lay  down  by  a  fence.  It  appeared  that  after  he  left 
the  house,  his  wife  went  to  one  of  the  neighbors  to  ask  his 
aid  in  getting  her  husband  back,  and  this  person  declining  to 
interfere,  she  went  alone.  As  she  approached  him  still  lying 
by  the  fence,  she  asked  him  why  he  was  lying  there  and 
making  such  a  noise.  He  immediately  sprang  up,  put  his 
hands  upon  her  shoulders,  threw  her  down  and  beat  out  her 
brains  with  a  stone.  He  then  left  the  body,  and  on  reaching 
a  house  near  by,  broke  in  the  windows  with  his  fists,  and 
also  struck  at  the  doors  and  side  of  the  house,  to  seal  it,  as* 
he  said,  with  his  wife's  blood.  Here  he  proclaimed  that  he 
had  killed  his  wife,  and  meant  to  kill  two  more ;  he  was  then 
arrested.  To  those  who  watched  with  him  during  the  night, 
he  declared  he  was  not  sorry  for  what  he  had  done,  but  was 
glad  of  it,  and  intended  to  have  done  it  before.  He  con- 
tinued furious,  talking  wildly  and  incoherently,  making 
unnatural  noises,  sleeping  none,  and  apparently  anxious  to 
kill  himself,  till  the  next  Saturday  morning,  when  he  became, 
and  remained,  rational.  It  further  appeared,  that  in  1830,  he 
went  on  a  fishing  voyage,  and,  that  being  deprived  of  spirits, 
he  became  deranged  after  three  days'  sailing,  and  had  to  be 
confined.  He  then  began  to  tear  his  clothes,  and  try  to  tear 
the  clothes  of  others.  He  complained  of  being  sick,  said  he 
should  die,  and  requested  the  captain  to  tell  his  sons  to  take 


464  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

care  of  their  mother.  He  was  afterwards  set  ashore  and  did 
not  go  on  the  voyage.  His  counsel  set  up  the  plea  of 
insanity  in  his  defence ;  and  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury, 
observed  that  it  was  not  material  for  them  to  determine  what 
species  of  insanity  it  was  under  which  the  prisoner  had  been 
suffering,  if  satisfied  with  the  fact  of  its  existence.  He  was 
acquitted.1 

§  466.  John  Birdsell  was  tried,  in  1829,  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Ohio,  on  an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  his  wife, 
on  Thursday,  5th  of  March,  1829.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  for  several  years  the  prisoner  had  indulged  in  fits  of  in- 
toxication, which,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  time,  had  been 
followed  by  delirium  tremens,  which  generally  lasted  for 
several  days,  and  went  off  spontaneously.  In  these  parox- 
ysms he  had  the  physical  and  moral  symptoms  that  usually 
characterize  the  disease.  Among  many  hallucinations  under 
which  he  labored,  the  prevailing  one  was,  that  his  wife  was 
in  combination  with  three  of  his  neighbors,  one  of  whom 
was  his  son  by  a  former  wife,  and  that  they  had  conspired 
to  take  his  life.  He  imagined  that  his  wife  had  a  criminal 
intimacy  with  these  persons,  and  even  threatened  to  kill  her 
if  she  did  not  desist.  On  the  Sunday  before  the  murder,  he 
drank  freely,  and  was  intoxicated;  in  which  condition  he 
was  quiet,  dull,  and  disposed  to  lie  in  bed.  Monday, 
*  Tuesday,  and  Wednesday,  presented  nothing  especial.  On 
Wednesday  evening  he  complained  to  a  neighbor  of  feeling 
unwell,  and  asked  his  son's  assistance  in  the  performance  of 
some  necessary  manual  labor  for  his  family.  He  seemed  to 
the  witness  to  be  rational.  During  the  night  he  slept  none, 
and  complained  of  cramp  in  the  stomach.  The  next  morn- 
ing his  family  thought  him  crazy,  but  were  not  alarmed,  as 
they  were  accustomed  to  such  attacks.  In  the  course  of  the 
day  he  took  an  axe,  and  walked  rapidly  to  the  house  of  a 
neighbor  whom  he  desired  to  go  home  with  him,  saying 
that  they  wanted  to  kill  him ;  and  about  the  same  time  he 

1  For  the  facts  in  this  case,  the  author  acknowledges  his  obligations  to 
Nathan  Dane  Appleton,  Esq.,  one  of  the  defendant's  counsel. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  465 

told  another  of  the  supposed  conspirators  that  he  overheard  his 
wife  and  him,  that  morning,  whispering  about  taking  his  [the 
witness's]  life.  He  spent  the  day  at  home  in  the  midst  of  his 
family,  apparently  in  agitation  and  terror  ;  but  said  he  would 
not  hurt  any  one,  and  did  not  wish  to  be  hurt.  He  also 
placed  an  axe  with  a  scythe  under  the  bed,  where  the  former 
was  often  kept.  He  manifested  jealousy  of  his  wife,  and 
told  her  to  act  better,  for  she  had  already  caused  the  death  of 
thirty  thousand  men.  He  fancied  that  the  persons  of  whom 
he  was  jealous  were  in  the  loft  manufacturing  ropes  to  hang 
him,  and  going  up,  returned,  saying  that  he  had  cut  the  ropes 
in  pieces,  and  brought  down  the  fragments  in  his  hands, 
though  he  had  nothing  in  them.  In  the  course  of  the  after- 
noon he  fastened  both  the  doors  of  his  house.  At  the  usual  I 
time  the  wife  went  out  to  milk,  and  he  barred  the  door  after  her. 
On  her  return,  he  fastened  it  again.  She  was  seated  near 
the  fire,  and  he  was  walking  the  room.  At  length  he  took 
the  axe  from  under  the  bed,  and  gave  the  fatal  blow,  follow- 
ing it  up  with  two  others  on  the  face.  His  eldest  daughter 
caught  the  axe,  which  he  yielded  up  ;  and  then  he  seized  the 
scythe,  with  which  he  attempted  to  strike  her.  She  defended  . 
herself  with  a  chair,  till  the  smaller  children  having  opened  the 
door,  she  escaped.  He  took  the  youngest  child  in  his  arms,  and 
sat  down  by  the  window.  The  child  complained,  "  Mamma 
bleeds ! "  which  he  said  made  him  feel  badly.  When  his 
neighbors  arrived,  immediately  afterwards,  he  gave  himself  up, 
acknowledged  what  he  had  done,  said  he  knew  he  should  be 
hanged  for  it,  but  that  he  ought  to  have  done  it  nine  months 
sooner ;  that  if  he  had  to  do  it  again,  he  would  strike  two 
blows  where  he  only  struck  one.  It  was  testified,  that  he 
talked  so  rationally,  that  many  of  the  witnesses  could  not 
believe  him  deranged ;  that  he  evinced  no  dread  of  punish- 
ment for  his  crime,  but  was  still  in  great  apprehension  from 
the  persons  who,  he  had  believed,  had  intended  to  kill  him ; 
and  that  he  was  glad  he  had  defeated  their  calculations.  On 
his  way  to  jail  he  talked  rationally  and  composedly  about  his 
affairs  and  various  other  subjects ;  but  frequently  asked  the 
guard  if  they  did  not  hear  sweet  sounds  of  different  kinds ; 


466  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and,  on  being  answered  in  the  negative,  insisted  he  could  not 
be  mistaken.  After  his  committal  he  became  rational,  and 
expressed  his  regret  at  what  he  had  done. 

§  467.  The  point  submitted  to  the  jury  for  their  deter- 
mination was,  whether  the  prisoner  was  capable  of  discrim- 
inating between  right  and  wrong.  They  concluded  that  he 
was,  and  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty.  In  consequence  of  a 
petition  from  a  number  of  persons  who  had  no  doubts  of 
Birdsell's  insanity,  the  punishment  was  commuted  by  the 
governor  to  that  of  imprisonment.  Previous  to  the  commu- 
tation, he  again  became  insane,  and  continued  so  perman- 
ently.1 

§  468.  The  essential  features  of  the  above  cases  being 
alike  in  every  thing  relative  to  their  pathological  nature,  we 
are  left,  without  any  satisfactory  reason  to  account  for  the 
issue  of  the  last.  It  is  probable  that  the  court  adhered  to 
the  antiquated  maxims  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject  of 
insanity,  and  that  the  jury  was  governed  by  the  opinions  of 
the  court,  or  relied,  with  that  confidence  which  ignorance 
usually  inspires,  on  their  own  crude  and  erroneous  notions. 
The  verdict  of  the  jury  in  Birdsell's  case  furnishes  another 
instance  of  the  deplorable  consequences  of  obliging  a  body 
of  men,  the  most  of  whom  are  utterly  unacquainted  with  the 
phenomena  of  insanity,  to  decide  the  question  of  its  exist- 
ence in  a  given  example,  and  with  it  the  fate  of  an  unfor- 
tunate fellow  being,  for  weal  or  woe,  here  and  hereafter. 
They  concluded  that  the  accused  was  capable  of  distinguish- 
ing right  from  wrong,  probably  because  others  who  knew  as 
little  of  insanity  as  themselves  testified,  that  immediately 
after  committing  the  murder,  "  he  talked  so  rationally  that 
they  could  not  believe  him  deranged ; "  and  on  such  a  con- 
clusion they  founded  their  fatal  verdict.  Of  course,  it  would 
have  been  too  violent  a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  have 
denied  the  existence  of  any  insanity  at  all  in  a  disease  whose 


1  This  case  was  reported,  and  the  medico-legal  questions  growing  out  of  it 
were  discussed  at  considerable  length  by  Dr.  Drake,  in  the  Western  Journal 
of  the  Medical  and  Physical  Sciences,  vol.  iii. ;  extracts  from  his  papers  may 
be  found  in  the  American  Jurist,  iii.  10-16. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  467 

very  name  is  delirium ;  but  it  appeared  that  the  prisoner  WE 
not  altogether  bereft  of  his  senses,  not  quite  reduced  to 
condition  of  a  brute  or  an  idiot.  Now,  without  resting  upon 
the  general  fact  that  the  mind  is  always  and  unequivocally 
deranged  in  delirium  tremens,  there  is  proof  enough  that 
various  hallucinations  took  possession  of  Birdsell's  mind, 
and  prompted  him  to  the  bloody  deed  for  which  he  was  coi 
demned ;  that  he  was  under  the  influence  of  manifest,  une- 
quivocal, strong,  delusion,  that  test  of  insanity  which,  when 
present,  never  deceives.  If  any  one,  on  being  made  ac- 
quainted with  the  particulars  of  Birdsell's  case,  can  pronounce 
it  not  to  be  insanity,  he  must  have  derived  his  notions  of 
this  disease  from  some  other  source  than  the  wards  of  the 
hospital  and  asylum. 

§  469.  In  the  first  two  cases,  the  directions  of  the  court  to 
the  jury  were,  substantially,  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the 
accused  was  insane  when  he  committed  the  criminal  act, 
that  they  were  not  to  go  back  and  inquire  into  the  cause  of 
insanity ;  but,  on  this  fact  being  established  in  their  minds, 
the  prisoner  was  entitled  to  an  acquittal.  In  the  first  case, 
the  court  examined  the  question  whether  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  insanity  are  affected  by  the  character  of  the  cause 
which  produced  it ;  and  so  clear  and  satisfactory  is  its  opin- 
ion, that  any  thing  further  on  this  point  is  rendered  unneces- 
sary here.  But  we  are  not  so  well  satisfied  with  its  distinc- 
tion between  the  insanity  which  is  the  remote  cause,  and 
that  which  is  the  immediate  effect  of-  drunkenness.  Where 
the  moral  guilt  is  so  nearly  alike,  as  it  certainly  is  in  the  two 
cases,  we  are  unable  to  perceive  the  justice  of  making  such 
a  fearful  difference  in  regard  to  their  legal  consequences. 
The  distinction  is  not  only  unjust,  but  we  apprehend  that 
there  would  often  be  no  little  difficulty  in  applying  it  to 
practice.  It  would  not  be  very  easy  to  determine  the  precise 
period  when  the  drunken  fit  is  over,  —  when  the  individual 
ceases  to  be  under  the  influence  of  the  intoxicating  liquor. 
A  case  is  related  by  Hitzig  in  which  this  difficulty  would 
have  been  experienced,  if  the  legal  consequences  of  the  act 
in  question  had  not  been  determined  by  very  different  princi- 


468  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

pies.  A  carpenter  in  Pregelswalde,  named  Thiel,  had  con- 
tracted such  a  propensity  for  drink,  that  he  finally  became  a 
dipsomaniac.  During  the  fits  he  would  continue  drunk  from 
eight  to  fifteen  days  together,  taking  no  food  in  the  mean 
time,  and  on  two  occasions,  he  continued  for  three  weeks  in 
a  complete  state  of  drunken  stupor.  While  the  fit  was  on 
him,  he  was  quiet,  taciturn,  and  peaceable,  and  during  the 
last  three  or  four  days,  extremely  stupid.  The  fit  that  occa- 
sioned the  criminal  act  with  which  he  was  charged,  began 
on  the  27th  of  May,  1824,  and  continued  till  the  2d  of  June, 
on  which  day  he  drank  less,  and  on  the  following  day,  (3d  of 
June,)  he  drank  only  one  glass  of  beer,  and  one  of  brandy. 
At  noon-time  he  assisted  his  wife  in  sawing  wood,  though 
she  had  to  tell  him  just  what  he  was  to  do.  In  the  evening 
he  slept  a  few  hours,  awoke,  walked  about,  and  finally  went 
to  bed  with  his  wife.  The  latter,  on  getting  out  of  the  bed 
for  the  purpose  of  going  to  the  window,  to  watch  some  cloth 
that  was  bleaching,  awoke  him  again.  Soon  after,  he  ex- 
perienced a  strong  sense  of  anxiety,  and  felt  a  trembling  over 
his  whole  body,  and  he  imagined  that  he  heard  an  inward 
voice  commanding  him  to  kill  his  youngest  child,  a  boy  of 
five  years  old,  who  with  two  older  children,  were  sleeping  in 
the  same  room.  After  a  while,  the  command  was  repeated 
so  peremptorily  that  he  could  no  longer  resist,  and  he  accord- 
ingly murdered  his  favorite  child.  Whether  at  this  moment 
he  was  under  the  direct  influence  of  the  liquor  he  had  drunk 
on  the  3d,  is  a  question  to  which  it  would  be  impossible  to 
give  a  satisfactory  answer.  In  the  present  case  it  was  not 
required,  for  drunkenness  being  regarded  by  the  German  law, 
as  an  extenuating  circumstance,  he  was  condemned  to  one 
year's  imprisonment,  and  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  prosecu- 
tion.1 

§  470.  In  Birdsell's  case  there  was  presented  a  new  fea- 
ture of  no  little  interest  to  the  medico-legal  student,  which, 
though  it  was  suffered  to  have  no  influence  on  the  verdict, 
might,  if  the  court  had  chosen  to  urge  its  opinion  respecting 

1  Henke's  Annalen,  viii.  186. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  469 

it  upon  the  jury,  have  prevented  an  acquittal,  even  if  they 
had  satisfied  themselves  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  party  was 
incapable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong.  In  replying 
to  the  arguments  of  counsel  for  a  new  trial,  the  court  ob- 
served in  the  course  of  its  remarks,  "that  they  were  not 
called  upon  to  give  an  opinion  whether  Mania  a  potu  would, 
under  any  circumstances,  be  an  excuse  for  the  commission 
of  a  crime ;  but  they  felt  no  unwillingness  to  express  their 
opinion,  that  if  the  insanity  were  the  offspring  of  intemper- 
ance, and  the  prisoner  knew  that  intoxication  would  produce 
it,  he  could  not  plead  it  as  an  apology."  Birdsell,  it  has 
been  seen,  had  experienced  several  fits  of  delirium  tremens 
following  his  drunken  debauches,  previous  to  that  in  which 
he  destroyed  his  wife,  and  consequently  knew  that  intoxica- 
tion would  b$  likely  to  produce  insanity.  How  far  this  fact 
changes  the  Attitude  of  the  case,  is  a  point  which  deserves 
a  careful  examination,  before  being  allowed  to  have  a  bear- 
ing on  judicial  decisions.  If  the  party  had  known  that,  in 
his  previous  attacks  of  delirium  tremens,  he  had  attempted 
the  life  of  his  wife,  then  indeed  this  opinion  would  not  have 
been  without  some  foundation ;  for  in  that  case,  perhaps,  he 
might  have  been  justly  held  responsible  for  whatever  crim- 
inal acts  he  committed  while  in  a  state  of  insanity,  just  so 
far  as  he  was  responsible  for  the  intoxication  that  produced 
it.  All  that  Birdsell  knew  on  this  subject,  however,  was, 
that  indulgence  in  drinking  having  frequently  occasioned 
delirium  tremens,  would  be  liable  to  produce  a  renewal  of 
its  attacks.  As  to  what  acts  he  might  commit  while  under 
their  influence,  he  knew  absolutely  nothing.  It  is  not  very 
clear  how  delirium  tremens  can  have  a  different  effect  on 
legal  responsibility,  from  that  which  would  follow  any  other 
form  of  mental  derangement  resulting  from  habits  of  intem- 
perance. If  Birdsell's  habits  had  led  to  attacks  of  common 
mania  instead  of  delirium  tremens,  his  guilt,  in  a  moral 
point  of  view,  would  certainly  have  been  no  less ;  nor,  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  court  that  insanity  is  no  apology  for 
crime,  if  the  party  knew  that  intoxication  would  produce  it, 
would  his  legal  responsibility  have  been  diminished.  It  does 

40 


470  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

not  appear,  however,  that  in  ordinary  cases  where  insanity  is 
pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  question  is  ever  raised 
whether  the  insanity  be  a  consequence  of  intemperate  drink- 
ing ;  and,  in  the  event  of  its  being  so,  whether  the  party  knew 
that  such  a  result  might  be  expected.  It  is  not  easy  to  resist 
the  impression,  that  the  opinion  of  the  court  against  the  ex- 
culpatory effects  of  Birdsell's  insanity  was  determined,  in 
some  measure,  by  the  reprehensible  character  of  its  cause. 
If  his  insanity  had  been  produced  by  mingling  in  scenes  of 
religious  excitement,  by  indulging  in  schemes  of  commercial 
speculation,  or  a  more  criminal  species  of  gambling,  would 
the  court  have  said  it  afforded  no  apology  for  crime,  because 
he  had  suffered  previous  attacks  in  consequence  of  exposure 
to  the  action  of  these  same  causes  ?  Probably  not ;  and  yet 
if  guilt  is  made  to  consist  in  disregarding  the  lessons  of 
experience  relative  to  the  manner  in  which  the  insanity  is 
produced,  then  the  nature  of  its  exciting  causes  is  clearly  an 
immaterial  circumstance.  In  short,  the  opinion  of  the  court 
of  Ohio  conflicts  with  the  principles  laid  down  by  Mr.  Justice 
Story  (§  464) ;  and  if  the  latter  be  admitted,  as  they  must  be 
undoubtedly  by  every  one,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  causes 
of  insanity,  the  former  is  untenable  for  a  moment,  and  there- 
fore it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  pursue  this  train  of  reflections 
any  farther. 

§  471.  Few  diseases  are  better  marked  than  delirium 
tremens,  yet  occasionally  it  is  not  easy  to  distinguish  it  from 
other  forms  of  mental  disturbance  directly  or  indirectly  pro- 
duced by  drinking.  The  importance  of  making  this  distinc- 
tion correctly,  was  recently  illustrated  in  the  trial  of  James 
McGlue,  for  the  murder  of  Charles  A.  Johnson,  in  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  held  at  Boston,  October  30,  1851.  It 
appeared  in  evidence  that  on  Thursday  the  15th  of  May, 
1851,  the  barque  Lewis  came  to  anchor  off  the  coast  of 
Zanzibar,  about  5  o'clock,  P.  M ;  and  that  immediately  after, 
McGlue,  who  was  second  mate  of  the  vessel,  without  any 
provocation  or  exchange  of  words,  rushed  upon  Johnson,  who 
was  chief  mate,  and  killed  him  with  the  sheath-knife  which 
sailors  usually  carry  at  their  side.  After  being  secured,  he 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  471 

was  very  restless,  rolled  about  the  deck,  laughed,  talked 
wildly  and  incoherently,  cursed  and  swore,  until  daylight  the 
next  morning,  when  he  came  to  himself,  and  was  greatly  sur- 
prised and  shocked  on  learning  what  he  had  done.  It  was 
obvious  enough  that  Me  Glue,  when  he  committed  the  act, 
was  laboring  under  some  kind  of  mental  disturbance  result- 
ing more  or  less  directly  from  intemperate  habits.  It  was  all- 
important  for  the  prisoner's  counsel  to  show  that  this  was 
delirium  tremens,  but  the  evidence  was  not  so  satisfactory  as 
it  might  have  been.  It  was  proved  that  on  the  Sunday 
previous  to  the  murder,  McGlue  drank  to  excess,  but  it  was 
not  quite  clear  that  he  had  not  drank  more  or  less,  up  to  the 
very  day  of  the  murder.  Between  Sunday  and  Thursday,  he 
was  described  as  looking  pale  and  stupid,  and  by  one  wit- 
ness, as  having  trembled,  but  he  performed  his  duty  without 
interruption.  On  Thursday  afternoon  he  talked  in  a  wild 
and  rambling  manner.  About  half  an  hour  before  the  fatal 
act,  he  asked  some  of  the  crew  if  they  wanted  to  make 
money,  and  to  their  inquiry  how  it  was  to  be  done,  he  replied, 
"  keep  a  hard  cheek  on  from  this  hour."  Immediately  after 
the  act,  he  said  he  was  captain  of  the  ship,  and  told  the  men 
to  arm  themselves  with  clubs,  handspikes,  etc.  He  told  the 
captain  to  give  up  the  command,  unless  he  wished  to  be 
killed  too.  It  was  clearly  established  that  he  did  not  sleep 
for  a  moment,  until  after  he  came  to  his  senses.  It  also 
appeared  that  McGlue  did  occasionally  drink  hard,  when  he 
seemed  to  the  witness  to  be  "  crazy,"  and  "  hallooing  like  a 
madman."  Several  medical  gentlemen  gave  their  opinions, 
as  experts,  all  of  whom  had  enjoyed  extraordinary  opportuni- 
ties for  witnessing  delirium  tremens.  While  some  were 
satisfied  that  McGlue  was  suffering  an  attack  of  that  disease, 
and  some  were  equally  satisfied  that  he  was  not,  all  were 
agreed  in  stating  it  as  one  of  the  results  of  their  experience, 
that  they  had  never  met  with  an  instance  of  recovery  from 
delirium  tremens,  prior  to  the  occurrence  of  sleep.  The  jury 
acquitted  the  prisoner,  and  their  verdict  could  not  well  have 
been  otherwise.  It  was  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
that  McGlue  was  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing  when 


472  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

he  committed  the  homicide,  or,  in  more  general  phrase,  was 
insane.  The  government  did  not  prove  —  as  they  were 
bound  to,  in  order  to  convict  the  prisoner  —  that  this  in- 
sanity was  the  direct  and  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness, 
and  therefore  the  prisoner's  plea  of  insanity  was  not  vitiated, 
though  his  counsel  failed  to  show  beyond  dispute,  that  his 
insanity  was  that  particular  indirect  effect  of  drunkenness, 
called  delirium  tremens. 

§  472.  Criminal  acts  are  sometimes  committed  by  drunken 
people,  in  consequence  of  the  illusions  by  which  their  minds 
are  frequently  possessed.  Although  the  ordinary  legal  con- 
sequences of  such  acts  would  not  be  regarded  by  the  English 
law  as  being  modified  at  all  in  consequence  of  the  mental 
illusion  under  which  it  is  committed,  yet  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  person  is  actuated  by  no  criminal  intention,  nor  any 
other  improper  motive.  Such  acts  have  been  viewed  in 
France,  Germany,  and  in  one  instance,  at  least,  extraordinary 
as  it  may  seem,  even  in  England,  with  more  indulgence  than 
those  which  arise  from  the  excited  passions  and  quarrels  pro- 
duced by  drunkenness.  On  the  Norfolk  Circuit,  10th  of 
March,  1840,  a  man  was  tried  for  killing  his  friend,  both  being 
intoxicated,  "  under  the  illusion  that  he  was  some  other 
person  who  had  come  to  attack  him.  The  judge  made  the 
prisoner's  guilt  to  rest  upon  the  fact,  whether,  had  he  been 
sober,  he  would  have  perpetrated  the  act  under  a  similar 
illusion.  As  he  had  voluntarily  brought  himself  into  a  state 
of  intoxication,  that  was  no  justification.  He  was  found 
guilty  of  manslaughter,  and  sentenced  to  two  months'  im- 
prisonment." i 

§  473.  After  the  thirty  years'  war  in  Germany,  it  was  a  popu- 
lar superstition,  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe,  that  the  spirits  of 
Swedish  cavaliers  were  sometimes  seen  at  midnight  mounted 
on  horses  and  dressed  in  a  blue  uniform  faced  with  red.  Two 
peasants  who  had  always  been  intimate  friends,  were  on 
their  return  in  the  evening  from  their  labors  in  the  fields,  when 
they  stopped  to  rest  their  limbs  under  a  tree,  and  there  they 

i  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  x.  1 72. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  473 

i 

drank  from  a  bottle  of  brandy  they  happened  to  have,  until 
they  became  quite  drunk.  In  this  condition  they  talked 
about  the  Swedish  cavaliers,  till  their  imaginations,  heated 
by  the  drink,  made  them  believe  that  they  were  surrounded 
by  the  spirits,  and  that  they  could  only  escape  by  fighting 
them.  Each  had  a  staff,  and  they  proceeded  to  belabor  each 
other,  believing  they  were  contending  with  the  cavaliers,  till 
one  was  finally  killed.  The  victor  went  home  and  pro- 
claimed his  triumph  over  the  devils  that  tried  to  carry  him 
off.  He  was  condemned  to  ten  years'  imprisonment.1 

§  474.  On  the  17th  of  December,  1838,  two  young  French 
peasants  in  the  commune  of  the  Prairie  of  Sept.  Vents, 
started  to  walk  home  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  after 
having  drank  excessively.  According  to  the  account  of  the 
survivor,  they  were  conversing  about  witches,  on  their  way 
home,  when  they  arrived  at  a  little  bridge  which  it  was 
rather  difficult  and  dangerous  to  pass.  The  survivor  offered 
to  carry  over  the  deceased  on  his  shoulders,  but  the  latter 
refused,  and  passed  over  first  on  his  hands  and  knees.  The 
former  did  not  know  how  he  got  over  ;  he  only  remembered 
that  when  he  reached  the  other  side,  he  could  not  find  his 
companion,  but  that  in  groping  about,  he  stumbled  against 
something  white  with  long  hair  on  its  legs.  He  called  out 
and  summoned  the  strange  thing  to  get  up  and  speak,  but 
receiving  no  answer,  and  getting  more  and  more  frightened, 
he  took  out  his  knife  and  stabbed  it  repeatedly.  Losing  the 
knife,  he  broke  the  branch  of  a  tree,  and  attacked  the  object 
of  his  fears  with  renewed  fury,  trying,  at  last,  to  break  one 
of  its  legs,  that  he  might  be  sure  of  finding  it  next  morning. 
Being  cold  and  tired,  however,  he  concluded  to  go  home,  and 
the  body  of  his  companion  was  found  next  day,  near  the 
bridge,  horribly  mutilated.  The  prisoner  was  condemned  to 
hard  labor  for  life,  and  to  exposition.2 

§  475.  In  the  first  of  the  above  cases,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury,  it  will  be  observed,  is  directly  at  variance  with  the 
principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  as,  indeed,  it  is  with  the 

1  Marc,  De  la  Folie,  etc.,  ii.  635.  2  Idem,  ii.  639. 

40* 


474  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

whole  doctrine  of  the  English  criminal  law  in  regard  to  this 
subject.  When  a  man  voluntarily  deprives  himself  of  the 
perfect  use  of  his  reason,  and  in  this  condition  commits  a 
criminal  act,  it  is  immaterial,  so  far  as  his  moral  guilt  is  con- 
cerned, whether  the  act  be  prompted  by  passion,  frenzy,  or 
hallucination.  The  verdict  is  a  memorable  one,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  the  first  within  our  knowledge,  in  which  an  English 
jury  has  made  any  distinction  between  a  homicide  committed 
in  a  state  of  drunkenness  though  without  any  criminal  inten- 
tion, and  one  deliberately  planned  and  deliberately  executed, 
in  the  full  possession  of  the  reasoning  powers. 

§  476.  Criminal  cases  are  not  very  unfrequent  in  which  in- 
temperance and  insanity  are  so  mingled  together  that  it  is 
impossible  to  unravel  their  relations  to  each  other,  and  ascer- 
tain their  respective  shares  of  influence  in  producing  the 
criminal  act.  The  following  will  serve  as  an  illustration  of 
this  class  of  cases. 

§  477.  David  Abbot  was  tried  by  the  Superior  Court  of 
Connecticut,  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  in  July,  1841.  The 
facts,  as  they  appeared  from  the  testimony,  were  substantially 
as  follows.  The  prisoner  belonged  to  a  respectable  family, 
possessed  some  property,  and  had  twelve  children  by  his 
wife.  For  several  years  prior  to  the  event,  he  had  been  very 
intemperate,  but  not  to  such  a  degree  as  to  prevent  his  walk- 
ing about  and  conversing  as  at  other  times.  Habitually 
harsh  and  cruel  to  his  wife,  he  became  still  more  so  when 
under  the  immediate  influence  of  liquor.  He  became  jealous 
of  her,  and  believed  that  she  had  frequent  criminal  inter- 
course with  two  of  their  neighbors.  But  it  was  admitted 
by  all  parties  that  the  conduct  of  these  persons  and  of  his 
wife  was  perfectly  unexceptionable,  so  far  as  this  subject 
was  concerned.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  day  when  the 
murder  was  committed,  he  was  observed  to  drink  rum  and 
cider  several  times.  After  he  and  his  wife  had  gone  to  bed, 
they  were  heard  talking  together,  and  at  eleven  o'clock  he 
called  up  one  of  his  daughters,  and  directed  her  to  summon 
the  neighbors,  "  as  they  were  all  dead,  or  would  be  soon." 
The  wife  was  found  dead,  apparently  choked  to  death,  and 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  475 

he  lying  on  the  floor  with  his  throat  cut  in  several  places, 
but  not  fatally.  When  asked  what  he  had  been  doing,  he 
replied,  "  that  the  devil  had  been  there,  that  he  had  had  a 
clinch  with  him,  and  that  the  devil  had  been  trying  to  kill 
them  both,  and  had  cut  his  throat."  Subsequently,  how- 
ever, when  he  became  more  composed,  he  stated  that  after 
they  went  to  bed,  an  altercation  ensued ;  that  he  became 
provoked,  and  seized  her  by  the  throat,  holding  her  five  or 
six  minutes,  when  he  found  she  was  dead.  He  then  at- 
tempted to  cut  his  own  throat  with  a  razor,  but  having  lost 
the  razor,  and  bled  a  while,  he  changed  his  mind,  and  called 
up  his  daughter.  It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  his  father, 
two  brothers,  and  sister  had  been  insane ;  that  the  prisoner 
himself,  when  about  eighteen  years  old,  was  delirious  for  sev- 
eral weeks  immediately  after  attending  a  camp-meeting ; 
and  that  about  seven  years  before  the  death  of  his  wife,  he 
went  to  one  of  his  neighbors,  with  both  hands  on  the  top  of 
his  head,  saying  that  he  had  lost  the  top  of  his  head  and 
must  go  home  and  get  his  wife  to  put  it  on  again.  The 
court,  in  laying  down  the  law,  relative  to  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  intemperance,  adopted  the  principles  of  Mr. 
Justice  Story  in  the  case  of  Drew,  and  the  jury  was  also  told, 
that  if  they  found  the  prisoner  insane,  but  not  to  such  a  degree 
as  to  render  him  wholly  irresponsible  for  his  acts,  they  had  a 
right  to  take  such  partial  insanity  into  consideration  in  con- 
nection with  the  provocation,  in  determining  upon  its  suffi- 
ciency. If  they  found  that  the  provocation,  in  that  case, 
operating  upon  a  mind  partially  insane,  was  equal  in  its  effect 
to  a  provocation  which  would  reduce  a  homicide,  committed 
by  a  man  of  perfectly  sound  mind,  from  murder  to  man- 
slaughter, they  would  have  a  right  to  find  the  prisoner  guilty 
of  manslaughter  only.  The  prisoner  was  found  guilty  of 
murder.1 

§  478.     In  the  present  state  of  public  opinion,  it  would  be 
difficult,  perhaps,  to  convince  a  jury  that  the  wretched  vic- 

1  MS.  of  Mr.  Justice  Waite  who  sat  upon  the  case,  and  kindly  furnished 
by  him. 


476  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tims  of  periodical  drunkenness,  or  of  that  other  form  of  the 
disorder  which  we  have  illustrated  (§  445)  ought  not  to  be 
held  responsible  for  their  criminal  acts.  It  would  be  ob- 
jected, probably,  that  these  conditions  are  the  result  of  habit- 
ual indulgence,  and  that  at  the  utmost,  the  only  difference 
between  these  and  other  drunkards  is,  that  they  are  impelled 
to  the  gratification  of  their  insatiable  cravings  by  different 
degrees  of  violence,  —  a  circumstance  which  it  would  be 
mischievous  to  recognize  in  estimating  the  degree  of  crimi- 
nal responsibility.  The  truth  would  be  overlooked  or  dis- 
puted, that  this  irresistible  propensity  to  excessive  drinking 
is  manifested  as  often,  if  not  oftener,  in  temperate  men,  as 
in  habitual  drunkards  ;  and  that  it  is  either  a  symptom  of  the 
first  stage  of  madness,  or  of  a  temporary  impairment  of  the 
mind  produced  by  some  disturbance  of  the  cerebral  circu- 
lation. The  drunkenness  being  thus  an  accidental,  involun- 
tary consequence  of  a  maniacal  state  of  the  mind,  it  cannot 
impart  the  character  of  criminality  to  any  action  to  which  it 
may  give  rise.  If  the  merchant,  or  servant  girl  whose  cases 
we  have  quoted  from  Esquirol,  (§  443,  446,)  had  committed 
murder  in  one  of  their  paroxysms,  we  should,  no  doubt,  have 
had  the  testimony  of  that  distinguished  physician,  as  he  has 
already  recorded  it  in  his  writings,  that  they  were  "  true 
monomaniacs,  not  morally  responsible."  The  other  cases  we 
have  related,  though  differing  a  little  from  these,  in  some  of 
then:  accidental  symptoms,  evidently  proceeded  from  the 
same  pathological  causes  ;  and  if  moral  responsibility  ceases 
in  the  former,  it  must  equally  cease  in  the  latter. 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION. 

§  479.  WITH  respect  to  the  kind  and  degree  of  mental 
impairment  that  warrant  interdiction,  there  prevails  the 
utmost  diversity  of  opinion ;  and  such  must  continue  to  be 
the  case,  till  sounder  views  are  entertained  of  the  true  pur- 
poses of  this  measure.  The  radical  fault  of  speculations  on 
this  subject  is,  that  the  attention  has  been  directed  to  gene- 
ral rules  and  abstract  distinctions,  rather  than  to  a  thorough 
and  discriminating  examination  of  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  each  individual  case.  In  the  following  para- 
graphs will  be  found  abundant  illustrations  of  the  truth  of 
this  remark. 

§  480.  Imbeciles  in  the  first  degree  cannot  be  justly 
deprived  of  the  management  of  their  property,  on  the  ground 
of  mental  deficiency  alone.  If  they  have  shown  no  disposi- 
tion to  squander  their  money  on  trifles,  nor  suffered  their 
affairs  to  be  grossly  neglected,  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
pretence  for  taking  it  altogether  from  their  control  and  enjoy- 
ment. Neither  should  we  be  too  rigid  in  our  scrutiny  of 
these  cases.  If  a  whole  life  of  extravagance,  or  hazardous 
speculation,  is  not  enough  to  produce  the  interdiction  of 
a  sound  person,  why  should  an  occasional  act  of  either  in 
one  of  feeble  intellect,  provoke  that  measure  ?  Of  course 
there  can  be  no  question  of  its  propriety  when  it  is  perfectly 
obvious  that  he  is  dissipating  his  fortune,  to  the  great  detri- 
ment of  himself  and  of  those  who  are  dependent  on  him. 

§  481.  Much  discussion  and  tedious  litigation  have  arisen, 
from  the  difficulty  of  determining  the  exact  measure  of  in- 
tellectual capacity  requisite  to  the  undisturbed  enjoyment 


478  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  civil  rights  and  privileges,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  losing 
sight  of  the  real  object  before  us,  and  pursuing  a  shadow  of 
our  own  'creating.  It  is  a  question  of  capacity  in  reference 
to  certain  ends  and  duties,  and  we  are  not  called  on  to  go 
beyond  the  consideration  of  these,  in  our  endeavors  to  settle 
this  question.  The  speculative  opinions  of  the  imbecile  per- 
son, the  little  peculiarities  of  his  conduct,  his  style  of  living 
and  talking,  and  his  general  deportment  in  society,  are  points 
that  require  but  little  attention  in  this  inquiry.  Our  business 
is  with  the  manner  in  which  he  has  conducted  his  affairs, 
and  from  this  chiefly,  we  are  to  draw  our  inferences  respect- 
ing his  probable  future  conduct  and  capacity.  And  here  we 
are  not  bound  to  institute  a  rigid  comparison  between  his 
habits,  and  those  of  people  enjoying  ordinary  soundness  and 
vigor  of  intellect.  We  are  not  warranted  in  stripping  him 
of  all  his  possessions  and  leaving  him  at  the  mercy  of  others, 
the  moment  we  can  fix  upon  a  single  instance  in  the  course 
of  his  life,  where  he  has  neglected  to  profit  by  a  happy  turn 
of  fortune,  or  has  rewarded  a  service,  or  bestowed  his  boun- 
ties, in  a  manner  altogether  opposed  to  our  ideas  of  fore- 
thought and  economy.  Has  the  individual  indulged  in  re- 
peated acts  of  extravagance,  or  of  profitless  expenditure  ? 
Has  he  engaged  in  the  execution  of  visionary  projects  with 
reckless  indifference  as  to  the  extent  of  his  means  and  appli- 
ances ?  Has  he  squandered  his  money  on  favorites,  or 
become  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  designing  and  pro- 
fligate associates  for  advancing  their  own  selfish  projects  ? 
These  are  among  the  most  prominent  questions  that  require 
a  satisfactory  answer ;  and  if  they  are  kept  steadily  before  us, 
there  will  be  little  fear  of  losing  ourselves  in  the  maze  of  per- 
plexities which  the  judical  investigation  of  cases  of  imbecility 
frequently  creates. 

§  482.  These  views,  it  will  be  seen,  afford  no  countenance 
to  the  usual  practice  of  canvassing  the  whole  history  of  the 
imbecile  person,  arraying  act  against  act,  and  speech  against 
speech,  and  drawing  from  each  an  inference  for  or  against 
his  capacity  of  managing  his  own  affairs,  in  his  own  way. 
Few  of  those  whose  interests  become  involved  in  protracted 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  479 

litigation,  are  so  destitute  of  intellect  as  never  to  conduct 
like  persons  of  well-developed  minds  under  similar  circum- 
stances. They  may  write  sensible  letters,  make  shrewd 
bargains,  and  converse  on  ordinary  topics  without  betraying 
any  mental  deficiency,  while  yielding  implicitly  to  the  will 
of  others,  and  committing  acts  of  folly  that  can  arise  from 
nothing  short  of  unequivocal  imbecility.  The  popular  error 
that  imbecility  is  only  an  inferior  endowment  of  mind,  con- 
sidered in  regard  to  its  absolute  quantity,  has  led  people  to 
forget  that  in  this  condition,  the  mental  faculties  may  be  very 
unequally  defective ;  and,  therefore,  that  very  different  con- 
clusions would  be  formed  respecting  an  individual's  capacity, 
according  as  the  attention  is  exclusively  directed  to  the  man- 
ifestation of  this  or  that  faculty.  Many  also,  who,  while 
surrounded  by  their  usual  circle  of  associations,  manage 
their  slender  means  with  the  utmost  prudence  and  economy, 
would  prove  themselves  totally  inadequate  to  the  manage- 
ment of  a  large  property,  and  be  easily  led,  by  the  influence 
of  new  associates  and  the  excitement  of  new  desires,  into 
habits  of  extravagance  and  dissipation. 

§  483.  The  little  success  that  has  attended  every  attempt 
to  fix  upon  certain  criteria  as  tests  of  that  degree  of  imbe- 
cility which  is  incompatible  with  the  management  of  prop- 
erty, and  to  run  the  line  between  this  mental  condition  and 
that  of  legal  capacity,  is  another  circumstance  in  favor  of 
the  course  here  indicated.  "  In  order  to  arrive  at  the  true 
meaning  of  <  imbecility  of  mind,'"  says  Sir  .John  Nicholl, 
"  we  may  resort  to  what  the  law  describes  as  perfect  capa- 
city, which  is  most  correctly  found  in  the  form  of  pleadings 
used  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  in  the  averment  in  support 
of  a  will,  that  the  testator  was  of  '  sound  mind,  memory, 
and  understanding  —  talked  and  discoursed  rationally  and 
sensibly,  and  was  fully  capable  of  any  rational  act  requiring 
thought,  judgment,  and  reflection.'  Here  is  the  legal  stand- 
ard." l  It  may  be  doubted  if  this  definition  can  ever  be  of 
much  practical  service,  for  no  definition  can  be  so  which 

1  Ingram  v.  Wyatt,  1  Haggard's  Eccl.  Reports,  401. 


480  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

embraces  either  more  or  less  than  is  strictly  warranted  by 
the  exact  nature  of  the  thing  defined.  Many  an  imbecile 
who  could  not  be  safely  trusted  with  the  control  of  property 
for  a  single  week,  may  nevertheless  "  talk  and  discourse 
rationally  and  sensibly,"  so  long  as  the  conversation  is  con- 
fined to  simple  subjects  that  have  long  been  familiar  to  the 
mind ;  and  many  a  man  of  legal  capacity  may  be  found,  of 
whom  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  is  "  fully  capable  of  any 
rational  act"  whatever,  "requiring  thought,  judgment,  and 
reflection."  The  very  point  to  be  decided  is,  whether  the 
person  in  question,  who  talks  and  discourses  so  rationally 
and  sensibly,  and  does  so  many  rational  acts,  is  or  is  not 
capable  of  managing  his  affairs ;  and,  however  much  we  may 
scrutinize  the  character  of -his  intellect,  the  only  just  and  ac- 
curate test  of  such  capacity  is  the  manner  in  which  he  has 
already  managed  his  affairs.  The  tests  of  legal  capacity  so 
much  sought  after  in  imbecility,  cannot  be  obtained,  from  the 
nature  of  things,  because  the  general  strength  of  mind  is  but 
an  uncertain  index  of  its  ability  when  exercised  on  particu- 
lar subjects.  The  ministers  of  the  law,  therefore,  should  be 
extremely  cautious  how  they  are  moved  by  theoretical  con- 
siderations, instead  of  particular  facts  bearing  on  the  point  at 
issue,  in  examining  requests  for  interdiction  on  the  ground 
of  imbecility. 

§  484.  General  intellectual  and  general  moral  mania  are 
always  a  sufficient  cause  of  interdiction ;  for  the  reflective 
faculties  are  too  much  deranged  in  those  disorders  to  discern 
the  relations  of  property,  or  to  provide  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements for  preserving  and  improving  it.  The  only  ques- 
tion is,  how  soon  after  the  manifestation  of  the  disease,  are 
we  warranted  in  taking  this  measure.  Since  its  publicity 
serves  to  expose  the  patient  and  his  family  to  the  popular 
and  not  unfounded  prejudice  against  insanity,  and  since 
mania,  when  early  attended  to,  is  cured,  in  the  larger  pro- 
portion of  cases,  within  the  first  or  second  year,  this  step 
should  be  delayed,  unless  extraordinary  reasons  require  im- 
mediate action,  till  the  effect  of  judicious  treatment  has  been 
observed.  The  restraint  and  seclusion  which  curative  meas- 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  481 

ures  necessarily  require,  prevent  the  patient  from  engaging 
in  business,  and  indeed  place  him  in  the  same  condition  as 
would  sickness  of  any  other  kind.  Neither  is  this  measure 
always  justifiable  when  the  disease  is  so  slight  as  not  to  pre- 
vent him  from  going  abroad  and  mingling  in  the  affairs  of 
the  world.  If,  however,  the  patient  is  a  merchant,  for  in- 
stance, and  continues  to  engage  in  the  transaction  of  busi- 
ness, immediate  interdiction  would  be  required,  perhaps,  to 
save  him  from  the  effects  of  ruinous  contracts.  Generally 
speaking,  no  harm  is  done  by  a  little  delay,  but  the  practice 
of  taking  property  from  its  lawful  possessors  to  place  it  in 
the  control  of  others  who  may  have  no  other  object  than  that 
of  enriching  themselves  by  their  trust,  the  first  moment  the 
presence  of  madness  is  satisfactorily  established,  must  lead  to 
positive  and  considerable  evils.  So  jealous  is  the  French 
law  of  this  hasty  interference,  that  it  permits  nothing  less  than 
habitual  insanity  to  procure  interdiction.1 

§  485.  In  partial  mania,  Hoff  bauer 2  thinks  we  should  be 
governed  by  the  nature  of  the  predominant  idea,  not  con- 
sidering it  a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction,  unless  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  property  in  a  manner  likely  to 
lead  to  its  wasteful  and  improvident  management.  Such,  too, 
was  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Rush,8  and  a  late  writer4  has  con- 
tended against  the  opposite  practice  with  signal  ability 
and  skill.  "  Mental  derangement,  to  be  a  sufficient  reason 
for  interdiction,"  says  a  French  jurist,  "  should  have  refer- 
ence to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  civil  life,  and  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  person  and  property  of  the  individual ;  a  man 
who  is  merely  visionary,  or  entertains  speculative  notions 
that  are  palpably  false,  should  not  be  interdicted,  if  he  manage 
his  affairs  well  enough  in  other  respects."6  Georget,  how- 
ever, thinks  that  monomaniacs  are  not  to  be  trusted,  and  that 
we  can  never  be  sure  that  the  predominant  idea  may  not,  by 


1  Code  civil,  art.  489.  2  Op.  cit.  §  110. 

3  Lecture  on  Medical  Jurisprudence,  Philadelphia,  1811. 

4  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  430,  445. 
6  Toullier,  le  Droit  civil  Fran9ais,  etc.  1811. 

41 


482  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

means  of  some  mental  associations,  lead  to  the  dissipation 
of  their  fortunes.  Accordingly,  he  is  dissatisfied  with  the  de- 
cision of  the  tribunal  of  La  Seine,  who  rejected  a  petition  for 
the  interdiction  of  M.  Selves,  a  celebrated  advocate,  although 
admitted  to  be  a  "  meddler  in  his  family,  litigious  in  society, 
impertinent  towards  the  magistrates,  vainly  profuse  in  his 
expenditures,  and  subject  to  some  illusions."  * 

§  486.  This  distrust  of  the  insane  of  whatever  descrip- 
tion, is  nowhere  more  strongly  implied  than  in  the  habitual 
practice  of  Great  Britain  at  the  present  day.  One  finds  it 
difficult  to  believe  on  what  slight  grounds  interdiction  is 
there  every  day  procured,  —  a  measure,  that  with  the  osten- 
sible purpose  of  protecting  the  interest  of  the  insane  party, 
is  too  often,  in  reality,  designed  to  promote  the  selfish  views 
of  relatives  and  friends.  A  kind  and  degree  of  mental  im- 
pairment that  has  never  obscured  the  patient's  knowledge 
of  his  relative  situation,  never  altered  his  disposition  to  be 
kind  and  useful  to  those  around  him,  never  weakened  his 
enjoyment  of  social  pleasures,  and  never  affected  his  capa- 
city to  manage  his  concerns  with  his  usual  prudence,  has 
been  repeatedly  deemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  depriving 
him  of  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his  own  property,  and  sub- 
jecting him  to  all  the  disabilities  the  law  can  impose.  Dr. 
Conolly  speaks  of  a  gentleman  on  whose  account  his  family 
applied  for  a  commission  of  lunacy,  because  he  had  become 
possessed  with  the  idea,  that  the  queen  of  England  was  in 
love  with  him.  Yet  this  person  conducted  himself  very  well 
in  most  of  the  offices  of  life,  and  on  one  occasion  after  this 
application  was  made,  while  dining  with  a  party  of  friends 
in  company  with  the  lord  chancellor,  he  contributed  so  re- 
markably to  the  enjoyment  of  the  day  by  his  polite,  agreea- 
ble, and  amusing  manner,  that  this  functionary  could  not 
help  expressing  to  him  how  much  he  had  been  gratified  by 
his  introduction  to  him,  and  how  utterly  absurd  it  now  ap- 
peared to  him,  to  have  ever  given  credit  to  the  story  of  his 
delusion.  This  was  enough  to  produce  its  avowal  from  the 

1  Des  Maladies  mentales,  108. 


INTERDICTION  AND  ISOLATION.  483 

patient,  and  the  issuing  of  the  commission  from  the  lord 
chancellor.  The  sequel  furnished  a  striking  comment  on 
the  injustice  of  this  act ;  for  the  insane  gentleman  gave  so 
much  assistance  to  those  intrusted  with  the  management  of 
his  affairs,  that  he  was  the  means  of  their  getting  over  diffi- 
culties which,  without  his  aid,  would  have  been  insurmount- 
able ;  and  in  the  end,  he  was  actually,  if  not  formally,  con- 
stituted the  steward  of  his  own  estate.  It  is  well  known 
that  a  monomaniac  in  England,  who  fancied  himself  duke 
of  Hexham,  and  was  accordingly  interdicted,  became  the 
agent  of  his  own  committee  for  the  management  of  his  own 
estate,  and  did  the  duties  of  the  office,  for  a  time  at  least,  not 
incorrectly. 

§  487.  The  case  of  Mr.  Edward  Davies,  which  engrossed 
the  attention  of  the  English  public,  a  few  years  since,  being, 
says  Dr.  Gooch,  "  by  far  the  most  important  lunatic  cause 
which  has  been  tried  in  our  time,"  furnishes  a  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  manner  in  which  these  things  were  managed  in 
England.  Mr.  Edward  Davies  was  born  of  humble  parents, 
and  though  particularly  shy  and  reserved  among  his  school- 
fellows, he  was  generally  considered  sharp  and  intelligent. 
On  leaving  school,  he  commenced  the  business  of  a  tea- 
dealer  in  London,  and  by  indefatigable  industry  and  cautious 
management,  rapidly  became  rich.  It  appears  that  his 
health,  at  best,  was  delicate,  and  that  he  suffered  much  from 
dyspepsia  and  nervous  excitement.  He  was  fond  of  reading 
medical  books  ;  and,  like  most  persons  who  indulge  in  such 
a  taste,  was  fanciful  about  his  complaints,  and  subject  to 
false  alarms.  The  defects  of  his  early  education,  he  en- 
deavored to  remedy,  by  reading  what  he  took  to  be  the  best 
authors,  and  was  often  guilty  of  making  a  ridiculous  display 
of  his  acquirements,  by  making  long  quotations  which  he 
would  spout  with  a  theatrical  air.  He  was  of  a  remarkably 
timid  and  yielding  disposition,  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be  com- 
pletely subjected  to  the  authority  of  his  mother.  Though  he 
was  twenty-seven  years  of  age,  and  managing  an  extensive 
and  lucrative  business,  she  would  not  allow  him  to  carry 
any  money  in  his  pocket,  nor  to  spend  the  most  trifling  sum 


484  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

without  her  permission.  He  dared  not  go  to  the  play,  nor 
leave  the  house  for  a  few  hours,  without  asking  her  leave.  She 
was  particularly  at  great  pains  to  prevent  his  meeting  young 
women,  lest,  in  the  event  of  his  marriage,  she  might  be  dis- 
placed from  the  control  of  his  conduct  and  the  command  of 
his  purse ;  and  she  took  various  opportunities  of  inducing 
him  to  give  considerable  sums  of  money  to  different  branches 
of  her  family.  At  the  age  of  twenty-seven,  he  grew  restive 
under  the  maternal  restraints,  and  made  many  attempts  to 
emancipate  himself.  He  offered  to  leave  the  shop  to  his 
mother  and  take  his  own  property  away ;  or  to  give  her  seven 
thousand  pounds,  on  her  consenting  to  leave  the  concern  ; 
but  she  was  not  to  be  got  rid  of  at  that  price.  The  incessant 
state  of  contention  at  last  seriously  impaired  his  health  and 
his  mental  tranquillity,  and  on  the  first  of  July,  1829,  he  ap- 
plied to  Mr.  Lawrence,  the  surgeon.  He  told  this  gentleman 
a  long  story  about  his  health  and  his  tea-trade ;  and  at 
another  interview,  he  recited  poetry  and  expressed  a  strong 
antipathy  to  his  mother  and  several  relations.  Mr.  Lawrence 
considered  him  of  unsound  mind,  but  thought  that  if  he 
could  be  reconciled  to  his  mother  and  family,  the  disease 
would  be  at  an  end  —  that  his  antipathy  to  his  mother  was 
his  chief  delusion. 

§  488.  About  this  time,  he  applied  to  Dr.  Latham,  claim- 
ing his  protection.  His  discourse  was  wild  and  rambling, 
and  his  manner  strange  and  excited.  He  told  the  doctor  in 
a  sort  of  a  whisper,  that  he  had  a  tale  to  relate  of  the 
greatest  horror,  and  then  flung  himself  away  and  stalked  into 
the  middle  of  the  room.  He  appeared  very  apprehensive 
lest  he  might  be  overheard,  and  begged  that  he  might  lock 
the  doors  and  close  the  windows.  He  spoke  of  his  wealth 
and  his  trade,  and  quoted  poetry  largely,  using  great  gesticu- 
lation and  throwing  his  arms  about.  Several  times  he  asked 
if  he  looked  insane,  and  on  leaving  the  house,  he  said :  "  If 
you  fail  (in  his  promise  to  call  on  him)  dread  the  vengeance 
of  a  madman  ;  for  I  carry  a  loaded  pistol."  Dr.  Latham 
thought  him  insane,  though  not  prepared  to  recommend  that 
he  should  be  shut  up  as  an  acknowledged  lunatic.  Shortly 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  485 

after  this,  he  left  his  own  house  and  went  to  spend  the  night 
at  Furnival  Inn,  on  the  third  of  August.  About  one  o'clock, 
in  the  night,  he  rang  the  bell,  and  told  the  waiter  that  there 
were  thieves  in  the  house  ;  that  he  heard  them  snapping  off 
pistols,  and  striking  a  light.  On  being  remonstrated  with  by 
the  waiter,  on  the  impropriety  of  his  ringing  the  bell,  and 
thus  disturbing  the  lodgers,  he  said  he  was  sorry  for  it,  went 
upon  his  knees,  and  humbly  begged  his  pardon. 

§  489.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  on  the  same  days 
on  which  Dr.  ITatham,  Mr.  Lawrence,  and  others,  saw  him 
in  his  most  explosive  state,  his  friends  who  had  known  him 
long,  passed  hours  with  him;  and  though  he  was  ill  and 
terrified,  he  appeared  to  them  quite  himself,  and  as  equal  as 
ever  he  had  been  to  give  directions  about  his  shop  affairs. 
Indeed,  the  very  persons  who  were  trying  to  confine  him  as 
unfit  to  take  care  of  his  business,  were  themselves  consulting 
him  about  the  management  of  that  business. 

§  490.  Mr.  Davies  was  shortly  after  this  removed  to  a 
private  asylum,  where  he  remained  till  the  end  of  Decem- 
ber, when  he  was  liberated  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury.  Here 
his  agitation  subsided,  his  incoherence  diminished  almost  to 
nothing ;  and  the  only  remaining  grounds  for  believing  him 
a  lunatic,  were  his  antipathy  to  his  mother,  and  certain  sus- 
picions that  were  considered  to  be  delirious.  Nevertheless,  a 
commission  of  lunacy  was  granted  by  the  lord  chancellor, 
which  finally  resulted  in  restoring  him  to  liberty,  and  the 
management  of  his  property.  The  evidence  of  the  physi- 
cians who  were  sent  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  examining 
Mr.  Davies  at  various  interviews,  and  who  pronounced  him 
to  be  mad,  is  worthy  of  a  little  notice,  inasmuch  as  they 
present  the  grounds  on  which,  in  the  year  1829,  the  most 
eminent  physicians  for  diseases  of  the  mind  shut  up  patients 
in  asylums,  among  the  English. 

§  491.  Sir  George  Tuthill  testified,  that  he  was  of  un- 
sound mind,  at  the  period  of  his  last  visit;  principally, 
because  he  spoke  indignantly  of  the  manner  in  which  he  had 
been  treated  by  his  family.  His  additional  reasons  for  think- 
ing him  insane,  and  unable  to  manage  his  affairs,  were  his 

41* 


486  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

learning  to  box,  his  purchasing  a  fowl  for  ten  shillings,  and 
his  saying  that  he  could  weep  over  his  little  rabbits,  which 
he  had  not  seen  for  six  weeks. 

Dr.  Algernon  Frampton  testified,  that  he  could  not  con- 
sider him  sane  on  the  seventh  of  December,  because  he 
would  not  admit  himself  to  have  been  insane  on  the  eighth 
of  August.  He  thought  there  was  a  delusion  in  his  mind  as 
to  his  mother's  conduct,  though  he  admitted  there  would  be 
no  delusion,  if  his  mother  had  interfered  as  Davies  de- 
scribed, and  as  other  witnesses  testified.  He  thought  that 
the  purchase  of  a  certain  estate  for  6000  guineas  was  in 
itself  an  act  of  insanity,  considering  his  circumstances, 
though  he  admitted  he  knew  nothing  of  his  circumstances. 
A  man  of  business,  he  thought,  ought  not  to  lock  up  so 
much  of  his  capital.  He  never  inquired  how  Mr.  Davies 
managed  his  business,  though  he  declared  that  he  was  inca- 
pable of  managing  it. 

Mr.  Haslam  testified,  that  he  was  induced  to  consider  him 
insane,  from  his  manner  of  complaining  of  the  dirty  habits  of 
the  keepers  of  the  establishment  where  he  was  confined.  He 
said  decidedly,  that  as  long  as  his  morbid  hostility  remained 
against  his  mother,  it  was  not  safe  for  him  to  go  at  large. 

§  492.  In  opposition  to  this  evidence  —  and  it  is  but  a 
small  portion  of  what  might  be  given  —  it  may  be  well  to 
exhibit  a  specimen  or  two  of  that  given  by  Mr.  Davies's 
medical  witnesses.  Dr.  Macmichael,  who  had  been  sent 
down  by  the  lord  chancellor  to  examine  into  the  state  of  his 
mind,  satisfactorily  showed  that  Mr.  Davies's  peculiar  notions 
and  views  which  had  been  considered  by  many  as  delusions, 
either  did  not  exist  at  all,  or  proved,  upon  examination,  to  be 
perfectly  rational  and  proper.  In  attributing  his  prosperity 
to  the  favor  of  Providence,  which  had  been  mentioned  as  one 
of  his  delusions,  he  said  he  did  not  mean  immediate  or 
special  interference,  but  that  general  providence  which  regu- 
lates human  affairs.  His  boast  of  having  improved  the 
revenue  by  his  biddings,  which  had  also  been  imputed  to 
him  as  a  delusion,  he  explained  by  saying  that  there  was  a 
certain  kind  of  tea  that  was  now  almost  given  away  ;  that  if 


INTERDICTION  AND  ISOLATION.  487 

he  bid  higher  than  others,  the  duty  would  be  increased,  and 
that  thus  he  should  put  money  into  the  pocket  of  government. 
He  showed,  that  instead  of  sacrificing  his  property  by  this 
course,  he  realized  a  large  sum  of  money  in  a  very  short  time. 
Dr.  Macmichael  was  not  willing  to  admit  that  his  learning  pu- 
gilism, or  carrying  pistols,  was  any  evidence  of  unsoundness 
of  mind,  for  he  might  have  had  good  reason  for  doing  both. 

§  493.  Dr.  Mackinnon,  who  was  connected  by  marriage 
with  the  family  of  Mr.  Davies,  and  had  visited  him  several 
times  during  his  confinement,  thought  him,  from  the  first 
interview  to  the  last,  capable  of  managing  himself  and  his 
affairs.  He  showed  that  many  of  his  peculiar  habits  and 
manners  which  had  given  rise  to  the  idea  of  insanity,  he 
had  always  manifested  when  in  good  health.  His  letters 
which,  from  being  full  of  quotations  and  puns,  were  thought 
to  indicate  disordered  mind,  he  showed  were  not  different,  in 
that  respect,  from  those  he  wrote  long  before  insanity  was 
imputed  to  him.  He  conversed  with  him  freely  on  the  affairs 
of  his  family,  and  his  remarks  upon  his  mother's  interference 
were  rational,  just,  and  free  from  excitement.  His  inquiry  into 
the  imputed  delusions,  ended  in  the  same  result  as  Dr. 
MacmichaeFs.  In  particular,  he  did  not  consider  his  hostility 
to  his  mother  as  a  delusion,  for,  from  the  son's  account,  there 
was  good  reason  for  it.  On  a  variety  of  other  subjects,  his 
discourse  was  calm  and  rational. 

§  494.  This  case  is  not  calculated  to  recommend  the 
opinion  of  those  who  look  on  the  slightest  mental  aberration 
as  a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction.  The  principle  to  be 
followed  here  is  precisely  that  which  we  have  indicated  as 
applicable  to  cases  of  imbecility.  Instead  of  puzzling  our- 
selves with  vain  attempts  to  gauge  the  depth  and  breadth  of 
the  absolute  capacity  of  the  mind,  our  duty  is  simply  to 
ascertain  if  the  individual  has  been  guilty  of  any  instances 
of  gross  improvidence,  of  expenditure  beyond  his  means,  or 
for  objects  unsuited  to  his  station  and  pursuits.  If  it  be 
found  that  he  has,  then  interdiction  is  implicitly  required  by 
a  regard  to  his  own  and  the  interests  of  those  who  are 
dependent  on  him  for  support,  or  entertain  rational  expecta- 


488  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tions  of  being  benefited  by  his  wealth.  If  he  has  not,  it  is 
not  very  clear  how  his  property  can  be  taken  from  his  con- 
trol, without  violating  the  first  principles  of  civil  liberty.  If 
no  one  doubts  that  the  mental  operations  in  monomania  may 
be  perfectly  sound,  except  within  a  certain  very  narrow 
circle,  why  should  it  be  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  ideas  of 
property  should  sometimes  be  among  those  which  are  un- 
affected by  the  influence  of  the  disorder?  To  deprive  a 
person  laboring  under  a  partial  rnania  that  does  not  involve 
his  notions  of  property,  of  the  natural  right  of  controlling 
and  disposing  of  his  own  fortune,  is  as  unjust  and  irrational 
as  it  would  be  to  inflict  upon  a  felon  convicted  of  theft,  the 
penalties  attached  to  the  violation  of  every  article  in  the 
criminal  code.  If,  too,  we  interdict  one  monomaniac  whose 
derangement  is  limited  to  a  single  subject,  we  are  bound  in 
consistency  to  proceed  till  we  have  included  all,  from  him 
who  believes  he  has  lost  his  rational  soul,  to  the  poor  hypo- 
chondriac who  imagines  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  or  that 
a  fish  has  taken  up  its  abode  in  his  stomach.  The  mischief 
that  would  arise  from  such  a  course  of  disqualification,  may 
be  easily  enough  conceived,  without  the  aid  of  any  more 
particular  description.  Even  when  the  hallucination  has 
reference  to  property,  as  the  idea,  for  instance,  that  the  in- 
dividual possesses  immense  wealth,  or  that  every  ship  which 
enters  the  harbor  is  his  and  freighted  with  his  goods,  we  are 
not  too  hastily  to  strip  him  of  what  is  really  his  own,  for  he 
might,  nevertheless,  in  the  management  of  it,  evince  the 
most  commendable  prudence  and  economy.  It  is  a  remark- 
able but  not  an  uncommon  fact,  that  monomaniacs  often 
make  no  practical  application  of  their  insane  notions  to  their 
own  conduct  or  concerns,  but  continue  to  manage  both  as 
if  no  such  delusion  existed. 

§  495.  In  the  progress  of  dementia,  there  always  comes  a 
period  sooner  or  later,  when  interdiction  is  required,  where- 
ever  the  patient  has  much  property,  or  conflicting  interests 
are  involved  in  its  disposition.  To  decide  when  this  period 
has  actually  arrived,  is  generally  a  difficult  and  a  responsible 
duty.  To  avoid  the  disagreeable  alternative  of  favoring  the 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  489 

designs  of  selfish  relatives,  which  would  be  promoted  by  the 
interdiction  and  seclusion  of  the  old  man,  by  premature  in- 
terference, or  of  delaying  proper  measures,  for  fear  of  being 
thought  accessory  to  schemes  of  fraud  and  oppression,  until 
too  late  to  be  of  any  service,  is  to  gain  the  happy  medium 
which  all  should  seek,  but  which  few  perhaps  are  successful 
enough  to  obtain.  The  difficulties  which  medical  men  have 
to  encounter,  who  are  consulted  in  such  cases,  are  graphi- 
cally described  by  Dr.  Conolly.  "  An  old  gentleman,"  he 
says,  "whose  intellects  are  so  impaired  that  he  does  not 
know  whether  he  has  received  his  rents  or  not,  or  who  is  un- 
able to  arrange  his  own  dress  decently,  and  requires,  when 
up  stairs,  ah1  the  attention  of  a  child,  is  seen  by  the  medical 
practitioner,  for  the  purpose  of  its  being  ascertained  how  far 
interference  with  his  property  is  justifiable.  The  very  ser- 
vant who  is  hourly  robbing  him,  takes  care  to  send  him  down 
very  carefully  drest.  The  mere  effect  of  habit  is  to  cause  the 
patient  himself  to  be  more  guarded  and  exact  in  his  manner 
and  words  in  the  presence  of  a  stranger ;  he  feels  under  a 
temporary  and  a  wholesome  restraint ;  asks  and  answers  com- 
mon questions  as  well  as  most  other  old  men,  and  is  per- 
fectly correct  in  his  deportment.  Two  very  serious  evils 
may  ensue.  If  the  practitioner  is  unacquainted  with  the 
varieties  of  the  mind  and  their  tendencies ;  and  imagines 
that  insanity  and  sanity  cannot  be  mixed  up  together  in  the 
mind  as  they  are  in  the  body ;  he  feels  a  degree  of  conscien- 
tious horror  concerning  any  interference  with  an  old  gentle- 
man who  may  be  a  little  weak,  but  who,  he  is  quite  con- 
vinced, is  no  more  mad  than  any  of  those  about  him.  He 
turns  his  thoughts  to  the  probable  motives  of  interest,  in  the 
children  or  the  friends,  and,  determining  not  to  warrant  any 
kind  of  restraint,  inwardly  applauds  his  own  sagacity  and 
incorruptibility.  The  friends,  now  more  afraid  to  interfere 
than  before,  allow  the  old  man  to  do  as  he  likes,  and  he  sets 
off,  and  gets  married  to  a  worthless  and  designing  woman, 
or  he  alters  his  will  in  favor  of  some  unprincipled  person,  or 
finds  his  way  to  some  neighboring  town,  where  he  becomes 
a  disgraceful  spectacle,  and  gets  robbed  of  his  money  and  ill- 


490  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

treated ;  or  perhaps  he  falls  into  the  pond,  and  is  drowned  ; 
all  the  world  then  exclaiming  against  the  heartlessness  and 
inattention  of  those  about  him,  and  the  unaccountable 
supineness  of  those  who  were  consulted  about  the  case. 
Thus,  the  view  of  a  very  plain  and  easy  duty  is,  not  unfre- 
quently,  obscured  by  prevalent  opinions  respecting  the  nature 
of  insanity,  and  respecting  the  measures  which  insanity  is 
supposed  to  render  indispensable.  If  the  patient  whom  I 
have  described,  as  conducting  himself  so  satisfactorily  in  a 
short  and  common  conversation,  is  left  to  his  own  thought 
for  a  little  time,  and  his  attention  is  not  excited  by  those 
about  him,  his  state  will  become  evident  enough.  He  will  be 
seen  to  be  wandering,  and  lost  in  his  reflections,  and  will 
perhaps  rise  up  and  endeavor  to  make  his  way  out  of  the 
room,  but  without  seeming  to  remember  the  situation  of  the 
door.  Or  he  will  declare  his  intention  to  set  off  on  a  long 
journey,  or  by  many  slight  indications  show  that  his  mind  is 
reduced  to  imbecility.  In  some,  the  effects  of  the  recent 
restraint  of  a  stranger's  presence  may  be  more  permanent 
than  in  others ;  but  half  an  hour,  or  a  few  hours  at  the  utmost, 
will  suffice  to  show  the  state  of  the  case.  The  decision  is 
important,  and  due  time  must  be  allowed  for  it.  If  one  visit 
is  not  sufficient,  the  visit  should  be  repeated,  until  the  prac- 
titioner can  give  a  clear  and  decided  opinion. 

"  But  now  comes  the  other  danger.  A  sanguine  practi- 
tioner sees  the  undoubted  signs  of  folly  and  weakness  in  the 
old  man,  and  forgetting  that  they  are  as  much  the  effects  of 
age  as  are  the  unsteadiness  of  his  limbs,  and  the  dulness  of 
his  hearing,  pronounces  the  patient  to  be  mad ;  and  to 
gratify  persons  of  no  feeling  or  compunction,  consigns  the 
poor  patient  to  strange  hands,  and  causes  him  to  spend  the 
little  remnant  of  his  days  away  from  his  own  house,  and 
unseen  by  any  of  those  whom  his  former  care  perhaps 
preserved,  and  whom  his  wealth  will  enrich."  1 

§  496.  The  principles  we  have  indicated,  as  proper  to 
guide  us  in  deciding  questions  of  interdiction  in  the  various 

1  Indications  of  Insanity,  440. 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  491 

forms  of  imbecility  and  mania,  are  not  to  be  so  implicitly 
relied  on  here,  because  the  unfitness  of  the  patient  to  man- 
age his  own  concerns  is  often  proved,  not  so  much  by  spe- 
cific acts  of  extravagance  or  folly  as  by  his  subjection  to  the 
will  of  those  who  are  deliberately  and  cautiously  preying 
upon  his  substance.  "We  may  also  bear  in  mind,  that 
although  we  take  from  him  the  control  of  his  property,  even 
while  his  faculties  are  sound  enough  to  make  him  capable  of 
performing  the  duty  himself,  yet  we  are  only  prernaturely 
taking  a  measure  which  a  few  weeks  or  months  will  generally 
render  absolutely  necessary. 

§  497.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  cases  of  insanity 
where  the  mental  disorder  does  not  seem  sufficient  to  war- 
rant so  extreme  a  measure  as  complete  interdiction,  while  it 
occasions  reasonable  doubts  of  the  ability  to  manage  prop- 
erty with  ordinary  prudence,  our  laws  have  established  no 
inferior  grades  of  restraint.  The  civil  code  of  France  ordains 
that,  "  in  rejecting  a  demand  for  interdiction,  the  court  may, 
nevertheless,  if  circumstances  require  it,  debar  the  defendant 
from  appearing  in  suits,  making  contracts,  borrowing,  receiv- 
ing payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  discharge,  alienating  or 
pledging  his  property,  without  the  aid  of  a  council  which 
shall  be  appointed  in  the  same  judgment."  1  It  would  be 
well,  if  something  of  this  kind  always  found  a  place  in  the 
legal  regulations  of  the  insane. 

§  498.  The  views  here  presented  on  the  propriety  of 
interdiction  in  different  kinds  of  insanity,  can,  at  the  most, 
affect  only  the  opinions  of  the  expert,  or  the  conclusions  of 
the  judge.  They  cannot  easily  be  embodied  into  a  legisla- 
tive enactment,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  the  slightest  attempt 
thereto,  would  not  be  productive  of  uncertainty  and  embar- 
rassment. In  the  French  civil  code  it  is  enacted  that  only 
habitual  imbecility,  dementia,  or  furor,  can  be  a  sufficient 
cause  of  interdiction.2  In  thus  requiring  the  alienation  to 
have  been  habitual,  it  was  the  object  of  the  legislator,  no 
doubt,  to  prevent  the  abuses  that  might  arise,  if  this  measure 

1  Code  civil,  art.  499.  2  Art  489. 


492  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

were  allowed  in  those  temporary  alienations  that  readily 
yield  to  medical  treatment.  But  as  no  two  individuals 
would  probably  agree  as  to  the  number  of  weeks  or  months 
necessary  to  make  a  case  of  insanity  habitual,  the  law  must, 
of  necessity,  either  be  entirely  disregarded  in  practice,  or  be- 
come the  means  of  great  injustice,  in  consequence  of  the 
diversity  of  interpretation  to  which  it  is  liable.  Georget 
observes,  that  in  Paris,  the  judge  is  always  governed  by  the 
opinion  of  the  patient's  physician,  relative  to  the  future  pro- 
gress and  result  of  the  disease,  rather  than  its  previous  dura- 
tion.1 The  French  jurists  have  disagreed  as  to  the  construc- 
tion intended  to  be  put  on  the  terms,  imbecility,  etc.  While 
some  contend  that  these  terms  are  thus  multiplied,  merely 
in  order  to  embrace  every  possible  form  of  mental  disorder, 
it  is  contended  by  others,  thai  the  legislator's  object  was  to 
prevent  interdiction  on  account  of  any  mental  disorder  which 
could  not  fairly  be  brought  under  one  of  these  divisions. 
The  consequence  is  what  might  be  expected  —  the  law  is 
practically  disregarded  altogether. 

§  499.  What  the  legislator  can  and  ought  to  do,  is  to 
provide  for  the  impartial  administration  of  justice  where  in- 
terdiction is  provoked,  by  such  a  course  of  procedure  as 
will  tend  to  bring  out  all  the  material  facts.  In  France  the 
facts  of  the  case  must  be  stated  in  writing,  and  supported 
by  documents  and  witnesses ;  the  family-council  gives  its 
opinion  touching  the  utility  of  the  measure;  and  the  re- 
spondent is  examined  by  the  court  and  the  attorney-general. 
If  the  examination  and  the  documents  are  not  satisfactory, 
the  court  may  order  an  inquest.  The  same  formalities  are 
required  for  removing  the  interdiction.2  In  England  inter- 
diction is  obtained  by  application  to  the  Lord  Chancellor 
who  appoints  a  Commission  of  Lunacy,  consisting  of  three 
or  five  persons,  who  cause  a  jury  to  be  summoned  with 
whom  the  commissioners  sit  as  a  court,  and  hear  the  evi- 
dence adduced.  The  inquisition  may  be  traversed,  though 
the  chancellor  be  satisfied  with  it.  In  some  of  the  United 

1  Discussion  med.  leg.  174.  2  Code  civil,  art.  493,  494,  495. 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  493 

States,  this  method  is  still  preserved,  except  that  in  such  as 
have  no  chancery  court,  the  commission  is  issued  by  a  court 
of  law.  In  most  of  them,  however,  application  is  made  to  the 
judge  of  probate  who  gives  due  notice  to  the  respondent,  ap- 
points a  time  and  place  for  the  hearing  of  the  case,  and  decides 
without  the  intervention  of  a  jury.  This  course  is  far  pre- 
ferable to  the  English,  on  the  ground  of  expense,  and  proba- 
bly the  ends  of  justice  are  as  fully  obtained  as  if  the  case  were 
submitted  to  a  jury.  In  the  German  States,  medical  evi- 
dence is  always  required  by  the  law,  and  the  opinions  of  the 
physicians  govern  the  decision  of  the  judge.  In  Prussia,  for 
instance,  the  law  ordains  that  in  all  cases  involving  the 
question  of  insanity,  the  opinions  thereon  of  two  physicians 
shall  be  obtained,  one  of  whom  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  friends 
or  relations  of  the  party  whose  sanity  is  questioned,  and  the 
other  by  the  court ;  and  no  person  can  be  pronounced  insane 
by  the  court,  unless  so  considered  by  both  physicians.1  No 
provision  can  be  better  than  this  for  settling  the  question 
of  insanity,  though  whether  it  be  sufficient  to  warrant  inter- 
diction, is  another  question  in  the  decision  of  which  other 
considerations  must  enter. 

§  500.  Isolation  is  a  measure  entirely  distinct  from  that 
of  interdiction,  and  neither  should  be  considered,  as  they 
sometimes  are,  necessarily  dependent  on  the  other.  On  no 
point  in  the  whole  range  of  the  subject  under  consideration, 
is  it  more  necessary  that  we  entertain  clear  and  definite 
notions,  than  on  that  of  the  restraint  of  the  insane,  because, 
while  often  essential  to  the  restoration  or  comfort  of  the 
patient,  and  to  the  safety  of  the  community,  it  is,  at  the  same 
time,  liable  to  serious  abuses.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  this 
measure,  important  as  it  is,  has  seldom  been  regulated  by 
any  express  provisions  of  law.  In  France  this  measure  is  al- 
together unknown  to  the  laws,  except  in  relation  to  those 
whose  liberty  might  endanger  the  safety  of  society.  Such, 
and  such  only,  the  municipal  authorities  are  required  to  con- 
fine. The  Penal  Code,  art.  341,  inflicts  the  punishment  of 

1  Schroder,  delegibus  in  commodum  mente  alienatorum,  197. 

42 


494  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

hard  labor  on  any  one  who  shall  arrest,  detain,  or  sequester 
the  person  of  another  not  charged  with  any  criminal  offence, 
without  the  order  of  the  constituted  authorities.  The  4th 
article  of  the  charter  of  1830,  also  declares  that  "  no  person 
can  be  pursued  or  arrested,  except  in  cases  provided  by  the 
law,  and  in  the  forms  that  it  prescribes."  Of  course,  estab- 
lishments for  the  reception  of  the  insane  exist,  but  their  whole 
economy  is  regulated  by  their  respective  governments.  "  In 
many  departments,"  says  Esquirol,  "  it  is  sufficient  to  apply 
to  the  administration  of  the  hospital  or  asylum,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  admission  of  a  patient.  In  some  places  the 
authorization  of  the  mayor  is  necessary,  if  the  establishment 
is  communal ;  of  the  prefect,  if  it  is  departmental.  In  a  few 
establishments,  the  patient  must  be  interdicted  before  he  can 
gain  admission."  The  necessity  of  express  legislation  on 
this  subject  is  generally  felt,  and  within  the  last  year  or  two, 
it  has  received  the  attention  of  the  legislature,  but  with 
what  result  we  are  unable  to  say.  In  the  civil  code  of  Aus- 
tria, it  is  ordained  that  no  person  can  be  confined  on  account 
of  insanity,  who  has  not  been  legally  declared  to  be  insane 
by  physicians  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  his 
mental  condition.  In  this  country,  the  law  as  it  relates  to 
the  isolation  of  the  insane,  is  in  very  nearly  the  same  con- 
dition as  that  of  France,  except  in  those  States  which  pos- 
sess hospitals  that  are  controlled  and  supported  by  govern- 
ment. Isolation  is  also  sanctioned  by  the  law  when  adopted 
as  a  measure  of  police.  In  England,  a  person  cannot  be  ad- 
mitted into  any  lunatic  asylum,  without  a  certificate  of  his 
insanity,  signed  by  two  physicians,  within  seven  days  of  his 
admission. 

§  501.  The  seclusion  of  a  person  from  his  family  and  cus- 
tomary pursuits,  on  account  of  insanity,  should  be  regulated 
by  provisions  having  reference  to  the  varying  circumstances 
that  may  arise,  and  applicable  with  a  suitable  degree  of  ease 
and  quietness.  A  uniform  mode  of  proceeding  would  secure 
no  advantages  that  would  not  be  counterbalanced,  either  by 
a  degree  of  publicity  and  delay  exceedingly  painful  in  a 
majority  of  cases,  while  totally  unnecessary  and  uncalled  for, 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  495 

or  by  a  want  of  that  impartial  inquisition  which,  in  a  few  cases, 
is  necessary  to  remove  every  suspicion  of  unfair  dealing.  It 
seems  better  to  suit  the  provision  to  the  nature  of  the  case, 
and  on  this  principle  we  have  acted  in  making  the  following 
suggestions. 

§  502.  When  a  person  is  struck  down  by  disease,  and  is 
no  longer  capable  of  caring  for  himself,  he  is  completely  de- 
pendent on  those  around  him  —  his  family,  his  relatives,  his 
neighbors,  and  even  the  passing  stranger.  To  this  appeal  for 
sympathy  and  care,  the  ties  of  kindred,  the  holiest  instincts 
of  our  nature,  a  sense  of  duty,  a  decent  regard  for  the  opin- 
ion of  mankind,  each  or  all  prompt  a  favorable  answer,  and 
the  sacred  ministry  thus  exercised  is  instinctively  regarded 
with  feelings  of  respect  and  honor.  It  does  not  appear,  at 
first  sight  at  least,  that  there  is  any  difference  in  the  relations 
of  the  parties,  when  the  disease  is  mental,  instead  of  bodily. 
The  essential  conditions  of  the  case  are  the  same.  The  indi- 
vidual, if  not  utterly  helpless,  is  incapable  of  judging  what  is 
best  for  himself,  and  needs  appropriate  attendance  and  medical 
treatment.  Here  then,  as  in  case  of  bodily  disease,  the  duty  of 
making  such  provisions  as  the  welfare  of  the  patient  may 
require,  naturally  falls  upon  those  immediately  around  him 
or  near  him.  Nature  prompts  it,  the  common  sentiment  of 
mankind  expects  it,  in  most  cases  all  parties  are  ultimately 
satisfied  with  it,  and  the  legislature  should  legalize  it. 

§  503.  The  doctrine  of  the  common  law  on  this  point 
has  not  been  interpreted  with  the  uniformity  which  the  im- 
portance of  the  subject  requires.  Not  long  since,  Chief  Jus- 
tice Shaw  of  this  State  laid  down  the  broad  principle,  that 
the  friends  of  an  insane  person  are  authorized  in  confining 
him  in  a  hospital,  by  "  the  great  law  of  humanity." 1  On 
the  other  hand,  within  a  year  or  two,  the  Lord  Chief  Baron 
of  the  English  Court  of  Exchequer  incidentally  remarked,  that 
insane  persons  could  not  be  legally  held  in  confinement  un- 
less dangerous  to  themselves  or  to  others.2  In  this  opinion 


1  Law  Reporter,  viiL  122. 

2  Nottidge  v.  Ripley,  Law  Reporter,  N.  S.  ii.  277. 


496  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

he  was  undoubtedly  wrong,  because  the  legislature  had 
granted  the  power  (8  &  9  Victoria,  c.  100),  but  it  indicates 
his  interpretation  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject.  If, 
therefore,  the  friends  of  the  insane  are  to  enjoy  the  privilege 
of  providing  for  them  in  such  a  manner  as  they  may  deem 
most  suitable  for  their  welfare,  there  seems  to  be  a  manifest 
propriety  in  securing  it  by  a  legislative  act.  The  provision 
which,  in  accordance  with  these  views  we  have  adopted,  in- 
sures the  indispensable  requisites  of  a  great  majority  of 
cases,  —  despatch,  domestic  privacy,  and  those  natural  rights 
that  flow  from  the  family  relation,  —  and,  considered  in  all  its 
aspects,  is  both  wise  and  humane.  That  the  power  might 
sometimes  be  abused,  is  not  denied,  but  such  a  result  would 
be  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  would  be  effectually 
remedied  by  the  provisions  hereafter  mentioned.  For  obvi- 
ous reasons  we  would  give  the  same  power  to  the  guardian 
over  his  ward,  and  to  the  proper  municipal  authorities  over 
their  paupers. 

§  504.  A  very  different  provision  is  required  for  a  smaller 
class  of  cases,  in  order  to  secure,  in  the  fullest  degree,  the 
rights  of  persons  and  the  confidence  of  the  public.  We  all 
know  that  insanity  does  not  always  derange  every  operation 
of  the  mind,  and  deprive  the  patient  of  every  attribute  of  a 
rational  being.  Under  certain  circumstances,  his  conduct 
and  conversation  are  marked  by  ordinary  propriety  and  dis- 
cretion, and  to  those  who  regard  him  superficially,  he  appears 
to  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  feelings  and  motives  of  men. 
At  the  worst,  he  may  be  supposed  to  be  only  a  little  ec- 
centric, or  to  give  way  too  readily  to  passion  and  impulse. 
To  those,  however,  whose  relations  towards  him  place  them 
immediately  under  his  control,  and  whose  presence  furnishes 
no  check  upon  the  manifestations  of  his  character,  he  appears 
very  differently.  They  witness  a  degree  of  mental  excite- 
ment and  restlessness,  an  extravagance  in  his  prospects  and 
plans,  a  readiness  to  embark  in  new  and  hazardous  specula- 
tions, an  indulgence  in  habits  of  living  beyond  his  means  or 
unsuitable  to  his  condition,  an  impatience  at  the  slightest 
show  of  opposition  or  restraint,  unfounded  suspicions  and 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  497 

jealousies,  and  the  most  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  conduct  in 
his  family,  all  which  traits  are  foreign  to  his  natural  charac- 
ter, and  perhaps  of  recent  origin.  He  at  last  evinces  so  little 
control  over  his  passions,  or  is  so  completely  possessed  by 
his  morbid  fancies,  that  the  peace  and  comfort  of  those  in  any 
way  dependent  upon  him,  are  destroyed,  and  they  are  in 
momentary  fear  of  personal  violence.  Besides  this,  he  may 
be  squandering  his  estate  in  a  series  of  ruinous  undertakings, 
and  rapidly  bringing  his  family  to  beggary,  or  plunging  into 
unlawful  indulgences  that  fill  them  with  shame  and  sorrow. 
Now  when  such  a  person  is  placed  by  his  friends  in  a  hos- 
pital, the  discipline  of  which  is  necessary,  not  only  to  secure 
the  safety  of  others,  but  to  restore  him  to  his  natural  and 
healthy  condition  of  mind,  he  declares  that  he  is  the  victim 
of  an  iniquitous  cabal,  and  so  plausible  and  ingenious  are  his 
representations,  that  the  most  intelligent  and  cautious  are 
sometimes  led  to  suspect  that  he  has  not  been  fairly  dealt 
with.  "Wearied  by  his  incessant  importunities,  and  doubtful, 
perhaps,  of  the  propriety  of  his  confinement,  he  is  finally 
discharged  by  the  directors  of  the  institution,  to  renew  the 
same  course  of  ruinous  enterprises  and  domestic  tyranny, 
with  the  addition,  it  may  be,  of  a  lawsuit  against  his  friends 
for  false  imprisonment.  Even  though  he  fail  by  these  manoeu- 
vres  to  shorten  the  period  of  his  confinement  before  it  has 
produced  any  salutary  effects,  his  mind  is  kept  in  a  state  of 
agitation  and  wrath  that  might,  in  some  degree,  have  been 
avoided,  if  the  measure  had  come  from  a  different  quarter, 
and  with  some  of  the  formalities  of  a  legal  procedure. 

§  505.  The  condition  of  a  family  whose  head  is  laboring 
under  the  form  of  insanity  described  above,  is  sufficiently 
painful  and  embarrassing,  without  imposing  upon  it  the  ne- 
cessity of  adopting  the  only  appropriate  measure,  unaided  by 
any  of  the  sanctions  and  helps  of  law.  To  provoke  the 
wrath  of  such  a  person  by  what  he  would  consider  the  most 
flagrant  indignity  and  outrage,  would  be  too  fearful  a  thing 
to  be  ventured  upon  until  patience  had  been  tried  to  the 
utmost  limit  of  endurance,  or  some  overt  act  of  violence 
called  for  immediate  action.  Neither  is  it  a  small  thing  to 

42* 


498  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

provoke  the  criticism  of  the  public  by  taking  a  step  of  this 
importance,  the  necessity  of  which  may  not  be  unequivo- 
cally obvious  to  the  world.  In  such  cases  the  public  is 
severe  in  its  judgments,  and  not  particularly  careful  to  weigh 
the  parties  in  an  even  balance. 

§  506.  In  the  same  category,  too,  we  would  place  those 
persons  who  are  insane  enough  to  require  confinement,  but 
have  no  relatives  or  friends  with  sufficient  interest  in  their 
welfare  to  induce  them  to  assume  so  unpleasant  and  respon- 
sible a  duty  as  that  of  placing  them  in  confinement. 

§  507.  After  due  consideration  of  the  various  means  that 
might  be  adopted  for  determining  the  question  of  seclusion, 
in  regard  to  the  cases  above-mentioned,  we  can  think  of 
none  better  than  that  of  a  commission,  so  constituted  that  its 
decisions  shall  command  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the 
community.  It  should  consist  of  not  less  than  four  nor  more 
than  six  persons,  one  of  them  a  lawyer  and  another  a  physi- 
cian, for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  suitable  direction  to  the 
inquisition,  who  should  have  the  party  brought  before  them, 
hear  the  testimony,  and  render  a  decision  accordingly.  Of 
course  they  should  have  the  power  of  ordering  him  to  be  held 
in  custody  pending  the  proceedings.  The  authority  appoint- 
ing the  commission  should  be  as  accessible  as  possible,  to 
insure  the  necessary  despatch,  and  might  be  lodged  with  the 
judges  of  the  law  courts,  and  also  with  judges  of  probate 
where  these  functionaries  are  at  all  distinguished  from  the 
average  run  of  men  by  superior  knowledge  and  respectability. 
The  application  should  be  made  in  writing  by  some  friend 
or  relative,  and  should  present  the  grounds  on  which  the 
allegation  of  insanity  is  to  be  established.  The  success  of 
this  proceeding  would  very  much  depend  on  the  character  of 
the  individuals  composing  the  commission,  and  no  act  of  the 
legislature  could  regulate  that  exactly.  It  is  probable,  how- 
ever, that  the  importance  would  be  felt  of  intrusting  so  deli- 
cate and  responsible  a  duty  to  men,  whose  intelligence  and 
virtues  have  given  them  a  merited  weight  of  character  in  the 
public  estimation. 

§  508.     There  is  still  another  class  of  the  insane  for  whose 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  499 

committal  a  mode  of  procedure  is  required,  different  from 
both  of  those  already  mentioned,  —  those  whose  disorder 
renders  them  dangerous  to  the  community,  and  who  have 
no  friends  to  take  them  in  charge,  and  provide  for  them  ac- 
cording as  their  necessities  may  require.  Most,  if  not  all  the 
New  England  States,  and  perhaps  others,  have  a  statute 
which  gives  to  a  magistrate  the  power  of  committing  to 
some  place  of  confinement,  "persons  furiously  mad  and  dan- 
gerous to  be  at  large."  This  provision  should  be  retained. 
Indeed,  there  seems  to  be  no  other  way  by  which  this  class 
of  persons  can  receive  the  attentions  that  common  feelings 
of  humanity  and  a  regard  for  public  order  would  dictate. 
As  they  are,  for  the  most  part,  destitute  and  friendless,  and 
become  a  charge  to  the  community  where  they  are  arrested, 
there  can  be  no  inducement  to  seek  their  confinement  un- 
justly. It  wotdd  not  be  impossible,  certainly,  for  wicked  and 
cunning  men  to  make  the  statute  an  instrument  of  great 
injustice  ;  but  the  objection  arising  from  such  a  contingency 
may  be  obviated  by  the  fact,  that  if  the  case  present  any 
suspicious  circumstances,  the  magistrate  may  decline  to  take 
cognizance  thereof,  and  refer  the  parties  to  the  provisions 
just  mentioned. 

§  509.  Having  thus  provided  for  the  restraint  of  the 
different  classes  of  persons  who  may  require  it,  the  next  step 
would  be  to  provide  for  their  restoration  to  liberty.  For  the 
most  part,  the  latter  measure,  like  the  original  restraint, 
should  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  family  or  friends.  The 
same  authority,  also,  which  commits  persons  "  furiously  mad 
and  dangerous  to  be  at  large,"  should  have  the  power  of  dis- 
charging them,  when  satisfied  that  the  original  objects  of 
their  confinement  will  be  properly  cared  for.  It  is  proper, 
too,  that  those  who  have  guaranteed  the  payment  of  the 
expenses  of  an  insane  person  in  a  place  of  confinement, 
should  have  the  power  of  removing  him,  if  that  is  requisite 
in  order  to  close  their  liabilities.  Reasons  may  occur  that 
would  render  it  as  expedient  to  withdraw  from  such  an  obli- 
gation, as  it  might  have  been  to  assume  it  originally,  and  if, 
by  the  conditions  of  the  obligation,  the  patient  must  be 


500  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

removed  before  it  can  be  discharged,  then  most  clearly  the 
surety  should  have  that  power. 

§  510.  There  now  remains  but  one  more  class  whose  dis- 
charge from  confinement  we  have  to  consider, — those  who 
claim  their  liberty  on  the  ground  of  being  unjustly  confined. 
The  injustice  may  consist  in  being  confined  without  having 
ever  been  insane,  or  in  the  confinement  being  continued 
after  recovery  from  the  disorder.  We  can  conceive  of  no 
better  mode  of  meeting  such  cases,  than  by  a  process  very 
similar  to  that  by  which  those  are  committed  whose  friends 
do  not  choose  to  assume  the  responsibility.  There  would 
be  a  convenience  in  making  the  trustees,  directors,  or  by 
whatever  name  that  body  may  be  called  which  has  the  gen- 
eral supervision  of  the  hospital,  this  committee,  as  they  could 
discharge  the  duty  quietly  and  cheaply,  with  the  peculiar 
advantage  of  having  often  observed  the  party  in  question  and 
heard  his  statements  from  his  own  lips.  But  their  official 
connection  with  the  institution  might  be  thought  to  bias 
their  opinions,  and  therefore  there  seems  to  be  a  propriety 
in  forming  the  commission  of  persons  having  no  previous 
knowledge  of  the  parties.  It  should  be  an  indispensable 
condition  that  they  should  have  an  interview  with  the  patient, 
but  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be  attended  with  any 
formalities,  or  that  he  should  be  aware  of  its  object.  The 
proceeding  is  in  the  nature  of  an  inquisition,  not  a  trial  by 
jury,  and  hence  the  commission  may  not  be  bound  by  any 
formal  rules  in  pursuing  their  object.  Indeed,  the  great 
advantage  of  this  method  over  a  judicial  investigation  pro- 
cured by  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  is,  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
attended  with  a  degree  of  formality  and  publicity  calculated 
to  excite  injuriously  the  mind  of  an  insane  person,  and  also 
to  produce  a  mischievous  effect  upon  the  minds  of  other 
patients  in  the  same  establishment. 

§  511.  It  often  happens,  that  insane  persons  are  attacked 
with  bodily  disease,  when  their  friends  are  desirous  of  taking 
them  home,  and  contributing  whatever  may  be  in  their 
power  to  the  solace  of  their  declining  days.  The  character 
of  their  disorder  also  often  changes,  so  that  they  can  be  safely 


INTERDICTION  AND  ISOLATION.  501 

managed  at  their  own  homes ;  and  sometimes  there  may  be 
reasons  for  merely  changing  the  place  of  confinement.  In 
all  these  contingencies,  the  grounds  on  which  the  discharge 
of  the  patient  is  sought  for,  are  so  reasonable,  that  the  order 
of  a  judge  should  be  sufficient  without  the  interference  of  a 
commission. 

§  512.  The  above  provisions,  we  apprehend,  will  meet 
every  contingency  incident  to  the  confinement,  or  discharge 
therefrom,  of  the  insane.  They  possess  the  necessary 
requisites  of  despatch,  convenience,  cheapness,  and  regard  to 
private  feelings.  By  suiting  the  provision  to  the  particular 
emergency,  we  avoid  the  insuperable  objections  that  would 
lie  against  any  single  provision  intended  for  application  to 
all  classes  of  cases.  By  far  the  larger  class  require  no  legal 
procedure  at  all,  and  are  better  left  to  the  management  of  the 
family  or  friends.  To  subject  them  to  any  legal  formalities 
beyond  a  compliance  with  a  few  simple  rules,  would  be  to 
inflict  needless  pain,  and  thus  produce  a  certain  evil  in  order 
to  avoid  a  contingent  one.  The  much  smaller  class,  which 
require  some  judicial  investigation,  are  provided  for  by  a 
mode  of  procedure,  familiar  to  our  practices,  accessible, 
cheap,  and  well  calculated  to  satisfy  the  public  mind.  The 
commission,  let  it  be  observed,  is  its  only  essential  feature. 
The  manner  in  which  it  shall  be  constituted,  and  the  au- 
thority from  which  it  shall  emanate,  are  subordinate,  though 
important  points,  which  must  or  ought  to  vary  with  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  particular  community.  To  insure  the 
successful  working  of  the  system,  the  appointment  of  the 
commission  should  be  conferred  upon  functionaries  having 
some  practical  acquaintance  with  law  proceedings,  and  suffi- 
ciently cultivated  and  enlightened  to  be  above  the  influence 
of  vulgar  prejudices.  On  this  account  we  have  selected  for 
the  purpose,  the  justices  of  the  law  courts,  and  perhaps  those 
of  the  probate  courts,  and  in  sparsely  populated  parts  of  our 
country,  the  public  convenience  might  be  served  by  adding 
to  them  the  sheriff  of  the  county.  In  most  respects,  it  would 
be  decidedly  better  if  the  duties  of  these  commissions  were 
performed  by  a  single  permanent  board  appointed  by  the 


502  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

government.  The  members  of  such  a  board  would  naturally 
make  themselves  acquainted,  by  all  the  means  in  their 
power,  with  the  subjects  of  inquiry  that  would  come  before 
them,  and  frequent  practice  would  give  that  familiarity  with 
their  duty  that  would  enable  them  to  avoid  mistake,  and 
inspire  confidence  in  their  decisions.  The  only  conceivable 
objection  to  the  plan  would  be,  the  large  amount  of  travelling 
expenses  to  which  it  would  lead,  especially  in  large  States, 
and  this  would  be  sufficient,  probably,  to  outweigh  its  ac- 
knowledged advantages. 

§  513.  In  order  to  prevent  any  infringement  of  the  laws 
respecting  the  confinement  of  the  insane,  the  first  setp  would 
be,  to  render  it  a  penal  offence  for  the  directors  or  superin- 
tendents of  hospitals  to  receive  patients,  except  in  strict  con- 
formity to  the  laws.  In  respect  to  persons  admitted  under 
the  first  section,  a  certificate  of  insanity  from  one  or  more 
physicians  should  be  required,  as  well  as  a  written  request 
for  admission  from  some  relative  or  friend.  Beyond  this  we 
do  not  know  that  any  safeguard  would  be  practicable  or 
necessary,  and,  considering  the  provisions  that  furnish  a 
remedy  against  any  possible  abuse,  we  see  not  how  any  fault 
can  be  reasonably  found  with  it. 


CHAPTER    XXVII. 


DUTIES   OF  MEDICAL  WITNESSES. 

§  514.  BOOKS  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  usually  contain 
a  chapter  on  MEDICAL  EVIDENCE,  in  which  the  general  sub- 
ject is  discussed.  There  are  some  points,  however,  connected 
with  such  evidence  in  cases  involving  questions  of  insanity, 
which  require  a  more  special  consideration.  Cases  of  this 
kind  have  now  become  so  common,  that  it  is  highly  impor- 
tant for  the  medical  witness  to  know  precisely  what  are  his 
duties,  as  well  as  the  difficulties  which  he  is  likely  to  encoun- 
ter. 

§  515.  Unlike  the  ordinary  witness  who  relates  only  what 
comes  within  the  cognizance  of  his  own  senses,  the  expert 
testifies  respecting  the  inferences  that  may  "be  drawn  from  the 
facts  related  by  others.  In  other  words,  certain  facts  being 
given,  the  expert  is  required  to  state  the  general  principle  which 
they  indicate  in  regard  to  the  question  at  issue.  This  method 
of  obtaining  information  on  scientific  subjects  is  as  inappro- 
priate as  possible,  but,  in  this  respect,  our  rules  of  evidence 
recognize  no  distinction  between  matters  of  fact  and  matters 
of  opinion.  In  regard  to  the  latter  as  well  as  the  former, 
the  testimony  is  off-hand,  with  no  other  preparation  than 
what  may  have  been  anticipated  by  a  shrewd  conjecture  as 
to  the  course  of  inquiry  which  the  examination  might  pursue. 
Objectionable,  however,  as  this  method  is,  it  is  the  only  one 
known  to  our  laws,  and  its  requirements  must  be  met  in 
the  best  possible  manner. 

§  516.  The  expert  should  be  prepared  for  his  duty  by 
a  well-ordered,  well-digested,  comprehensive  knowledge  of 
mental  phenomena  in  a  sound  as  well  as  unsound  state. 


504  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

The  question  which,  in  one  shape  or  another,  is  put  to  him, 
is  whether  or  not,  certain  mental  phenomena  indicate  mental 
unsoundness.  The  true  character  of  doubtful  cases  cannot 
be  discerned  at  a  glance.  The  delicate  shades  of  disorder 
can  only  be  recognized  by  one  who  has  closely  studied  the 
operations  of  the  healthy  mind,  and  is  familiar  with  that 
broad,  debatable  ground  that  lies  between  unquestionable 
sanity  and  unquestionable  insanity.  How  little  dependence 
could  be  placed  on  the  testimony  of  a  physician  concerning 
the  results  of  a  cadaveric  autopsy,  who  has  not,  by  frequent 
inspection,  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  healthy  appear- 
ance of  the  organs.  How  this  knowledge  is  to  be  obtained, 
is  a  question  not  easily  answered.  In  books  on  mental  philos- 
ophy the  various  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind  are  un- 
folded and  described,  with  a  show  of  scientific  precision.  But 
the  expert  will  derive  from  them  little  aid  in  preparing  him- 
self for  his  duties,  for  the  reason  that  their  investigations  are 
partial,  being  confined  chiefly  to  the  individual's  own  mind, 
overlooking  the  manifestations  of  mind  as  affected  by  disease. 
If  any  books  are  to  be  studied,  it  should  be  those  immortal 
works  which  represent  men  in  the  concrete,  living,  acting, 
speaking  men,  displaying  the  affections  and  passions,  the 
manners  and  motives  of  actual  men.  Locke  and  Stewart 
will  here  be  found  of  less  service  than  Shakspeare  and 
Moliere.  But  better  than  all  books,  though  their  aid  is  not  to 
be  despised,  are  personal  observation,  and  study  of  mental 
phenomena  as  strikingly  exhibited  in  real  life.  Every  men- 
tal peculiarity,  especially  in  the  normal  condition,  and,  above 
all,  those  traits  of  character  that  mark  the  transition  between 
health  and  disease,  should  be  closely  observed.  The  expert 
should  learn  to  distinguish  the  thoughts  and  manners  of  the 
one  condition  from  those  of  the  other,  and  endeavor  to  gain  a 
ready  perception  of  the  general  air  and  tone  characteristic  of 
each.  No  kind  of  preparation  will  better  fit  him  for  perform- 
ing the  peculiar  duty  of  an  expert,  which  consists  in  forming 
opinions  respecting  mental  conditions,  from  a  few  and  per- 
haps disconnected  facts.  Without  it  he  will  be  constantly 
liable  to  the  mistake  of  regarding  a  trait  or  act  as  indicative 


DUTIES   OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  505 

of  disease,  for  no  other  reason  perhaps,  than  because  it  occurs 
in  a  case  supposed  to  be  doubtful,  and  of  confounding  natu- 
ral eccentricities  and  impulses  with  the  manifestations  of  ac- 
tive insanity.  The  expert  who  is  deficient  in  this  kind  of 
knowledge  can  never  be  a  reliable  witness  in  questions  of 
insanity. 

§  517.  However  well  prepared  the  witness  may  be,  he 
will  find  it  necessary  to  be  on  his  guard  against  another  dis- 
advantage incident  to  our  method  of  eliciting  evidence.  He 
is  called  by  the  party  that  has  reason  to  believe,  that  his  tes- 
timony will  serve  the  purpose  of  the  latter.  He  is,  in  form 
at  least,  that  party's  witness,  engaged  by  him,  and  by  him 
made  acquainted  with  all  that  he  knows  respecting  the  mer- 
its of  the  case.  Counsel  look  at  one  side  of  the  question 
only,  and  naturally  endeavor  to  make  the  expert  participate 
their  views,  while  their  intercourse  is  marked  by  a  kind  of 
cordiality  and  fellow-feeling  somewhat  adverse  to  that  inde- 
pendence which  the  expert  should  never  relinquish.  The 
consequence  of  such  a  relation  is  that  he  can  scarcely  help 
testifying  under  a  bias.  In  many  cases,  no  doubt,  this  would 
be  unavoidable  under  any  mode  of  procedure,  and  the  only 
thing  the  expert  can  do,  is  to  shun  the  evils  of  this  arrange- 
ment as  much  as  he  possibly  can. 

There  are  other  points  in  regard  to  which  an  expert  not 
much  familiar  with  courts,  may  be  benefited  by  a  word  or 
two  of  advice. 

§  518.  In  the  first  place,  let  him  beware  how  he  suffers  the 
dread  of  being  thought  ignorant  of  his  profession,  to  draw 
from  him  a  positive  and  unqualified  reply,  where  a  modest 
doubt  would  have  better  expressed  the  extent  of  his  knowl- 
edge. It  is  not  expected,  that  on  the  spur  of  the  moment, 
without  any  special  preparation,  he  should  always  be  ready 
to  express  an  opinion  on  an  obscure  point,  or  one  somewhat 
remote  from  the  line  of  his  ordinary  duties.  Neither  court 
nor  counsel  ever  commit  a  folly  like  this.  They  are  careful 
to  make  their  opinions  the  result  of  calm,  deliberate  reflection, 
and  thorough  research.  And  why  should  the  physician  do 
otherwise  ?  Life  and  death  may  be  involved  in  his  testimony, 

43 


506  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

and  the  consequence  of  his  rash  confidence  may  be  the  ruin 
of  a  fellow  being,  and  a  harvest  of  self-upbraiding  to  himself. 
He  loses  no  reputation  necessarily,  by  honestly  stating  that 
he  is  unprepared  to  give  an  opinion  without  mature  consider- 
ation, but  he  cannot  help  losing  much  by  taking  the  opposite 
course.  He  should  also  bear  -in  mind  that  the  object  of 
counsel,  as  every  body  knows,  is  not  so  much  to  elicit  the 
truth  as  to  serve  their  client,  and  thus  every  particular  question, 
as  well  as  the  general  tenor  of  the  examination,  is  adapted  to 
this  purpose.  They  form  an  hypothesis,  or  lay  down  a  plan 
of  operations,  and  then  frame  their  questions  so  as  to  bring 
out  the  wished  for  reply.  Let  the  witness  never  forget,  there- 
fore, that  every  question  has  its  object,  and  take  care  that 
his  answer  be  carefully  considered. 

§  519.  It  also  happens  that  an  ignorance  of  medical 
terms,  if  not  of  medical  subjects,  often  prevents  the  counsel 
from  using  language  with  that  degree  of  precision  which  is 
indispensable  in  the  discussion  of  scientific  subjects.  The 
witness  should  insist,  therefore,  on  having  the  question  clearly 
expressed,  and  never  allow  himself  to  answer  a  question 
he  does  not  thoroughly  comprehend.  Equally  necessary  is 
it  for  him  to  be  careful  how  he  returns  categorical  answers 
to  the  questions  put  to  him,  for  they  are  apt  to  leave  wrong 
impressions  upon  those  who  are  imperfectly  acquainted  with 
the  subject,  and  may  be  adroitly  used  to  embarrass  the  wit- 
ness and  discredit  his  testimony.  If  he  would  avoid  this 
result,  he  must,  in  spite  of  the  authoritative  demand  for  a  yes 
or  a  no,  so  qualify  and  explain  his  answers,  as  to  prevent  any 
mistake  of  their  meaning,  and  no  dread  of  amplification 
should  deter  him  from  this  purpose.  Let  him  bear  in  mind 
that  he  has  an  unquestionable  right  to  express  his  opinion  in 
his  own  way,  and  that  he  is  put  upon  the  stand,  not  solely 
to  answer  such  questions  as  the  ingenuity  of  counsel  may 
prompt  to  further  their  ends,  but  to  give  an  opinion  on  a 
scientific  subject  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  cause  of 
justice.  Such,  in  point  of  fact,  notwithstanding  our  modes 
of  procedure,  is  the  proper  function  of  the  expert,  and,  as 
courts  generally  are  disposed  to  receive  any  light  he  can  fur- 


DUTIES  OF  MEDICAL  WITNESSES.  507 

nish,  they  will  sustain  him  in  his  endeavor  to  make  himself 
thoroughly  understood.  Indeed,  they  are  less  likely  to  yield 
their  confidence  to  categorical  and  unqualified  statements,  in- 
dicative as  they  must  be,  either  of  ignorance  or  trepidation, 
than  to  the  cautious  and  guarded  manner  characteristic  of 
true  science. 

§  520.  The  medical  witness  must  be  on  his  guard  against 
another  favorite  manosuvre  of  counsel  —  that  of  supposing 
cases,  and  drawing  out  of  the  witness  an  opinion  that  may 
be  advantageously  applied  to  the  case  in  hand.  It  is  easy 
enough  for  an  active  imagination  to  create  a  case  apparent- 
ly favorable  to  a  certain  hypothesis.  And  this  is  its  radical 
fault,  that  it  is  without  life  or  substantiality,  a  mere  figment 
of  the  brain.  It  is  a  well-settled  principle,  that  in  matters  of 
science,  opinions  must  not  be  formed  on  a  partial  statement 
of  facts ;  but  how  can  any  statement  be  regarded  as  com- 
plete or  incomplete,  which  is  professedly  fictitious?  In  a 
case  where  the  validity  of  a  will  was  contested  on  the  ground 
of  the  insanity  of  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  it  ap- 
peared in  evidence,  that  he  had,  at  one  time,  entertained 
some  gross  delusions  and  attempted  suicide,  but  that  for  a 
few  months  previous  to  the  execution  of  the  will,  he  had 
renounced  the  delusions,  pursued  his  studies,  wrote  a  very 
good  book,  and  in  short,  seemed  to  be  entirely  like  himself, 
with  the  exception  of  unusual  shyness  and  desire  for  solitude. 
To  one  of  the  experts  who  had  expressed  the  opinion  that 
this  person  was  of  sound  mind,  this  question  was  put;  — 
"  Supposing  he  had  committed  murder  about  the  time  he 
witnessed  the  will,  would  you  have  considered  him  as  mor- 
ally responsible  for  the  act  ?  "  The  question  was  artfully 
founded  upon  the  imputed  disposition  of  the  expert  to  admit 
too  readily  the  plea  of  insanity  in  criminal  cases.  The  court 
did  not  permit  it  to  be  answered,  but  the  reply  would  have 
availed  the  party  nothing.  An  act  of  homicide  is  a  fact,  or 
more  properly  a  body  of  facts,  a  knowledge  of  every  one  of 
which  may  be  necessary  to  throw  any  light  on  the  mental 
condition  of  the  person  committing  it.  Nothing  could  be 
more  presumptuous  than  to  form  an  opinion  in  such  a  case, 


508  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

without  an  exact  knowledge  of  all,  even  the  minutest  of  the 
circumstances  attending  it.  Here  was  an  endeavor  to  draw 
out  a  professional  opinion  on  an  abstract  idea,  and  even  if  a 
tissue  of  circumstances  had  been  supposed,  they  would  have 
formed  no  ground  for  an  opinion. 

§  521.  Another  professional  manoeuvre  of  a  kindred  nature, 
is  that  of  selecting  one  or  more  particulars  which  have  been 
adduced  among  the  indications  of  insanity,  and  then  asking 
the  medical  witness  if  he  regards  that  as  a  proof  of  insanity. 
It  is  always  one  of  those  things  which,  whatever  they  may 
signify  when  viewed  in  connection  with  one  another,  yet, 
singly  considered,  prove  nothing  respecting  the  mental  con- 
dition. And  it  is  for  this  very  reason,  that  the  attempt  is 
made  to  throw  the  expert  upon  the  horns  of  a  dilemma,  for,  if 
he  replies  in  the  negative,  he  appears  to  deny  what  he  has 
but  just  virtually  affirmed ;  if  in  the  affirmative,  he  stultifies 
himself  in  his  eagerness  to  avoid  a  fancied  inconsistency. 
The  only  course  for  him  is,  to  state  the  general  principles 
which  no  one  sees  exemplified  oftener  than  himself;  that,  in 
a  large  proportion  of  cases,  insanity  is  manifested,  not  so 
much  by  any  particular  trait,  as  by  the  general  character  of 
the  person's  conduct  and  conversation,  as  compared  with 
that  which  he  exhibited  when  admitted  to  be  sane  ;  that,  in 
regard  to  many  patients,  it  would  be  impossible  to  mention 
a  single  trait  that  none  but  an  insane  man  would  exhibit ; 
that  even  in  the  strongest  cases,  it  would  often  be  difficult 
to  give  reasons  for  a  belief  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  those 
who-vhave  no  practical  knowledge  of  insanity ;  and  that  this 
difficulty  becomes  an  impossibility  when  the  indications  are 
obscure,  or  consist  more  in  the  general  style  of  the  conduct 
and  discourse  than  in  any  single  act  or  notion.  At  any  rate, 
let  him  firmly  decline  to  form  an  opinion  on  one  or  two 
selected  facts. 

§  522.  Lawyers  are  much  disposed  to  ask  for  a  definition 
of  insanity,  and  it  will  be  well  for  the  witness  to  be  prepared 
on  this  point,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  object  of  the  ques- 
tion is,  not  so  much  to  obtain  any  light  on  the  subject,  as 
to  perplex  and  embarrass  him.  Medical  writers  have  exer- 


DUTIES   OF  MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  509 

cised  their  wits  in  seeking  what  they  are  pleased  to  call  a 
definition  of  insanity,  in  the  belief  that  if  once  discovered, 
they  would  know  precisely  what  insanity  is  and  what  it  is 
not.  It  is  generally  admitted,  that  no  one  has  yet  succeeded 
in  accomplishing  this  laudable  purpose,  for  insanity  belongs 
to  a  class  of  phenomena  that  may  be  described  and  explained, 
but  are  not  the  proper  object  of  a  definition ;  and  the  reason 
why  an  unexceptionable  one  has  not  appeared,  is  not  so 
much  on  account  of  the  obscurity  of  the  subject,  as  because 
the  thing  is  inappropriate  and  nugatory.  If  the  medical  wit- 
ness suffer  himself  to  be  drawn  into  a  metaphysical  discus- 
sion, he  will  be  sure  to  be  worsted,  for  his  opponent  is  cool 
and  prepared,  while  he  is  taken  by  surprise,  and  unable  to 
see  the  point  to  which  he  is  dexterously  lead. 

§  523.  The  witness  is  sometimes  asked  if  all  people  are 
not  more  or  less  insane,  and  if  all  crime  is  not  temporary 
madness.  The  object  of  the  question  is  to  excite  a  preju- 
dice against  the  plea  of  insanity  generally,  by  implying  that 
it  is  used  to  shield  the  evil-doer  from  the  penal  consequences 
of  unbridled  passion.  Although  never  relevant  to  the  case 
in  hand,  yet  the  witness  may  sometimes  deem  it  proper  to 
return  a  formal  and  deliberate  answer ;  and  if  his  views  on 
the  subject  agree  with  ours,  he  will  firmly  maintain  the  dis- 
tinction between  normal  passion  and  maniacal  fury,  —  be 
tween  the  infirmities  and  short-comings  of  a  limited  nature 
and  the  manifestations  of  unequivocal  disease.  If  people 
choose  to  set  up,  in  good  faith  or  otherwise,  a  fancied  ideal 
of  perfection,  and  regard  every  one  who  falls  short  of  it  as 
more  or  less  unsound,  the  only  objection  is  the  misapplica- 
tion of  terms  ;  but  while  we  acknowledge  the  difficulty  some- 
times of  running  the  line  between  vice  and  insanity  where 
they  border  on  each  other,  for  the  most  part  they  are  wide 
enough  asunder  and  easily  distinguished.  Nature  draws  no 
dividing  lines  in  the  realms  of  moral  or  natural  science. 
Classes  and  orders  and  genera  are  merged  in  one  another,  and 
the  inquirer  is  ever  treading  upon  some  debatable  ground, 
where  the  clearest  distinctions  and  definitions  quite  vanish 
away.  Why  then  should  it  be  thought  so  strange,  that  the 

43* 


510  MEDICAL   JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

empire  of  health  should  be  divided  by  no  palpable  line  from 
that  of  disease  ?  or  that  this  fact  does  not  authorize  the  con- 
clusion that  their  respective  phenomena  can  seldom  be  accu- 
rately distinguished  from  one  another  ?  Our  knowledge  of 
the  philosophy  of  crime,  if  we  may  use  the  phrase,  has  been 
greatly  enriched  of  late  years,  by  observations  in  hospitals, 
jails  and  court-rooms,  in  the  purlieus  of  vice  and  the  walks 
of  respectable  society;  but  the  old  land-marks,  the  funda- 
mental distinctions,  remain  as  prominent  as  ever. 

§  524.  In  this  country  the  course  usually  adopted  for 
eliciting  the  opinion  of  the  expert,  is,  to  ask  him  if  he  has 
heard  the  evidence,  and  if  he  has,  and  supposing  it  to  be  true, 
what  is  his  opinion  respecting  the  mental  condition  of  the 
party.  Such  also  was  the  practice  in  England,  but  recently 
it  has  been  disallowed  for  the  alleged  reason,  that  it  placed 
the  witness  in  the  position  of  the  jury.  In  the  cases  where 
this  decision  was  made, *  the  court  permitted  the  counsel  to 
mention  any  particular  fact,  and  ask  the  witness  if  that  were 
a  symptom  or  indication  of  insanity.  However  objectionable 
the  original  practice  might  be,  the  substitute  is  infinitely 
more  so,  on  the  higher  ground  of  its  utter  irrelevance  to  the 
object  sought  for.  Insanity  is  a  disease,  and  like  other  dis- 
eases, its  presence  is  indicated  by  certain  incidents  called 
symptoms.  Inasmuch  as  many  symptoms  are  common  to 
different  diseases,  they  are  to  be  regarded  in  relation  to  any 
particular  disease,  collectively,  not  singly ;  and  inasmuch  as 
the  indications  thus  furnished  are  often  obscure,  the  observer 
will  need  all  the  aid  which  the  amplest  account  of  the  symp- 
toms can  afford.  To  ask  a  witness  if  a  certain  act  or  notion 
is  the  offspring  of  insanity,  would  be  like  asking  a  physician 
if  pain  in  the  right  shoulder  were  a  symptom  of  disordered 
liver ;  or  pain  in  the  side,  of  pulmonary  consumption.  To  re- 
turn an  affirmative  answer  to  these  questions  would  not 
help  the  matter  at  all,  because  these  symptoms  are  also  pres- 
ent in  other  diseases,  or  conditions.  Neither  is  it  obvious 
how  this  method  avoids  the  objection  in  question.  If  the 

1  Amer.  Journ.  Insanity,  ix.  292. 


DUTIES   OP  MEDICAL  WITNESSES.  511 

incident  which  is  particularized  has  not  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, then  certainly  it  can  have  no  bearing  on  the  mental 
condition  of  the  party,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  even  if  it 
have  thus  appeared,  its  effect  must  still  be  the  same,  unless 
supposed  to  be  true.  The  opinion  of  the  expert,  therefore, 
touching  the  case  on  trial,  must  be  formed  upon  a  considera- 
tion of  all  the  incidents,  and  whether  he  learns  them  from 
counsel  who  have  picked  them  out  of  the  evidence  and  stated 
them  in  their  own  words,  or  directly  from  the  witnesses  on  the 
stand,  the  result  must  obviously  be  the  same.  The  latter  has 
this  advantage,  perhaps,  that  the  statements  of  "witnesses  are 
necessarily  affected  in  some  degree,  by  their  tones,  gestures, 
and  expression,  and  therefore  are  deprived  of  part  of  their 
value  in  passing  through  the  mouth  of  another. 

§  525.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  course  per- 
mitted by  our  courts  is  encumbered  by  a  practical  difficulty 
which  should  be  carefully  considered.  It  not  unfrequently 
happens  that  discrepances  and  contradictions  appear  in 
the  testimony,  quite  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  its  being  all 
true.  Having  no  right  to  decide  for  himself,  between  the 
true  and  the  false,  what  is  the  expert  to  do  ?  We  can  only 
say  that  where  these  contradictions  are  of  a  trivial  character 
and  confined  to  subordinate  points,  they  may  be  overlooked, 
apparently  without  any  impropriety ;  but  where  they  involve 
the  main  facts  at  issue,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  he  can  ar- 
rive at  any  conclusions  without  assuming  the  functions  of 
the  jury.  In  this  contingency,  he  can  only  candidly  state  his 
embarrassment  and  show  how  the  testimony  clashes,  describe 
the  bearing  which  its  several  portions  may  have  on  his  opin- 
ion, and  leave  the  farther  disposal  of  the  matter  to  the  court. 

§  526.  It  often  happens,  too,  that  the  evidence,  without 
involving  any  manifest  contradiction  of  facts,  bears  the  marks 
of  high  coloring,  of  exaggerated  statement,  or  unintentional 
omissions.  Different  witnesses,  we  well  know,  seldom  state 
the  same  facts  precisely  alike.  There  will  be  something 
either  of  addition  or  omission,  in  the  testimony  of  each, 
calculated  to  leave  an  impression  different  from  that  pro- 
duced by  the  rest.  Here  the  expert  is  permitted,  if  not  re- 


512  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

quired,  to  make  such  allowances  as  are  naturally  made  by 
every  other  person  around  him,  otherwise  he  would  be  for 
ever  debarred  from  giving  an  opinion  in  a  judicial  inquiry. 
But  the  expert  must  never  forget,  that  it  is  the  whole  evidence 
on  which  his  opinion  must  be  founded,  and  if  it  be  con- 
tradictory or  deficient,  he  will  best  consult  his  own  reputa- 
tion and  promote  the  ends  of  justice,  by  candidly  stating  the 
fact. 


INDEX. 

[The  Figures  refer  to  the  Sections.] 

A. 

Abbot,  case  of,  40,  477. 
A.  B.,  case  of,  213. 
Abraham  B.,  case  of,  158. 
Aidoiomania,  168  et  seq. 
Allis  v.  Billings,  263  et  seq. 
Amos,  Prof.,  on  unsoundness,  5. 

Allison  on  the  test  of  right  and  wrong,  20  ;  on  delusion,  20  ;  on  drunk- 
enness as  an  excuse  for  crime,  461. 
Arnold,  case  of,  10. 

Arithmetical  acquirements,  not  proof  of  capacity,  76,  104. 
Association  of  ideas  in  the  insane,  247. 

B. 

Barbier,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  196. 

Barclay,  case  of,  97. 

Bagster,  case  of,  76. 

Beauquaire,  his  will  established,  105. 

Beck,  on  McDonough's  case,  449. 

Bell,  on  insanity  from  masturbation,  161;  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  261; 
case  of  Colonel  M.,  160  ;  case  of  simulation,  362. 

Bellingham,  case  of,  15,  37,  44. 

Ben  Johnson's  hallucination,  129. 

Bertet,  case  of,  257. 

Bichat,  picture  of  old  age,  292. 

Billings,  Allis  v.,  263  et  seq. 

Birdsell,  case  of,  466. 

Brain,  small  and  diseased  in  idiocy,  52  ;  the  seat  of  mania,  109 ;  how  af- 
fected by  liquor,  440. 

British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review 'on  Miss  Bagster's  case,  77;  on 
drunkenness,  461. 


514  INDEX. 

Brixey,  case  of,  195. 

Brown,  Rev.  Simon,  his  delusion,  136. 

Brown,  Wm.,  case  of,  186. 

Brougham,  Lord,  on  the  plea  of  insanity  in  criminal  cases,  3  7 ;  on  the  test 

of  sanity,  39;  annoyed  by  insane  persons,  39  ;  on  partial  insanity, 

239. 
Broussonnet,  case  of,  139. 

C. 

Campbell,  Lord,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  37 ;  on  competency  to  testify, 
427. 

Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  336. 

Castelli,  case  of,  405  et  seq. 

Character,  change  of,  a  proof  of  insanity,  115. 

Charolais,  Count,  case  of,  74. 

Chitty,  on  right  and  wrong,  19 ;  on  moral  insanity,  23. 

Classification  of  mental  diseases,  3,  49. 

Coke  on  insanity,  3  ;  on  drunkenness,  454. 

Combe  on  change  of  character,  115  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  332. 

Commission  of  lunacy,  its  proper  duty,  5. 

Committees  of  physicians,  apt  to  differ  in  their  conclusions,  3  73  et  seq. 

Competency  of  a  witness,  conditions  of,  419. 

Conolly,  definition  of  insanity,  131;  on  simulated  insanity,  342,  359; 
on  the  writing  of  the  insane,  376  ;  on  interdiction,  486,  495. 

Continued  observation  in  the  detection  of  insanity,  376. 

Contracts  of  the  insane,  7;  of  somnambulists,  414  ;  of  imbeciles,  106. 

Cornier,  case  of,  205  et  seq. 

Cory,  decision  in  his  case,  40. 

Cox,  on  moral  mania,  143. 

Crawford,  case  of  moral  imbecility,  71. 

Cretinism,  55. 

Crime,  distinguished  from  passion,  25. 

Criminal  law  of  insanity,  why  so  slowly  improved  in  England,  14;  ex- 
pounded by  English  judges,  26  et  seq. ;  debate  on,  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  37  ;  statutes  of  different  nations  on,  41. 

Gumming,  Mrs.  allusion  to  her  case,  373. 

Cunning,  active  in  the  insane,  21 ;  in  imbecility,  70. 

Curability  of  insanity  at  different  periods,  315. 

D. 

D'Aguesseau  on  lucid  intervals,  325,  334. 

Davies,  case  of,  487  et  seq. 

Deafness  in  old  age,  292. 

Delay  in  trying  cases  of  insanity,  enjoined,  256. 


INDEX.  515 

Delepine,  case  of,  89  et  seq. 

Delirium  tremens  described,  438 ;  cases  of,  441  et  seq. 

Delusions,  considered  as  a  test  of  insanity,  22;  of  monomaniacs,  135  et 

seq. ;  their  effect  on  mental  soundness,  240  et  seq. 
Denman,  Lord,  decision  in  Oxford's  case,  26. 
Dennet  and  wife  v.  Dow,  296  et  seq. 
Design  not  a  test  of  insanity,  21. 
Dew  v.  Clarke,  235. 

Dewey,  Judge,  charge  in  Allis  v.  Billings,  270. 
Dipsomania,  Esquirol  on,  443;  cases  of,  443  et  seq.',  Marc  on,  447. 
Donelly,  case  of,  427. 

Dolus  and  culpa  in  relation  to  drunkenness,  451,  455. 
Dreaming,  compared  with  insanity,  247. 
Depression,  alternating  with  excitement,  145  et  seq. 
Drew,  case  of,  463. 
Dyce  Sombre,  case  of,  373. 

E. 

Eccentricity,  its  relation  to  insanity,  114. 

Ecstasis,  409. 

Education  of  idiots,  54 ;  neglected,  a  cause  of  ignorance,  not  imbe- 
cility, 77. 

Eldon,  Lord,  his  definition  of  an  unsound  mind,  5 ;  on  lucid  intervals, 
334 ;  case  of  concealed  insanity,  369. 

Epidemic  character  of  homicidal  insanity,  253  et  seq.]  of  suicide,  395. 

Erion,  case  of,  453. 

Errington,  case  of,  22. 

Erskine,  Lord,  his  objection  to  a  verdict,  5 ;  distinguishes  between  civil 
and  criminal  cases,  .10 ;  mistakes  the  facts  in  Arnold's  case,  14 ;  on 
delusion  as  a  test  of  insanity,  14. 

E.  S.,  case  of,  71. 

Esquirol,  on  hallucinations  and  illusions,  129  ;  case  of  impaired  language, 
139;  cases  of  homicidal  insanity,  190  et  seq.]  on  the  validity  of  a  mo- 
nomaniac's will,  237  ;  on  the  mental  condition  after  recovery,  319  et 
seq.;  on  recurrent  insanity,  319;  on  dementia,  282;  on  the  pro- 
portion of  epileptics  to  other  insane,  379  ;  on  periodical  drunken- 
ness, 442  et  seq. 

Evans,  on  partial  mania,  233,  425. 

Evidence  of  medical  men,  44,  45. 

Excitement  alternating  with  depression,  145  et  seq. 

Experts,  their  duties  defined,  44;  the  necessity  of,  illustrated,  301. 

F. 

Falret,  cases  of  suicide,  392. 

Ferocity,  not  the  cause  of  homicidal  insanity,  351. 


516  INDEX. 

Ferrers,  Earl,  case  of,  154. 

Fodere,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  164 ;  theory  of  lucid  intervals,  333  ; 

on  somnambulism,  415. 

Flight  of  homicidal  monomaniacs  not  a  proof  of  guilt,  249. 
Franck,  case  of,  1 76. 
Frederic  William,  case  of,  162. 

French  code  relative  to  insanity,  13,  41 ;  relative  to  interdiction,  105. 
Friedreich,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  165 ;  on  lucid  intervals,  339. 

G. 

V 

Gall,  cases  of  propensity  to  steal,  165  ;  of  aidoiomania,  169  et  seq.]  of  py- 
romania,  173;  of  homicidal  insanity,  189,  199,  202;  of  suicide,  391, 
393. 

George  IH.,  allusion  to  the  case  of,  318. 

Georget,  on  Hale's  doctrines,  1 1 ;  on  Cornier's  case,  208 ;  on  imbeciles, 
70 ;  on  the  effect  of  monomania  on  the  mind  generally,  244 ;  general 
propositions  on  homicidal  insanity,  258  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  330 ;  on 
Jean  Pierre's  case,  346 ;  on  the  inquest,  377;  on  the  incubation 
of  insanity,  116;  on  somnambulism,  415;  on  competency  of  wit- 
nesses, 426. 

Gerard,  case  of,  364. 

Gibbs,  Sir  Vickery,  on  the  criminal  law  of  insanity,  10 ;  on  design  as  a 
test  of  insanity,  21. 

Gooch,  gives  a  test  of  insanity,  115 ;  on  the  Davies  case,  487. 

Graborkwa,  case  of,  1 76. 

Gracie,  case  of,  424. 

Greensmith,  case  of,  258. 

Greenwood,  case  of,  234. 

H. 

Habitual  insanity,  ground  of  interdiction,  485,  498. 

Hadfield,  case  of,  14,  256. 

Hale,  Lord,  classification  of  the  insane,  8 ;  distinction  between  partial 
and  total  insanity,  8 ;  on  the  test  of  responsibility,  8. 

Hallucinations,  explained,  129;  how  frequent,  130;  may  be  concealed, 
130 ;  instances  of,  135  et  seq. ;  in  delirium  tremens,  439. 

Hansterin,  case  of,  202. 

Hardwick,  Lord,  on  unsoundness,  5. 

Haslam,  gives  a  case  of  concealed  insanity,  21 ;  on  arithmetical  acquire- 
ments, 104  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  328  ;  on  simulated  insanity,  342,  356. 

Head,  size  of,  in  idiocy,  52 ;  injuries  of,  their  effect  on  the  mind,  314. 

Henke,  on  sexual  evolution,  1 78. 

Hinchman,  allusion  to  his  case,  320. 

Hoe  we,  case  of,  382. 


INDEX.  517 

Hoff  bauer,  on  imbecility,  58  et  seq. ;  on  stupidity,  66  et  seq.;  conditions 
of  culpability,  102 ;  on  wills  of  imbeciles,  105  ;  on  moral  mania,  144  ; 
on  the  trespasses  of  the  insane,  224  ;  on  the  exculpatory  effects  of 
partial  mania,  245;  on  somnambulism,  415,  417;  on  qualification  of 
witnesses,  419  ;  on  interdiction,  485. 

Homicidal  insanity,  generally  attended  by  physical  disorder,  188 ;  accom- 
panying certain  physical  changes,  192;  compared  with  crime,  218  ; 
its  characters,  217;  has  prevailed  epidemically,  253  et  seq.;  com- 
pared with  moral  depravity,  255  et  seq.;  simulation  of,  361. 

Homicide,  mutual,  400. 

Hood,  case  of  impaired  language,  139. 

Howison,  case  of,  23,  31. 

Humboldt,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  182. 

Hume,  on  right  and  wrong,  19. 


Idiot,  defined  by  the  common  law,  4. 

I.  K.,  case  of,  157. 

Illusions  of  the  Intoxicated,  472  et  seq. 

Imbeciles,  classified  by  Hoff  bauer,  62  et  seq. ;  Georget's  account  of,  70 ; 
not  fit  objects  of  punishment,  101 ;  their  knowledge  of  numbers, 
104  ;  their  testamentary  capacity,  105  ;  their  capacity  to  make  con- 
tracts, 106  ;  to  contract  marriage,  107  ;  to  give  testimony,  420  ;  in- 
terdiction of,  480  el  seq. 

Impairment,  kind  of,  essential  to  insanity,  131. 

Incoherence  of  ideas,  not  essential  to  insanity,  344. 

Incubation  of  insanity,  116. 

Inquest,  377. 

Insensibility  of  the  insane  to  medicines,  355. 

Intermission  of  disease,  324. 

Interrogatory,  371. 

Intoxication,  a  test  of  simulation,  340. 

Irritability  of  the  brain  during  the  lucid  interval,  340 ;  characteristic  of 
genuine  mania,  353. 

Irritation,  the  initial  stage  of  disease,  110,  339. 


J. 

Jean  Pierre,  case  of,  345. 

Jensen,  case  of,  191. 

Jones,  case  of,  422. 

Juries,  incapable  of  analyzing  evidence,  301. 

44 


518  INDEX. 


K. 

Kenyon,  Lord,  decision  in  Hadfield's  case,  336. 
Kindleside  v.  Harrison,  295. 


Lambert,  case  of,  368. 

Language,  impairment  of,  139. 

Latham,  opinion  in  the  Davies  case,  488. 

Law  in  relation  to  the  plea  of  insanity,  38 ;  how  regarded  by  the  insane, 

39 ;  of  different  people,  in  relation  to  drunkenness,  450  et  seq. 
Lawrence,  case  of,  40 ;  opinion  in  the  Davies  case,  487. 
Lecouffe,  case  of,  98  et  seq. 

Liberty  of  will  and  action  essential  to  criminal  responsibility,  249. 
Lispenard,  case  of,  99. 
Locke,  definition  of  insanity,  131. 
Lying,  propensity  to,  165. 
Lyndhurst,  Lord,  quashes  an  inquisition,  5 ;  decision  in  Oxford's  case, 

19  ;  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  37. 


M. 

M.,  Colonel,  case  of,  160. 

Mackinnon,  opinion  in  the  Davies  case,  493. 

Macmichael,  do.         do.        do  492. 

Macnish,  cases  of  drunkenness,  441  et  seq. 

Mansfield,  Lord,  on  the  criminal  law  of  insanity,  16. 

Marc,  on  pyromania,  288 ;  on  the  propensity  to  theft,  166 ;  on  a  case  of 

simulation,  356  ;  on  dipsomania,  447. 
Marriage  of  imbeciles,  107;  of  maniacs,  229. 
McDonough,  case  of,  458. 
Me  Glue,  case  of,  471. 
McNaughton,  opinion  of  the  law  lords  in  case  of,  27 ;  discussion  in  the 

House  of  Lords  in  case  of,  37. 
Mechanical  ingenuity  of  maniacs,  21. 
Memory,  how  affected  in  insanity,  282, 286 ;  revival  of,  in  acute  diseases, 

306. 

Mercer,  case  of,  122. 

Metaphysics,  unable  to  explain  insanity,  46. 
Metzger,  case  of  moral  insanity,  156. 
Michu,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  198. 
Molliens,  case  of,  196. 


INDEX.  519 

Moral  faculties,  seldom  escape  the  influence  of  disordered  intellect,  242, 

244. 

Moore,  case  of,  236. 
Motives  of  the  insane,  not  well  denned,  246. 

N. 

Negretti,  case  of,  403. 

Nicholl,  Sir  J.,  on  the  proof  of  insanity  in  civil  cases,  12 ;  sanctions  Er- 
skine's  test,  22 ;  judgment  in  the  Portsmouth  case,  78 ;  decision  in 
case  of  marriage,  229 ;  on  partial  insanity,  235 ;  on  lucid  intervals, 
310,  338  ;  on  suicide,  397 ;  on  imbecility,  483. 

o. 

Old  age,  description  of,  292 ;  not  to  be  confounded  with  dementia,  294. 

Old  men,  competence  to  testify,  434. 

Oppei,  case  of,  383. 

Otto,  cases  of  homicidal  insanity,  191,  197,  201,  203. 

Oxford,  case  of,  26. 


P. 

Papavoine,  case  of,  251. 

Parchappe,  case  of  suspected  simulation,  368. 

Parent  Duchatelet,  on  moral  imbecility,  73. 

Paris  and  Fonblanque,  on  partial  mania,  232 ;  on  drunkenness,  457. 

Park,  J.,  decision  in  Greensmith's  case,  25. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  N.  H.,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  261. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  Mass.,  decision  in  case  of  application  for  divorce,  229 ; 
of  sucide,  397. 

Parkman,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  215. 

Pascal,  his  hallucination,  131. 

Pathology  of  idiocy,  52 ;  of  insanity,  109  et  seq. 

Pechot,  case  of,  360. 

Perceptive  powers,  how  affected  in  dementia,  294. 

Periodicity  of  disease,  322. 

Phrenology,  well  explains  insanity,  46. 

Pierquin,  case  of  periodical  drunkenness,  444. 

Pinel,  reformed  the  treatment  of  the  insane,  1 ;  on  the  incubation  of  in- 
sanity, 117;  first  described  moral  insanity,  142;  case  of  moral  in- 
-sanity,  154  ;  on  curability  of  insanity,  315. 

Portsmouth,  case  of,  78. 

Pothier,  on  experts,  44. 

Predominant  idea,  its  effect  on  responsibility,  240  et  seq. 


9 
520  INDEX. 

Fresco tt,  case  of,  94  et  seq. 

Prichard,  on  moral  insanity,  142  et  seq.;  with  cases,  157  et  seq.;  on  the 

propensity  to  steal,  165. 
Procedure  in  procuring  interdiction,  499. 
Proof  of  insanity,  not  the  same  in  criminal  as  in  civil  cases,  1 2 ;  *burden 

of,  where  it  lies,  270. 
Provocation,  real  or  fancied,  not  the  true  measure  of  punishment,  34, 

240. 

Pulse  of  the  insane,  349. 
Purrington,  case  of,  215. 
Pyromania,  173  et  seq. 

R. 

Rabello,  case  of,  211. 

Reasoning  of  the  insane,  illogical  and  confused,  245,  246. 

Recovery,  sometimes  gradual,  316;  sometimes  sudden,  316;   sometimes 

imperfect,  320 ;  proportion  of,  315  ;  as  connected  with  competence, 

273. 

Recurrence  of  insanity,  319, 
Regina  v.  Hill,  427. 
Reid,  on  lucid  intervals,  331. 
Relapses,  319. 

Religious  fanaticism,  connected  with  homicidal  insanity,  253. 
Responsibility,  its  elements,  82,  221. 
Richardson,  C.  J.,  decision  in  Cory's  case,  40 ;  remarks  on  Prescott's 

case,  95. 

Rider,  Jane,  notice  of,  406  et  seq. 
Right  and  wrong,  knowledge  of,  16  et  seq.,  246. 
Rogers,  case  of,  40. 
Rush,  on  moral  imbecility,  74;  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  165;  on  the 

pulse  of  the  insane,  349. 
Russell,  on  right  and  wrong,  16  ;  on  design,  21. 

S. 

Schmidt,  case  of,  86  et  seq. 

Schwartz,  case  of,  423. 

Sgambari,  case  of,  137. 

Selves,  case  of,  485. 

Shakspeare,  represents  a  feature  of  insanity,  247. 

Shaw,  C.  J.,  decision  in  Rogers's  case,  40 ;  on  the  right  of  isolation,  503. 

Shelford  on  suicide,  13. 

Sleeplessness  of  the  insane,  350. 

Smith,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  165. 

Story,  J.,  effect  of  insanity  on  contracts,  106  ;  on  drunkenness,  464. 


INDEX.  521 

Stowell,  Lord,  decision  in  a  case  of  marriage,  229. 
Stupidity,  distinguished  from  imbecility,  68  et  seq. 
Swinburne,  on  the  wills  of  the  insane,  12;  and  of  imbeciles,  105. 

T. 

Testamentary  capacity,  302,  313. 

Testimony,  medical,  42  et  seq. 

Theft,  common  in  imbecility,  70 ;  propensity  to,  165. 

Thiel,  case  of,  469. 

Thurlow,  Lord,  on  lucid  intervals,  326,  334. 

Tracy,  J.,  decision,  in  Arnold's  case,  10. 

Trespass,  action  of,  lies  against  the  insane,  224. 

Trestel,  case  of,  210. 

Turn  of  life,  an  occasion  of  dipsomania,  447. 

Tuthill,  testimony  in  the  Davies  case,  491. 

U. 

Unsoundness,  legal  definition  of,  5 ;  not  weakness,  79. 

V. 

Vatelot,  case  of,  459. 

W. 

Weber,  case  of,  175. 

Wilson,  case  of,  40,  465. 

Wills  of  imbeciles,  105  ;  of  monomaniacs,  234  etseq.;  of  the  demented, 

302etseq.;  of  the  delirious,  311  etseq.;  how  affected  by  suicide, 

397  etseq. 

Witnesses,  medical,  27 ;  differently  impressed  by  the  same  facts,  75. 
Wynne,  on  lucid  intervals,  336. 
Wood,  case  of,  124. 
Woodward,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  261 ;  case  of  a  will  made  in  delirium, 

309  ;  case  of  a  monomaniac's  will,  238 ;  on  proof  of  sanity,  273. 


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